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AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 20th-23rd November 1978 
I. Political Questions 
1. Europe's external relations 
2. Consequences of the forthcoming enlarge-
ment of the European Communities for the 
defence of Europe and for WEU 
11. Defence Questions 
1. Disarmament 
2. A European armaments policy 
3. Limitation of strategic arms 
4. New weapons and defence strategy 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Application satellites (Part II) 
2. Weather forecasting 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the :fina.ncial year 
1979 
2. Accounts of the Administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1977-
The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve 
the final accounts 
3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the minis-
terial organs of Western European Union for 
the financial year 1978 
V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
1. Methods of voting 
2. Second reading of texts amended by the 
Assembly 
3. Right of Su)>stitutes who are Committee 
Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the 
Assembly 
VI. Relations with Parliaments 
Relations with Parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Druon on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Roper (reference back to Com-
mittee of the rkaft Recommendation not voted upon 
in the absence of a quorum) on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Preliminary report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on 
behalf oflthe Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on 
behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and_ Privileges 
Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on 
behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments 
Document 780 17th November 1978 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 20th-23rd November 1978 
MONDAY, 20th NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 to 11 a.m. 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
11 a.m. 
1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session. 
11.30 a.m. 
5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
6. Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of 
Europe and for WEU : 
draft order submitted by Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
7. Europe's external relations : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
6 p.m. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
TUESDAY, 21st NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the Presidential Committee. 
10 a.m. 
1. Disarmament : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
2. Limitation of strategic arms: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
3. New weapons and defence strategy: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Joint debate. 
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11 a.m. 
4. Address by Mr. Tomlin.son, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs of the United Kingdom. 
AJternoon 3 p.m. 
5. Disarmament ; Limitation of strategic arms ; New weapons and defence strategy : 
Resumed joint debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
6. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments. 
WEDNESDAY, 22nd NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges. 
I. A European armaments policy : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
18.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Mazzola, Minister of State for Defence of Italy. 
11.30 a.m. 
3. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
AJternoon 3 p.m. 
4. A European armaments policy : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4 p.m. 
5. Address by Mr. Peijnenburg, Minister for Scientific Affairs of the Netherlands. 
6. Application satellites (Part II) : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffier on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
At the close of the afternoon sitting 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
THURSDAY, 23rd NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
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9.30. a.m. 
1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1977 - The 
Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft texts. 
3. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1978: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
4. Application satellites (Part II) : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
5. Weather forecasting: 
12 noon 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on behalf of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
7. Weather forecasting: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
8. Voting methods : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
9. Second reading of texts amended by the Assembly: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
10. Right of substitutes who are Committee Chairmen or Rapporteurs to sit in the Assembly: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the -Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for thf! financial year 1977 
General 
1. The following financial statements, together 
with an explanatory memorandum, were sub-
mitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1977 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 1977 
(Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1977 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix II). 
(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of 
Western European Union budget for 
1977 (Appendix Ill). 
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(d) Account of the ·provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1977 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
Summary of Income and Expenditure 
(Appendix I) 
(a) General 
3. The approved original budget provided for 
expenditure of F 7,301,000 of which F 65,000 
was expected to be covered by miscellaneous 
receipts and the balance by contributions. 
4. Article 9 of the Financial Regulations of 
the Assembly states that if payment of a com-
Initment for the previous year has not been 
made before 1st April, the credits concerned 
sh.al1 be cancelled automatically and correspond-
ing credits will be taken up in the budget of 
the current financial year. The Council of W es-
tern European Union accordingly agreed that 
unspent salary credits (F 81,523) on Head I 
of the 1976 budget should be brought forward 
into 1977 to meet the balance of sums due to 
staff arising from the new scale of emoluments 
effective from 1st July 1976 but not imple-
mented in full until after 31st March 1977. The 
revised budget for the Assembly thus amounted 
to F 7,382,523 and the remainder of the 1976 
surplus (F 337,466) has been reimbursed to the 
Council. 
5. Actual expendWt1m:1 in the year amounted 
to F 7,108,483 and income amounted to 
F 7,497,593 comprising F 7,236,000 from con-
tributions requested and received, F 81,523 from 
the 1976 surplus and F 180,070 from miscel-
laneous receipts. There was thus an excess of 
income over expenditure of F 389,110 arising 
from a budgetary surplus of F 274,040 (as shown 
in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts 
ofF 115,070. 
(b) Pension scheme 
6. In January 1974 the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Government Budget Experts recom-
mended that the Councils of the co-ordinated 
organisations, Western European Union, Council 
of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European 
Space Agency, should introduce a common pen-
siol!- scheme. The Council of Western European 
Umon approved these recommendations in 
March 1974 and later, in 1976 and 1977, 
approved further reports of the Committee con-
cerning the pension scheme rules and associated 
tax arrangements. The pension scheme was 
implemented in 1977 and provides for pensions 
to be payable from 1st January 1973. 
7. The cost of pension benefits is charged to 
the budget of the organisation. Eligible staff 
employed before 1st July 1974 have until 30th 
June 1978 to choose whether or not to join the 
scheme but those recruited on or after 1st July 
1974 are obliged to join. Staff pension con-
tributions made under the new scheme from 
1st January 1977 are credited to the budget· as 
miscellaneous income. In lieu of the contributions 
due for the period to 31st December 1976 or to 
the date of the option if later, staff members 
are required on joining the scheme to surrender 
sums from their provident fund holdings. These 
sums are held in special pension validation 
accounts by the office of the Secretary-General 
pending transfer to member governments. 
8. The 1977 contributions (F 14,447) of three 
Assembly staff members who joined the pension 
scheme are included as income in the Assembly's 
1977 accounts. Amounts in lieu of their contri-
butions for the period to 31st December 1976 
and interest thereon (F 27,427) have been trans-
ferred from the provi:deDJt fund account to the 
pension validwtion accounts. 
9. The pension scheme rules may also apply 
to staff whose service terminated before 1st 
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January 1973. The widow of one former staff 
member of the Assembly, who retired in April 
1970, opted to join the pension scheme in 1977 
and refunded F 43,960 in validation of her 
deceased husband's past service. The Budget and 
Organisrution Committee agreed in September 
1977 that for 1977 only, to avoid calling for 
additional contributions from member govern-
ments, pension payments could be financed by 
transfers to the budget from the validation 
accounts. The F 43,960 was so transferred and is 
included as income in the Assembly's 1977 
accoUDJts. 
(c) Provident fund compensation account 
10. In paragraphs 5-7 of my report on the 
Assembly's accounts for 1976, I explained the 
circumstances under which a provident fund 
compensation account had been established out 
of 1964 budgetary surpluses and maintained by 
the Secretary-General for the benefit of certain 
staff members. I recorded that the office of the 
S.ecretacy-General had submitted for approval by 
delegations that amounts equivalent to the 
interest earned on the principal held in the 
compensation account should be credited to the 
account and distributed, along with the prin-
cipal, to the eligible staff members still serving 
at 1st January 1976. The amount required for 
this purpose was to be met from the 1976 budget-
ary surpluses of al:l the organs of Western 
European Union. I further reported that pend-
ing the Counci['s approval of this proposal the 
Assem?ly had charged the interest due (F 20,945) 
to the1r 1976 budget and credited a suspense 
account. 
11. The Council gave their approval in Septem-
ber 1977 and the interest was duly paid over to 
the eligible staff members from the suspense 
account. The principal was distributed at the 
same time and the provident fm1d compensation 
account has now been closed. 
Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure 
and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) 
12. The transfers between sub-heads within 
Heads I to V of the budget, as shown in 
Appendix II, were duly authorised in accordance 
with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. 
These regulations contain no provision for the 
authorisation of tmnsfers between heads but in 
accordance with a procedure approved by 'the 
Council in 1973, the Assembly informed the 
Council in February 1978 that ·expenditure of 
F 91,562 would be incurred on Head VI (Pen-
sions) for which no provision had been made in 
the 1977 budget. The expenditure was met from 
savings on Head II. 
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Provident fund 
(Append~ IV) 
13. The · assets of the provident fund of the 
Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of 
the provident funds of the other organs of 
Westem European Union in joint deposits held 
in a number of currencies and administered by 
the Office of the Secrebary-General. On the 
advice of an Advisory Panel representing all 
the interested parties, the number of currencies 
held during 1977 remained at four. 
14. In accordance with a decisivn taken in 1974 
by the Office of the Secretary-General the 
baliiiii.ce on the accounts of staff members of the 
.Assembly reflect the book value of the Assem-
bly's share of the joint deposits and have not 
been adjusted for differences between book and 
market values resulting from fluctuation in 
exchange rates. Withdrawals from the fund in 
1977 of F 35,502 include F 27,427 transferred 
to the pensions validation account maintained 
by the Office of the Secretary-General (para-
graph 7 above) and F 7,145 (including interest 
accrued in 1977) to a former staff member 
(paragraph 10 of my report on the Assembly's 
1976 accounts refers). 
15. I have received from the Office of the 
Secretary-General of the Western European 
Union a certificate by the depositary showing 
the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st 
December 1977 and a S'taitement confirming the 
share of those deposits standing to the credit 
of the Assembly's provident fund in the Office's 
books at 31st December 1977. A valuation of the 
currencies held in the joint deposits at that date 
showed a gain on book value of F 1,041,678 of 
which F 243,362 related to the accounts of the 
staff of the .Assembly. 
16. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the Assem-
bly during my audit. 
Sir Douglas IIENLEY, K.C.B. 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
12th July 1978 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the Praident to the Auditor of 
the Assembly in connection with the financial year 
1971) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1977 (Appenrlix I) ; 
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(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix Il) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 274,040 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F 389,110. The difference 
between these two figures, F 115,070, represents : 
F F 
- Bank interest . . . . . . . . 97,497 
- Sundry receipts . . . . . . 5,265 
- Sale of publications . . 18,901 
- V aJidation amounts 
received . . . .. . . . . .. . 43,9601 
- Contributions 7% 14,4472 
- Less receipts for 1977 
estimated in the bud-
get ............... . 
180,070 
65,000 
115,070 
3. On 1st April 19778 the Council approved 
the transfer to the 1977 budget of F 81,523 
relating to unexpended salary credits in the 
1976 accounts of the ..Assembly8• This amount 
referred to increases in salaries for the per-
manent staff following the 1976 general review 
of emoluments. · 
Transfers 
4. Excess expenditure amounting to F 212,634 
has been met by transfer between sub-heads 
within heads. Of this amount, F 91,562 corres-
ponded to certain payments under Head VI for 
which no credits had been requested in the 
1977 budget. 
Oontrtoutions 
5. AN. contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1977. 
1. In accordance with the Council's deeision of 7th 
Deeember 1976 (Document C (76) 165). 
2. Concerns staff recruited after 1st July 1974 who 
automatically join the pension scheme. 
3. Document C. B. (77) 1. 
Provident fund 
6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with 
those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
7. The Secretary-General h.aB continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in United States dolilars, French francs, 
German marks and pounds sterling with the 
International Westminster Bank Ltd., London. 
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8. Interest was distributed to individual 
accounts on 31st December 1977. As shown in 
Appendix IV, the balance of the fund on 31st 
December 1977 was F 5,716,755. 
9. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
17th A.pril1.978 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL 
President of the Assembly 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1911 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) 
Transfer of credits from 1976 to 1977 ......................... . 
M isceUaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts .............................................. . 
Sale of publications .......................................•... 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7 %) ........................................... ., 
Validation receipts ........................................... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II) ....... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1911 
Asset8 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable 
LetJs: 
LiabilitietJ 
Accounts payable ............................................ . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Certified correct : 
7,236,000 
81,523 
97,497 
5,265 
18,901 
14,447 
43,960 
552,511 
65,752 
62,004 
291,157 
389,110 
APPENDIX I 
7,317,523 
180,070 
7,497,593 
7,108,483 
F 389,110 
680,267 
F 680,267 
Ka.i-Uwe von HAssEL 
PreBident of the Assembly 
Francis HUMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly 
Siegbert ALBER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
12th July 1978 
Signed : Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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APPEN 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AND 
Total budget for 
DETAILS 19771 
HEAD I • EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 3,061,664 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
B and C), including travelling expenses and French 
social security 10,000 
Sub-Head 2 .Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(.A) .Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 107,100 
(b) Children's allowance 146,616 
(e) Expatriation allowance 261,723 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 15,026 
(e) Overtime 16,024 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 38,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses 3,730 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 215,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 132,828 
(e) Provident fund 417,088 
(d) Retirement pension 
-
(0) Ezpenses relating to the recruitment, arrivaL and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination 
papers 2,008 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 3,000 
(e) Removal expenses 6,000 
(d) Installation allowance 9,000 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 7,102 
(/) Medical examination 2,614 
Total of Head I 4,454,523 
1. Document 750. 
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DIX ll 
UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
29,138 3,090,802 3,090,802 -
17,976 27,976 27,976 -
213 106,887 106,887 -
5,870 140,746 140,746 -
6,943 254,780 254,780 -
11,895 3,131 3,131 -
3,943 12,081 12,081 -
23,984 61,984 61,984 -
3,370 360 360 
-
9,072 224,072 224,072 -
15,506 117,322 117,322 -
28,143 388,945 388,945 -
174 2,182 2,182 -
3,000 350 2,650 
6,000 1,752 4,248 
4,461 4,539 3,082 1,457 
7,102 4,638 2,464 
2,614 1,916 698 
80,344 80,344 4,454,523 4,443,006 11,517 
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DETAILS 
HEAD Il - EXl'ENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head, 3 1. Temporary &tafl 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. LinguiBtic &taff 
(A) Interpetation Bervice& 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Tramlation Bervice& 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. Imurance for temporary Btaff 
4. InBtallnlion of equipment for BeBBion& 
5. MiBcellaneou& expenditure during Be&Bion& 
Total of Head II 
HEAD ill · EXPENDITURE ON l'Bl~MISES AND EQUII'MENT 
Sub-Head 4 Premises 
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment. 
Total of Head Ill 
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Total budget for 
1977 
366,000 
165,000 
150,000 
321,000 
5,000 
158,000 
40,000 
1,205,000 
165,000 
83,000 
248,000 
APPDDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
60,000 306,000 305,267 733 
165,000 150,479 14,521 
150,000 132,412 17,588 
31,562 289,438 289,229 209 
5,000 3,552 1,448 
5,984 152,016 151,985 31 
5,984 45,984 45,984 -
5,984 97,546 1,113,438 1,078,908 34,530 
16,733 148,267 143,567 4,700 
16,733 99,733 99,733 -
16,733 16,733 248,000 243,300 4,700 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head, 6 Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents 
Sub-Head, 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head, 9 
Sub-Head, 10 
Sub-Head, 11 
Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official cars 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head, 12 
Sub-Head, 13 
Sub-Head, 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head, 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head, 19 
Sub-Head, 20 
Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Com-
mittees and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(d) Orphans' pension 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(d) Relief allowance 
(C) Severance grant 
(D) Payrn,erUB to member states for validation 
Total of Head VI 
I TOTAL 1 ......... . 
Total budget for 
1977 
250,000 
135,000 
680,000 
19,500 
22,000 
500 
1,107,000 
55,000 
90,000 
3,000 
140,000 
22,000 
33,000 
15,000 
3,000 
7,000 
368,000 
7,382,523 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1977, 8.Il 
Ka.i-Uwe von HAssEL 
President of the Assembly 
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APPENDIX Il 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
6,790 243,210 204,424 38,786 
3,026 138,026 138,026 
-
680,000 539,921 140,079 
19,500 17,683 1,817 
3,764 25,764 25,764 
-
500 73 427 
6,790 6,790 1,107,000 925,891 181,109 
11,221 43,779 19,733 24,046 
1,573 91,573 91,573 -
3,000 1,129 1,871 
140,000 136,127 3,873 
22,000 . 12,568 9,432 
8,609 41,609 41,609 -
1,039 16,039 16,039 
-
3,000 796 2,204 
7,000 6,242 758 
11,221 11,221 368,000 325,816 42,184 
27,034 27,034 27,034 
49,452 49,452 49,452 
15,076 15,076 15,076 
91,562 91,562 91,562 
212,634 212,634 7,382,523 7,108,483 274,040 
aid for up to 31st March 1978, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
:UMBLET 
4ssembly 
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Siegbert ALBER 
Okairman of the Oommittee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX m 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1977 
Contributions Budget surplus Main Revised Net Member states 600ths overpaid budget budget contributions 
in 1976 1976 for 1977 for 1977 required 
F F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 54,753 (-) 41,200 711,540 8,016 623,603 
France 120 (-) 111,363 (-) 83,798 1,447,200 16,305 1,268,344 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 111,363 (-) 83,798 1,447,200 16,305 1,268,344 
Italy 120 (-) 111,363 (-) 83,'l98 1,447,200 16,305 1,268,344 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 1,856 (-) 1,397 24,120 271 21,138 
Netherlands 59 (-) 54,753 (-) 41,200 711,540 8,016 623,603 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 111,363 (-) 
' 
83,798 1,447,200 16,305 1,268,344 
--
' . 
600 (-) 556,814 (-) 418,989 7,236,000 81,523 6,341,720 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1977 
F 
Balances brought forward : 
Accounts of staff members as a.t 1st January 1977 4,546,738 Withd.ra. wa.ls 
Accounts of a. former staff member awaiting settle-
ment 7,056 
Interest to be distributed 88 
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 586,212 
Repayments of loans by staff members 237,200 
Interest received during year 374,963 Accounts of existing 
December 1977 
5,752,257 
Ka.i-Uwe von IIASSEL Francis HUMBLET 
President of the Assembly Clerk of the Assembly 
F 
35,502 
staff members a.s a.t 31st 
5,716,755 
5,752,257 
Siegbert ALBER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of 
my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is correct. 
12th July 1978 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
ComptroUer and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
Doeument 781, Addendum 26th September 1978 
Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1977 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1977 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 8 
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1977, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. AZ'ber (Chairman) ; 
MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahr6118, 
Antoni (Alternate : Rossi), Bonalumi, Del Duca, Depietri, 
Evers, HengeZ, Jeambrun, Koopm.an (Alternate : Voogd), 
28 
Lewis, MoNamara, Lord Morris, MM. Orsini, Page (Alter-
nate: Kershaw), Peeters, Schleiter, Vohrer, Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra. 
N. B. The names of those taking part iln the vote ere 
printed in itaZios. 
Doeument 782 26~ Septemmber 1978 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs arrd Administration 1 
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1979 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1919 
Details 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 
Herul 11 : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............ . 
Herul Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ . 
Herul IV: General administrative costs .......................... .. 
Herul V : Other expenditure ......................•.....••....... 
Herul VI : Pensions ............................................. . 
ToTAL EXPENDITURE •••••••••••••••••••• 
ToTAL RECEIPTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Estimate for 1979 
F 
4,997,000 
1,697,000 
363,000 
1,286,000 
893,000 
83,000 
9,319,000 
387,000 
8,932,000 
1. Adopted in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration by 11 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions 
and approved unanimously by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Membe'l's of the Committee : Mr . ..lf.Zbe'l' (Chairman) ; 
MM. J"ager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM . ..lf.hrens, 
Antoni (Alternate : Eossi), Bonalumi, Del Duca, Depietri, 
Eve'l's, Hengel, Jeambr'Wfl,, Koopman (Alternate: Voogil), 
Lewis, MoNamara, Lord Morris, MM. Orsini, Page 
(Alternate : KMshaw), Peeters, Schleiter, Vohre'l', Mrs. 
van der Werf-Terpstra. 
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N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Allocation of Expenditure under Beads and Sub-Beads 
Details 
Head, I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment ......•........ 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances ................................ . 
(B) Social charges ............................. . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials ............. . 
ToTAL OF HEAD I ...................... . 
Head II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3: -1. Temporary staff ............................. . 
2. Linguistic staff .............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions ....... . 
6. Reception of groups of students ............... . 
ToTAL OF HEAD II ..................... . 
Head, lli- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : Premises ....................................... . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment .............................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD III ................... . 
Head IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE cosTs 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents ...................................... . 
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines .............. . 
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishingof Assembly documents .... . 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc ...... . 
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .................................... . 
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges .................................. . 
ToTAL OF HEAD IV .•.....•............. 
H earl, V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Commit-
tees and Rapporteurs ............................ . 
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ....................... . 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information ..................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for ................................... . 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ........................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD V ..................... . 
H earl, V I - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions ................................... . 
(B) Allowances .................................. . 
(C) Severance grant ............................ . 
TOTAL OF HEAD VI- .................... . 
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Estimate for 1979 
F 
3,'768,000 
707,000 
498,000 
24,000 
460,000 
7'70,000 
5,000 
321,000 
41,000 
100,000 
33'7,000 
26,000 
295,000 
181,000 
740,000 
25,000 
44,500 
500 
'70,000 
110,000 
3,000 
1'70,000 
2'7,000 
300,000 
200,000 
3,000 
10,000 
83,000 
4,997,000 
1,69'7,000 
363,000 
1,286,000 
893,000 
83,000 
Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES 011' PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
DOOUMENT 782 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate : F 3, 768,000 
Estimate: F 3,754,000 
Rank 
The Clerk ............................................ . 
The Clerk Assistant ........................•........... 
Counsellors .............................................• 
First Secretaries ..•..................................... 
Secretary •.•......•..................................... 
Secretaries-Translators /Publications ...................... . 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ...................................... . 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................ .. 
Switchboard Operator .................................. . 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................ . 
Messengers ............................................ . 
WEU 
Grade 
Hors cadre 
Hors cadre 
A5 
A4 
A3 
A2 
' 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
06 
C3 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and French social security 
No. Total F 
1 125,000 
1 221,000 
5 1,150,000 
2 389,000 
1 173,000 
3 379,000 
1 134,000 
4 404,000 
6 502,000 
1 87,000 
1 75,000 
2 115,000 
28 3,754,000 
Estimate: F 14,000 
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Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL OHABGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Rank 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... 
Counsellors .•.••.......................•..•..........•... 
First Secretary ......................................... 
Secretary ............................................... 
Personal Assistants ..•....•...........................••. 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ....•...•.......•............. 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................. 
Messengers •••••.•...•.••............................•.... 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate : F 707,000 
Esti'T1t01£: F 135,000 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
Hors cadre 1 13,000 
A5 4 55,000 
A4 1 11,000 
A3 1 10,000 
B4 3 18,000 
B3 3 15,000 
C6 1 5,000 
C3 2 8,000 
16 135,000 
Estimate : F 170,000 
6,300 F per year per child : 27 .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. F 170,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance Estimate: F 310,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Counsellors ..•.........................•................. A5 3 130,000 
First Secretary ......................................... A4 1 38,000 
Secretary .•...........•..............................•.. A3 1 35,000 
Secretary-Translator/ Publications 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator .............. A2 2 42,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... B4 2 37,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................•. B3 2 28,000 
11 310,000 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance Estimate: F 10,000 
(e) Overtime Estimate : F 20,000 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance Estimate : F 60,000 
(h) Allowance for ·language courses Estimate : F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL CJJIABGBS 
Eslimale : F 498,000 
(a) Social Security Eslimate : F 275,000 
27 officials F 275,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Eseimate : F 150,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate : F 73,000 
14 % of basic salaries X 521,900 F F 73,000 
(C) .BIXPJIINSES BELA.TING TO TBlll BEOBUIT:Ml!INT, ARBIVAL AND DEPARTUBE OF PERMANENT Oli'FIOIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and 
cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure 
of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installat'Jon allowance 
(1) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(/) Medical examination 
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Estimate : F 24,000 
Eslimate : F 1,600 
Eslimate : F 1,500 
Estimate : F 3,400 
Estimate : F 4,500 
Estimate : F 10,000 
Estimate: F 3,000 
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Head 11 - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Anembly 
EatimaU: F 1,697,000 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STA.J'J' 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Paris: 10 days 
Function Daily Total 
remuneration No. 
F F 
Head of the sittings office .......................•....... 4~5 la 6,900 
Heads of sections .•....•............................•... 380 2a 31,400 
495 " 4b 
Sergeant-at-Arms .•...................•...•.•••.•..•..•.• 430 1 b 5,200 
Secretaries for the Assembly ......................•....•. 350 2a 17,300 
430 2b 
Precis writers ......•.................................... 350 4a 34,600 
430 4b 
Verbatim reporters •....................................• 430 12 b 98,500 
555 6c 
Assistants ...••.••....••..•••..•.•..••.•.••••..•.•...... 300 4b 124,400 
285 23 b 
210 6a 
185 10 a 
Head ushers .•............•...............•............. 160 2a 3,200 
Ushers .....••.......................................... 145 12 a 31,100 
285 4b 
Roneo /Assemblers ....................................•.• 145 12 a 17,400 
111 370,000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
e. Recruited as free-lance staff. 
Travelling expenses .......•.•.... F 90,000 
460,000 
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2. LINGl118TIO ST.Al!'J' 
(A) InterpretaOOn Semcu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function Total 
No. 
F 
Interpreters ............................................ 12 180,000 
12 180,000 
Travelling expenses • • . • . . • • F 13,000 
F 193,000 
{b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions F 170,000 
(B) Translation Servicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Estimate 1 
Function remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisers ................................................ 490 3a 158,000 
815 4b 
Translators .............................................. 395 4a 143,000 
680 4b 
Assistants ....•.•..••.....•.•.•.•.•..•......••••.........• 300 3li 95,000 
285 2b 
210 4a 
185 3a 
27 396,000 
I. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recmited outside France. 
Travelling expenses . • . • . • • • • • • • • F 11,000 
F 407,000 
3. INSURANOE FOR TEMPORARY STAll'Jr 
EBtimate : F 5,000 
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4, INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
- Insta.lla.tion of simultaneous interpretation equipment ................ F 193,000 
·-Installation of telephone booths .................................... F 14,000 
- Installation of a. teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service ...... F 8,000 
- Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms • . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
- Installation of closed-circuit television . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 100,000 
Estimate: F 321,000 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
- Removal expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
-Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse) ................................. F 5,500 
- Hire of typewriters and technicians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,500 
- Servicing of lifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
- Cleaning •••......•.........•.•.........••...••..................• F 11,000 
- Miscellaneous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . F 9,000 
Estimate : F 41,000 
6. RECEPTION OF GROUPS OF STUDENTS 
Estimate: F 100,000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate : F 363,000 
Sub-Head 4 
PREMISES 
- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment ........................................... F 10,000 
- Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,500 
- Joint overheads for the premises and insurance ...................... F 186,000 
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture F 14,500 
F 215,000 
- Share of renovation of conference rooms ............................. F 122,000 
Emmale: F 337,000 
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Sub-Heatl 5 
CA.PITA.L liiQ'UIPMENT 
~ Equipment for the archives office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
- 4 English-keyboard typewriters .......................... F 10,000 
- 10 typists' desks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Eatimate : F 26,000 
Bead IV - General administrative costs 
Estimate: F 1,286,000 
Sub-Head 6 
l"OST.A.Glll, TliiLllll"HONlll, TliiLliiGR.A.l"H OHABGBS, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMBNTS 
- Postage ................................................ F 171,000 
- Telephone ....... · ........................................ F 100,000 
- Telegrams ....••...•.........•.......•................... F 9,000 
- Transport of documents . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Eatimate : F 295,000 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUl"l"LLES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing 
Eatimate: F 181,000 
Sub-Head 8 
l"RRNTTNG AND l"UBLISHlNG OF ASSliiMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, 
minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
-Reprints · 
-Brochures 
Eatimate: F 740,000 
Sub-Head 9 
l"UROJIA.Slll OF DOCUMENTS, REFliiRliiNOE WORKS, ETO. 
Eatimate : F 25,000 
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Sub-Head 10 
OJ'J'IOIAL OABS 
- Hire of official oars 
Emmate: F 44,500 
Sub-Head 11 
BA.NX OH.ARGBS 
Eatimate : F 300 
Bead V - Other expenditure 
Estimate : F 893,000 
Sub-Head 12 
TBA.VBL AND SUBSISTBNOB .A.LLOWANOBS AND INSURANOB FOB TliB PBBSIDBNT OF THB ASSBMBLY, 
OHATBMBN OF OOMMITTBBS AND BA.PPOBTBUBS 
Estimate: F 70,000 
Sub-Head 13 
BXPBNSBS FOB BBPBBSBNTATION AND BBOBPTIONS 
Estimate: F IIO,OOO 
Sub-Head 14 
OOlDIITTBB STUDY MISSIONS 
Eatimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OJ'I'IOIAL .JOUBNBYS OF MBMBBBS OF TliB OJ'I'IOB OF TliB OLBBX 
Estimate : F 170,000 
Sub-Head 16 
BXPBNSBS OF BXPBBTS AND TliB AUDITOR 
Estimate: F 27,000 
Sub-Head 17 
BXPBNDITUBB ON INFORMATION 
Estimate: F 300,000 
Sub-Head 18 
BXPBNSBS FOB GROUPS OF THB ASSBMBLY 
Estimate : F 200,000 
Sub-Head 19 
OOJn'IWGBNODIS AND OTliBB BXPBNDITUBB NOT BLSBWBBBB PBOVIDBD FOB 
Estimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON·BBOOVBBABLB TA..Xli:S 
Ealin&aH : F 10,000 
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Bead VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOW A.NOES, ETO. 
(A) Pensions 
Estimate : F 83,000 
(a) Retirement pension ...•................................. Estimate: F 46,000 
(b) Invalidity pension ...................................... Estimate: pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension ...................................... Estimate: F 24,000 
(d) Orphans' pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: F 13,000 
(B) Allowances 
Estimate : pro mem. 
(a) Household allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: pro mem. 
(b) Dependants' allowance .................................. Estimate: pro mem. 
(c) Education allowance .................................... Estimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate : pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
Estimate: pro mem. 
Income 
(A) Su1Ulry receipts 
Estimate: F 100,000 
(a) Sale of publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
(b) Bank interest ......................................... F 75,000 
(c) Social security reimbursements F 10,000 
(B) Pe1tBions 
Estimate: F 287,000 
(a) Contributions (7 %) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . Estimate: F 217,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). Estimate: F 70,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(eabmftted by Mr • .Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 8,932,000. The budget for 1978 amounted to 
F 7,778,000 1• The difference is therefore F 1,154,000. 
2. Head I - Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 190,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1978 in basic salaries, expatriation and 
household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social security ; 
( ii) annual increments ; 
(iii) an expected increase of 7.5% in 1979. 
3. Head 11 - Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Temporary staff 
The estimated increase is F 64,000. 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly 
applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied 
by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) - Interpretation services 
The increase (F 25,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in 
the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable to 
interpreters. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B) - Translation services 
The increase (F 61,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to scales applied in the Council 
of Europe. 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for sessions 
The 'increase (F 148,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in 
the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris and to the installation of closed-
circuit television in the national delegation offices and in certain parts of the building of the Econo-
mic and Social Council to allow members to be kept constantly informed of the m.i.mes of speakers 
and the conduct of votes z. 
Sub-head 3.6 (new sub-head) - Reception of groups of students (F 100,000) 11 
4. Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4 - Premises 
The increase (F 155,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the higher cost of maintenance 
for the premises at 43, avenue du President-Wilson, insurance for the building and a share in the cost of 
renovating conference rooms. 
Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum of F 26,000 is for the purchase of additional equipment for the archives office, four 
English-keyboard typewriters for the use of temporary staff during sessions and the replacement of ten 
typists' desks for temporary staff (twenty-five have been in use since 1956 and it is planned to replace 
fifteen others in 1980). 
5. Head IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-head 6 - Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents 
The increase (F 35,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
1. The 1978 budget included F 40,000 from Head V of the 1977 budget for opening a doorway to connect 
the Wilson Wing with the Palais d'Iena. 
2. See Document 782, Addendum. 
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Sub-head 7 - Office supplies and hire of machines 
The increase (F 31,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper 
and office supplies. This sub-head now also covers the hire of a printing machine for addressing envelopes 
for despatching documents of the Assembly. An Addressograph machine had been purchased in 1965 but 
the manufacturer can no longer guarantee its maintenance nor the supply of address plates. 
Sub-head 8 - Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in 
the cost of printing. 
Sub-head 9 - Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
The increase (F 2,500) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of subscriptions 
to newspapers, periodicals and reference works. 
Sub-head 10 - Official cars 
The increase (F 4,500) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of hiring cars. 
6. Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-head 12 - Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling expenses 
and per diem allowances. 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling 
expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1979. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable 
to the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
Increase (F 264,000) 1. 
Sub-head 18- Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
There are now five political groups in the Assembly. This sub-head has been increased by F 183,000 1• 
7. Head VI - Pensioos 
In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid : one retirement, one 
survivor's and one orphan's pension. 
8. Sundry receipts 
2* 
Expected receipts in 1979 include: 
(i) sale of publications; 
( ii) bank interest ; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7% from staff subscribing to the pension fund and 
the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals. 
1. See Dooument 782, Addendum. 
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Head I -Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
S.ALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISlDriENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate for 1979 ....................................................... F 3,754,000 
Budget for 1978 ... :.: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,488,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 266,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling 
expenses and French social security 
Estimate for 1979 ....................................................... F 
Budget for 1978 ..................................................... -... F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F . 
14,000 
12,000 
2,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff. 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOW ANOES, SOOUL OJIARGES, BTO. 
(A) ALLOWANOES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . F 135,000 
Budget for 1978 .........................................•................ F 127,100 
Net increase .................. F 8,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Chlldren's allowance 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . F 170,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 174,000 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 310,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • F 291,000 
Net increase .................. F 19,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent a.llowance 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
(/) 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
42 
DOOUMENT 782 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1979. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . F 60,000 
Budget for 1978 .....................................•.................... F 55,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this a.llowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Budget for 1978 ........ ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
(B) SOOUL OHABGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1979 . . • • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . • • • . . • . F 275,000 
Budget for 1978 •............••..................•.........•.....•..•..... F 250,000 
Net increase ................... F 25,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1979 ............ : . . . . • • • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . • . . . . . • • • . • . • • . . . • F 150,000 
Budget for 1978 ..................••................•............•...•.... F 141,000 
Net increase . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . F 9,000 
(c) Provident Fund 
Estimate for 1979 ........••.........••.••...•..•...•.••••....•...•....... F 73,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • . . . . . • • • . . . • • • . F 218,000 
Net decrease ................. F 145,000 
This calculation is based on 14% of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the 
provident fund scheme. 
(C) EXl'ENSES RELATING TO THE BEORUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEl'ARTUBE OF :PERMANENT OFFIOULS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened 
for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1979 ...................•..••••••...•••.•..••...•.•..•.... , . . F 1,600 
Budget ·for 1978 .....•.••..........•......•...••....••.................... F 1,600 
Estimate unchanged 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Budget for 1978 .....................•...........•.......•......••......•. F 1,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • • . • . . • . . . • . • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • F 3,400 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . • . . . • • . . . . . . . • . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . • . . F 3,400 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
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(d) Insta.llation allowance 
Estimate for 1979 •.......................................•.......•.....•• F 4,500 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . • • . . . . . . F 4,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1978. 
(/) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1979 . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Head 11 - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TBMPOJU.RY STAD 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 460,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 396,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 64,000 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
2. LINGUISTIC STA.J'J' 
(A) InterpretatK>n Semcu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1979 ..................................•.••.................. F 193,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 178,000 
Net increase ........•......... F 15,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 170,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . F 160,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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(B) Traulation SmJicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
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Estimate for 1979 .....................................................•.. F 407,000 
Budget for 1978 • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 346,000 
Net increase .................. F 61,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANCE FOB TBMPOBA.BY STAFF 
Estimate for 1979 ....................•••................................. F 5,000 
Budget for 1978 .....................•..•................................. F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOB THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1979 .....•..................•............................... F 321,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 173,000 
Net increase ....•............. F 148,000 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris and the 
installation of closed-circuit television. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3, and Document 782, Addendum. 
5. MISOliiLLA.NBOUS BXPBNDITUBB DUBING THB SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . • . • . • . . . . . . . • • • • • • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . • F 41,000 
Budget for 1978 . . • . . • . . . • • • . • . . • • . • . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . • F 44,000 
Net decrease ................. F 3,000 
6. RECEPTION OF GROUPS OF STUDENTS 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 100,000 
Budget for 1978 ........................................................ . 
----
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 100,000 
See Document 782, Addendum. 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
PREMISES 
Estimate for 1979 .•.•••....•..•.....•..•................................. F 337,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 182,000 
Net increase . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. F 155,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs, the 
hire of committee rooms and insurance. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sub-Head 6 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1979 .....................•.........................•......•• F 26,000 
Budget for 1978 • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • F 70,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
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Bead IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGB, TBLBPHONB, TELBGIU.l'H OIIARGBS, TRANSPORT OJ' DOOUMBNTS 
Estimate for 1979 ....••...•.......•................ · ..................... ; F 295,000 
Budget for 1978 .•...................•.•.........•........................ F 260,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 35,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 7 
OJ'FICE SUPPLIES AND liTRE OF MACHINES 
Estimate for 1979 ................................................•...•... F 181,000 
Budget for 1978 . • • . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
Net increase .................. F 31,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PBINTING AND PUBLISliiNG OJ' ASSBMBLY DOOUXIDNTS 
Estimate for 1979 . • . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 740,000 
Budget for 1978 . • . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • • . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • F 680,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 60,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 9 
1'UlWllASlll OJ' DOOUXIDNTS, BJIJ'JIBJINOB WOBXS, ETC. 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . • • F 26,000 
Budget for 1978 ......•.............•..••.••..•....••...............•...•. F 22,500 
Net increase .................. F 2,500 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 10 
Oli'J'IOIAL CABS 
Estimate for 1979 . • • . . • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . • . . . . • • . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • • • • F 44,500 
Budget for 1978 • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • . F 40,000 
Net increase ................. F 4,500 
In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. 
driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK OIIARGBS 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . • . . . . • • . . . • . . . . . • . . . . • • . • . . . • . • . . . • . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . F 500 
Budget for 1978 ......••...•..............••..••••..••..•.....•.••••.•.... F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
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Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 70,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . F 55,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Ra.pporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a. report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1979 ........................................................ F 110,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 100,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 14 
COM:MITTBB STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1979 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1978 .....................•.................................... F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 15 
OJ'J'IOIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OJ'J'ICE OF THE CLERK 
Estima.~ for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 170,000 
Budget for 1978 . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . F 155,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Bead 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
Estimate for 1979 .................................................... , ... F 27,000 
Budget for 1978 .................•........................................ F 24,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 300,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 36,000 
Net increase ................. F 264,000 
See Document 782, Addendum. 
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8ub-Hea4 18 
BXPBNSliS I'OR GROUPS Oll' THB ASSBMBLY 
Estimate for 1979 • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . • • F 200,000 
Budget for 1978 •.............•........•.........•.•..•....•..•.........•• F 17,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 183,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6, and Document 782, Addendum. 
8ub-Hea4 19 
OON'l'INGBNCIBS AND OTHBR EXPENDITURE NOT l!ILSliiWHBRE PROVIDED li'OR 
Estimate for 1979 ........................................................ F 3,000 
Budget for 1978 ......................................................... F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-HefMl 20 
NON ·Rl!ICOVl!IIU.BLB TAXliiS 
Estimate for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • F 10,000 
Budget for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
(a) Retirement pension 
Estimate for 1979 
Estimate for 1978 
Estimate unchanged 
Head VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
F 46,000 
F 40,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(b) Invalidity pension ......................................................... pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension 
Estimate for 1979 
Estimate for 1978 
F 24,000 
22,000 
······················································· F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(d) Orphans' pension 
Estimate for 1979 
Estimate for 1978 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(B) Allowances 
F 13,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 13,000 
pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
pro mem. 
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 
NOTE 
submitted by Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly 
During his official visitB, the President of 
the Assembly noted that the governments of 
member countries were agreed in recognising 
the importance of the role accorded to the WEU 
Assembly and in considering that recent political 
developments could not jeopardise its responsibi-
lities nor lead to any restriction of itB activities. 
The President concluded therefore that the 
Council cannot refuse to grant the Assembly 
the financial means it needs to accomplish its 
tasks when it is felt that the insignificance of 
appropriations under certain heads of the budget 
or the total absence of budgetary means are an 
impediment to its work. · 
The Presidential Committee of the WEU 
Assembly and the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration have decided to make 
substantial increases in sums available under 
two heads of the Assembly's budget for the 
financial year 1979 aa follows : 
(i) appropriations for the Assembly's infor-
mation service are to be increased from 
36,000 French francs for the financi·al 
year 1978 to 300,000 French francs for 
the financial year 1979 (Sub-Head 17) ; 
(ii) appropriations for the political groups 
are to be increased from 17,000 French 
francs for the financial years 1978 to 
200,000 French francs_ for the financial 
year 1979 (Sub-Head 18). 
It has also been decided to include a new 
item in the Assembly's budget for the reception 
of groups of students for which there would be 
an appropriation of 100,000 French francs for 
the financial year 1979 (Sub-Head 3 (6)). 
It was considered necessary to make these 
inereases in the budget for the following 
reasons: 
1. The WEU Assembly is the only European 
assembly with responsibilities in defence matters. 
Its duties are based on a treaty in which the 
contracting parties assumed specific commit-
ments, particularly the commitment in Article V 
to afford each other aid and assistance in the 
event of attack. 
It deals with the political, military and 
technical conditions of European security. Its 
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work is therefore no less important than that of 
the other European assemblies which deal with 
economic, social, cultural or juridical matters. 
Persistent tension in the worLd today, the 
continued arms race and the imbalance of forces 
in Europe clearly demonstrate the need for the 
WEU Assembly to be able to carry out one of its 
most important duties, i.e. to alert public opinion 
in our countries to the need to recognise in full 
the threats to Europe's security and to encourage 
parliaments, over and above present economic 
difficulties, to maintain a defence effort equal 
to these threats by voting the necessary money. 
2. The Assembly is the only WEU organ in 
touch with public opinion since the Council has 
no information budget and does nothing in this 
field. The Assembly is responsible for all efforts 
to make WEU known. 
Yet many parliamentarians have realised 
that a large section of public opinion is unaware 
of the very existence of WEU and that even in 
political circles there is a tendency for it to pass 
unnoticed or for its importance to be overlooked. 
3. Only the lack of adequate financial means 
prevents the WEU Assembly from taking certain 
steps it considers necessary to draw the attention 
of public opinion to its Committees' reports, the 
ensuing debates and the conclusions drawn. 
Students should therefore be given an 
opportunity of gaining an on-the-spot knowledge 
of its work and attending debates on matters 
relating to their studies. In particular, the 
Assembly should be able to invite students from 
military academies to follow the debates on 
reports of the Committee on Defenee Questions 
and Armaments, students from institutes for 
political studies to follow the debates on reports 
of the General Affairs Committee and certain 
university engineering students to follow the 
debates on reports of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Toohnological and Aerospace Questions. 
Further, the Assembly's information budget 
should allow its Rapporteurs to be given 
hearings by certain committees in national par-
liaments or certain associations directly con-
cerned by the subject of their reports. It should 
also be possible to invite jo11l'Il!alists from member 
countries who specialise in defence questions to 
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attend the debates at each session, to arrange 
press conferences in the capitals of member 
countries before each session in order to present 
the reports on the agenda in liaison with the 
delegation of the host country and, depending on 
the subjects on the .Assembly's agenda, to 
organise seminars and symposia to which parlia-
mentarians, journalists and representatives of 
governments or industry would be invited. 
Finally, it was considered that adequate 
funds should be earmarked for political groups 
to allow them to choose what they consider to 
be the most appropriate way of making known 
their position on questions on the agenda. The 
election of the European Parliament by universal 
suffrage will probably increase the cohesion and 
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work of transnational political groups. The sums 
now. at the disp.osal of WEU Assembly political 
groups would not allow them to meet these 
changed circumstances, particularly in view of 
the foreseeable increase in their secretarial 
requirements. 
Although not negligible, the planned increases 
do not bring the appropriations in the above-
mentioned sub-heads to a level comparable to the 
means available for similar work in the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, not 
to mention the European Parliament, but, never-
theless, they have the merit of ending a disc.rimi-
natory situation 1 which the Presidential Com-
mittee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and .Administration considered intolerable. 
1. For instance, appropriations in the WEU Assembly's 
budget for information amounted to 36,000 francs in 
1978, whereas under the same head the Council of Europe 
had 2,201,000 francs, of which 129,000 francs for the 
purchase of newspapers and information bulletins alone. 
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Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1978 
The Assembly, 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. AZber (Chair-
man) ; MM . .Tager, Adriaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
AhrlmB, Antoni (Alternate : Bosai), Bonalumi, Del Duca, 
Depietri, Evers, HengeZ, Jeambr'lltn, Koopman (Alternate: 
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Voogd), Lewis, MoNamara, Lord Morris, MM. Orsini, 
Page (Alternate : Kershaw), Peeters, Schleiter, Vohrer, 
Mrs. van der Werf·Terpstra. 
N.B. The names of those ta'ki!ng part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated orga.nisa.tions to set up a joint pensions 
administration section as a first step towards the creation of a truly independent body to deal with 
pensions; 
Reiterating its regret tha.t provision has still not been ma.de for a reversionary pension to be 
granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ; 
Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the Assembly's recommendation to set up a com-
mittee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated 
organisations ; 
2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for 
the widows of male staff ; 
3. The establishment of a. committee of senior experts to plan and promote a. personnel policy ; 
11. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a 
fund from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU; 
m. Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff already serving in the 
organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur) 
I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
(i) Approval 
1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1978 and 
have, for the time being, no comment to make 
Secretariat-General ........... . 
Standing Armaments Committee .. 
Agency for the Control 
thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft 
opinion and draft recommendation to the Com-
mittee for its approval. 
( ii) The budget 
2. The total budget of WEU for 1978 as com-
pared to 1977 is as follows : 
1977 Budget 1978 Budget 
£ F £ F 
569,840 666,705 
4,243,320 4,747,625 
of Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,089,060 10,207,655 
----------------------------------Office of the Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,236,000 7,778,000 
----------------------------------
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU . . . . . . . . 569,840 20,568,380 666,705 22,733,280 
(iii) WEU establishment 
3. The total establishment of WED for 1978 
is as follows : 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Standing Armaments Committee . . . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 52 
128 
Office of the Clerk . .. .. .. . . . . .. .. . 28 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WED FOR 1978 156 
11. Pension scheme 
4. On 30th June 1978, the staff of the co-ordin-
ated organisations exercised their option rights 
in respect of the pension scheme. Staff recruited 
before 1st July 1974 were given three options: 
Option I : partial validation of past 
service; 
Option II : full validation of past service ; 
Option Ill : retainment of the provident 
fund. 
Staff recruited after 1st July 1974 were automa-
tically affiliated to the pension scheme. 
5. Your Rapporteur has asked the Secretary-
General of WEU to obtain replies to the question-
naire at Appendix IV from the secretaries-general 
of the other co-ordinated organisations. These 
replies will be communicated to the Assembly as 
and when they are received. 
6. In the various reports which he submitted 
to the Assembly, Lord Selsdon outlined his sug-
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gestions for setting up a pension unit. The 
Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts 
adopted a report (see Appendix VI) which goes 
part of the way to meeting the Assembly's pro-
posals. It is envisaged that a joint pensions 
administration section would be created : 
- a pensions study unit and pensions com-
putation unit I, installed at the OECD, 
Paris, would take over the co-ordinated 
management of pensions for the staff 
of all the co-ordinated organisations 
with the exception of the actual calcula-
tion of pensions for NATO; 
- a pensions computation unit II would be 
installed at the NATO headquarters and 
would calculate the pensions of the 
NATO staff. 
There would naturally be co-ordination between 
the two units, as foreseen in the regulations of 
the joint pensions administrative section. The 
units would start to operate as soon as the neces-
sary staff had been recruited and all material 
arrangements made, so that one could hope for 
both to be in service by 1st January 1979. 
7. While welcoming the creation of these units, 
the Assembly feels that the final goal of the 
co-ordinated organisations must be the setting 
up of a truly independent body as outlined in 
Document 742·: 
"19. The fund should be an entirely inde-
pendent body, set up by l!Overnments who 
are members of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions. This would require the ratification of 
protocols by all the governments concerned. 
It would thereafter follow that this organ-
isation would have its own budget, with its 
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own independent staff ; its head should have 
both financial and legal experience. 
20. A joint arbitration committee should be 
set up to deal with all litigation. The organ-
isation should, if possible, be housed in the 
OECD in order that contact with the inter-
organisation study section on salaries and 
prices might be maintained and access facil-
itated to the OECD computer. 
21. The joint management fund should be 
governed by a board comprising one or two 
senior officials from each of the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
22. Once the organisation had been set up, 
it would follow that all the pensions pre-
viously paid by the co-ordinated organisa-
tions would be paid by the joint management 
fund. The new organisation would take over 
all administration in respect of pensioners, 
including the problem of taxation. 
23. The budget of the joint management fund 
would make provision for all retired staff. 
The budget would also include the normal 
running expenses of the organisation. Con-
tributions to this budget would be levied 
from all present and former member govern-
ments of the co-ordinated organisations, who 
have an implied debt to the pensioners of 
these organisations. It should be stressed that 
the setting up of the joint management fund 
would not entail a staff establishment very 
much larger than that of the pension unit. 
24. The creation of a reserve fund should 
also be envisaged since the organisation 
would have only the aforementioned contri-
butions at its disposal and it would appear 
essential for some funds to be available for 
emergencies, i.e. late payment of contribu-
tions, a goYernment or governments with-
drawing from an organisation, etc. It would 
be for member governments to calculate the 
amount to be held in such a reserve fund." 
Provident fund 
8. The WEU provident fund, which since 1956 
has comprised the holdings (contributions plus 
interest) of the permanent staff in the organisa-
tion, will now be constituted by the holdings 
of those members having opted to retain the 
provident fund, the partial holdings of those not 
having chosen to validate all past service and, in 
some cases, a minimal surplus for certain mem-
bers after full validation. 
9. The fund, which at 30th June 1978 stood 
at approximately F 25,700,000, now stands at only 
F 5,600,000. Quite obviously, with fund holdings 
so considerably reduced, some thought should be 
given to transferring the WEU fund to that of 
54 
one of the larger co-ordinated organisations since 
it would appear logical to invest the holdings 
with those of a larger unit. 
Housing loans 
10. Staff having opted to remain in the pro-
vident fund will continue to benefit from the 
possibility of obtaining housing loans. However, 
out of a total of 150 staff, only 36 members will 
actually have this possibility. It is therefore 
obvious that some alternative must be provided 
for the other staff members who require financial 
assistance in purchasing a house. The matter 
is of particular urgency for those taking up 
employment in WEU, those faced with changes 
in family circumstances and those nearing retire-
ment who wish to resettle in their country of 
origin. 
11. The WEU Council should therefore give 
serious consideration as to how the granting of 
such loans might be achieved. One possibility 
might be to use, say, 20 % of the validation 
monies received to create a fund from which 
interest-bearing loans could be made. Rules would 
naturally have to be worked out in respect of 
reimbursement periods and interest rates. 
Careers and conditions of employment 
for staff in the co-ordinated organisations 
12. In its Recommendation 302, the Assembly 
· recommended that the Council : 
"I. Promote in the framework of the co-
ordinated organisations : 
4. The establishment as soon as possible of 
a committee of senior experts to plan and 
promote a personnel policy;". 
The Council made no reference to this point 
in its reply to the recommendation, which touched 
upon the basic problem of staff careers. Previous 
Assembly reports have dealt in depth with the 
lack of career opportunities within the co-
ordinated organisations. It may be argued that 
in WEU, where the tasks which devolve upon 
the various organs are diverse, the transfer of 
staff from one part of the organisation to another 
is often precluded. However, this does not detract 
from the fact that before any vacancies are filled, 
consideration should be given to staff already 
serving in the organisation, with a view to 
facilitating some promotions ; no post should, in 
any case, be the prerogative of a specific govern-
ment. In many instances, the fact . that a 
permanent official of WEU has been with the 
organisation for a number of years means that 
he is better qualified than a newcomer to fill a 
particular post. Although such a policy would 
only be a modest step towards helping some 
officials to obtain a higher post, it would be a 
move in the right direction as far as reviewing 
the career possibilities of WEU permanent 
officials is concerned. 
13. Careful consideration should also be given 
to the age at which staff members are recruited 
on permanent contract now that a pension scheme 
has been brought into operation, and the 
Secretary-General of WEU should seek, together 
with the secretaries-general of the other co-
ordinated organisations, better methods for 
enabling qualified staff, when vacancies occur, 
to be transferred from one co-ordinated organisa-
tion to another. 
14. A high percentage of WEU staff are now 
at the top of their grade, with no immediate 
possibility of promotion, and indeed faced with 
every likelihood of remaining in the same post 
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and at the same grade until retirement. This 
situation cannot be conducive, in the long run, 
to staff giving of their best. The Assembly would 
therefore again urge governments to give the 
idea of setting up a "committee of senior experts 
to plan and promote a personnel policy" urgent 
consideration. 
Co-ordinated procedure for salary adjustments 
15. As from 1st July 1978, the previous salary 
adjustment procedure as defined in the 133rd 
report of the Co-ordinating Committee came to 
an end. Proposals for a new procedure have now 
been worked out by the secretaries-general of the 
co-ordinated organisations for the future. The 
Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts has been invited by one Council to 
examine these proposals and make a recommenda-
tion before the end of 1978. 
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WEU BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR 1978 
Proposed expenditure and income 
A* B* c• TOTALB + C 
£ Francs Francs Francs 
Salaries and allowances .............. 814,120 6,240,350 13,501,600 19,741,950 
Pensions ............................ 27,425 365,000 704,300 1,069,300 
Travel .............................. 26,685 81,000 387,450 468,450 
Other operating costs ................ 87,740 352,475 491,505 843,980 
Purchase of furniture, etc. ........... 3,495 5,500 43,700 49,200 
Buildings ........................... - - - -
Total expenditure ................... 959,465 7,044,325 15,128,555 22,172,880 
WEU tax .......................... 270,050 2,140,100 4,590,150 6,730,250 
Other receipts ....................... 9,600 39,500 83,500 123,000 
Pension receipts ..................... 13,IIO l17,100 247,250 364,350 
Total income ....................... 292,760 2,296,700 4,920,900 7,217,600 
NET TOTAL ......................... 666,705 4,747,625 10,207,655 14,955,280 
National contributions 
J 
A* B• c• Office of the Clerk 
600ths 
£ 
Belgium .................... 59 65,559.33 
France ..................... 120 133,341.00 
Federal Republic of Germany. 120 133,341.00 
Italy ................. · ...... 120 133,341.00 
Luxembourg ................ 2 2,222.34 
Netherlands ............... , . 59 65,559.33 
United Kingdom ............ 120 133,341.00 
600 666,705.00 
Total WEU budget 
• A • Secretariat-General. 
B • International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C • Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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1,470,602.53 764,840 
2,991,056.00 1,555,600 
2,991,056.00 1,555,600 
2,991,056.00 1,555,600 
49,850.94 25,920 
I ,4 70,602.53 764,840 
2,991,056.00 1,555,600 
14,955,280.00 7,778,000 
£ 666,705 
Francs 22,733,280 
APPENDIX II 
At 
Secretary -General 1 
Deputy Secretary-General 1 
Director of the Agency -
Assistant Secretary-
General 1 
A7 -
A6 1 
A5 2 
A4 -
A3 3 
A2 2 
L5 1 
L4 1 
L3 1 
L2 1 
B6 -
B5 -
B4 8 
B3 7 
B2 5 
B1 2 
C6 -
05 -
C4 1 
C3 8 
C2 2 
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1. A - Secretariat-General. 
APPENDIX II 
Table of establishment 
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Bt Ct Total A,B, C 
- -
1 
- - 1 
- 1 1 
1 - 2 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
- 1 4 
- 2 4 
- -
1 
1 - 2 
3 2 6 
- -
1 
- - -
- - -
4 8 20 
7 8 22 
- 2 7 
- - 2 
- - -
- 1 1 
4 - 5 
3 9 20 
- - 2 
28 52 128 
B - International Secretariat· of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations /Publications. 
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Office of the Clerk 
Clerk 1 
-
-
Clerk Assistant 1 
-
-
5 
22 
1 
32 
-
1 
-
4 
7 
-
-
1 
-
-
2 
-
28 
DOCUMENT 783 APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
RECOMMENDATION 302 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 8 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pension 
scheme; 
Deploring nevertheless that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up a 
joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations ; 
Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a reversiona.ry pension to be 
granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ; 
Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in 
applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. The early establishment of a joint body to manage the pension scheme ; 
2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as 
for. widows of male staff ; 
3. The creation of a voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommo-
dation; 
4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote 
a personnel policy ; 
11. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living 
which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ; 
Ill. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on condi-
tions for seconding national officials. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 742). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 30Z 
I. 1. The Council consider that the pension scheme of the five co-ordinated organisations could 
with advantage be managed by a joint unit. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts has instituted a working party to study this question. On this subject, the Secretaries-
General have called on the assistance of an internationally reputed expert to advise on the practical 
problems a.BBOcia.ted with the creation of such a unit. The expert recommends the setting-up of the 
administrative unit to operate as from January 1978. 
The Council however have not yet taken a position on this question. 
2. As requested by one of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations in June 1977, the 
Co-ordinating Committee is now studying the question of reversiona.ry pensions. Consideration has 
been given to the possibility of allowing female staff who have opted to stay in the provident fund 
to reopen this option in the event of the pension scheme rules being amended to include uncondi-
tional reversion on a. widower of a. survivor's pension upon the death of his spouse. 
3. Staff members who opt for the provident fund will continue to have the possibility of obtain-
ing loans as in the past. For those staff members who opt for the pension scheme, the Council note 
that the Secretary-General of WEU is already studying various suggestions. 
4. The functioning of the machinery for co-ordination is currently under review by various 
authorities. 
IT. In December 1976 and January 1977, the councils of the five co-ordinated organisations 
approved the 133rd Report of the Co-ordinating Committee which amended the procedure for 
adjusting the remuneration of staff of those organisations. 
This more elaborate procedure, applied this year for the first time, for the annual salary 
adjustments due on 1st July, allowing for changes in cost of living and in standard of living, has 
caused delays in preparing intermediate but related advances limited to cost of living increases. 
Advances based on these increases for the first half of 1976 were granted in December 1976 and 
for the second half of 1976 in June 1977. 
The Council are following closely the development of this problem. 
Ill. As recommended by the Assembly, the Secretariat-General has transmitted to the Clerk of the 
Assembly the information collected by the Public Administration Committee during its enquiry into 
conditions for the secondment of national officials to international organisations. 
It is recalled that this study, carried out at the request of the Council, was concerned with 
the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council in this matter. 
These principles, which were transmitted to the Assembly with the Council's twentieth annual report, 
were the outcome of the studies of the special working group set up in October 1971 following 
Recommendation 200. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Letter to the Secretary-General 
concerning the pension scheme 
APPENDIX IV 
lOth July 1978 
The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has appointed me as Rapporteur on the 
report to be tabled in the Assembly next November on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1978. 
Since the staff in the co-ordinated organisations have now exercised their options in respect of the 
pension scheme, I should be most grateful if you could obtain replies to the questions at appendix [hereafter] 
from the Secretaries-General of these organisations. This information would be most useful in the preparation 
of my report. 
H. E. Mr. Edoua.rd Longerstaey, 
Secretary -General, 
Western European Union, 
9 Grosvenor Place, 
London SWIX 7HL 
Anthony KERSHAW 
Rapporteur 
Questionnaire submitted to the Secretaries-General of the 
co-ordinated organisations 1 
Information in respect of the pension scheme 
(As at 1st July 1978) 
Name of· organisation ............................... . 
1. Total number of staff employed 
2. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme 
with full validation of past service 
3. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme 
with partial validation of past service 
4. Number of staff having opted for the provident fund 
5. Number of staff recruited after 1st July 1974 and 
hence automatically bound by the pension scheme 
6. Number of pensions already being paid to: 
( i) retired staff 
( ii) survivors 
7. Total amount of money being returned to govern-
ments for pension validation costs 
1. A table summarising the answers will be published separately. 
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Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts 
Reopening for female staff of the option provided for 
in the pension scheme rules of the co-ordinated organisations 
154th report 1 
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Paris, 8th June 1978 
1. At its meeting on 16th and 17th May 1978 the Co-ordinating Committee decided on the proposal 
of the Representative of the United Kingdom, to include on the agenda for its next meeting, the examination 
of the problems raised by the possible attribution of reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female 
staff of the co-ordinated organisations. 
2. At this meeting on 16th and 17th May the Committee decided it would be in favour of the reopening 
of the option for the female staff concerned if and when it were decided to modify the pension rules by 
attributing reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff. It was stressed that the possibility 
of reopening the option should be strictly limited to the female staff concerned and to this particular case 
only, and that it should in no way be invoked as constituting a. precedent for other changes which might 
be made in the pension rules. 
3. The Committee accordingly recommends that Councils decide: 
(a) to reopen the option for the female staff concerned if and when it were decided to modify the 
pension rules by attributing reversion of pension rights to the widowers of female staff ; 
(b) that the possibility of reopening the option should be strictly limited to the female staff concerned 
and to this particular case only, and that it should in no way be invoked as constituting a. precedent 
for other changes which might be made in the pension rules. 
1. Approved by the Council on 19th July D7il. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Regulations for the joint pensions administrative section 
of the co-ordinated organisations 1 
I. General 
1. Article 51 of the pension scheme rules 
provides that the Secretaries- and Director-
General of the co-ordin.ated organisations shall 
consult among themselves in order to carry out 
the co-ordination necessary to ensure that these 
rules are applied in a uniform manner. To this 
end, the Secretaries- and Director-General of the 
organisations set up on 11th September 1974 a 
pensions administrative committee of the co-
ordinated organisations, hereafter called P ACCO. 
2. Article 31 of the pension scheme rules 
provides that " ... the assessment of entitlement 
of the benefits payable under these rules shall 
be made by the organisation in whieh the staff 
member was serving 'at the time when his active 
employment ended with the assistance of a joint 
administrative unit for the organisations listed 
in Article 1.1, responsible for such part of the 
work as can be centralised". 
3. In this context, the Secretaries- and 
Director-General of the organisations listed in 
Article 1.1 have agreed that a joint pensions 
administrative section, hereafter called "the 
section", should be set up with effect from 
1st May 1978 under the conditions and arrange-
ments specified below. 
D. Role of the section 
4. The section shall have the following duties : 
A. Tasks performed on behalf of all co-ordinated 
organisations 
( i) To carry out a1l<Yilted functions for the 
general application of the pension scheme of the 
co-ordinated organisations and in particular : 
(a) to examine, on the basis of standard 
forms containing the reLevant personnel 
data, a1l provisional assessments of 
pension entitlement prepared by the 
organisation concerned to ensure that 
these are in conformity with the pension 
scheme rules and that all beneficiaries 
in the various co-ordinated organisations 
receive uniform treatment ; to obtain 
from the organisation concerned any 
additional information needed for the 
assessment of entitlement ; 
1. Approved by the Council on 21st April 1978. 
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(b) to transmit monthly to the pensions 
administrative committee of the co-
ordinated organisations (P ACCO), the 
assessment forms, together with a report 
of its findings, to enable the committee 
to check the provisional assessments 
and make a recommendation, before a 
decision is taken by the Secretary- or 
Director-General of the organisation 
concerned; 
(c) to advise P ACCO, in conjunction with 
the inter-organisations study section 
(lOSS), on the manner in which Article 
42 should be applied on a case by case 
basis and, if instructed by P ACCO, 
enter into discussions with national tax 
authorities as required ; 
(d) to maintain all records of all pension 
assessments to constitute a guide for the 
future interpretation of cases ; 
(e) to prepare and maintain the standard 
forms used for the establishment of 
individual entitlement ; 
(f) to arrange that the pension scheme 
computer programmes are tested at 
least once each year and immediately 
after any change in the rules and 
regulations affecting them, to ensure 
that the programme at each computer 
centre will produce identical and cor-
rect results ; 
(g) on the basis of experience, to advise 
on: 
- questions arising out of the assess-
ment of entitlement ; 
- the need for amendments to the 
pension scheme rules, the imple-
menting instructions, standard forms 
and the calculation programmes ; 
- any other matters referred to it by 
P ACCO or by an administration of 
a co-ordinated organisation. 
(ii) To provide the secretariat for PACCO. In 
this capacity and under the direction of the 
chairman of P ACCO, the head of the section 
shall: 
(a) prepare and circulate the agenda and 
minutes of the meetings ; 
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(b) prepare and circulate in time to permit 
prior study all documents required by 
the committee, particularly in com-
pliance with pa·ragraph 4.A. (i) (b) ; 
(c) prepare proposals for amendments to 
the pension scheme rules and/or imple-
menting instructions ; 
(d) prepare, as required, draft agreements 
to be concluded by the co-ordinated 
organisations for the inward and 
outward transfer of pension rights in 
application of the provisions of Article 
12 of the pension scheme rules. 
B. Additional tasks performed on behalf of some 
organisations 
For those co-ordinated organisations which 
decide to delegate to it specific tasks relating to 
the monthly pension computation after final 
assessment, the section shall in particular : 
(i) ·receive from the co-ordinated organisa-
tions and register data regarding 
persons entitled to pensions ; · 
(ii) calculate the amount of individual 
pensions, allowances and tax adjust-
ments and deductions from pension 
benefits, if any ; 
(iii) communicate the result to the entitled 
person, to the organisation concerned 
and, as provided for by Article 42 
of the pension scheme rules, to the 
member country ; 
(iv) draw up the lists required by each 
co-ordinated organisation for making 
the monthly pension payments ; 
(v) draw up the lists required for recover-
ing from the member countries tax 
·adjustment disbursements made by the 
co-ordinated organisations ; transmit 
these lists to the organisation respons-
ible for reclaiming funds from member 
countries concerned ; 
(vi) provide the data required by each 
co-ordinated organisation for working 
out the annual pensions budget for 
the following year ; 
( vii) maintain full historical records of 
personal, administrative and financial 
data of pensioners, including that 
pertaining to persons entitled to defer-
red pensions. 
C. Supplementary tasks delegated by some organ-
isations - Payment of pensions 
The section shall furthermore carry out the 
task of paying pensions, allowances and tax 
adjustments in the name and on behalf of any 
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organisation which shall remit to it in written 
form a separate delegation of power to this 
effect. 
m. Organisation of the section 
5. The staff of the section shall be organised 
in three units : pension study unit, pension 
computation unit I and pension computation 
unit II. 
6. The pension study unit, located at OECD, 
shall carry out all tasks specified in II.A. above. 
The unit will be responsive to the requirements 
of all the co-ordinated organisations in its area 
of responsibility. The head of the section shall 
be responsible for the work of the unit to the 
standing committee of Secretaries-General. He 
will receive from the chairman of that committee 
general direction and detailed directives neces-
sary for the organisation of the unit's work, the 
priorities to be observed, assignments to be 
carriled out, etc. 
7. Pension computation unit I, located at 
OECD headquarters, shall carry out all tasks 
specified in II.B. above for such co-ordinated 
organisations as delegate those tasks to the unit. 
Where a separate delegation has been made in 
written form by an organisation, this unit shall 
carry out the additional tasks specified in II.C. 
above. The head of the section shall be respons-
ible for the work of the unit through the 
standing committee of Secretaries-General to the 
Secretary- or Director-General of each organ-
isation from which delegation has been received. 
Further, where any delegaJtion of powers has 
been made, the section shall be subject to the 
internal and external financial controls of the 
organisation from which delegation has been 
received. 
8. Pension computation unit II, located at 
NATO headquarters, Brussels, shall carry out 
all tasks specified in II.B. above for all NATO 
bodies. In addition, if so decided, it shall carry 
out the tasks specified in II.C. above. It shall be 
responsible to the Dirootor of Management at 
NATO headquarters, Brussels, and shall form an 
integral part of the NATO international staff. It 
shall be responsive to the technical direction of 
the head of the joint pensions administrative 
section and to the requirements of the heads o.f 
all NATO bodies in its area of responsibility. It 
shall be subject to the internal and external 
financial controls of NATO. 
9. The staff of the pension study unit and of 
pension computation unit I shall be attached to 
and form part of the OECD and shall come 
under the authority of the head of personnel 
services of that organisation for all administra-
tive purposes. The staff of pension computation 
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unit 11 shaLl be attached to and form part of the 
NATO international staff and shall come under 
the authority of the head of personnel services 
of that organisation for all administrative 
purposes. All units shal1 be subject to the staff 
rules and regulations of the organisation to 
which they are attached, and shall be bound by 
professional secrecy in the performance of their 
duties. 
10. In view of their responsibilities to a1l co-
ordinated organisations, staff members of the 
pension study unit shall be : 
(i) recruited through open competition 
from staff serving in all of the co-
ordinated organisations as well as else-
where; and 
(ii) if occupying an A-grade post, confirmed 
in their appointments by all Secretaries/ 
Director-General of the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
IV. Budget of the section 
11. Draft budget estimates of the section, 
including detailed indications of the establish-
ment necessary for the operation of each unit 
for the forthcoming year, with the appropriate 
justification where necessary, shaH be submitted 
to the standing committee of Secretaries-General. 
The standing committee of Secretaries-General, 
after consideration of these budget estimates, 
shall make any amendments to them deemed 
necessary in the light of the duties to be 
performed on behalf of all or any of the co-
ordinated organisations. 
12. The draft budget estimates, after approval 
by the standing committee of Secretaries-General, 
shall be transmitted to the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee for its opinion. 
13. The opinion of the Co-ordinating Committee 
on the draft budget estimates of the section shall 
be communicated. to the standing committee of 
Secretaries-General which shall, if appropriate, 
revise them, having due regard to such opinion. 
14. The draft budget estimates of the section, to 
which shall be attached as annex the opinions 
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of the Co-ordinating Committee, shall then be 
incorporated, as appropriate, in the draft 
budgets of the OECD and NATO for submission 
to their budget committees, and approved by the 
Councils of those organisations as provided in 
their financial regulations. 
V. Distribution of the budgetary cost of the 
section 
15. The costs of the section will be divided for 
any given financial year : 
( i) as to the actual cost of the pension 
study unit, among all co-ordinated 
organisations in proportion to the total 
number of their authorised posts at 
30th June of the preceding year. The 
contribution of any one co-ordinated 
organisation shall, however, not exceed 
40 % of the total expenditure ; 
(ii) as to the actual cost of pension compu-
tation unit I, among such co-ordinated 
organisations that delegate powers to 
the unit in regard to tasks set out in 
II.B. above in proportion to the total 
number of persons shown in their books 
as being entitled to immediate or defer-
red pension benefits at 30th June of 
the preceding year. However, should 
any organisation request the unit to 
carry out any such additional work as 
foreseen in II.C. above, its share will 
be augmented by increasing the number 
of such persons by 10 % ; 
(iii) as to the actual c<l'Jt of pension compu-
tation unit 11, by NATO. 
16. The contribution of each organisation, calcu-
lated on the basis of the draft budget estimates 
for each year, shall be entered in the draft 
budget of each co-ordinated organisation. If it 
appears on the completion of the financial year 
that the actual expenditure of operating the 
section has exceeded or fallen short of the budget 
estimates, any necessary adjustment upward or 
downward shall be made in the next ensuing 
budget after the financial year in which such 
expenditure has been incurred. 
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Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 1st January 1976 by countries 
Co-ordinated Organisations Obsarvar 
NATO 
Council Grand Countries OECD Total ESA WEU ECMWF 1 of Europe Secretariat NATO ·SHAPE Total Agancias SHAPE 
Milit Com. 
A·L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A·l B-C ALBC A-l B-C ALBC A·l B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A·L B-C ALBC 
----------
----------------
-- ---- ------------ ----
----
--0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
-- ------ -- ------ --
-------------------- -- ---- ----
--
-- --
Germany 152 122 274 36 77 113 188 199 387 152 115 267 340 314 654 
Belgium 1 1 2 445 988 1433 126 183 309 571 1171 1742 1 
- 1 573 1172 1745 
Canada 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Denmark 5 17 22 5 17 22 5 17 22 
Spain 1 - 1 1 - 1 
United States 2 
- 2 10 1 11 1 - 1 11 . 1 12 4 - 4 17 1 18 
France 616 1008 1624 266 456 722 85 160 245 85 160 245 158 156 314 43 61 104 1168 1841 3009 
Italy 4 8 12 79 249 328 71 158 229 150 407 557 17 35 52 171 450 621 
Japan 2 
- 2 2 - 2 
Luxembourg 130 533 663 130 533 663 130 533 663 
Norway 19 56 75 19 56 75 19 56 75 
Netherlands 164 319 483 164 319 483 606 302 908 770 621 1391 
Portugal 2 3 5 1 - 1 3 3 6 3 3 6 
United Kingdom 6 6 12 4 2 6 10 8 18 12 33 45 50 25 75 72 66 138 
Turkey and Greece 47 74 121 47 74 121 47 74 121 
-- ------ ------ --
--------
------------------------
------
Grand Total 624 1016 1640 267 457 724 909 2062 2971 475 886 1361 1384 2948 4332 939 608 1547 55 94 149 50 25 75 3319 5148 8467 
1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
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Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Organisations Observer 
Member countries Council 
OECD of Europe NATO ESA WEU ECMWF
1 
EUROPE 
Germany ............. X X X X X X 
Austria ............... X X X 
Belgium .............. X X X X X X 
Cyprus ............... X 
Denmark ............. X X X X X 
Spain ................ X X X 
Finland ............... X X 
France ............... X X X X X X 
Greece ................ X X X X 
Ireland ............... X X X 
Iceland ............... X X X 
Italy ................. X X X X X 
Luxembourg .......... X X X X 
Malta ................ X 
Norway .............. X X X 
Netherlands ........... X X X X X X 
Portugal .............. X X X 
United Kingdom ...... X X X X X X 
Sweden ............... X X X X 
Switzerland ........... X X X X 
Turkey ............... X X X X 
Yugoslavia ............ X 
AMERIOA 
Canada ............... X X 
United States ......... X X 
AsiA 
Japan ................ X 
AusTiALA.sa 
Australia ............. X 
New Zealand •......... X 
ToTAL •••••••••••••••••• 24 18 15 10 7 16 
1. European Centre for Medium·Range Weather Forecasting. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on application satellites 
Considering the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might result in the Soviet Union 
occupying a. dominating technological position with dangerous consequences in the economic, political and 
military fields ; 
Aware that the United States space efforts are levelling off and that decisions are not being taken 
for a detailed long-term United States space programme; 
Convinced that the European space policy to be defined in the near future should take into account 
the danger which might result from this world situation ; 
Considering the vast industrial potential which has been developed during the last fifteen years 
and especially since 1971 when the space applications programme started; 
Taking into account the need to provide maruend with knowledge of and the means to attenuate 
the consequences of drought, energy shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member states: 
A. To instruct ESA to study the possibility of: 
(i) establishing a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data. gathered 
by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined ; 
(ii) building a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity; 
and to release the financial means necessary for these studies ; 
B. To indicate at the next ESA Council meetings which elements of ESA's draft spacelab follow-on 
development programme are to be carried out ; 
C. To prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and 
their financial implications and to have a draft long-term budget drawn up, inter alia to ensure, in the 
future, the existence of a study group to draw up a coherent programme ; 
D. In the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and in its sub-committees, 
to afford strong support to steps to oblige states launching satellites, in addition to measures governing 
security and the provision of mutual assistance, to accept specific commitments to provide information 
about their satellites which have sources of nuclear energy on board. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Since your Rapporteur had to submit his 
first report on application satellites 1 to the 
Committee on 2nd March 1978, he is now grati-
fied to be able to submit a follow-up report to 
take into account the developments of signifi-
cance which have taken place since the begin-
ning of the year. Important meetings of the ESA 
Council and the communications satellites pro-
gramme board were held in March, April, June 
and October 1978. 
2. During the spring meetings, approval was 
given to undertake the building of a second 
maritime communications sateJlite, Marots B. 
Two operational satellites, ECS 1 and 2, will 
be built for intra-European telephone, telegraph 
and telex communications and television relay. 
As already mentioned during the debate on the 
first report, the ESA Council also approved the 
building of a first series of five operational 
Ariane launchers. 
3. Your Rapporteur regrets that the Council 
has still not been able to adopt a firm three-year 
budget for the expenditure of the European 
Space Agency apart from the budgets for 
optional programmes. Part of the agency's fin-
ances is still covered by what is known as "one-
twelfth financing". Consequently, the stability 
of the agency is not fully assured and no reason-
able planning for the next few years is possible. 
This ia the more serious as the agency needs to 
project its long-term goals up to the year 2000. 
4. The lack of long-term planning impedes the 
promotion of European-United States co-opera-
tion in advanced technology projects, the need 
for which was advocated unanimously in the 
recommendation on United States-European co-
operation and competition in advanced techno-
logy 2• NASA has not yet spelt out its long-term 
plans either. 
5. One of the most important projects men-
tioned in the report on United States-European 
co-operation and competition in advanced tech-
nology 3 concerns the building of solar power 
satellites. The building of such satellites could 
eventually contribute to re-establishing a sound 
economy based on Europe's own energy resources. 
The advent of the space shuttle, the reusable 
manned space vehicle, is a significant first step 
towards the possibility of building solar power 
satellites. 
1. Document 766. 
2. Document 773, 17th May 1978. 
3. Document 773, paragraph 142. 
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6. New applications of satellites can now be 
envisaged which were not feasible with expend-
able rockets. Routine trips to low earth orbit 
aboard the shuttle mean that solar power satel-
lites could be installed on a sufficiently large 
scale to provide an electrical capacity which 
would meet future European requirements. New 
applications in communications, remote sensing 
of the earth's resources, and monitoring of 
weather, climate and the environment are also 
within reach. New scientific activities can also 
be planned. 
7. However, there will be no long-term plan-
ning if the Council, at its meetings, cannot even 
adopt the three-year budget of the European 
Space Agency. The Council should meet at 
ministerial level and try to establish a compre-
hensive European space policy and formulate 
specific goals for the coming decades. 
8. Your Rapporteur believes that in the 1980s 
a global information system should be developed 
in which the data gathered by remote sensing, 
environmental and meteorological satellites 
should be brought together. Such a system would 
provide mankind with invaluable knowledge 
about such physical problems as drought, energy 
shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters. 
Enhanced communications techniques using a 
large antenna in space would provide many new 
services. The experience gained in developing 
these systems, including the assembling of large 
structures in space, would be directly appli-
cable to more advanced projects such as space-
based energy systems and space industrialisation. 
9. Apart from these peaceful activities, it is 
not excluded that space might assume an even 
more important place than it now has in the 
military arms race. Military competition in space 
is already being discussed in bilateral talks bet-
ween the Soviet Union and the United States; 
whether they can stop this competition depends 
on the outcome of the SALT discussions. If these 
are successful, all nations capable of operating 
in space should be included in a treaty following 
the treaty on principles governing the activities 
of states in the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies 1• 
I. Applications programmes 
(a) Historical review 
10. The European Space Research Organisation 
(ESRO) started a number of applications pro-
1. See Document 388. 
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grammes but none became operational during 
ESRO's existence. The organisation's original 
mission, as set forth in the ESRO Convention, 
was to provide for and promote collaboration in 
space research and technology. The programme 
thus defined was implemented through scientific 
satellites and sounding rockets. 
11. However, in the middle of the 1960s the 
growing importance of application satellites, par-
ticularly in communications, became evident, 
especially to the European Conference on Satel-
lite Telecommunications (CETS), which requested 
ESRO to conduct a six months' study on experi-
mental television distribution satellites. This and 
following studies determined that Europe was 
technically capable of carrying out an applied 
research programme in communications satellites. 
12. The presence of three European space 
organisations, ESRO, ELDO and CETS, rendered 
the decision-making machinery so cumbersome 
that no definite decisions could be taken. How-
ever, when the European Space Conference came 
into being with regular meetings at ministerial 
level, some progress became possible. 
13. In 1968, the decision was taken to allocate 
some modest sums for studies in application satel-
lites. These studies were to assess the economic 
and technological aspects of application satellite 
projects such as meteorological satellites and 
satellites for air and sea traffic control. The 
study group formed by the Ministers was given 
the task of defining a European communications 
satellite programme capable of meeting the 
requirements of the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU) and the European Conference on 
Posts and Telecommunications (CEPT). It was 
considered that Europe would have no future in 
space if it failed to concern itself with applica-
tion satellites. 
14. The first launch of a telecommunications 
satellite was planned for between 1978 and 1980. 
At the same time preliminary studies were under-
taken on an aeronautical satellite system which 
would be developed jointly by the United States 
and ESRO and, finally, a feasibility study was 
made of a European meteorological satellite. 
These three study programmes were the focal 
point of European efforts in space applications 
at that time and the studies were funded to the 
tune of approximately 1.9 million accounting 
units. Strong ties were established between ESRO 
and potential users. 
15. The formal start of the ESRO applications 
programme took place in 1971 when the ESRO 
Council agreed on a European space programme 
in which applications activities would be given 
adequate consideration. 
16. ESRO's resolution of 20th September 1971 
on the reform of the organisation gave details of 
the new European space programme : 
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(1) a joint aeronautical programme to be 
undertaken with the United States and 
Canada by Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
with a budget not to exceed 100 MAU ; 
(2) a meteorologica:l statellite programme to 
be undertaken by Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the United King-
dom with a budget not to exceed 115 
MAU; and 
(3) la communications satellite programme 
complying with the requirements of the 
CEPT and EBU undertaken in an 
experimental phase followed by an 
operational phase by Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom with a budget 
not to exceed 100 MAU. 
17. A fourth applications project for ESRO 
was Marots, a satellite designed to study mari-
time navigation. The United Kingdom was the 
prime sponsor of the project, other participants 
being Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden. The decision to undertake the 
Marots programme was facilitated by the fact 
that Marots would use the modular platform 
being developed for the orbital test satellite pro-
gramme (OTS), which was to be a forerunner 
of the future European communications satel-
lites. By using a design developed for another 
satellite, Marots was expected to be ready for 
launching six months after the launching of 
OTS. The total cost of the Marots progra:nppe \ 
was estimated at not more than 75 million 
accounting units at 1973 prices. It was consi-
dered possible to carry out this concept of 
developing families of satellites which could eco-
nomically use the same structure for different 
purposes. 
18. ESRO's activities in 1973 and 1974 were 
characterised by further definition of the four 
major applications programmes. During this time 
ESRO introduced the concept of allowing finan-
cial participation in special projects to the degree 
a member state was interested, rather than 
requiring participation according to the fixed 
scale ESRO had set up for support of its man-
datory programme. This facilitated participation 
by member states in the various programmes ; 
thus the Netherlands joined the OTS programme 
in 1973, and in 1974 the Netherlands and Sweden 
joined the Marots programme, as did Norway 
which is not an ESRO member country. 
19. In the middle of 1975 when the European 
Space Agency came into being, ESRO's Marots 
and OTS programmes were in the development 
stage and Aerosat and Meteosat design definition 
were being finalised. 
20. In addition to the four major applications 
programmes, ESRO conducted many studies on 
possible applications activities in diverse fields : 
specialised telecommunications missions, televi-
sion and sound broadcasting, definition of remote 
sensing technology and meteorological applica-
tions. These studies explored the future possi-
bilities of developing applications technologies. 
21. From the very beginning, the applications 
programmes were definitely international in out-
look. Aerosat was an international programme 
from the very beginning with the United States 
and Canada as partners. Meteosat will. become 
an important element of the World Weather 
Watch with satellites from Japan, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. A co-operative pro-
gramme between Europe and Canada was opera-
tive with the Canadian communications tech-
nology satellite (CTS) for which Europe provided 
certain advanced technical equipment. This 
satellite was launched in 1976. European interest 
in the CTS programme was to have a mechanism 
to test on-board equipment for possible use in 
the orbital test satellite (OTS) and the European 
communications satellite (ECS). 
22. When the International Maritime Consul-
tative Organisation (IMCO) discussed the possi-
bilities of maritime application satellites, Europe 
sent its observers as it was very interested in 
the establishment of a world-wide network of 
maritime satellite communications. IMCO is the 
United Nations agency which studied the charac-
teristics and operational requirements of a mari-
time mobile satellite system. Once this study 
was completed, in the spring of 1975 IMCO 
organised a conference in London called the 
intergovernmental conference on the establish-
ment of an international maritime satellite 
system (Inmarsat). One of the items on the 
agenda was the establishment of a permanent 
Inmarsat organisation comparable to the inter-
national telecommunications satellite organisa-
tion (Intelsat), which would develop and admin-
ister the space segments of the maritime commu-
nications satellite but not its fixed land-based 
terminals. The Inmarsat convention was con-
cluded on 3rd September 1976 and is now open 
for signature but has not yet come into force. 
(b) Orbital test satellite (OTS) programme 
23. In describing present-day programmes your 
Rapporteur will discuss respectively - and in 
the same order as in his first report -the orbital 
test satellite programme, the communications 
satellite programme, the Meteosat programme, 
the earth resources programme and, in separate 
chapters, military application satellites, spacelab 
and the Ariane launcher. 
24. As indicated in his first report, the OTS 
is an experimental telecommunications satellite 
and is described as a stabilised programme with 
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sun-oriented solar arrays. The satellite is built 
on the modular concept with a service module 
carrying the service's payloads. The communi-
cations module can be adapted to carry alter-
native payloads without major redesign and the 
service module can carry other payloads without 
costly redesign. The structure is furthermore 
designed to accommodate a weight heavier than 
that required for the OTS programme. 
25. The first OTS launch failed due to the 
explosion of the Thor-Delta rocket. The second 
OTS was launched from Cape Canaveral on 12th 
May and reached its final position on 25th May 
1978. On 7th July 1978, ESA confirmed that the 
OTS-2 was functioning correctly. The satellite 
could operate for more than five years. 
26. At the end of October 1978 the satellite will 
be placed at the disposal of its users, i.e. the 
national telecommunications administrations, 
originally organised in the European Conference 
on Posts and Telecommunications and now in 
a new organisation called Eutelsat. Eutelsat has 
two Councils : one for maritime and one for 
fixed communications. Another important user 
will be the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) 
which will use the TV relay service from the 
satellite. The experimental pr.ogramme will con-
sist for the most part of telephone and television 
routing tests, propagation experiments and a 
variety of experiments connected with new com-
munications satellite applications in Europe, 
including the semi-direct broadcasting of tele-
vision programmes. 
(c) European communications satellite programme 
27. The European communications satel]jte will 
be an operational version of the OTS. One spe-
cific experiment is particularly worth mention" 
ing, i.e. the high-speed transmission of data bet-
ween the European high energy physics labora-
tories. This experiment is partly financed by 
the Commission of the European Community 
and, in addition to the European Space Agency 
and CERN, groups French, British, German and 
Italian laboratories. This experiment is Europe's 
first test of computer-to-computer liaison by 
satellite and opens the way to major develop-
ments. 
28. As currently planned, the ECS is expected 
to be able to carry a large portion of the ever-
increasing intra-European telephone, telegraph 
and telex traffic and to relay Eurovision pro-
grammes. The ESA Council and the communica-
tions satellite programme board approved the 
production of two operational satellites, the ECS 
1 and EOS 2, for intra-European telephone, tele-
graph and telex communications and television 
relay. Only minor modifications to the OTS will 
be necessary as far as the vehicle is concerned. 
There will of course be major modifications to 
the payload. The two flight modeJs and the 
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stand-by model will cost some $100 million. It 
is estimated that the satellites, as currently 
. designed, will be operational for up to seven 
years. 
29. As your Rapporteur stated in his earlier 
report 1, the overall communications satellite pro-
gramme was based on the expansion of existing 
programmes and was composed of four elements : 
(i) completion of the initial two-satellite ECS 
mission ; (ii) operational extension of the Marots 
programme; (iii) a research and development 
programme starting in 1979-80 to keep ESA 
abreast of the latest deveLopments in satellite 
communications; and (iv) the development of a 
heavy platform with a payload primarily devoted 
to the development of direct television broad-
casting. 
30. The research and development programme 
preparing the next stage in space application 
technology has been adopted by the member 
countries of ESA, with the exception of France 
and Germany which still have separate national 
research and development programmes in this 
field. 
31. The purpose of developing the heavy plat-
form is to provide an alternative television and 
broadcasting network for countries which do not 
have elaborate ground commlliD.ication and broad-
casting infrastructures and whose sparse popu-
lations cannot be economically served by stan-
dardised earth stations. The system is considered 
to be complementary to the ECS programme 
which is designed primarily to meet the high-
density telecommunications requirements of 
Western Europe. The implementation of the 
whole · telecommunications programme might 
place European industry in a strong position to 
offer highly-flexible satellite communications 
systems to the many new markets which are now 
appearing in the third world. 
32. The impetus for a European maritime .com-
munications satellite programme came from the 
involvement of the European nations in shipping 
activities. Existing communications at sea can 
be quite slow and unreliable and the European 
nations involved in shipping felt the need for 
a faster and more reliable communications 
system. 93 % of all messages are sent by tele-
graph and it takes about six hours for a message 
to reach a ship and an additional six hours for 
the reply to be received. 
33. The United Kingdom agreed to undertake 
the major financial share of the Marots pro-
gramme and therefore two United Kingdom firms 
were awarded the prime contract for the main 
platform and the main payload. 
1. Document 766, paragraph 16. 
72 
34. The Marots programme was changed in 
1974 when its original geostationary position 
over the Atlantic was shifted considerably. The 
American Marisat satellite will be obsolete in 
1981 and a new global system will then be set 
up. This could be a joint American-European 
venture, established along the lines of Intelsat ; 
an international agreement for this purpose is 
now being discussed. The satellite-to-shore com-
munications frequency also had to be changed in 
response to a request from European postal 
authorities. In order to incorporate the pro-
gramme in the overall European communications 
satellite system its name has been changed to 
Marecs (maritime European communications 
satellite). 
35. The Aerosat programme - a joint under-
taking by ESA, Canada and the United States 
- was abandoned at the end of 1977 as the 
American Federal Aviation Agency did not wish 
to spend any more money on it. It also .appeared 
that the airlines were not inclined to use a world-
wide operational system of air traffic control 
by satellite. The development of air traffic 
brought in large-capacity wide-bodied air-
craft and not the expected multiplication of 
small-bodied aircraft. With fewer rather than 
more aircraft in operation, the use of an aeronau-
tical satellite became less urgent. 
(d) Meteosat programme 
36. The meteorological satellite programme con-
sists of tWIO identical satellites the first of which 
was launched from Cape Canaveral on 23rd 
November 1977. The principal mission objectives 
of Meteosat are the following : 
(1) imaging of the earth's surface and 
cloud system simultaneously at visible 
and infrared wavelengths, every half-
hour, and transmission to earth of the 
raw data; 
(2) dissemination of the processed data in 
suitable formats from the Meteosat 
ground facilities via the satellite to the 
data users' stations ; 
(3) collection by the satellite and relay to 
the ground of data from drifting or 
fixed sea- or land-based sensor plat-
forms (interrogated or self-timed) or 
from a polar orbiting satellite. 
37. There are two aspects to the mission of 
Meteosat : (i) meeting the scientific requirements 
of European meteorologists and of the interna-
tional conduct of global meteorological research 
through GARP (the global atmospheric research 
programme) of the World Meteorological Organ-
isation, and (ii) allowing meteorological data to 
be applied in weather forecasting. A third aspect 
of Meteosat's mission is that it will help the 
growth of the World Weather Watch surface 
observation network by providing a reliable tele-
communications link to any ground station. 
38. Although it will have operational applica-
tions, Meteosat is experimental in the sense that 
it is a new untried prototype. The fixed position 
of Meteosat in relation to the earth enables it 
to scan the same part of the globe continuously 
and to transmit very quickly information on 
weather developments. The lifetime of the satel-
lite is about five years. The satellite is able to 
detect and image water vapour in the atmos-
phere ; water vapom data are important because 
of the vapour's effect on the whole meteorological 
situation in a given area. This type of observa-
tion also has a bearing on aircraft routing and 
long-range weather forecasting. Meteosat is cur-
rently the only synchronous orbit weather space-
craft to carry the water vapour imaging capa-
bility. Meteosat has an infrared capability as well. 
which also has been used to take photographs of 
Europe and North America. 
39. The second Meteosat satellite will be laun-
ched in 1980. The estimated cost of the whole 
Meteosat programme to completion is some 170 
million accounting units, of which 20 % is being 
paid by France, 24.6 % by Germany, 20 % 
by the United Kingdom, 15% by Italy and the 
rest by the other four participants in the pro-
gramme. The second Meteosat satellite will be 
launched by the third Ariane test launch. 
(e) Earth resources programme 
· 40. The Meteosat programme was the first step 
towards earth observation and the building of 
satellites to detect earth resources by remote 
sensing. Although ESA has shown great interest 
in earth resources satellites Europe has not yet 
defined a programme to achieve an independent 
European remote sensing capability in the earth 
resources field. It was for this reason that the 
recommendation in your Rapporteur's first 
report asked the governments to promote the 
Europeanisation of the French project Spot 
(satellite probatoire d'observatim de la terre), 
after all, the Meteosat programme also started as 
a French national programme. 
41. In its note of 1st December 1976 to the 
United Nations Committee on the peaceful uses 
of outer space, ESA stated that its future plans 
for remote sensing of earth resources were to 
install remote sensing instrumentation in space-
lab, to base pre-operational activity on European 
automatic satellites and to set up a ground 
station system, Earthnet. This system would 
receive, preprocess and distribute remote sensing 
data- initially-from NASA satellites and later 
on from European satellites. 
42. ESA's interest was in the following areas : 
agriculture, water resources management, coastal 
3* 
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zone surveys, monitoring of land use and aid to 
developing countries. The late interest of Euro-
peans in earth observation is understandable as 
much more is known about the surfa&e of Euro-
pean countries than of many other regions. In 
Emope non-space-based centres have been in use 
for a long time and have proved reasonably 
satisfactory. Nevertheless, Europe has specific 
problems in environmental control such as pollu-
tion in the Mediterranean, control of fisheries 
and of the new sea boundaries, etc. It was for 
these reasons that in February 1977 the ESA 
Ministerial Council approved the Earthnet pro-
gramme as an ESA special project and authorised 
the Director General to examine further pro-
posals for a European earth resources satellite 
programme. 
43. The European association of remote sensing 
laboratories was set up in 1976 to promote co-
ordination of European research on various 
aspects of remote sensing for the benefit of all 
mankind, to facilitate the exchange of ideas and 
scientific information between the participating 
institutions and to identify priority sectors in 
remote sensing. 
44. The ESA-Canadian agreement of 1977 
covered the study of remote sensing applications, 
development of microwave remote sensing systems 
and other activities in this field. The creation 
of a European ocean satellite programme is also 
being discussed. 
D. Military application satellites 
45. In his first report your Rapporteur descri-
bed military satellite programmes, especially in 
the United States, and the uses of military appli-
cation satellites. These are used for the following 
tasks: 
(a) reconnaissance ; 
(b) countering enemy satellites ; 
(c) telecommunications ; 
(d) navigation ; 
(e) meteorology ; 
(/) other tasks (radar calibration, survey-
ing, military participation in research 
programmes and manned space flights). 
46. Reconnaissance satellites can be divided into 
photographic reconnaissance satellites, early-
warning satellites and Elint satellites. Photo-
graphic reconnaissance satellites, many of which 
have been launched by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, as well as by China and France, 
use special types of cameras and are programmed 
from ground stations. The disadvantage of this 
type is that they cannot be used when there is 
cloud cover ; through their infrared equipment 
night reconnaissance is, howe.ver, possible. 
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47. Early-warning satellites have the task of 
detecting missile launchings and attacks and are 
able to calculate the missiles' trajectory, thus 
giving the country controlling these satellites the 
time to launch its own missiles. Early-warning 
satellites are also capable of detecting nuclear 
explosions. Only the United States and the USSR 
have this type of satellite. 
48. Elint satellites are used to locate radar 
sources and determine their characteristics and 
possiblities. Radar-equipped ocean observation 
satellites are special reconnaissance satellites. 
49. Interceptor satellites are being tested by the 
Soviet Union, mostly against low-altitude iden-
tification satellites. .As far as is known, the 
United States has not carried out tests with this 
type of satellite. 
50. Military telecommunications satellites are 
so far the most important as they provide the 
safest way for military commands to maintain 
contact with all their units. One of the first 
communications satellites was established by the 
United States navy in the 1950s. The specialised 
technology developed by the military command 
put great emphasis on security and certainty 
under hostile conditions. 
51. The Americans now have the defence satel-
lite communication system (DSCS), and the 
Russians the Molnya system ; both systems have 
geostationary satellites. NATO has a share in 
the American system but also owns its own com-
munications satellites and ground stations to 
link its major commands via satellites. This 
system was considered necessary for the organisa-
tion as secure communications are vital to suc-
cessful military operations, especially when 
efforts involve co-ordination of different forces 
in separate locations. Moreover in NATO there 
are many sovereign states with different lan-
guages and with forces deployed from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to Greenland. 
52. Before NATO had an independent capabi-
lity it shared in the United States defence com-
munications satellite programme and for that 
purpose purchased two transportable ground 
stations : one placed in Casteau in Belgium and 
the other in Naples. In the early 1970s it decided 
to establish its own system and launch several 
communications satellites of the British Skynet 
type. In the second half of the 1970s new satel-
lites with improved capacity were ordered. The 
latest satellites are called the NATO 3-A and 
NATO 3-B satellites; the NATO 3-C will follow 
in 1979 and after. These satellites are expected 
to last seven years ; therefore in the early 1980s 
new orders should be placed and, as indicated 
in the recommendation in your Rapporteur's 
first report, a fair share of those should be 
obtained by the European industries. 
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53. In his first report your Rapporteur has 
already described the Navstar global positioning 
system; navigation satellites are also being used 
to detect the launching of ballistic missiles from 
submarines and to determine the position of air-
craft. 
54. The Federal German navy has chosen the 
compact military satellite navigation system to 
provide some of its frigates with satellite naviga-
tion facilities. The system was designed for 
warships of all types, submarines and maritime 
patrol aircraft. It can be used in all. civilian or 
military activities requiring accurate and imme-
diate knowledge of the position of a moving 
object : control of approaches by sea to national 
territories ; surveillance of the economic zone 
and tanker navigation corridors. It is to be hoped 
that through this system the number of serious 
accidents at sea frequently reported in the press 
will be greatly reduced. 
55. Military meteorological satellites have 
already been mentioned. The United States and 
the USSR also use calibration satellites, especially 
to calibrate particularly important radar systems. 
56. Satellite research programmes for surveys 
and studies of the magnetosphere are also of 
military interest as the results might affect the 
accuracy of launching intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. 
57. Manned spaceflight can be of use for milit-
ary forces : for instance, the cosmonauts on the 
Soviet Soyuz space station, now in operation, can 
perfectly well take photographs of sectors or 
regions of military interest. 
58. According to Annex II of the Aerospace 
Daily of 5th January 1978, in 1977 the Soviet 
Union conducted ninety-eight launchings involv-
ing 105 space vessels, whereas the United States 
launched a total of twenty-three satellites for 
their domestic requirements and seven for other 
countries. Of the Soviet satellites, about two-
thirds are used exclusively for military purposes. 
Military satellites account for some 50 % of the 
American launches. One should take into aooount 
that the American satellites are more complex, 
allow more frequent multiple app1ications and 
can often be used for much longer periods. It 
might be for these reasons ·that the United States 
has launched four times fewer space vessels than 
the Soviet Union. This ratio has been the same 
for many years. 
m. Spacelab 
59. The spacelab development programme 
appears to be on schedule : delivery of the flight 
module to NASA will take place next year and 
in 1980 the first spacelab will be launched aboard 
the shuttle. The prototype of the spacelab payload 
is now in the initial stages of final assembly in 
Germany. This prototype will be built in the 
flight configuration which has a large pressurised 
cabin and two scientific experimental palets 
exposed to the ambient space environment. 
60. The space shuttle orbiter 102 is under final 
assembly at the Rockwell International factory, 
Palmdale, California. The spacecraft should be 
in orbit some time between September and 
December 1979. 
61. As the spacelab development programme is 
phased down, ESA's future plans are for deep 
involvement in spacelab utilisation and produc-
tion, the development of a corps of European 
payload specialists, and extension and evolution 
of spacelab concepts for utilisation in future 
international programmes. 
62. Your Rapporteur wishes to recall here what 
he wrote in his first report on these develop-
ments1: 
"If the spacelab experiment succeeds it will 
mark a new low-cost concept of space explor-
ation and exploitation. A permanent rela-
tionship between Western Europe and the 
United States in the space field will then 
prove essential. 
Europe will have invested some 500 million 
accounting units ($550 million) in the space 
transportation system which will be the basis 
of all great space ventures by the year 2000. 
It is therefore logical and necessary that 
Europe should be intimately associated with 
the space transportation system and its 
further development from the very outset. 
Europe should avoid the situation which 
arose with the post-Apollo programme when 
political decisions were postponed for so long 
that European participation [in the main 
part of the shuttle] came too late. In order 
to take appropriate decisions in time a suffi-
cient research and development programme 
should be established to provide the decision-
making authorities with all the required 
data." 
63. Future European co-operative activities will 
therefore involve utilisation of the spacelab and 
its capabilities. 
64. In addition to its activities through ESA, 
Germany is interested in spacelab utilisation and 
has formed a group to afford commercial sup-
port to spacelab users and to promote interna-
tional use of space1ab capabilities. Except for 
France, no other member countries have an active 
policy for spacelab utilisation. A German space-
lab utilisation working group of interested 
industries and laboratories has been formed and 
a national payload centre to plan for the most 
1. Document 766, paragraphs 67 and 68. 
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economic use of spacelab has been created. One 
of its leading aims is materials research and 
processing technology. 
65. Apart from the German national effort there 
is also the United States national effort. So far, 
however, the United States has not clearly defined 
the future of the spacelab programme. At present 
there is some concern in the United States that 
the shuttle might have excess unused capacity 
which will make its operation less economical. 
Should this situation arise, NASA will probably 
encourage the Europeans and all. potential users 
to make maximum use of the spacelab and shuttle 
and may formulate pricing policies to this end. 
66. At the moment space shuttle reassessment 
being conducted in NASA is close to defining 
a first manned orbital flight goal. When the 
vehicle is considered operational and capable 
of carrying commercial payloads, a decision 
will have to be made on how many - five, 
six or seven - shuttle test flights should be 
made, before an operational capability is declared. 
67. In its 1978 - draft - spacelab follow-on 
development programme, ESA has stated that a 
certain degree of programme continuity is essen-
tial to preserve the teams of engineers and other 
manpower and the valuable European know-how 
acquired in this field. From the very beginning 
ESA anticipated that co-operation between the 
United States and Europe would continue with 
increased sharing of responsibilities. There were 
several ESA-N.ASA co-ordination and working 
meetings in 1977 and 1978. One of these groups 
was especiall.y concerned with new mission appli-
cations, advanced concepts for space exploration 
and attractive avenues for future space utilisa-
tion possibilities. 
68. A spacelab follow-on development programme 
is therefore the next logical step for Europe in 
order to allow it to maintain its role in man-
ned space flights. The European objectives, poli-
tical and economic as well as industrial, should 
be to continue p·articipation in manned space 
activities in co-operation with the United States 
and to share in the use of the space shuttle and 
complementary new systems. It is to be hoped that 
the United States Government will also prepare 
the forward planning for the NASA activities. 
69. One motivation for continuous participation 
in manned space activities is to maintain the 
potential of participating in important commer-
cial application activities which may devolve from 
the spacelab utilisation programme. One such 
example is the space solar power satellite which 
might be capable of generating and transmitting 
to earth electrical energy in the gigawatt range. 
This would mean that habitation and working 
stations in space would have to be buiLt to sup-
port construction activities. 
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70. The ESA Council will therefore soon have 
to take important decisions on its medium- and 
long-term programmes. 
71. At the last Ministerial Council meeting the 
figure of 350 million accounting units was sug-
gested and more or less accepted by the Council. 
On the basis of this figure the future program-
mes shou1d therefore be established. 
IV. Ariane launcher 
72. As in his first report, your Rapporteur 
wishes to record here too the developments con-
cerning the Ariane launcher as ,they are of such 
great importance for the whole of European 
space co-operation. The present situation is that 
the 1979 launch dates will be met and, if all goes 
well, the Europeans will at last have an inde-
pendent launch capability for their scientific and 
applied satellites. 
73. The launches "\\ill take place at Kourou in 
French Guiana. The first four Ariane launches 
will be test launches and are planned for 15th 
June 1979, 15th December 1979, 15th May 1980 
and 15th October 1980 respectively. The first 
launch will be without a satellite but the other 
three offer the possibility of free launches for 
those who wish to entrust their satellites to these 
launches. 
74. The decision concerning the launcher of the 
last three of the seven Intelsat V spacecraft will 
be of major importance. Will this be done by the 
shuttle, and Atlas Centaur launcher, or by 
Ariane? 
75. Between 1980 and 1984 five European satel-
lites will be launched : two European communi-
cations satellites and Marots B, the scientific 
European satellite Exosat and the French obser-
vation satellite Spot. These five Ariane launches 
will of course be operational. If a decision is 
taken to build the hea yy experimental satellite 
then a sixth launch by Ariane is assured. Six other 
launches which ESA hopes to obtain are those of 
the last three Intelsat V satellites and the three 
Anik C satellites for the Canadian telecommuni-
cations network. Should this come about, the 
four test launches would be followed by twelve 
operational launches within some forty months. 
76. Eurospace (the association of Europea;n in-
dustries interested in the promotion of civilian 
space projects) ha;s made a market study indicat-
ing that of the 200 geostationary satellites to be 
launched in the next fourteen years, the Ariane 
launchers could be used to put into orbit 
between sixteen and sixty-two satellites. 
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V. Conclusions 
77. At the end of this year, ESA's programme 1 
will be the culmination of fourteen years of joint 
European space activities. During that period 
European co-operative space invol'Vement ha;s in-
creased considerably and has changed in cha-
racter in three major ways : first, the structure 
for collective European space activities has been 
consolidated and strengthened in ESA; second, 
European collaborative space activities were 
originally oriented solely towards scientific ende-
avours wherea;s now the applications program-
mes, spacelab and Ariane included, account for 
over 80% of the budget; third, resources for 
purely national programmes have been reduced 
in favour of European collaborative ventures. 
78. It seems clear that ESA will continue its 
involvement in applications programmes, both to 
ensure the availability of services to the member 
states and to establish the European space 
industry as a commercial source of utilisation 
of space_ applications throughout the world. 
79. There is much uncertainty a;s to whether 
ESA's member states will be willing to maintain 
an appropriate level of financing for future 
space activities. Both the spacelab and Ariane 
programmes are now reaching completion and a 
follow-on development programme is required. 
ESA's proposed budget for the three-year period 
1978-80 averages some $500 million per year 2 and 
it remains to be seen what ESA's future finances 
will be. It is on these that its future programme 
depends. 
80. Your Rapporteur wishes to stress the con-
tinuing high level of Soviet space efforts which 
might lead to the Soviet Union occupying a dom-
inating technological position which eventually 
might be translated into economic and military 
domination of the western world. European space 
policy to be defined in the near future should 
take account of this danger and the following 
essential policy criteria: (i) there should be con-
tinuity in space policy, a;s should be apparent to 
all concerned; (ii) the policy should be flexible 
enough to take full advantage of new scientific 
and technological developments; (iii) the policy 
should be directly related to major terrestrial 
problems affecting ba;sic human needs. 
81. The decade of the 1980s should lead to a 
more sophisticated world-wide communications 
network, earth and ocean resources discovery 
and/or m'Onitoring, weather forecasting and the 
prediction of natural disasters. 
82. In the scientific field, the exploration of the 
solar system a;nd outer space through manned 
and unmanned missions should be continued and 
accelerated. 
1. See Appendix I - Programmes and activities of 
the European Space Agency. 
2. See Appendix II - ESA's 1977 budget and con-
tributions. 
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APPENDIX I 
Programmes and activities of the European Space Agency 
I. The scientific programme 
-1. Scientific satellites 
Oos-B - llllSSion: gamma rays; launch 
date : 9th August 1975. 
Geos-1 - mission: magnetosphere; launch 
date : 20th April 1977 (satellite placed in too 
low an orbit due to a malfunction of its Delta 
2914 launcher). 
ISEE-B - mission : sun-earth ; launch 
date: 22nd December 1977. 
IUE -the international ultraviolet expLorer 
(IUE) satellite, an element of a programme 
undertaken jointly by NASA, ESA and the 
United Kingdom Science Research Council 
(SRC), was launched on 26th January 1978. 
The purpose of this programme is to provide 
the international scientific community with an 
orbiting laboratory for the ultraviolet that can 
be operated from two ground stations (one pro-
vided by ESA) in much the same way as if it 
was an earth-based observatory. 
Geos-.2 - launched into geostationary orbit 
on 14th July 1978 to replace Geos-1, which 
was placed in too low an orbit by its Delta 2914 
launcher in April1977. 
2. Current scientific activity 
Exosat - this satellite, which is due to be 
launched in the first half of 1981 by the Euro-
pean Ariane launcher, will determine the posi-
tion and examine the structure of celestial X-ray 
sources. 
Space telescope - ESA is participating in 
this NASA programme, which provides for the 
operation for at least fifteen years of an observa-
tory in space, placed in orbit by the space shuttle 
in 1983. 
International polar solar mission (IPSM) -
exploration of deep space by two satellites, one 
European and one American, as from 1983. This 
mission will enable the exploration for the first 
time of the solar system's third dimension and 
of the region around the sun into which no space-
craft has yet penettated. 
Space sled - a piece of equipment designed 
to study the vestibular function, which has its 
seat in the inner ear and on which the sense of 
equilibrium in humans and animals depends. It 
will be flown by Spacelab in 1980 and will be 
accelerated (together with its passenger) at well-
defined rates. 
LIDAR (contraction of Light and raDAR) 
-a device designed for the study of the earth's 
atmosphere. By making use of Spacelab, the 
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atmosphere will be actively sounded with power-
ful laser beams at altitudes between 35 and 
120 km. It will be possible to analyse the back-
scattered signaLs by means of a variety of spectro-
photometric devices. 
D. ESA applications satellites 
OTS- mission: communications (pre-opera-
tional satellite) ; launch date and launcher: 14th 
September 1977 (satellite destroyed by explosion 
of its Delta 3914launcher). 
Meteosat-1- mission: meteorology; launch 
date and launcher: 23rd November 1977 (Delta 
2914). 
OTS-.2 - mission : communications (pre-
operational satellite) ; launch date and launcher : 
12th May 1978 (Delta 3914). 
M eteosat-2 - mission : meteorology ; launch 
date and launcher : May 1980 (Ariane). 
Marots-A- mission: maritime communica-
tions ; launch date and launcher : October 1980 
(Ariane). 
EOS-1 - mission : communications (opera-
tional system) ; launch date and launcher: late 
1981 (Ariane). 
Marots-B - mission : maritime communica-
tions ; launch date and launcher : mid-1981 
(Ariane). 
H-SAT- mission: communications (direct 
broadcasting) ; launch date and launcher: 1982 
(Ariane). 
EOS-.2 - mission: communications (opera-
tional system) ; launch date and launcher : 1982 
(Ariane). 
Earth observation 
Meteosat - Meteosat-1, the first European 
meteorological satellite, was launched from Cape 
Canaveral on 23rd November 1977. Every thirty 
minutes, it provides images of the earth and its 
cloud cover produced by a radiometer operating 
in three spectral bands. Once the Meteosat system 
is fully operational, in mid-1978, the information 
thus provided will enable the users (meteorolo-
gists, oceanographers and hydrologists) to 
improve the quality of long-term weather fore-
casts. Meteosat-1 also represents Europe's con-
tribution to the World Weather Watch and 
the Global Atmospheric Research Programme 
(GARP). Meteosat-2 will be launched by the 
third Ariane development flight in May 1980. 
Earthnet - ESA's activities in the remote-
sensing field constitute the Earthnet programme, 
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whose purpose is to build up a European ground 
network for the acquisition, pre-processing and 
dissemination of the images produced by the 
NASA remote-sensing satellites: Landsat 1 and 
2, HCMM, Seasat and Nimbus G. Having thus 
gained access to the data from the American 
satellites, the European users will acquire exper-
ience that will enable them to lay down the bases 
of the future remote-sensing programmes. The 
Earthnet network at presenJt consists of two 
Landsat data-reception stations, located at 
Fucino (Italy) and Kirnna (Sweden). 
In addition, the first Spacelab mission will 
carry remote-sensing instruments, whose data 
will be exploited by European laboratories. 
m. Space transportation systems 
Ariane launcher 
The Ariane launcher is intended to give 
Europe a launch capability for its own applica-
tions and scientific satellites, and to enable it 
to secure a share of the important launcher 
market forecast for the 1980s, estimated at about 
200 geosta.tionary satellites. 
Ariane, designed in particular to place satel-
lites of up to 970 kg in geostationary orbit, will 
be operational at the end of 1980. The four 
development firings in the qualification pro-
gramme are scheduled for June ·and December 
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1979 and May and October 1980, and will be 
carried out from the Ariane launch site located 
within the Guiana Space Centre at Kourou, 
French Guiana. 
At the end of 1977, the ESA member states 
decided to undertake the series production of 
the Ariane European launcher with a first batch 
of five launchers known as the promo~ion series. 
This promotion series will serve to launch ESA 
satellites and satellites belonging to member 
states and non-member states or international 
organisations. 
Spacelab 
Spacelab, a manned and reUS~~~ble space labo-
ratory, developed for ESA by European indus-
try, was designed to be placed in orbit by NASA's 
space shuttle. Up to four persons - scientists, 
engineers and technicians - will be able to work 
in Spacelab for a week to a month at a time. 
Spacelab is the most important programme 
carried out by ESA and NASA in co-operation. 
A total of seventy-six scientific and tech-
nological experiments - sixty European, fifteen 
American and one Japanese - have been chosen 
by ESA and NASA to be carried out on the first 
Spacelab mission, scheduled for late 1980. ESA 
and NASA planned this mission jointly, sharing 
equally the available Spacela.b experiment weight, 
energy and crew time. 
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ESA 's 1911 budget 1911 contributions 
MAU 1 % 
General budget 59.670 Member states 
Scientific budget 67.864 
Meteosat 33.675 
Belgium 4.31 
Denmark 1.44 
OTS 35.317 France 34.25 
Marots 33.671 Germany 27.26 
Aerosat 2.572 
Ariane 133.320 
Spacelab 99.837 
Italy 9.93 
Netherlands 2.91 
Spain 2.40 
Sweden 2.43 
Earthnet 0.804 Switzerland 2.02 
Budgets for new activities United Kingdom 12.71 
yet to be approved 
(as at May 1977) 27.836 Other participants 
Unallocated 0.216 Austria 0.19 
Ireland 0.03 
494.782 Norway 0.12 
100.00 
1. Million accounting units(= EEC accounting units). 
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EEC weather research pr~gramme - 20th October 1978 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Warren (Chair-
man) ; MM. ValZeia;, Lenser (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Adriaensens (Alternate : Peeters), Bernini, Cavaliere 
Oornelissen, Hawkins, Konings (Alternate : Portheilne), 
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LewiB, Malvy, Mart, Miiller, Peronnet, Dr. Phipps 
(Alternate : J esseZ), MM. Pinto, Bohwencke, Talon, Treu, 
Ueberhorst (Alternate: Bohef!Zer), Van Watersohoot. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in itaZioa. 
The .Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on weather (orec1111ting 
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Aware that meteorology for both civil and military purposes is a national responsibility but by defi. 
nition it is an international co-operative science calling for continuous international collaboration ; 
Considering that co-ordination at civil level is conducted in the World Meteorological Organisation, 
its regional organisations and technical commissions and at military level in the NATO meteorological 
group of the Military Committee ; 
Noting that the availability of adequate data on surface weather and upper air conditions over the 
North Atlantic and North and Central Africa is of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe; 
Regretting that the network covering the North Atlantic has been reduced to four stations and that 
the USSR has replaced the United States as an operator of weather ships ; 
Considering ESA's success in pursuing the Meteosat research and development programme and 
convinced that the time is now ripe to urge the users, i.e. the national European meteorological services, 
to launch the operational phase of a European Meteosat system ; 
Aware that civil and military agencies in the United States have to share the same meteorological 
satellites, ocean surveillance satellites and also the space shuttle, but that in Europe, since countries such 
as Sweden and Switzerland take part in the Meteosat programme, this is not possible for political reasons ; 
Considering that the need for a defence meteorological satellite programme nevertheless exists in 
Europe, possibly linked to the NATO communications satellite system, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A. Draw the attention of member governments to the need to provide more reliable meteorological 
information covering the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa by increasing the number of 
observation posts in these areas, and, especially in the North Atlantic, by establishing a network of ocean 
buoys, organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and placing a 
system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit ; 
B. Promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to 
start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system "Eurometsa.t" similar to the 
"Eutelsat" of the European postal authorities; 
C. Afford its active support to the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for 
defence purposes, possibly linked to the domestic United States and NATO satellite programmes, together 
with an appropriate network of mobile ground stations ; 
D. Invite member governments to test existing military meteorological co-ordination by means of more 
frequent exercises to verify the implementation of recommendations made by the meteorological group 
of the NATO Military Committee; 
E. Encourage member states to engage fully in fundamental research so as to understand the mechanism 
which determines weather conditions and climate, as well as the possible disturbances human activities 
can bring about. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawldru~, Rapporteurs) 
Introduction 
1. The implications of weruther and cLimate 
for military :manJOeUV~ amd developments on the 
battlefield are well known. Weather forecasting 
played a major role for instance in the selection 
of the right day for the allied invasi.Oill of the 
European continent in June 1944. 
2. The effects of weatiher and climate on 
mankind, nations, regions and private lives are 
only dimly perceived. ReaJ.ising the importa.nce 
of theiT role, we as parliamentarians wouil.d wish 
to improve our knowliedge and understanding of 
the major causes and mechanisms of climatic 
variations. 
3. With this aim in view, the Committee 
thought it would be useful to study the national 
and international organisations concerned with 
these matters in order to understand the political 
and military aspects of weather services. 
4. For the first time man has come to realise 
the fragile nature of the earth's environment 
with the knowledge that land, sea and air are 
not limitless resources. Can we81ther conditions 
be controlled and modified and if so should we 
try to do so? 
5. Weather fo:recasting aB a public service has 
been known for only a century or so. Initia.llw 
meteorologists were concemed mainly with fore-
casting major storms. The invention of radio-
telegraphy allowed weather reports to be 
gathered from wider areas. After the f:ilrst world 
war, aircraft and balloons equipped with 
instl"'lilllents began to provide regular informa-
tion on the state of the atmosphere 81t higher 
levels. The second world war brought radar to 
the fore capable of providing information on 
clouds and precipitation. Radar was also used in 
locating and tracking thunder-storms and 
tornadoes. 
6. Electronic computers are making a major 
contribution to improving the processing of 
meteorologicaL data and allowed many mathema-
tical problems to be solved which could not 
otherwise be solved within acceptable time-limits. 
7. Since the United States launched its first 
weather satellite Tiros on 1st April 1960 the 
weather has been monitored without inter-
ruption. Space photographs gave meteorologists 
the first global view of weather patterns. Since 
then, satellite control systems, orbital configura-
tions, sensors and data-processing have been 
improved enormously. 
8. Alil major military operations reqlrire 
detailed weather forecasts. Highly specialised 
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forecast:B are needed for air operations in 
darkness, amphibious operations, etc., and the 
importance of military weather forecasting has 
grown at the same Mte as the advancement of 
military technology and meteorological techni-
ques. 
9. On an initiative by the European Com.-
mrmity, a new and independent European 
organisation is being established near Reading 
in the United Kingdom - the European centre 
for medium-roange weather forec:asts 1• 
10. Moreover, in September 1978 the European 
Co:mmission asked the Council of Ministers to 
allow it to conduct a study on climate and 
weather in view of the increasingly extra-
ordinary nature of the woo.ther situation. A 
question to be asked is whether man's inter-
ference through chemical or thermal pollution is 
not one of the causes of these climatic changes 
in recent years - chrunges which, of course, have 
a direct influooce on eaxth ~esources, espooi:a.Iil.y 
agricultural production and water. 
11. The Commission's proposals 2 were accom-
panied by a Hst of e:rtl'laordiina.ry meteorological 
situations since 1960. The list includes extremely 
cold wiln:ters, extreme droughts, wide-scale flood-
ing and other unusual climatic situations. 
12. Your Rapporteurs have been unable to 
provide the Committee in a relatively short time 
with a full picture of the different organisations, 
their workings and possibiilitiles, but hope the 
insight they offer is sufficient to draw some 
political conclusions. 
13. Your Rapporteurs are most grateful to all 
authorities of national ·and inrtel'llJaJtional services 
and organisrutions for their help in preparing 
this report. 
Part I 
(submitted by Mr. CarJaliere, Rapporteur) 
I. World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 
14. Orga.nised internatiiO!nal meteorological co-
operation started in Vienna in 1873 with the 
first international meteorological congress. The 
invent:ilon of the electric telegraph and the 
technological development of meteorology as a 
science, stimulated by the rapid expansion of 
I. See Part II, Chapter VI. 
2. See Appendix. 
international maritime trade, made world-wide 
weather forecasting possible. 
15. Meteorology is by definition an inter-
national co-operative science and continuous 
intemati.onaJ. collaboration is therefore of the 
greatest importance. The world organ]sation in 
its present form was formally established in 
1951 and is a specialised United NatioDB agency. 
The purposes of the organisation are to facilitate 
world-wide co-operation in .the establishment of 
networks of strutions for meteorologiool ·as well 
as hydrologic:al and other geophysical observa-
tions related to meteorology, to promote the 
establishment and maintenance of systems for the 
rapid exchange of meteorological and related 
information, to promote activities in operational 
hydrology and to enooura.ge research and traittling 
in meteorology for improving knowledge of 
weather systems and enhancing we8lther predic-
tion capabilities. · 
16. Membership of the orgarusation is open to 
any state or territory which maintains a 
meteorological service. Nearly 150 countries or 
terrirtories ·are now members. The organisation 
has a technical ·and scientific secretariat which 
enables it to play an important role in support-
ing members of the organisation. The WMO 
seeretariat has about 270 members and some 
sevenJty meteorologists and other scientific or 
technical s1Ja:ff are now employed on a .temporary 
basis to provide technical assistance as requested 
by cOU'lltries. 
17. The dirootors of the national meteorological 
services are directly involved in the technical 
actirv:i!ties of .the organisation. Implementation of 
most of the programmes of the organisation 
depends mainly on the efforts of the countries 
themselves. Adherence to this principle has 
paved the way for a world-wide businesslike 
collaboration am.d for programmes which in fact 
respond to the real needs of the countries them-
selves. 
18. The Congress in which most principal 
delegates are direc:tors of the national meteoro-
logical services meets every four years. Between 
Congresses the executive committee, which con-
sists of twenJty-fo1lil' members, meets annually 
and includes in it~ membership the p'l'esiden.ts 
of the six regional assooiatiJons - Africa, Asia, 
SoUJth America, North and Central America, the 
Sourth-West Pacific and Europe. 
19. The exooutiw committee is, in turn, 
assisted by numerous committees am.d panels of 
experts. In addition there are eight technical 
commissions on which experts of all member 
OOUilltries may serve. 
20. Meteorology has in :recent years m8lde an 
important step forward through the enormous 
technological developments in other technological 
fields, notabLy outer space techniques and high-
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speed elootronic computers. In Deoomber 1961, 
the United Nations General Assembly recognised 
the potenJti:aJ. of space technology Md called upon 
WMO :to make studies which in fact led to the 
development of a single co-ordinated global 
meteorological service, the W orild W OOlther 
Watch (WWW). This is a world-wide metooro-
logiool system composed of the co-ordinated 
national faci:ld.ties and services provided by the 
member countries and 8\lPPlemen.ted by the 
regional and world centres in certain counrtries. 
Its primary purpose is to ensure that all 
members obtain the meteorological observations 
and processed data they require for both their 
operational and research work. 
21. The operational elements of the World 
W.eaJther Watch are the gfi)bal observing system, 
the globaJ. data-processing system and the global 
telecommunication system. 
22. The global observing system provides data 
from satellites and ground-based observation 
stations, merchant ships at sea, commercial air-
Cl'laft etc. There were originally two nations 
whose satellites provided meteorologic'aJ. data : 
the United· States through the Tiros satellites 
and the Soviet Union through iJts Meteor saJtel-
lite system. Recently however the European 
Space Agency and Japan have W.SO provided 
satellites for the global observing system. The 
latest developments will provide for satellites to 
colloot data from ships, buoys, airrc.m:ft and auto-
malted weather balloons. 
23. The globaJ. data-processing system is 
designed to make available to all. the world's 
meteorologicaJl services the processed druta 
11equired for preparing forecasts and warnings 
and for research purposes. The three world 
meteorologiool centres are in Washington, 
Moscow and Melbourne, at which hemisphere 
forecasm are made twioo a day. The one m 
Melbourne has a limited capacity ·and Moscow 
has limited computer facilities. Only Washington, 
Bracknell and Offenbach have very large 
compUJters to process the data and pil'epare fore-
casts for most of the northern hemisphere. In 
·addition there are twenty-three regional meteoro-
logical centres which furnish pl"'CU!Sed data and 
forooasts 8llld analyses on a regional basis. 
Finahly, nearly all members of the world 
organmtion have national meteorological centres 
which satisfy the dasta-processing requirements 
at natiooal revel. 
24. The technical co-operation programmes of 
the world organisation, in particul8lr the 
voluntaey assistance programme, play an impor-
tant pal'lt in enabling the regional and national 
centres to be properly m.an.Ilied and equii>ped. 
In this way they can reap the full benefilt of 
the information obtained. These programmes are 
only established if the donor country and the 
receiving cou;ntry both agree. 
DOCUMENT 785 
25. The third operational element of the World 
Weather Watch is the global telecommunication 
system, a world-wide system for collecting 
weather information and for distributing the 
raw and processed material to the three world, 
twenty-three regional and all national meteoro-
logical centres. It works at three levels : the 
main trunk circuit oonnoots Melbouxne, Moscow 
and Washington and a number of other impor-
tant centres. All re~onal centres are linked to 
the main trunk circuit, and these in turn inform 
the national centres. The regional meteorological 
centres in Europe are at Bracknell (United King-
dom), Offenbach (Germany), Rome (Italy) and 
Norrkoping, near Stockholm (Sweden). 
26. With satellite data-processing and com-
munications systems the World Weather Watch 
provides continuous information on cloud cover, 
both day and night, snow and ice cover and 
information on temperature and water vapour. 
In addition, many of the satellites are equipped 
with automatic picture transmission equipment 
which allows immediate transmission of satellite 
data. These transmissions can be received by 
any country over which the satellite is passing 
by means of a simple ground receiver. This is 
of great value, especially in areas where con-
ventional meteorological observing systems have 
not yet been fully developed. 
27. In 1967, the WMO and the lntemationa.l 
Council of Scientific Unions decided with the 
blessing of the United Nations to establish a 
global atmospheric research programme (GARP). 
The two major objectives of this progra.mttl.e 
are to extend the range, scope and accuracy of 
weather forecasts and to gain an improved 
understanding of the physical basis of climate 
and climaJtic fluctuations. Both objectives require 
special investigation of complex physical proces-
ses and observational experiments to formulate 
and test series and models. 
28. For forecasts beyond a few days the atmos-
phere must be treated as a single integrated 
physical system which is global in extent. Over 
a period of days weather events at remote loca-
tions can influence the weather anywhere, thus 
the forecast problems of any nation are closely 
related to those faced by every other nation. 
Furthermore, since a model requires data 
everywhere in its domain, the need for global 
observation is inescapable. The research pro-
gramme is thus essentially a global research 
programme which is of such dimensions that it is 
far beyond the capacity of even the largest 
countries. 
29. The programme started in 1969 with a 
number of regional experiments and the first 
global atmospheric research experiment is to 
be started on 1st December 1978. All countries 
of the world will participate in this exercise. 
For a period of one year the atmospheric con-
ditions of the entire globe will be under observa-
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tion. Never before has such an enormous research 
programme been undertaken. This has been made 
possible through the availability of a satellite 
system consisting of two polar orbiting satellites 
and five geostationary satellites spaced around 
the globe over the equator, two of which will be 
provided by the United States and the other 
three by Japan, the USSR and the European 
Space Agency (through Meteosat). The planning 
and co-ordination of this research programme is 
conducted by the WMO secretariat in Geneva. 
30. Data will also be gathered from ground-
based and airborne sources for the first global 
atmospheric research programme experiment. 
Emphasis will be placed on the development of 
links between these data platforms and certain 
meteorological satellites. 
31. In order to make every effort to assist 
economic planners and decision-makers at 
national and international level to take the right 
decisions at this difficult time for the world 
economic situation, the WMO is also working 
on a plan known as the world climate pro-
gramme. This plan has been launched because 
many important aspects of progress and develop-
ment are highly sensitive to climate and climatic 
fluctuation. On 7th July 1978, the Secretary-
General of the WMO, addressing the second 
regular session of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil of the United Nations, made the following 
remarks concerning the programme : 
"For example the severe drought in the 
Sudano-Sahelian region a few years ago 
gave rise to a major disaster which shocked 
the whole world ; the problems of deserti-
fication now require urgent attention ; the 
effects of cold spells and dry spells even 
in the most highly developed countries have 
in recent years presented grave problems 
in energy supplies and distribution and 
have seriously affected agricultural output. 
In many cases it is indeed the hard-earned 
progress that has been achieved in economic 
development which renders the economy 
more VUJlnerable to climatic fluctuations. 
A further relevant factor is that as a 
result of such progress, especially in indus-
trial development, man's own activities may 
now be influencing the world's climate. 
It is for reasons such as these that WMO, 
two years ago, embarked upon the prepara-
tion of a plan for the world climate pro-
gramme and the planning process has now 
reached an advanced stage. The world 
climate programme will be a comprehensive 
programme which will have several separate 
though interrelated aims. In the first place 
it aims to improve significantly and 
rapidly the advice and information which 
each national meteorological and hydro-
logical service already provides to the 
planners and decision-makers on the 
national level. To this end, the global 
system for the collection and processing 
of the climatic observational data will be 
reviewed and improved. Fortunately other 
existing WMO programmes will assist 
greatly in this process - particularly the 
World Weather Watch and the new 
meteorological geostationary satellite system 
which now encircles the earth and to which 
I referred in my statement to the Council 
a year ago. By using an improved data 
acquisition system and by applying modern 
methods and technology, it is believed that 
much greater assistance can be give to 
economic planners in the individual 
countries. 
Another component of the programme will 
involve a broad study of the impacts of 
climate on human activities, the aim in 
this case being to gain a better understand-
ing of the role of climate in relation to 
environmental and socio-economic systems 
and thereby ultimately to enable individual 
countries to lessen their economic vulnera-
bility to climatic fluctuations. Already 
several climate-sensitive fields have been 
identified for special study under this 
component - namely : energy, agriculture 
and forestry, development of ocean resources, 
ecology and environment, water resources 
use and management, socio-economic 
conditions. Studies and investigations into 
such subjects will clearly involve disciplines 
other than meteorology and hydrology and 
the closest co-operation is envisaged between 
WMO and other international organisa-
tiiOIIS, notably FAO, UNESCO and UNEP 
as well1as non-governmental bodim such as 
the International Council of Scientific 
Unions a.nd the IIllter'llational Institute for 
Applied Systems A.n.alysis. 
Yet another component of the world climate 
programme will deal with research on 
climate change and variability. The main 
objectives of this work will be to study the 
predictability of climate behaviour and the 
sensitivity of climate to external influ-
ences - whether natural or anthropogenic. 
I will not attempt to describe this research 
programme in detail; suffice it to say that 
a well-defined and broad-based approach 
to the problem is envisaged and that it will 
require a major scientific effort. It is of 
course an extremely complex subject and 
it must be considered as a long-term project 
rather than one likely to produce immediate 
results. 
An essential element in the planning pro-
cess of the world climate programme is a 
world climate conference which will take 
place in February of next year - that is 
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prior to the world meteorological congress 
at which the overall plan for the world 
climate programme will be considered. This 
conference which, from many points of 
view, will be a unique occasion will take 
the form of a conference of experts on 
climate and mankind ... " 
32. Your Rapporteur would point out that one 
example of the way in which weather has had 
a major influence on the political life of a 
country is the upheaval in Ethiopia after the 
three-year drought, leading to the overthrow of 
the Emperor and his government. 
D. The meteorological service 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
33. The present service was set up under a 
law on the German meteorological service dated 
November 1952. This law was modified in 1955 
and 1959 in order to enlarge the competences 
of the service. The Federal Transport Minister 
is politically responsible for the service. 
34. The Ministry of Defence has its own service 
called the geophysical advisory service of the 
Federal military forces. Within this service is 
the military meteorological service which works 
closely with the civil service ; together they have 
many joint working groups which meet every 
month and between which there is a data 
exchange arrangement. 
35. The civil meteorological service has four 
regional main offices : the maritime meteoro-
logical office in Hamburg and offices in Essen, 
Munich and Frankfurt. The whole service 
employs some 2,200 staff ; the meteorologists are 
trained at universities. A major problem arises 
where staff are concerned since there are far 
more trained meteorologists than there are jobs 
in the Federal Republic ; there are some 200 
places in universities, 300 in the forces, 300 in 
the civil meteorological service and some 100 jobs 
in private industry. 
36. The hydrological service is separate from 
the meteorological service. This service comes 
under the responsibility of the Liinder and there 
is a Federal office in Coblenz. The meteorological 
service maintains close contact with the Federal 
office. The same is true with the oceanographic 
institute in Hamburg. The meteorological office 
provides all the data in the atmosphere, whereas 
the oceanographic institute takes measurements 
at sea level and under seas and oceans. The 
Federal Republic has no weather ships. 
37. The meteorological service is divided into 
weather forecasting, climatological activities, the 
agricultural meteorological service, communica-
tions and research. Since the installation of the 
World Weather Watch, data from the Federal 
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service are used by eighteen national meteoro-
logical services. 
38. Apart from collaborating in the World 
Meteorological Organisation, to the overall 
budget of which the Federal Republic contributes 
4.5 %, the service is also collaborating in the 
fnamework of the EEC for the establishment in 
the United Kingdom of the European centre for 
medium-range weather forecasts and in the 
Meteosat programme in the framework of the 
European Space Agency. 
39. The weather forecasting service has a 
network of eighty stations, around fifty-five of 
which provide each day reports at all eight 
standard hours of observation and about twenty-
five of which provide reports at five standard 
hours of observation. The climatological service 
has some 450 stations, each of which provides 
some 1,000 data per year. 
40. All data are collected and filed on magnetic 
tapes in computer systems for communication to 
all interested users. A difference is made between 
data which are checked and rough data. 
41. The possibility of forecasting weather for 
more than four days and less than ten is now 
being studied at the European centre, part of 
which has already been established. 
42. The national service has a forecasting 
reliability of three or four days, depending on 
the meteorological stituation. Three-day weather 
forecasting is now reliable due to the use of large 
computers and satellites. 
43. The service's budget is some DM 120 mil-
lion, nearly half of which is for staff and the 
other half for hardware. The staff question is 
a major problem as the Federal Government is 
extremely reluctant to allow more staff to be 
recruited and consequently the average age of 
staff is relatively high and the structure 
unbalanced. 
44. The national meteorological centre at 
Offenbach is also a regional meteorological centre 
for the World Weather Watch and the area 
forecast centre for communicating meteorological 
information to airlines. The centre's activities are 
especially concentrated on the eastern part of 
the United States, the Northern Atlantic and 
Europe. Weather forecasting data and weather 
charts for these areas are provided four times 
a day. Moreover, weather forecasting information 
is sent out daily for the next forty-eight hours. 
Fom times a day the area forecast centre also 
sends all airports information on flying condi-
tions at different heights. 
45. The centre at Offenbach has direct rela-
tions with the Washington and Moscow world 
weather centres ; it often "translates" the data 
between these two centres. It also has a special 
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relationship with the meteorological centre in 
Nairobi. 
46. The climatological division is becoming 
more and more important as climatic conditions 
play an important role in planning, whether in 
national, regional, or municipal frameworks. They 
can, for instance, be of great importance for the 
establishment of nuclear power plants. Consider-
able research is also being carried out in bio-
meteorology, medical meteorology, pollution and 
many other fields. 
m. Meteorological services in Italy 
4 7. Three separate independent bodies deal 
with meteorology in Italy : 
. ( i) the air force meteorological service ; 
( ii) the central office of agricultural 
ecology, responsible to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry ; 
.(iii) the hydrographic service, responsible 
to the Ministry of Public Works. 
48. The most important one and the most com-
prehensive, is the air force meteorological 
service ; the other two deal with specific aspects. 
It also represents Italy in the World Meteoro-
logical Organisation. 
Structure of the air force meteorological service 
49. The director of the air force meteorological 
service is a general officer from GARF (aero-
nautical physical engineering). He is assisted by 
a deputy director. 
50. The central organisation of this service at 
present includes the following offices and 
centres: 
Offices 
Technical 
co-ordination 
Scientific 
eo-ordination 
Planning office 
Duties 
- Co-ordination of the 
overall operation of 
the meteorological ser-
vice 
- Co-ordination of meteo-
rological research 
- Staff training 
- Organisation and man-
agement of networks 
of meteorological sta-
tions 
- Preparation of national 
technical regulations 
and ensuring applica-
tion of international 
regwlations 
Offices 
Documentation 
office 
Instruments and 
maintenance office 
International 
co-operation office 
Office of the 
permanent 
representative 
Centres 
Meteorological 
information, 
forecasting 
and analysis 
Climatology 
Meteorological tele-
communications and 
electronic processing 
of meteorological 
data 
Duties 
- Organisation of meteo-
rological telecommuni-
cations networks 
- National and inter-
national meteorologi-
cal documentation 
- Supply, installation 
and maintenance of 
meteorological instru-
ments 
- Contacts with foreign 
meteorological services 
- Handling matters re-
lating to international 
organisations 
- Handling matters con-
cerning the World 
Meteorological Organ-
isation 
Duties 
- Issue of meteorological 
information and maps 
and national and inter-
national level 
- Study of analytical 
and forecasting tech-
niques and methods 
- Technical supervision 
- Preparation of meteo-
rological data 
- Use of national and 
international meteoro-
logical data transmis-
sion networks 
- Distribution and ex-
change of national and 
international meteoro-
logical information 
51. The peripheral organisation of the air 
force meteorological service consists of three 
regional meteorological centres at Milan Linate, 
Rome Fiumicino and Brindisi. The following 
depend on these centres at technical level : 
4 main airport meteorological offices 
(Uffici Meteorologici Aeroportuali 
principali - UMAp) ; 
15 airport meteorological offices (Uffici 
Meteorologici Aeroportuali- UMA) ; 
17 meteorological information posts (Posti 
di Informazioni Meteorologiche -
PIM); 
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19 meteorological information stations 
(Stazioni di Informazioni Meieoro-
logiche - SIM) ; 
141 ground meteorological data observation 
stations; 
6 high-altitude meteorological data obser-
vation stations. 
52. All data obtained are recorded on magnetic 
tapes for statistical and climatological purposes 
and on magnetic discs for practical purposes. 
They are processed by IBM 360/25 computers 
for data on the magnetic tapes and by two 
principal IBM 370/145 computers and two 
secondary IBM/7 computers for the magnetic 
discs. 
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53. The Director of the air force meteorological 
service is Italy's permanent representative to 
the WMO. There is close co-operation between 
the civil and military services although each of 
them is independent. The data obtained are 
generally highly reliable and in accordance with 
the standards of the WMO. 
IV. The civil meteorological service 
in the United States 
54. The National Weather Service (NWS), 
which comes under the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the 
Department of Commerce, is efficient and very 
well organised. It has a wide-ranging programme 
of activities in which more than 400 stations in 
the fifty states and elsewhere take part. 
55. Overall, NWS employs about 5,000 full-
time staff iin its meteorological, hydrological rund 
oceanographic departments. To indicate the scale 
of its operations, each year some 3.5 million 
observations are recorded and some 2 million 
atmospheric forecasts and advance information 
given. 
56. National and foreign activities are linked 
to a vast international communications system. 
57. Preparation of forecasts and opinions on 
weather trends a.re the main act.dvity of NWS. 
A lesser known activity is oceanography. NWS 
also obtains meteorological data gathered at sea, 
on the ground and in the upper atmosphere. The 
information satellite also receives data from a 
large number of stations. The data 'gathered are 
used for preparing weather forecasts. 
58. Meteorological forecasts and services 
include: 
( i) the gathering of data and preparation 
of analyses and forecasts in addition 
to basic material; 
( ii) the transformation of basic material · 
into a form suitable for use by the 
public and specific groups of users. 
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Organisation of forecasts 
59. The NWS meteorological organisation con-
sists of three groups of services : 
(i) The National Meteorological Centre 
(NMC) is the backbone of the whole organisation. 
This first group includes the National Severe 
Storms Forecast Centre (NSSFC) in Kansas 
City, which broadcasts warnings of tornadoes; 
the National Hurricane Centre (NHC) in Miami 
and the Hurricane Warning Centres in San 
Francisco and Honolulu which are responsible 
for detecting and notifying hurricanes. 
(ii) The Weather Service Forecast Offices 
(WSFOs), of which there are fifty-two, situated 
inter alia in Anchorage, Juneau, Honolulu and 
San Juan. The larger and more densely-
populated states have several WSFOs (Texas, 
California, New York, etc.), whereas a few 
smaller states are integrated in the area of 
responsibility of neighbouring states' WSFOs. 
WSFOs are the main bodies for forecasting and 
are responsible for the notices and forecasts 
issued to states, the navy and the air force. 
(iii) The Weather Service Offices (WSOs) 
ensure local services providing estimates and 
data specific to a given area. 
60. The NMC is in Camp Springs, a suburb 
of Washington. It is directly dependent on the 
Director of the NWS and is responsible for 
preparing most of the basic material and fore-
casts over a wide area and provides hemispheric 
analyses and forecasts. 
61. It has information on the weather for the 
United States and the rest of the world. In fact, 
the area covered by the NMC embraces the 
whole world, particularly the northern hemi-
sphere and the tropical regions of the southern 
hemisphere. 
62. The NMC has three divisions and one group 
carrying out complementary tasks. The NMC, 
which uses the most advanced computers and 
forecasting systems, is capable of making 
atmospheric forecasts for five days ahead It 
also has a group of technicians working to 
improve forecasts. 
63. These are the broad lines of the way the 
United States meteorological services are organ-
ised. In the absence of a full and detailed 
description, they should suffice to give a clear 
picture of the complexity, accuracy and great 
usefulness of these services which are made avail-
able to the whole world and consequently to 
Europe. 
64. The data for forecasts are broadcast by 
the NOAA wellither radio in messages repeated 
every four minutes and usually revised every 
two or three hours, and more often if necessary. 
88 
The global telecommunications system 
65. The global telecommunications system 
(GTS) ensures the exchange of meteorological 
data at world level. The GTS main trunk circuit 
links the world weather centres, the regional 
meteorological centres and the regional tele-
communications hubs. 
66. Data received from Washington by com-
puter through extremely fast channels are :made 
available to other centres in accordance with 
international agreements and are circulated to 
users. American data for foreign centres are 
gathered in circuits, prepared in the form of 
bulletins by the communications computer in 
Suitland and transmitted by telex and radio 
telex. · 
67. The GTS has four channels : Washington-
London; Washington-Toronto; Washington-
Tokyo and Washington-Brasilia. A Washington-
Moscow circuit is also in operation. 
68. Data transmitted from Washington to 
London are sent from London to other European 
countries to reach them within a maximum of 
two hours. 
69. Our talks with NWS officials showed the 
need to gather data in Central and North African 
countries, the absence of which is at present a 
source of concern, particularly for air traffic 
which is now expanding quickly. These officials 
also expressed the opinion that Italy might do 
something in this respect. Those responsible for 
the Italian meteorological service pointed out 
that only intervention by the World Meteoro-
logical Organisation, which has its seat in 
Geneva, might allow this deficiency to be over-
come. 
Part 11 
(submitted by Mr. Hawldns, Rapporteur) 
I. General remarks 
70. Of vital importance for weather forecasting 
in Europe is the availability of sufficient data 
on surface weather and upper-air conditions over 
the North Atlantic. For budgetary reasons, the 
United States withdrew its weather ships from 
the North Atlantic, which caused the termina-
tion in 1975 of an ICAO agreement on the 
operation of ocean weather ships. 
71. A new joint financing agreement on North 
Atlantic ocean stations (NAOS) came into force 
under WMO, initially with a limited number of 
European states as contracting parties. The new 
ocean station network had to be reduced to four 
stations, with France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
the United Kingdom and the USSR as ship-
operating countries. The Netherlands institute 
runs a weather ship on a position between Nor-
way and Iceland. 
72. The limited number of stations is regret-
table, especially where a satellite observing 
system is not yet accurate enough to replace 
on-the-spot observations. The situation in the 
North Atlantic grew even worse because of dif-
ficulties in financing the observation stations in 
Iceland and Greenland. 
73. Your Rapporteur feels that this left a 
considerable gap in the information from the 
Atlantic area where most of Europe's weather 
comes from. 
74. On the military side one always has to 
reckon with the possibility of an armed conflict. 
There is a good chance that in such circumstances 
the weather ships, being an easy target for any 
enemy, will be withdrawn. Satellites can take 
over the task of a weather ship only partly, as 
stated above. Moreover, nobody knows what will 
happen with satellites during hostilities. Killer 
satellites are already a technical possibility and 
information transmitted by satellites may be in 
code or jammed. 
75. Installing a denser observation network in 
the .Atlantic, as with ocean buoys and specially-
equipped aircraft, would be very costly. An 
experimental project is now being developed 
for automated meteorological data collection from 
commercial aircraft via satellite : ASDAR. 
76. For the development of civil weather fore-
casting it would_ be useful if, apart from 
Inmarsat, OTS and Meteosat all of which are 
in geostationary orbit, a system of meteorological 
satellites in polar orbit were guaranteed ; in 
particular, meteorological institutes at higher 
latitudes would be interested in such a develop-
ment. 
77. Another problem is that equipment for 
observing, transmitting, plotting and forecasting 
the weather is becoming more and more 
sophisticated. A relatively small technical failure, 
a break in a cable or in the power supply may 
paralyse the greater part of a meteorological 
service. To return to a manually-operated system 
would i~ most cases be impossible. 
78. Your Rapporteur received this general 
information from the Netherlands but is fully 
aware that this applies to the whole of Western 
Europe. 
U. The meteorological service in Belgium 
79. The Belgian meteorological service includes 
three different branches: (i) the Royal Institute, 
which comes under the Minister of National 
Education and Culture; (ii) civil aviation, which 
comes under the Ministry of Communications ; 
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and (iii) the military meteorological service called 
meteo wing of the air force, under the Ministry 
of Defence. 
80. During the last world war Belgian meteor-
ologists in London organised a service to assure 
the security of air lanes for civil aircraft in the 
future. After the war this service was incorpor-
ated into the Ministry of Communications and 
has remained there ever since. In 1951, the 
meteo wing of the air force was created. 
81. There is close collaboration between the 
three services and this co-ordination is presided 
over by the Director of the Royal Meteorological 
Institute. 
82. The Royal Institute has stations in Uccle, 
Ostend, Ghent, W evelgem, Sinsin, Virton, Genk 
and Botrange. It employs some 200 persons, 
nearly fifty of whom are scientists. The domain 
in Uccle, surrounded by the Circular Avenue, 
also has a Royal Observatory and an Aeronomy 
Institute. 
83. There are thus three institutions with three 
different directors and a total of roughly 400 
staff (200 Royal Meteorological Institute ; 100 
Royal Observatory ; 100 Aeronomy Space 
Institute). 
84. As far as weather forecasting is concerned, 
forecasting for twenty-four hours is 90% 
accurate, for forty-eight hours: 80 %, for 
seventy-two hours : 70 %, and for ninety-six 
hours (or more) : 60% (or 50%). Obviously the 
last figure is of no use as a forecast. 
85. In the fields of hydrology and oceano-
graphy the institute works in conjunction with 
the Ministry of Public Works and the universities 
(particularly those of Liege and Louvain-
La-Neuve). 
86. Regarding international collaboration, the 
institute has many activities outside Belgium, 
especially in Africa, where it works on problems 
in the Sahel region south of the Sahara, and 
also in Corsica where it works on problems in 
the Mediterranean Sea and trains scientists from 
developing countries (sea-air interactions). It 
works with institutes of the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway on marine meteorology in 
the North Sea. 
87. Inside Belgium there is a constant flow of 
information between the three services and all 
the data are computerised. Close links with the 
RAF remain as a result of co-operation built up 
during the war. 
88. The military meteorological service, apart 
from being in charge of all meteorological ser-
vices for the Belgian forces, is also linked to 
NATO and provides some meteorological services 
for the NATO forces. 
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89. According to NATO, meteorology is a 
national responsibility and not therefore an 
integrated NATO service. Co-operation takes 
place in the NATO meteorological group of the 
military committee. From time to time "white 
shadow" exercises'- are held ; safety regulations 
require them to be restricted however. 
90. Your Rapporteur feels that these exercises 
are not held frequently enough and that it is 
only lack of money which prevents this. 
m. Meteorological services in the Netherlands 
91. The Royal Netherlands Meteorological 
Institute comes under the Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works. 
92. The Ministry of Defence has three meteoro-
logical services, one for each of the three forces, 
but the air force is pre-eminent. 
93. A co-ordinating committee in which the 
four meteorological services are represented seeks 
to ensure close co-operation. 
94. The Netherlands is represented by the 
instiroulte in civil organisations and normally by 
the air force in military organisations. 
95. World-wide, the institute co-operates in the 
World Meteorological Organisation of which the 
foremost priority is the collection and exchange 
of meteorological information required by 
national weather services. This information, 
together with some information from military 
airfields, is also available at military commands .. 
96. Within the framework of the global tele-
communication system of WMO the regional 
communications centre for the Netherlands is 
Bracknell in the United Kingdom. A number of 
other international and national data links are 
also available, especially with Offenbach. 
97. The task of the institute is divided into 
two main sectors : operational service and 
scientific research (meteorological, oceano-
graphical and geophysical). The operational 
department comprises the central weather 
service, the civil aviation service and the 
climatological service. There are also supporting 
departments for computer activities, administra-
tion and instrumentation. 
98. The staff of the institute totals some 600 
persons, 260 of whom are employed in the 
operational department. 
99. More directly engaged in the daily 
operational activities are 120 persons for the 
central weather service (De Bilt), 100 for the 
civil aviation service (mostly at Amsterdam/ 
1. Exercises without the help of information gathered 
from civil sources. 
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Schiphol airport), twenty for the climatological 
service and twenty for the sub-stations in Den 
Helder and Vlissigen together and the special 
office at Zierikzee in Zeeland for the "Delta 
Works". 
100. Present budgetary restraints mean that few 
new staff are being recruited. Scientific personnel 
comes mostly from the University of Utrecht. 
101. The training of meteorologists (semi-
academic) for both the civil and military service 
starts with a ha;lf-year primary forecasting course 
run by the air force. The secondary advanced 
course for meteorologists is organised by the 
institute in co-ordination with the air force. This 
is a part-time two-year course which has to be 
pa.ssed to become a senior forecaster. Staff for 
weather-observing and other meteorological-
technical duties are trained mostly in co-operation 
between the institute and the air force. 
102. Hydrological information on the flow of 
the rivers Rhine and Meuse comes from Germany 
and Belgium. The problem of inland flooding has 
largely been overcome in the Netherlands as there 
is a complete system of dykes (banks) and con-
trolled overflows. 
103. Along the North Sea coast of the Nether-
lands flood protection is monitored by a 24-hour 
storm-warning service which also calculates the 
rise of the water due to tidal and wind effects. 
In dangerous situations, a special office of the 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works is 
brought into being to monitor developments and 
action. 
IV. Meteorological services 
in the United Kingdom 
104. At Bracknell is the United Kingdom Meteo-
rological Office which is also a regional meteo-
rological centre within the framework of the 
World Weather Watch set up by the World 
Meteorological Organisation. The Bracknell office 
provides regional forecasts and guidance for 
Europe. As a regional centre it has direct contacts 
and special lines with Brussels and De Bilt for 
instance. 
105. The Meteorological Office forms part of the 
RAF department of the Ministry of Defence. The 
Director-General is responsible to the Secretary 
of State for Defence through the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for the Royal Air 
Force. 
106. The general functions of the Meteorological 
Office are: 
(a) the provision of meteorological services 
for the Royal Air Force, army, civil 
aviation, the merchant navy and 
fishing fleets; provision of basic meteo-
rological information for use by the 
Royal Navy; and liaison with the 
Director of Naval Oceanography and 
Meteorology ; 
(b) the provision of meteorological services 
to other government departments, 
public corporations, local authorities, 
the press, television, radio, industry 
and the general public ; 
(c) the organisation of meteorological 
observations, including observations of 
radiation, atmospheric electricity and 
ozone, in the United Kingdom and at 
certain stations overseas ; 
(d) the collection, distribution and publica-
tion of meteorological information 
from all parts of the world ; 
(e) the maintenance of the observatories at 
Kew and Lerwick ; 
(f) the provision of professional training 
in meteorology ; 
(g) research in meteorology and geo-
physics. 
107. The office is divided into two parts: one 
is the directorate of services and the other the 
directorate of research. Currently it has about 
630 observation stations and the whole service 
employs some 3,500 persons. The defence services 
of the Meteorological Office have sixty-three 
offices and around 1,000 staff. The military 
sometimes provide buildings or building sites. 
108. The office has its own meteorological 
training board which determines policy on the 
professional and managerial training of staff. 
Most of the professional training is provided 
either at the meteorological office college or at 
the meteorological technical training school. For 
university graduates the office provides post-
graduate training ; some 100 people take this 
course each year. 
109. The directorate of research at Bracknell 
plays an extremely important role in improving 
forecasting. This is true for basic as well as 
applied research. However, it is not always easy 
to direct the research to cover an the different 
fields required by the users. 
110. Apart from services provided by the 
directorate of naval oceanography and meteo-
rology for the navy, the office provides services 
for defence, civil aviation and other public 
services. 
111. The RAF is a principal client of this office 
. which works 25 % for the RAF and 75 % for 
civilian users such as farmers, civil aviation and 
the oil industry, which have to pay for the 
services. The Meteorological Office has offices 
at all RAF flying stations. Most communications 
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services for defence meteorology are taken care 
of by the RAF central signals staff. The RAF 
also provides support for research flying by the 
Meteorological Research Flight at the Royal Air-
craft Establishment, Farnborough. 
112. The meteorological requirements of the 
RAF are in general more localised, specialised in 
location and time-scale, with emphasis on safety 
regulations. The RAF also receives the same type 
of general meteorological information as the civil 
and general aviation. 
113. The protected communications systems and 
additional information circuits are of special 
importance for the RAF. 
114. The Meteorological Office is also an agent 
of the Civil Aviation Authority with special 
emphasis on upper wind and temperature fore-
casts required by civil aviation. The most 
important office is at Heathrow which is the 
flight information base and provides all the 
necessary documentation for all airports in the 
United Kingdom and Europe. 
115. When the RAF has special requirements 
they are met by the Meteorological Office. The 
Ministry of Defence can ensure that civil 
research programmes pay sufficient attention to 
RAF requirements through the Meteorological 
Research Committee. 
116. RAF requirements for meteorological 
services and research are established by the air 
staff in the Ministry of Defence. In peacetime the 
information for the RAF meets their require-
ments ; it is difficult to give details of what will 
happen in wartime or in case of emergency, 
but generally speaking there are plans for 
supporting the major subordinate NATO com-
manders and automatic weather stations in 
remote places are being planned. Mobile meteo-
rological units are also used to support RAF or 
army bases and units. In wartime the link 
between the civil and military elements will be 
more clearly defined. 
117. For the United Kingdom the question of 
the continued existence of weather ships will 
become acute in a few years' time as the two 
existing weather ships (one on and one off duty) 
are nearly forty years old and will have to be 
replaced ; it is highly unlikely that the British 
Government wilJ. want to pay for two new ships. 
Therefore a study has to be undertaken to see 
what should be done, taking into account other 
sources of information such as satellites and 
buoys. For the moment there is one French 
station with two ships, one Russian station with 
three ships, one combined Dutch-Scandinavian 
station with two ships. The future of the Atlantic 
observation posts will therefore depend on the 
possibilities of maintaining these stations. 
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118. The Meteorological Office takes a leading 
part in international co-operation in meteorology. 
The Director-General acts in concert with the 
other directors of the meteorological services in 
Western Europe in the C(H)rdination of their 
programmes and the Meteorological Office par-
ticipates actively in the work of NATO through 
the NATO Military Committee meteorological 
group. 
Royal Navy 
119. The Royal NaVY has a special meteorological 
service, establishoo in 1937, and now known as 
the Directorate of Naval Oceanography and 
Meteorology (DNOM). Provision of tidal surge 
warnings for the national flood protection service 
comes under DNOM. 
120. Although the directorate was initially set 
up for the provision of a naval weather service, it 
is now also responsible for environmental aspects 
related to underwater warfare. The Meteo-
rological Office also has some ocean research 
activities. The naval service has some 250 staff, 
which includes personnel deployed on board every 
ship down to and including missile ships. Obser-
vational information gathered goes to the oper-
ational naval headquarters as well as to the RAF 
Strike Command. Information of value for civil 
purposes is sent to Bracknell with whom close 
liaison is maintained. Staff posts are held at the 
headquarters of the three major NATO com-
mands and at the subordinate commands in the 
Mediterranean, Portugal and Norway. 
NATO 
121. Apart from a small office in Maastricht 
(Netherlands) there is no NATO military meteo-
rological service; nor is there a separate NATO 
skeleton staff. Each nation is normally respons-
ible for ensuring the provision of adequate 
meteorological services for its own military 
forces. The Military Committee meteorological 
group is responsible for developing and maintain-
ing effective plans for integrating the separate 
national meteorological services meeting military 
needs into an efficient NATO-wide organisation 
in an emergency. In such a situation extra 
resources are likely to be available for this pur-
pose through the reduction of meteorological 
services to the civilian community. 
122. A major problem in providing meteo-
rological services for both military and civilian 
needs is the constant reduction in meteorological 
observations, mainly as a result of economic 
pressures. The military and civilian agencies 
which require meteorological support and are 
concerned with the funding of the means for 
obtaining observations have been made aware of 
this problem. In particular, NATO has asked its 
member nations to bear in mind the effects of 
station closures on the ability of meteorological 
services for defence to function effectively in an 
emergency. 
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123. It was drawn to the attention of the 
national authorities, for instance, that the with-
drawal of the weather ships from the Northern 
Atlantic has been done without taking into 
account the defence aspects of this action. To 
depend solely on satellites is not acceptable. The 
ships were withdrawn as the civil aviation author-
ities were no longer willing to pay for their 
services and thus for part of their upkeep. This 
was a major reason for the withdrawal of these 
ships. 
124. According to various sources, sometimes 
Russian ships remove weather buoys which belong 
to other services to study them and put them 
back again. 
125. Probably the most urgent study that should 
be done now is on the future requirements for 
data gathering in the Atlantic for the next ten 
or fifteen years. At present there are gaps 
because of the loss of American weather ships 
and because satellites cannot replace the data 
gathered on land or at sea. There is also question 
of reducing observations by the closure of air-
fields in the United Kingdom and in other coun-
tries. The study should set out how best this could 
be handled. 
126. There are also shortcomings in the com-
munications systems for exchanging information 
gathered from ships or aircraft crossing the 
Atlantic. This is of particular importance for 
military aviation. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to know whether the recommendations 
made by the Military Committee to national 
governments at the instigation of the Military 
Committee meteorological group have an effect. 
V. Meteorological services in France 
127. There are two meteorological services in 
France: one for the overseas departments and ter-
ritories and the other for the metropolitan terri-
tory. France has fifty-nine overseas stations in 
the various parts of the world. The metropolitan 
service is divided into six regions, each with its 
own director and subordinate stations. The six 
directorates are at Le Bourget (42 stations), 
Strasbourg (20 stations), Lyons (28 stations), Aix-
en-Provence (35 stations), Bordeaux (26 stations) 
and Rennes (22 stations). The division for meteo-
rological research has six research centres in the 
different parts of the country. There is also a 
technical and material centre at Trappes and the 
national meteorological school which is in Paris. 
128. The World Meteorological O:r:ganisation has 
established its requirements, for instance for the 
navigation of aircraft and ships, for industry, 
agriculture and ecology. In accordance with these 
requirements the stations send in their data ; 
depending on the importance of the station, data 
are sent in every six hours, every hour or even 
every half-hour. All these data are received by 
computers and processed. Apart from the ground 
stations, France has two weather ships which 
work together with nine other ships in the North 
Atlantic to meet the requirements of the WMO. 
Furthermore there are the data from satellites 
and radio soundings. The distance on land 
between stations, sub-stations and posts should 
pe some 150 km whereas the ocean stations should 
be 1,000 km apart. Howewr, these WMO require-
ments cannot be met for budgetary reasons. The 
total staff of the service is some 3,000 persons, 
2,000 of whom are civil servants. 
129. In France like everywhere else the fore-
most client of the service is aviation. The second 
most important client is agriculture and a special 
agriculturaJ. meteorological service has been set 
up. The third client is the navy and merchant 
shipping. Efforts are also made to provide 
industry and transport with special information. 
A growing activity is that related to the environ-
ment. 
130. River flow forecasting is carried out in 
direct relation with the national hydrological 
service, which issues special information on pos-
sibihl.ties of flooding, rains, etc. The national 
services are co-ordinated on a regional basis by 
the Prefet concerned. 
131. A special feature of the French organisa-
tion is the national meteorological school which 
provides three types of courses : (i) to train 
technicians ; ( ii) to train works engineers 
requiring the Baccalaureat and two years of 
higher mathematics ; ( iii) to train meteorological 
engineers - only open to graduates from the 
higher French technical schools. In 1977, from 
3,188 candidates only 145 were accepted. The 
school also has a certain number of students from 
overseas territories. 
132. There are no special military meteorological 
services in France. The civil service provides all 
the necessary information on whatever level it is 
requested. If necessary, the staff of the service 
may sometimes wear a military uniform but they 
remain attached to the national civil meteorologi-
cal service with the exception of some non-
commissioned officers, mainly from the air force, 
who have been trained at the national school. 
133. France co-operates with the NATO meteo-
rological service but since it is not an integrated 
part of the NATO forces it has an observer status. 
VI. The European centre for 
medium-range weather forecasts 
134. In order to set up a European centre for 
medium-range weather forecasts (four to ten 
days) seventeen European countries have joined 
together to build such a centre at Reading in 
the United Kingdom. The agreement was ratified 
in 1975. The permanent buildings are nearly 
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complete and the international staff- some 140 
persons - will be equipped with a large-capacity 
computer. Making this centre a joint European 
venture was not only necessary for financial 
reasons in order to share the cost of the computer 
between a large number of countries, but also 
because it was not possible for one country alone 
to bring together such a concentration of scien-
tists. 
135. The seventeen countries are : eight from the 
EEC, Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
Budget contributions are : Federal Republic of 
Germany 25 %, France 18 %, United Kingdom 
13 %, Italy 11 % and the other States 5 % or 
less. 
136. The purpose of the centre is to study the 
possibilities of establishing mathematical models 
for weather forecasting for four to ten days, to 
improve the quality of weather forecasting, to 
submit to the participating states the result of 
the use of its computer and, finally, to participate 
in the 1979 globrul experiments organised by the 
WMO. If the studies at Reading prove successful 
the centre might become operational in five or 
six years, but it is not at all sure that the time-
table can be adhered to. 
137. There is no fear of duplication of effort 
as meteorologists fully realise that only if all 
data are exchanged reciprocally will they be able 
to do their job properly. There is a great deal 
of international co-operation at a world-wide 
level as well as at a regional level. 
138. Satellites have certainly revolutionised 
meteorology by making it possilble to observe the 
formation of cyclones and tornadoes, especially 
important for areas above deserts and oceans 
from where there was little information. Never-
theless, there are still many unknown factors and 
it is not sure that with all the data it can collect 
the centre at Reading will give the hoped-for 
results. 
Conclusions 
139. Ever since the 1960s the American military 
authorities have been studying the possibilities 
of a defence meteorological satellite programme. 
The present system provides weather data for the 
entire earth four times a day using two satellites 
in polar orbit. One collects early-morning and 
evening data and the other collects noon and 
midnight data. These weather data are stored 
abloard the satellites and later transmitted to the 
air force global weather centre in Nebraska and 
the fleet numerical weather centre in California. 
The images are also transmitted to mobile sta-
tions at military locations, worLd-wide, to support 
tactical operations. Great improvements have 
been made in satellite reliability and life. 
140. The latest Tiros-N domestic United States 
weather satellite will be adapted to the defence 
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meteorological satellite programme. There is also 
close collaboration with NASA on the new Nim-
bus meteorological satellite, Seasat-A (specialised 
experimental applications satellite) and GOES-A 
(geostationary operational environmental satel-
lite). The United States navy is establishing a 
central satellite data-processing centre at the 
fleet weather centre in California. 
141. Although the United States has co-opera-
tion agreements with the United Kingdom for its 
Skynet satellite and with NATO for the NATO 
communications satellites, no international co-
operative agreements exist on the meteorological 
satellite programmes for the armed forces, the 
main reason being that on the European side no 
military meteorological satellite programme 
exists. 
142. From what is known today, it can logically 
be concluded that weather satellites will probably 
provide in the not-too-distant future a global 
weather network not just for disasters and 
emergencies, but for accurate ·long-term fore-
casts, i.e. forecasts up to two weeks. By knowing 
overall weather· trends through out the world, 
accurate long-term forecasts might be routine 
within the next decade. Then it will probably be 
possible to make exact measurement of the atmos-
phere itself, temperature versus depth in the 
atmosphere and also the condition of the oceans 
and the temperature of lakes, all of which have 
an impact on the global weather. 
143. The economic potential of accurate fore-
casting for a two-week period is already evident. 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing will all benefit 
from longer-term forecasts. The same is true for 
the construction and transport industries. There 
is also a potential for weather modification 
which might have a tremendous impact in the 
future. 
144. Thought must also be given to the impact 
of such satellites on military pLans and strategic 
and tactical situations. 
145. Your Rapporteurs are convinced that the 
EUil'opean aerospace industries would be able to 
provide the military forces with an adequate 
military meteorological satellite network. This 
would fill the gap which at the moment and 
certainly in the future will exist with regard to 
weather forecasting for defence operations. 
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146. There are still technolOgical limitations in 
existing meteorological satellite systems, but 
progress is so fast that this will soon no longer 
be so and Europe should therefore prepare for 
the future ·and consider establishing a defence 
meteorological satellite programme. 
147. No one can say whether the superpowers 
would continue to allow existing civilian meteo-
rological satellites to be used. How would the 
national meteorological services then receive the 
necessary data ? It would not be possible to 
establish an independent military infrastructure 
for all meteorological activities but a separate 
satellite network linked to the American one 
would be feasible and desirable. 
148. It has been claimed that the information 
the Soviets obtain from their meteorological 
offices is less comprehensive than the informa-
tion available to western countries. The conclu-
sion of a treaty on the inviolability of satellites 
might therefore be to their advantage. However, 
the outcome of present negotiations in this 
respect is far from certain, but it can safely be 
assumed that no information will be forthcoming 
without a system of one's own. 
149. Long-range forecasts are worked out from 
information communicated by both satellites and 
ships. Here again the European position is not 
very favourable. The withdrawal of American 
vessels from the North Atlantic and the fact that 
British ships may not be replaced will have 
serious consequences for European weather fore-
casting. The competent NATO and national mili-
tary authorities should remind member countries 
of the importance of meteorological services for 
the defence of the West. Alternatives should be 
found for land or ocean stations which are 
phased out and new developments in automatic 
observation stations should be given high priority 
in the defence budgets. 
150. Your Rapporteurs are disappointed to have 
learned that there has been little improvement 
in forecasts for periods of less than twenty-four 
hours ahead. These shorter period forecasts can 
have considerable economic importance. How-
ever, they were glad to learn that the meteoro-
logical service at Bracknell in the United King-
dom has started a major research and develop-
ment programme to deal with this problem which 
it is hoped will lead to real progress. 
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APPENDIX 
EEC weather research programme 
20th October 1918 
Since earliest times, man haB turned his 
attention towards the sky to discern what the 
heavens had in store for him. Sometimes it was 
a question of his survival. 
It is not really necessary to point to the 
great flood to be convinced of the dangers from 
extreme meteorological conditions. One glance at 
the events in recent years shows how harshly 
droughts, crop failure and floods have hit many 
regions of the globe, including our own. 
Droughts and hurricanes 
- 1968-1973 : Africa's Sahel (Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger, etc.), Ethiopia and the Cape Verde 
islands were badly hit by the prolonged drought 
which was the most severe this century. 
- 1975: a heat-wave descended on Western 
Europe during the summer and countries such as 
the NetherlEmds and Denmark experienced their 
highest temperatures on record. For the first 
time in the 20th century, ice from the Arctic 
ocean found its way to Iceland in the month of 
JuLy. 
- 1975-1976: the drought hit all of western, 
central and southern Europe. Rainfall in 
England from May 1975 over the following 
16 months was the lowest recorded since 1727. 
- 1976 : a new heat-wave hit Western Eur-
ope at the beginning of the summer. For 24 
days in England, temperatures were 4°C above 
the monthly average for the previous 300 years. 
The USSR and Canada, by contrast, suffered a 
very cold and humid summer. 
The catastrophic drought which tortured a 
large number of tropical and sub-tropical 
countries between April and August (from Sri 
Lanka to West Africa) was followed by tor-
rential rains. Over the same period, Europe suf-
fered bad weather, whilst extremely violent hur-
ricanes ravaged the coasts of Madagascar and 
Mexico. 
Zero safety margin 
The impact of such climatic trauanas on man 
and the earth's resources is enormous. During 
the period 1960-70 for example, extreme meteoro-
logical phenomenon caused some economic 
disasters. World reserves of wheat were reduced 
to negligible size, foodstuff and market prices 
went haywire. Millions of people in developing 
countries found themselves threatened with star-
vation. 
The climate of our planet has always been 
unstable and will doubtless stay so in the future. 
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We know neither the causes of these changes, nor 
their size or speed. It is vital to direct our 
research and forecasting resources to these cli-
matic variables. 
Whilst our vulnerability has greatly in-
creased compared to past centuries, current 
world reserves of wheat only represent a small 
fraction of our annual consumption. The gal-
loping birthrate and increased food requirements 
imply that a period of bad weather could be 
catastrophic. It would not require another glacial 
era to destroy our agriculture. Our water 
resources are also becoming increasingly scarce 
given the population growth and the expansion 
of our cities and industries. For the future, we 
can probably expect droughts to threaten our 
supplies of water for home, industrial and agri-
cultural use. By contrast, well-dispersed rain 
could feed our underground waters and increase 
our water reserves. Though we know that our 
security (water and food) depends on the climate, 
we do not know the precise quantitative relation-
ships involved. Urgent scientific research is 
required. 
Weather forecasting limits 
This urgency has led the European Commis-
sion to propose to the Council of Ministers a 
research programme into the mechanics of cli-
mate and temperature. The five-year programme 
aims to co-ordinate research work in Community 
and associated countries. The total cost will be 
around 15 million EUA (1 EUA = ± 1.3 dol-
lars) of which 8 million EUA will come from the 
Community budget. 
This European climatology programme will 
form part of the international research being 
conducted by the World Meteorological Organisa-
tion (GARP). In the science of climatology, co-
ordination of efforts produces good results which 
is why the European Commission wishes to 
mobilise the leading specialists from the Nine 
rather than see European researchers work in 
relative isolation. 
The programme proposed by the Commission 
covers two research fields : 
1. Climatic mechanisms 
This area of research covers short-term cli-
matic forecasting, i.e. over a period of a few 
weeks. All weather forecasting techniques have 
their limits and it is currently impossible to fore-
cast the weather or the state of the atmosphere 
more than two weeks ahead. 
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The gaps in our knowledge not only concern 
the actual weather but also causes and origins 
and the precise moments when certain changes 
will occur. 
At the moment only visionaries can predict 
climatic disasters with any precision. 
To develop useful forecasting techniques, 
the climatic conditions of ancient times have to 
be reconstructed to find historical precedents for 
the current climatic cycles. Information on cli-
mates in ancient times can be collected from fos-
sils, tree rings, river beds, analysis of insect life 
and marine micro-organisms in sedimentary 
layers, etc. 
2. Man-climate interactions 
Man is increasingly concerned to know if he 
is in any way responsible for the increasing 
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changes in climatic conditions. Technological pro-
gress increases energy consumption which pol-
lutes the atmosphere either thermically or 
chemically. 
The second area of research proposed by the 
European Commission is composed of the fol-
lowing two themes : 
- the effect of climate on European 
resources (food and water). Evaluation of 
climatic risks (crops, droughts, avalan-
ches, etc.) The impact of climatic condi-
tions on energy production (importance 
of rainfall for feeding hydro-electric 
power stations or cooling nuclear power 
stations) ; 
- influence of man on the climate: che-
mical pollution through carbon dioxide 
in particular and thermal pollution of 
the atmosphere. 
8ooroe : Euroforum No. 34, 3rd October 1978, 
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Amendments I, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Weather forecasting 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
21st November 1978 
1. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after "reliable" insert "but cost-
effective". 
2. In paragraph B of the draft recommendation proper, at end add "providing that this can be 
carried out inexpensively". 
3. In paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "Afford its active sup-
port to" and insert "Consider providing modest support for". 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph D. 
5. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, leave out "fully". 
Signed: Hardy 
1. See 13th Sitting, 23rd November 1978 (Amendment 1 agreed to; Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 withdrawn). 
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Amendment 6 
Weather forecosting 
AMENDMENT 6 1 
tabled by Mr. ComeUssen 
22nd November 1978 
6. In paragraph E of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "fully" and insert "their efforts 
jointly". 
Signed : Oomeli8sen 
1. See 13th Sitting, 23rd November 1978 (Amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on a European armaments policy 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead 
to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ; 
Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and 
standardisation of military equipment; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry; 
and lastly a. two-way street in armaments with the United States; 
Considering that limited but a.s yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the 
independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National•Armaments Directors, 
and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate ; 
Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and 
competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ; 
Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing 
Armaments Committee, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and the standardisation of defence 
equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European 
programme group ; 
2. Call for the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European 
Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ; 
3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be 
made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ; 
4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its 
activities to the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. There are two vital objectives of the North 
Atlantic Alliance which are subject to chronic 
delays, if not frustration, for lack of effective 
unity between its European members. One is 
the standardisation and interoperability of arms 
equipment, the other is the establishment of a 
two-way street between Europe and North Amer-
ica, which is needed not only to provide a more 
cost-effective use of resources and increased 
standardisation of weapons systems but also for 
the psychological and political purpose of creat-
ing a better balance in the Alliance between the 
United States and its European allies. These 
frustrations and delays are a great impediment 
to the build-up of the defensive strength of the 
Alliance, which the ever-growing weight of the 
Warsaw Pact's offensive capability has made 
necessary. 
D. The problems 
2. It is, of com'Se, an MSential feature of 
the Atlantic Alliance that it is an association 
of independent, democratic states, within which 
are divergent trends of public opinion, in con-
trast to the political conformity to the Marxist 
ideology and the control of the CPSU, the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (commonly 
called Russia in the West), which characterise 
the Warsaw Pact. The lack of political unity 
between the NATO countries is reflected in every 
sphere of activity, diplomatic, strategic and 
financial ; and it is an astounding tribute to the 
validity of voluntary co-operation between free 
societies that NATO has held together as well 
as it has for nearly thirty years. But it is in 
the field of arms procurement and manufacture, 
with the rapidly rising costs of weapons, that 
the lack of an integrated European programme 
is most marked and its disadvantages most 
evident, both in regard to the Soviet bloc and 
to the industrial and financial strength of the 
United States. 
3. Indeed, if any real progress is to be made 
along the two-way street in view of the constant 
development and sales-drive of the great Amer-
ican armament corporations, then there is no 
time to lose. Given the time-scale in the design 
and production of weapons systems, decisions 
will have to be taken by 1980 if new equipment 
is to enter service by the nineties. 
4. If no progress is made towards rationalisa-
tion within Europe, large European arms or 
aircraft manufacturers will enter into joint agree-
ments with American companies, such as that 
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already signed between Mes:serschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm and McDonnell Douglas in September 
1977, with a view to the development of a new 
fighter aircraft. The result of such transcon-
tinental collaboration would be the disappearance 
of the independent European firms from the 
market. The threat that faces the European 
aircraft industry can best be understood when 
we look at the difference between American and 
European civil and military aircraft manu-
facturers. There are nineteen companies within 
the European Community as compared to only 
eight in the United States. The nineteen com-
panies have to share a substantially lower 
turnover of 7.4 billion units of account in the 
Community, as against 17.6 billion in the United 
States. This can only mean that both military 
and civil aircraft industries in Europe are badly 
planned from the point of view of competition ; 
their research and development activities overlap 
thus reducing effectiveness ; costs are dispropor-
tionately high, while the benefits of economy of 
scale cannot be exploited. The result is that both 
the civil and military aircraft industries are 
threatened unless military procurement policy 
is used to promote increased collaboration across 
national frontiers. 
5. Apart from the danger of American 
dominance of the European armaments indus-
tries, one of the greatest threats that faces the 
western Alliance is the danger of "disarmament 
through inflation". At a time of low economic 
growth, governments are reluctant to direct 
further scarce resouroos to defence even though 
weapon costs are growing fast and even though 
weapon effectiveness offers Alliance members 
the best hope of counteracting the ever-increasing 
offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact forces. 
Greater efficiency in weapon supply and a 
rationalisation of the equipment procurement 
process are therefore of paramount importance 
for western security. As Elliott R. Goodman has 
written : " ... some observers look hopefully to a 
new arms technology that promises to provide 
inexpensive but extremely effective weapons. 
Their general adoption might make it possible 
for Europe to avoid being priced out of the 
weapons market, while also reducing the United 
States Defence Bill." 1 
6. Mr. Goodman cites the increased accuracy 
of precision-guided munitions and the example 
of their effectiveness in the Arab/Israeli war of 
October 1973 as evidence of the greater cost-
effectiveness of future defensive short-range 
1. Elliott R. Goodman : "The puzzle of European 
defence: the issue of arms procurement", Survey, 
summer/autumn 1976, page 219. 
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battlefield weapon systems. However, he concedes 
Richard Burt's argument that "both long-range 
and all-weather precision-guided munitions now 
under development will cost far more than pre-
sent generation systems." 1 
Wasted money 
7. .Another unhappy consequence of the 
separate national procurement and production 
of land, sea and air armaments, which tend to 
be increasingly sophisticated and costly, is the 
duplication of expenditure on research. Thomas 
.A. Callaghan, the "doyen" of writers on this 
subject, estimates that in 1974 Europe spent 
$2.5 billion on research and development, while 
the United States spent $7.6 billion . .As the 
United States research and development pro-
gramme duplicated virtually all European pro-
jects and included much else besides, the .Alliance 
as a whole could save $2.5 billion if research 
and developmenJt projects were shared equitably 
between Europe and the United States instead 
of being duplicated. Nor is there any evidence 
to suggest that the overlap in research and 
development between the European countries 
themselves is any less than that between the 
European allies of the United States. One has 
only to count up the different types of weapons 
with the same functions in use today with the 
armed forces of the European members of the 
.Alliance to have some vivid idea of the waste 
involved. It is not simply a matter of the 
procurement of non-standardised equipment, 
manufactured in different countries on a small 
scale - the training of operating and main-
tenance personnel, and the setting up of repair 
and maintenance facilities will be far more 
expensive as well. 
8. Thus we can only conclude that if national 
defence budgets are taken as a yardstick, coun-
tries are getting too little defence for their 
money, or, if existing capabilities are used as a 
yardstick, countries are paying too much for 
what they are getting. The present policies of 
the European allies entail an unwarrantable 
waste of resources, which, if properly used, 
would amount to a policy of European rearma-
ment. Up till now, the problem of producing 
standardised military material and reducing 
duplication has been seen as one of achieving 
specific objectives of defence policy. This has 
been due to the fact that discussion has taken 
place within organisations chiefly concerned with 
defence, e.g. Eurogroup, WEU and most recently 
the independent European programme group. 
9. In other words, the new weapons techno-
logy heightens the advantages which the United 
States already possesses of greater resources for 
1. R. Burt : "New weapons technologies and European 
security", Orbis, summer 1975, page 256. 
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research and development and longer production 
runs. The European members of the .Atlantic 
.Alliance would without countervailing measures 
be even more likely to increase their dependence 
on the United States, thereby perpetuating the 
imbalance in the arms trade between Western 
Europe and the United States. 
The European defence equipment market 
10. The manufacture and procurement of air-
craft, though the most costly, is, of course, only 
part of the whole operation of supplying the 
manifold defence requirements of the European 
Atlantic allies. They constitute (incliuding France) 
a very substantial market, amounting to nearly 
$40 billion in 1976, compared with the arms 
expenditure of $77 billion of the United States. 
This gives us some idea in financial terms of 
the size of the defence transactions by members 
of the .Atlantic .Alliance who also constitute the 
whole of the European Community, except Ire-
land. 
11. The following table shows the spending by 
countries which form part of the NATO military 
system on major purchases of equipment as a 
percentage of their overall defence spending, 
and from this we see that the Community coun-
tries for which figures are given spent between 
10 % and 21 % of their 1977 defence budgets 
for this purpose, apart from Luxembourg with 
its very low figure. .At the same time, nearly 
all these countries show a substantial increase 
for 1977 by comparison with previous years. 
The figures must, however, be viewed with some 
reservation as they only cover major purchases 
of equipment, and it is often difficult to draw 
the line accurately between the purchase of 
equipment and expenditure on buildings and 
insta.llations. In most cases, total spending on 
equipment would be considerably higher than 
indicated in the table. 
12. While .American equipment (e.g. computers, 
precision-guided weapons, airborne missiles and 
aircraft) account for a sizable proportion of 
the European non-nuclear weapons market, the 
German Federal Republic, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom are basically self-supporting 
in conventional arms. The other countries in 
the Community are obliged to import most of 
their military requirements. This aggravates the 
present situation in which the equipment of 
their armed forces is not only not standardised 
but for the most part not interoperable either. 
13. Fortunately, there is now not only a 
recognition throughout NATO of the nature of 
the problem, but also a publicly-declared 
determination to achieve overdue reforms in the 
field of weapons procurement which is already 
being translated into concrete action. The prob-
lems in this field have been clearly identified. 
Thomas Callaghan has estimated that weapon 
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Spending on major purchases of equipment as a percentage of total defence expenditure 
1972 1973 
% % 
Belgium 11.4 8.4 
Canada 6.1 7.3 
Denmark 15.4 17.2 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 12.3 12.1 
Italy 16.9 15.2 
Luxembourg 1.5 1.3 
Netherlands 10.7 11.2 
Norway 11.8 11.7 
Portugal 7.5 4.5 
Turkey 4.9 5.0 
United Kingdom 18.6 19.3 
United States 21.6 18.9 
Source : NATO. 
duplication 1 has cost NATO more than $10 bil-
lion per annum. He believes that the appalling 
waste of manpower, money, energy and materials 
has occurred because NATO has failed to 
achieve: 
(a) common military requirements for 
weapons and equipment through com-
mon tactical doctrine ; 
(b) complementary research and develop-
ment projects through rationalisation 
of development tasks and through 
specialisation in development areas ; 
(c) a diversity of weapon system options 
and hardware through a United States/ 
European technology base and through 
savings in system acquisition and sup-
port practices ; 
(d) larger weapons inventories at lower 
unit cost through rationalisation of 
production sources and through pro-
duction runs of the combined Euro-
pean/ American scale ; 
(e) mutually-supporting general-purpose 
forces through standardisation of 
weapons and equipment and through 
common ·spares and maintenance 
logistics; 
1. For table on advanced missile duplication, see the 
previous report of the Committee: Document 671. 
Explanatory Memorandum, Chapter V "Production of 
missiles in Europe" and Appendix n (Rapporteur Mr. 
Wall, 29th April 1975) ; see also R. Burt: "New weap-
ons technologies", page 4, Institute for Strategic Stu-
dies, London, 1976. 
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1974 
% 
8.8 
5.9 
19.3 
11.9 
15.2 
2.4 
13.2 
13.4 
3.1 
3.0 
17.2 
18.1 
1975 1976 1977 
% % % 
9.1 11.1 10.3 
6.3 8.0 9.1 
19.0 19.4 17.3 
11.8 13.2 13.3 
13.9 13.1 14.0 
1.0 3.4 2.9 
15.6 15.2 18.2 
14.4 13.3 16.6 
1.9 1.9 2.2 
- - -
19.3 20.6 21.8 
17.5 18.5 20.8 
(f) a balanced, collective, conventional 
force dete~nt through military, 
technological and industrial interde-
pendence and through marshalling 
available economic means to achieve 
desired military ends ; 
(g) equitable financial burden-sharing in 
all defence areas through economic 
and technological benefit-sharing ; 
(h) jobs and markets for underemployed 
defence industries through non-
duplicative projects on an Atlantic 
development and production scale and 
through a North Atlantic common 
defence market 1• 
Joint production and the arms trade 
14. The cost of modern arms having risen far 
more than the rate of inflation, simple economics 
has obliged some countries to co-operate, mainly 
in the production of military aircraft. The very 
high research and development costs of aircraft, 
such as the Tarn.ad.o, makes it virtually impos-
sible for a single country to build such aircraft 
on its own. Thus joint production has become 
one obvious solution, and one which, whenever 
possible, NATO has encouraged. The other has 
been to reduce unit costs by selling arms abroad. 
This arms trade has three disadvantages : it 
depends upon the procurement policies of others ; 
it runs the risk of accelerating arms races in 
other continents which may lead towards involv-
1. Thomas A. Callaghan, Jnr.: "A common market for 
Atlantic defence" Survival, May/June 1975, page 129, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
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ing Europe to its disadvantage, and it subor-
dinates NATO standardisation to the competitive 
interests in the third world. Nevertheless, the 
size of the arms business makes it such an 
important element both in regard to the balance 
of trade and employment in at least two major 
countries of Western Europe that it could not 
be dispensed with. A survey made by the United 
States Department of Defence shows that in 
197 4 France was the largest arms exporter in 
the European Community with total exports 
worth $3 billion, followed by the United Kingdom 
with $1.5 billion, ItJI,ly with $0.25 billion and 
the German Federal Republic with $0.18 billion. 
Evidently, the sale of armaments to other coun-
tries is essential to the present structure of the 
French and British arms industries, even if it 
is not an instrument of foreign policy such as 
the United States' export of military aircraft to 
the Middle East. This is not a factor which 
operates in favour of a coherent European arms 
procurement policy. 
Standardisation and interoperability 
15. The notorious inefficiency, which stems 
from the diversity of weapons, ammunition and 
communications systems produced and operated, 
has been denounced for years by NATO's 
supreme commanders and contrasted with the 
advantages of uniformity in the armament of 
the Warsaw Pact. Standardisation and inter-
operability of arms have been under discussion 
virtually since 1949 and in a growing number 
of forums. Many standardisation agreements 
(STANAGs) have been negotiated and, no doubt, 
as the NATO long-term defence programme goes 
into action there will be more, particularly as 
the result of Task Force 7 (electronic warfare) 
and Task Force 8 (rationalisation). But progress 
has been slow and piecemeal. There is, of course, 
no way of removing two of the main causes of 
diversity, the rights of independent states to 
determine their defence policies, of which the 
French is the most extreme example, and the 
competition and vested interests of rival arms 
manufacturers in a free-market economy. All 
must be accomplished by agreement. But there 
can be no question of the urgency of the matter. 
The attainment of interoperability is an absolute 
minimum requirement. Standardisation itself is 
urgently needed not simply from the point of 
view of cost, but also to achieve proper logistic 
support. Non-standardised but interoperable 
equipment could not, in the event of damage, 
be repaired and supplied with spare parts in 
all allied countries using different types of 
weapons, unless those countries held stocks of 
spare parts, special tools, and, in many cases, 
had specially trained personnel. Interoperable 
but non-standardised equipment would therefore 
become rapidly unusable as a result of minor 
damage in situations where equipment was 
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dependent on an allied country's supply and 
maintenance facilities: 
m. The approach to solutions 
16. There is broad agreement on both sides 
of the Atlantic that urgent measures are neces-
sary to rectify these deficiencies and the Alliance 
has acknowledged the principle that there is a 
"need to maintain a highly developed techno-
logical scientific and industrial base in. Europe 
whilst also seeking to achieve the closest possible 
co-operation in arms production and procure-
ment between the countries of North America 
and Europe". This Eurogroup statement of June 
1974 was officially noted by the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee. 
17. The British Secretary of State for Defence 
told the House of Commons on 16th December 
1974 that "there was general agreement- and 
in this I include my colleague the United States 
Defence Secretary - that progress on stand-
ardisation of equipment must involve genuine 
two-way traffic between the European allies 
and the United States". 
18. By May 1975, following the circulation in 
official quarters of the Callaghan report on 
United StatesjEuropean economic co-operation 
in military and civil technology in late summer 
and autumn 1974, and following the approval 
by the United States Senate Armed Services 
Committee of the CulverjNunn amendment on 
harmonisation and interdependence between the 
United States of America and Western Europe 
in the field of military equipment, the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee agreed at its 
meeting of 22nd-23rd May 1975 "to pursue 
within the appropriate machinery the establish-
ment of a two-way street between Europe and 
North America in order to provide a more cost-
effective use of resources and increased stan-
dardisation of weapons systems" 1• The then 
United States Secretary for Defence, Mr. Schle-
singer, made it clear in October 1975 that he 
expected the Europeans "to put their own house 
in order, and to make such arrangements as 
would enable them to compete realistically with 
American industry." 2 
19. Western European equipment experts res-
ponsible to the national armaments directors 
examined the collective resources necessary to 
meet the organisational and technical challenge 
to the European arms industries which a genuine 
two-way street on American terms would pre-
sent. The result of their recommendations was 
1 .. NATO communique. 
2. The Alliance and Europe, Part IV - the European 
programme group - D.C.R. Heyhoe, Institute for Stra· 
tegic Studies, London, 1977, page 8. 
the decision of Eurogroup Ministers at their 
meeting in The Hague on 5th November 1975 
"to explore further the potential for extending 
co-operation in European armaments collabora-
tion in an independent forum open to all Euro-
pean members of the Alliance". Having partici-
pated in the meeting of United States, British 
and German Defence Ministers in October 1975 
and the French Mirage F-1 aircraft having lost 
out in the marche du siecle to the General 
Dynamics F-16 for the re-equipment of the 
Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Belgian air 
forces, the French Government felt more willing 
to participate in a European arms procurement 
organisation which accorded to French strategic 
concepts of independence from the United States 
while offering to French armaments industries 
the benefits of additional economies of scale 
allied to access to useful technological informa-
tion. 
20. Accordingly, a meeting of the Eurogroup 
countries and France was held in Rome on 
2nd February 1976. The independent European 
programme group (IEPG) 1 which was formed 
at that meeting has proved an invaluable forum 
and workshop for evolving at both a technical 
and political level a European armament policy 
which is independent of Eurogroup and of 
NATO's integrated military structure but which 
nevertheless brings together twelve European 
members of the Alliance (i.e. the Eurogroup 
members plus France) in a way which should 
enable them not only to harmonise their own 
weapon requirements but to adopt a common 
position in transatlantic dialogue with North 
Americans in the field of equipment procure-
ment. In Europe, the work of the IEPG has 
made some progress, while in the United States a 
dec}ared commitment to the two-way street and to 
equipment rationalisation has been maintained. 
In Congress, the House of Representatives Armed 
Services Committee on 24th January 1978 
announced the appointment of a special sub-
committee on NATO standardisation, interopera-
bility and readiness. 
21. Furthermore, the United States Adminis-
tration has been pursuing similar objectiws for 
a considerable time. Defence Secretary Harold 
Brown stated at a press conference on 6th May 
1977 that "we need to concentrate on rationalis-
ing NATO's defence posture. That is, individual 
national contributions must be fitted together 
better. In the short run, we need the ability to 
interchange parts, ammunition, supplies and 
units of soldiers. In the longer run, we aim for 
more standardisation of equipment, together with 
the development of compatible doctrine, tactics 
and procedures ... Such co-operation", Mr. Brown 
argued, "inevitably means more of a two-way 
1. Described in Chapter IV B below. 
4' 
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street in defence procurement. The overwhelming 
predominance of United States arms and equip-
ment in use by NATO forces generally should 
give way to greater United States military pur-
chases in Europe. Moreover, there should be more 
licensing of European-designed equipment for 
production in the United States." 1 
IV. The international organisations 
A. The r8le of NATO 
22. While American political determination to 
develop a transatlantic dialogue on armaments 
questions persists and while Western Europe 
has concerted its efforts to improve European 
co-operation in arms production, the Alliance as 
a whole has within the ambit of NATO pressed 
forward its studies on standardisation and inter-
operability. Interoperability is now accepted as 
essential throughout the Alliance, not least by 
· the United States. Standardisation, however, is 
regarded as a desirable objective for the more 
distant future - the late 1980s or 1990s. 
Dr. Waiter Laberge, the previous NATO 
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Sup-
port, used to argue that "competition makes 
western technology great" and it is accepted 
within NATO that the military benefits of 
standardisation must not be allowed to be out-
weighed by any drawbacks inherent in monopoly 
supply. 
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23. Improved co-ordination of research and 
development between the members of NATO is 
necessary. This will be a difficult task which 
would be achieved by the creation of a supra-
national agency to allocate research and develop-
ment tasks and resources. Information would 
have to be stored which for primarily commercial 
considerations is bound always to be a sensitive 
ISSUe. 
24. Secondly, for interoperability, the stan-
dardisation of component parts rather than of 
systems is of prime importance. One of the main 
difficulties that NATO has faced in this regard 
is that national operational requirements are not 
harmonised by NATO. Nevertheless, strenuous 
efforts are made to achieve the maximum 
rationalisation of arms procurement. 
25. Following the Atlantic summit in London 
in the summer of 1977, NATO launched a long-
term defence programme in which ten areas of 
particular importance (task forces) for the next 
ten years were specified such as readiness, rein-
forcement, etc. 2 The long-term defence pro-
1. "NATO defence co-operation", press conference with 
Harold Brown, Survival, July/August 1977, page 179, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
2. The task forces are listed at appElndix. 
DOCUMENT 786 
gramme draws up specific objectives and 
iden~ifies national participation and costings. It 
consists of long- and medium-term elements. 
The medium-tel1ll one overlaps the normal five-
year rolling programme in which force goals 
for up to five years ahead are established and 
biennially reviewed. 
26. One of the sector studies is known as 
Task Force 8 and deals with rationalisation, i.e. 
the search for more efficient use of NATO 
resources in the field of standardisation and 
interoperability of military equipment · its 
recommendations were transmitted to the ca~itals 
of the member countries in preparation for a 
discussion during a ministerial meeting of the 
Defence Planning Committee in mid-May, fol-
lowed by the Washington summit meeting. This 
!ask force has examined the way NATO plans 
Its equipment reprovisioning ; whether there 
~hould be more central planning ; whether changes 
m procedures are needed to implement stand-
ardisation and interoperabili.ty; and whether 
~hanges are needed in staffing in NATO to 
Implement standardisation. It has also examined 
~ few other spheres, .such as the question of 
mtellectual property rights (the study of prob-
lems concerning ownership of patents, payment 
of royalties for licences, etc., in which joint 
ventures very often become bogged down) and 
oth~r schemes to improve standardisation by 
hav~g more countries collaborating in the pro-
ductiOn of the same defence equipment. 
27. The recommendations of this task force 
are considered to be "reasonable and modest" 
at NATO. Certain countries, including the United 
States in particular, consider that the recom-
mendations should have gone further but, in 
general, all the countries agree on the fact that 
they "will oil the wheels of the organisation 
according to one Atlantic source". The three 
main recommendations of the task force are 1 : 
"The efforts to implement the STANAGs 
should be stepped up 
For many years, through the Military 
Agency fot· Standardisation (in which 
France participates), the NATO countries 
have concluded standardisation agreements 
- STANAGs- concerning the standard-
isation in particular of the components of 
military equipment. Task Force 8 considers 
that more pressure should be exercised on 
the national governments to implement 
them. The first stage will consist in asking 
the ~in NATO commanders (MNC) why 
certam STANAGs have not been imple-
mented. 
1. From Atlantic News, No. 1015, 5th April 1978. 
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Continuation of the PAPS studies 
NATO would like to establish a long-term 
armaments planning system. About two 
years ago, the foundations were laid of 
a PAPS (periodic armaments planning 
system) which combines the present and 
future armament requirements of the allied 
countries and also examines the require-
ments of future warfare so as to enable the 
member countries to collaborate to a greater 
extent in developing armaments. The PAPS 
system is only in its initial stage, that of the 
NATq armaments planning (NAPR). This 
essentially consists in reviewing national 
military equipment schedules (replacement 
dates, etc.) against NATO requirements 
for standardisation to enforce maximum 
interoperability. 
NATO has chosen six test areas. The two 
naval spheres concern underwater weapons 
- torp~does and sonobuoys (for detecting 
submarmes) ; the two army fields concern 
anti-tank weapons and mortars ; and the 
two air force fields laser illuminators and 
cluster bombs. The results of this first test 
will not be known until the end of the 
year. Subsequently, it is hoped that it 
will be possible to go on to the second 
stage of the PAPS system, i.e. to group 
together the national countries with respect 
to NATO programmes before they embark 
on their own national plans for the develop-
ment of military equipment. In its con-
clusions, Task Force 8 endorses the PAPS 
studies. 
A new review of national armaments 
planning 
There is a suggestion to set up a kind of 
high-level committee (probably at the level 
of the deputy national armaments directors) 
to co-ordinate and even exercise pressure 
on the main NATO armaments groups, for 
example the army, navy and air forces 
research groups. It might be said however 
that the CNAD (Conference ol Nationai 
Armaments Directors, which meets twice 
a year) is already accomplishing this co-
ordination task. It is considered however 
at NATO that the CNAD, being formed b; 
experts at a very high level, is often far 
too removed from the daily work of the 
individual armaments groups." 
28. The long-term defence programme was 
endorsed at the Washington summit meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on 30th and 31st May 
19_7~, but ~ranee, represented by its Foreign 
Mmister, did not subscribe to that part of the 
communique. The work of Task Force 8 was 
thus referred to : 
"Rationalisation 
13. The objective is to achieve economic 
savings and enhanced military efficiency 
through increased standardisation and 
interoperability. Programmes include 
development of new procedures for syste-
matic long-range armaments planning, new 
procedures for the improved formulation 
and utilisation of standardisation agree-
ments and continuation of the work under-
taken' by the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors in the field of intel-
lectual property rights. In the development 
and acquisition of the equipment recom-
mended in the long-term defence pro-
gramme, co-operative programmes will be 
pursued to the greatest extent possible. 
Nations have also endorsed the need for 
the transfer of technology between member 
countries where such transfers contribute 
to the furtherance of standardisation/ 
interoperability of NATO defence equip-
ment." 
29. .Although it does not participate in the 
long-term defence programme, France through 
its continued membership of the NATO Confer-
ence of National Armaments Directors remains 
a participant in the arms co-operation activities 
of the Alliance. Some members of Task Force 8 
attend IEPG meetings, but no formal decision 
has yet been taken on the method of informing 
the IEPG of the work of the task forces ; cer-
tainly the IEPG also is an essential tool of 
weapon rationalisation. 
30. However, there are inherent drawbacks to 
be overcome in any economic rationalisation of 
arms procurement. Buying equipment from 
abroad entails the export of funds and jobs to 
the supplier nation. Of course, equipment designs 
can be purchased and licence construction ini-
tiated but then the economies of large-scale 
produ'ction are lost. Task Force 8 is engaged 
in the resolution of these problems. For example, 
countries can build sections of the equipment 
to be procured. There can be an allocation to 
individual countries of responsibility for the 
supply of different categories of weapon systems. 
Common research and development programmes 
can be instituted although it is unlikely that they 
would produce major financial savings -
perhaps a maximum of 10 %. However, joint 
production can be very cost-effective, but only 
for really major programmes such as warships, 
aircraft and guided weapons. 
31. From all this, the two basic reasons for 
standardisation stand clear - military effec-
tiveness and economic logic. The logistic simpli-
fication inherent in weapon standardisation is 
a very important military consideration. The 
principal economic considerations are the eco-
nomics of scale in production and savings in 
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research and development. The work, therefore, 
of Task Force 8 (defence support) covering the 
equipment and support of NATO for~s has 
great potential. Both the support and eqmpment 
functions offer scope for savings as does the 
whole area of logistics. However, for the imme-
diate future, the achievement of a good measure 
of interoperability is vital such as the ability 
to turn round allied aircraft on the completion 
of a sortie, and harmonisation in the field of 
ammunition, communications and fuel. 
B. The independent European programme group 
32. The IEPG which is only some two and 
a half years old 1 was established under the 
pressure of increasing weapons sophisticat~on 
which prevents any European country meetmg 
its own weapon requirements alone, and from 
the desire to include France in a purely European 
armaments forum with all other European NATO 
members. The IEPG is attempting to achieve 
practical results, particularly to present agreed 
projects to the participating governments. The 
IEPG is seeking to create a balance between 
the armaments capability of the United States 
and Europe by concerting the European allies' 
efforts in the field of defence equipment. 
33. The greatest difficulty which the IEPG 
faces is in achieving a common position without 
damaging the varying national interests of the 
twelve member countries. The problem of balance 
between the nations with advanced defence 
industries and the others is especially intractable 
and offset considerations are often crucial to the 
agreement of joint projects. 
34. The IEPG meets on two planes. The first 
is at under-secretary of state level 2 under the 
chairmanship of the Italian Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Mfairs and takes place once 
a year in Rome 3 • The second level is technical. 
The national armaments directors meet under 
Italian chairmamship (originally Admiral 
Mainini now General Moizo) in Rome. Under it, 
there a;e three working panels. The first (the 
equipment planning panel) identifies areas for 
potential co-opemtion and compiles equipment 
replacement schedules. The second (the specific 
projects co-ordinating panel) works out the 
machinery of collaboration. The third (the defence 
economics and procedures panel) identifies dif-
ferences in national company laws, export regula-
tions, etc., and proposes means of harmonising 
them. Panel I has collated equipment replace-
ment schedules, transmitted them to NATO and 
1. See paragraph 20. 
2. Some countries being represented by (political) 
under-secretaries of state, others by senior officials. 
3. At the meeting in Rome on 6th and 7th November 
the question of the chairmanship of IEPG is expected 
to be discussed. 
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received comparable schedules from the United 
States and Canada ; Panel II has reached an 
advanced stage in some projects and a number 
of agreed collaborative programmes are likely 
to be started soon ; Panel Ill has been operating 
in the very delicate area of economic compensa-
tion and procedures. 
Transatlantic dialogue 
35. Between the three panels and the national 
armaments directors, there is an ad hoc working 
group on transatlantic dialogue. The IEPG has 
identified four topics for discussion with the 
North .Americans: 
( i) the preparation and offer of a list of 
equipment which the West Europeans 
feel that the United States and 
Canada should consider purchasing 
for their troops in Europe ; 
( ii) a list of supplies for American and 
Canadian forces in Europe ; 
( iii) the identification of technical and 
legal obstacles to the entry of Euro-
pean equipment to the North 
American market ; 
( iv) the exchange of information - e.g. 
replacement schedules. 
36. Both the IEPG and North Americans have 
agreed that a working group on obstacles be set 
up, but the latter wish to establish at the same 
time two further open-ended working groups. 
The first would examine possible rationalisation 
of research and development and production. 
The second would examine industrial co-
operation. However, the IEPG is not yet ready 
to respond to these two initiatives. Rational-
isation is already being studied ·by the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors in 
NATO and there is a danger that these sug-
gestions, if taken up, could lead to a duplication 
of work being done already in another forum -
particularly as France participates in NATO's 
CNAD. Panel I and Panel II of the IEPG are 
therefore making a careful study of the American 
proposals before the IEPG responds. It has been 
agreed that exchange of basic information 
between the IEPG and the North Americans is 
adequately covered by the production of the 
combim.ed equipment replacement schedules. 
37. At its meeting on 2nd and 3rd October 
1978 the IEPG· at the level of national arma-
ments directors welcomed recent United States 
proposals for complementary competitive develop-
ment of families of weapons (designed to avoid 
duplication of development projects in Europe 
and the United States), but called for more 
information at the CNAD meeting on 24th and 
25th October. The IEPG also stressed that the 
bilateral memoranda of understanding now being 
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concluded between the United States and its 
European allies should not jeopardise efforts in 
the IEPG to develop specific equipment projects 
at the European level. 
38. At the present time such memoranda of 
understanding have been concluded between the 
United States on the one hand, and France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and 
the United Kingdom on the other. Others are 
being negotiated with Belgium and Denmark 
as well as Canada. These memoranda on mutual 
trade in defence equipment are designed to waive 
the Buy American Act, to enable the Europeans 
to sell defence equipment in the United States 
to the same value as that sold by the United 
States in Europe. 
39. The succeES of the IEPG will depend on 
its ability to speak with a single voice and on 
the ability of the United States and Canada· to 
develop a truly balanced trade with the Euro-
peans in armaments. In this regard, the attitude 
of the United States Administration alone will 
not be critical - the practical attitude of Con-
gress will be crucial also, as the matter of the 
selection of a German or American for the new 
United States army main battle tank has shown. 
The European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) 
40. This body, established by the major arma-
ments firms to make contact with the IEPG, 
meets under the chairmanship of Admiral Azzoni 
of Oto Melara. Its aims are: 
( i) to make proposals to and react to 
suggestions from the IEPG on indus-
trial matters ; 
( ii) to consider the possible association of 
groups of companies to implement 
IEPG programmes ; 
( iii) to offer industrial expertise for use 
if necessary by the IEPG ; 
( iv) to co-operate more closely together 
with a view to making better use of 
available financial and technical 
resources. 
The EDIG informs the IEPG on its proceedings 
and keeps in touch with progress in the work 
of the IEPG panels and group, although no 
formal relationship between the EDIG and IEPG 
has yet been ~greed. 
C. The r8le of WEU 
41. The Council has instructed the Standing 
Armaments Committee to carry out a study in 
three parts. The first part is to define and list 
European armaments and arms manufacturers. 
This task upon which the SAC and IEPG have 
worked together is now complete. 
42. The second part is to define the legal status 
of the various armaments industries to define 
which companies are private, which public, which 
transnational and which nationalised. Also the 
government ordnance factories have had to be 
listed. This report is complete and has been sent 
to the respective national authorities. 
43. The third part concerns the economic facts 
about the European armaments industries. To 
avoid all danger of duplicating the work of 
Panel Ill Sub-Committee 4 of the IEPG in this 
field, its tempo has been carefully phased and 
method of working appropriately organised. 
44. On the question of staffing, there is 
flexibility in the composition of delegations to 
the Standing Armaments Committee. For 
example, economic experts are invited to attend. 
An economic specialist on the staff of the 
French DGA was attached to the SAC. Likewise, 
two Belgian economic experts have been attached. 
(The IEPG, in contrast, has no permanent 
secretariat and is dependent on the goodwill and 
co-operation of member governments). 
45. At the present time the SAC and the IEPG 
are seeking to obtain from national sources the 
economic and commercial data required for the 
study, taking into acount considerations of com-
mercial or governmental confidentiality. The 
means required to obtain the information are 
different for different countries and industrial 
sectors. For example Germany, where most of 
the equipment firms are free enterprise concerns, 
requires a different approach from the United 
Kingdom where much of the armament industry 
is nationalised. The kind of data that the SAC 
has been seeking for the study concerns tech-
nology, co-operation, employment and financial 
inputs. 
46. WEU like the IEPG meets various kinds 
of difficulty from national quarters. WEU is 
mostly engaged in paper studies, not in making 
decisions at the present time on specific arma-
ment projects. 
D. Panavia Tornado -A case study in 
collaborative procurement 
NAMMA 
47. The NATO Multiple Combat Aircraft 
Development and Production Management 
Agency is responsible for the day-to-day manage-
ment of the programme for the MRCA, now 
known as the Tornado, which is being produced 
for the Luftwaffe, German navy, Italian air 
force and the Royal Air Force. 
48. The top policy-making body responsible for 
the Tornado programme is the trinational policy 
group which is constituted twice a year at natio-
nal armament director level. The policy group 
gives guidance to the board of directors on 
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essential and principal matters of policy and 
resolves those issues which can only be decided 
at a political level. 
49. The more routine control of the project is 
exercised by the board of directors upon which 
official representatives of the three participating 
governments sit together with a representative 
of the Secretary-General of NATO, although he 
rarely attends. Each country has one vote and 
decisions are taken unanimously. NAMl\IA is 
located at Munich. The staff of NAMMA is 240 
with 107 from Britain, 109 from West Germany 
and 27 from Italy, reflecting broadly the 
governments' participation in the programme. 
50. NAMMA is set up as follows : 
( i) office of general manager and 
deputy general manager ; 
( ii) programme and configuration con-
trol; 
( iii) military factors division ; 
( iv) systems engineering ; 
( v) production and quality assurance ; 
(vi) budgets and contracts ; 
( vii) administration and personnel ; 
( viii) office of the :financial controller ; 
( ix) office of secretary to board of 
directors. 
51. Britain has ordered a total of 384 
Tornados of the interdictor/strike variant and 
air defence variant ; West Germany has ordered 
322 aircraft :for the Luftwaffe and navy and 
Italy 99 aircraft, both the latter being the 
interdictor/strike variant. Two production 
batches have been authorised. From the second 
production batch, Panavia will become the prime 
contractor and all contracts will be authorised 
through them. 
52. Well over half of the aircraft's flight test 
programme has been completed. The first 
instructors :for the Tornado will be trained at 
MBB's military division airfield at Manching 
and possibly all subsequent ones at a joint 
operational conversion unit, RAF Cottesmore. It 
is possible that an Anglo-German weapon train-
ing unit will be formed at RAF Honington. 
53. NAMMA is the trinational procurement 
agency for spares. The three countries will 
exchange defect data with NAMMA establishing 
interim trinational repair procedures. 
54. Co-operation has, however, had its price 
as well as its advantages. There are of course 
additional administrative and communication 
costs, although no single nation could have 
afforded to build the aircraft alone. Further-
more, it has not always been possible to select 
the optimum equipment and in some instances, 
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out of consideration of equity in work sharing 
or for operational reasons, national equipment 
fits have been demanded. 
55. Stores commonality also between the 
customer services will not be as good as had been 
envisaged because of the need to maximise the 
utilisation of respective countries' existing 
weapon stocks. 
56. The experience and expertise of NA.MMA. 
should be harnessed for the procurement of a 
European successor to the Tornado. In this 
regard, the time-scales for the two clear poten-
tial national inputs to such a project - the 
Royal Air Force's AST-403 and the Luftwaffe's 
N eue Kampf Flugzeug - must be resolved. 
57. The Tornado approach to collaboration has 
proved basically sound. Pure subcontracting as 
with the F -16 programme is less satisfactory. 
The Tornado system of procurement ensures that 
continuous in-service development is possible and 
that expertise is spread among the partner com-
panies. The procurement system by contrast used 
for the British Phantom made in-service develop-
ment difficult. 
58. A dilemma remains over work sharing, 
Should it in the future be based on propor-
tionality of financial input as with the Tornado 
or should partner nations in a successor project 
be able to play down social and political con-
siderations by specifying the most cost-effective 
options on airframe and engine construction and 
equipment? 
59. Lessons also need to be learned from the 
experience with To:m:ado over the aircraft's 
RB-199 power plant which was developed at the 
same time as the aircraft. However, engines take 
usually three years longer to develop than a 
new airframe and the aircraft's development 
has been consequently delayed. 
View of Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm 
60. Clearly, one of the great benefits of a 
multinational combat aircraft programme is that 
the differing expertise of the participating coun-
tries can ensure an optimised joint approach to 
the project. 
61. If a new joint combat aircraft programme 
were initiated by the partner companies, the 
design team should be centralised, but final 
assembly and flight test should be decentralised 
as with Tornado. Separate flight testing 
increases the overall cost but speeds up the 
development programme. The friendly rivalry of 
the respective flight test establishments is a spur 
to progress. 
62. If a new military aircraft were initiated 
with the United States, there would be dif-
ficulties changing all the standards from metric. 
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However, if a new project were initiated by the 
Panavia partners, some 20 % of the development 
time would be cut. 
63. The repair of aircraft sections made by 
one of the other partner nations usually pre-
sents no problem except when a return to the 
jigs is required. Because final assembly takes 
place in each of the partner countries, general 
expertise on the aircraft is satisfactorily spread 
and shared. 
64. NAMMA's role in ensuring a degree of 
commonality between the aircraft in service with 
the different services is very important. The 
eo-location also of NAMMA and Panavia in the 
same building is extremely useful. However, 
NAMMA can be slow in reaching decisions and 
should have more authority, likewise Panavia 
should be given more authority over the resolu-
tion of technical problems. 
65. The choice of equipments specified rests 
with the partner nations. When a system 
manufacturer is. chosen, he may choose two sub-
system collaborators in the partner countries. 
The aircraft would not have been built in the 
view of the MBB experts if design leadership 
had rested with one airframe manufacturer. 
66. The project is thought to be especially 
helpful to Italy industrially. Almost every 
Italian aerospace company is involved in the air-
craft in one way or another. The employment-
generating effect of the Tornado programme in 
Italy is considerable. Furthermore, although Italy 
contributes to only a 15 % share of the work, 
Italian industry benefits fully from sharing 
technical knowledge and acts as a full partner 
in the aircraft's management. 
Panavia 
67. The long-term significance of the Panavia 
Tornado programme has been well summarised 
by Mr. F.W. Page, Chairman of Panavia, at a 
press conference at the Hanover air show on 
26th April 1978, who, when asked whether 
Panavia would undertake further projects now 
that the Tornado was in production, said : 
"The answer must be Yes, if and when 
our customers agree on their future require-
ments. Panavia represents the first 
determined and successful attempt by three 
major European nations to get together 
to rationalise their defence requirements 
and to eo-produce a major weapon system 
to meet those requirements. It is a huge 
step forward in the evolution of European 
commonality which has important ramifica-
tions in many important areas such as 
finance, tax and company law, as well as 
in supply, logistics, operations and training. 
It is therefore inconceivable that this 
pioneering effort should in future be 
thrown away and wasted. Indeed, we hope 
it will expand so that Panavia will include 
other nations." 1 
V. The view from national capitals 
A. Belgium 
68. The greatest constraint on Belgian weapons 
procurement lies in the fact that Belgium's 
defence requirements are well below its indus-
trial capacity and it is therefore difficult for it 
to develop or produce defence equipment in 
general, except for telecommunications equip-
ment, small arms and munitions of all calibres 
which are Belgium's principal exports in this 
field. 
69. There is no specific research and develop-
ment allocation within the Belgian defence 
budget - such research as does take place is 
purely on the scientific level and not directed 
towards particular projects or weapons. Weapon 
research at Fabrique N ationale is financed 
privately. Where possible, Belgium is trying 
to participate in joint research and development 
as has been done with the new minehunters 
which are being developed with France, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. 
70. Belgium hopes that the IEPG .will prove 
helpful and that both European eo-production 
and transatlantic eo-production (two-way street) 
will be possible. If the Belgian armaments 
industry produced only for the Belgian market, 
the production runs would be too short and unit 
costs too high. Belgium has therefore to be 
involved in co-operative ventures and the most 
effective were eo-production programmes like the 
General Dynamics F -16. 
71. The creation of a European Armaments 
Agency would be desirable so long as competition 
is retained. For a small country like Belgium, 
offset considerations are of crucial significance 
in the work allocation for any jointly-agreed 
weapon programme as are social considerations 
such as employment. 
B. France 
72. The percentage of the defence budget 
allocated to personnel and associated functions 
is 57% and the percentage allocated to equip-
ment 43%. 
73. Of the expenditure on equipment, 25 % 
is spent on research and development of which 
5 % is research in the pure sense and 20 % is 
development expenditure. These figures are on 
the old basis of budgetary computation whereby 
1. Panavia press release, Munich, 27th April 1978. 
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the cost of service pensions is not included in 
the defence budget. 
7 4. A summary of the major equipment 
replacement programmes for the French armed 
forces for the next ten years is at Appendix Ill. 
A.ir force 
75. To replace the Mirage 3 and Mirage F-1 
interceptors, the Mirage 2000 is entering pro-
duction in 1982. To replace the Jaguar attack/ 
strike aircraft, a new aeroplane would be 
required. Discussions are being held with the 
British and West German Ministries of Defence 
on this project. In addition, a new generation 
of air-launched guided weapons would be 
required. 
Army 
76. The principal requirement is for a new 
battle tank to replace the AMX-30. 
Navy 
77. The Foch and Clemenceau aircraft carriers 
will need to be replaced. This is so far only at 
the planning stage. No firm decisions have yet 
been made. New anti-submarine and anti-aircraft 
frigates will be required throughout the next 
decade. A second generation of surface-to-surface 
guided weapons to succeed the Exocet will be 
required. 
Strategic strike force 
78. Multiple warheads need to be developed as 
a matter of urgency for France's submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and the first of a new 
generation of ballistic missile submarines is to 
be constructed to enter service in 1985. 
French view of independent European pro-
gramme group 
79. Progress is difficult with twelve nations 
participating. There are sometimes divergent 
views and interests. For example, the more 
industrialised nations with highly developed 
armaments industries have different interests 
and criteria to apply to the questions of arms 
procurement from those nations which have no 
armaments industries of their own. 
80. A policy of deliberate preference in favour 
of European equipment is essential if the Euro-
pean armaments industry is not to be 
overwhelmed by American imports. The United 
States enjoys the advantage of scale, great 
research and development funding and protec-
tion (the Buy American Act). 
81. Before the independent European pro-
gramme group was initiated all other avenues 
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of co-operation had been exhausted. France would 
like the SAC of WEU to have more work to do 
also. 
C. Federal Republic of Germany 
82. From experience already derived, parti-
cularly from the Panavia Tornado and Sepecat 
Jaguar consortia, it is clear that Europe has the 
capability to carry out future military aircraft 
programmes. 
83. The three leading nations in the aerospace 
field, France, West Germany and the United 
Kingdom, will all be looking for new combat 
aircraft around the 1990s. France and the United 
Kingdom- will be seeking a successor to Jaguar, 
whereas West Germany will be seeking a succes-
sor to the Phantom. 
84. The aircraft industry in the Federal 
Republic values outside technical support for a 
European programme, hence the usefulness of 
the support from the McDonnell Douglas C()m-
pany which MBB is currently receiving and of 
the support which BAC in Britain receives from 
the Grumman company. 
85. An industrial approach to arms procure-
ment rationalisation is preferred. H()wever, it 
has to be borne in mind that in the Federal 
Republic, the armament industry is in private 
hands and cannot therefore be ordered to 
rationalise by the government. The government 
can only encourage rationalisation by a judicious 
administration of its powers of project sponsor-
ship and funding. 
86. The Federal Republic of Germany is 
probably better suited than the United Kingdom 
to giving up some of its authority to a supra-
national body like an international armament 
agency. The United Kingdom is in a more 
ambivalent position having ties with both Europe 
and with the United States. 
87. West Germany's defence expenditure is 
rising at 3.5% per annum, but because of infla-
tion the real increase is smaller. 
88. The two-way street has already been 
initiated. First on the question of a gun for the 
United States army's new main battle tanks, the 
American Administration has decided in 
principle to purchase the German gun for all 
tanks procured beyond number 3,000 on the 
production line. 
89. Over Roland II, Germany has had to 
persuade the American authorities that full 
Americanisation of the system is against United 
States interests in view of the considerable 
benefits of standardisation with the weapons 
with which· the French and German armed forces 
are equipped .. 
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90. The lack of a united policy to concert the 
production in Europe of weapons which could 
be offered to the United States is especially 
regrettable. In three particular areas the Euro-
peans could develop weapons of the highest 
quality - third-generation anti-tank missiles, 
air-to-air missiles and air-to-ship missiles. The 
Europeans could devel()p their systems in parallel 
with those being developed by the United States 
with the selecti()n being decided by a competition. 
91. The current difficulty has been that the 
United States has offered to participate from 
the start in arms programmes in Europe while 
continuing to develop i:ts own competitor weapon 
systems. 
92. As far as West Germany is concerned, all 
its new projects will be done co-operatively and 
the Federal Republic will do its very best to 
concert its requirements with those of its allies. 
In the field of small projects however, such as 
telecommunications and small arms, the emphasis 
within NATO is on standardisation and they 
could initially be developed separately with a 
competitive final selection. · 
D. Italy 
93. Italy gives tangible support to the IEPG 
and encourages its activities which are now con-
centrated on two basic sectors, transatlantic 
dialogue and the drafting of specific projects ; 
where the transatlantic dialogue is concerned, 
it has bec()me apparent that the parties wish to 
move on as quickly as possible to the concrete 
stage of achievements. In comparing positions, it 
became clear that there are still different posi-
tions between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
94. The tendency of the North American allies 
to speed up the dialogue and extend the frame-
work to cover wider subjects is limited by the 
IEPG's need in each case to harmonise its posi-
ti()n beforehand within the organisation so as to 
speak with a single voice, which the North 
Americans expect, moreover. 
95. In any event, Italy believes that in view 
of the complexity of the dialogue it must take 
the form of continuing neg()tiations but on a 
pragmatic and gradual basis ; differences of 
opinion which are inevitable at the outset when 
tackling matters which involve the parties' 
fundamental interests must not lead to discour-
agement. 
96. Progress in the dialogue assumes parallel 
progress in the constructive work within the 
IEPG where the greatest effort is needed, i.e. 
carrying out meaningful projects on a colla-
borative basis. 
97. In this context, it seems essential for the 
IEPG 's work to be given constant and effective 
political impetus by member countries with a 
view to carrying out a few wholly IEPG projects 
without delay. Italy has taken appropriate steps 
to ensure that its national representatives in the 
various working groups concentrate their atten-
tion on specific procedure relating to every 
aspect of co-operation, recently confirmed by the 
national armaments directors, with a view to 
finding concrete and effective means of speed-
ing work up. 
98. The coming months can be used for con-
tinuing the present work of shaping and com-
position which, in spite of the various levels of 
agreement to be successively obtained, should 
allow the major difficulties to be overcome and 
even more effective forms of co-operation to 
be found. 
VI. Conclusions 
99. Mr. Leo Tindemans in his report on Euro-
pean union suggested that consideration should 
be given to the establishment of a European 
armaments agency. Likewise the Commission 
of the EEC's action programme for the aero-
nautical sector (Spinelli report) presented to the 
Council of the European Communities on 30th 
October 1975 advocated a similar body for the 
procurement of military aircraft. Also the Euro-
pean Parliament resolved on 15th December 1975 
that "an agency ultimately aimed at the joint 
manufacture of weapons meeting the require-
ments of the NATO states" be established. 
100. More recently there was the tabling in the 
European Parliament on 15th December 1976 
by Mr. Berkhouwer of a motion for a resolution 
on co-operation in the armaments sector, in which 
he referred to the Tindemans proposal for the 
establishment of a European armaments agency 
and the importance for the attainment of a com-
mon European industrial policy of rationalisa-
tion of the European armaments industry, and 
called on the Commission of the European Com-
munities to submit to the Council an action 
programme for a European policy on the pro-
curement of armaments. 
101. This text was referred to the Political 
Commi.ttee of the European Parliament and 
Mr. Egon Klepsch appointed as Rapporteur. His 
report of 8th May 1978 on European armaments 
procurement co-operation (Document 83/1978) 
reiterates the call for the Commission of the 
European Communities to draw up an action 
programme to define "potential responsibilities 
concerning the development of a common arma-
ments procurement policy within the overall 
framework of a common industrial policy". It 
even considers as "indefensible any further 
attempts to establish a common industrial policy 
which does not include this key sector". On 
14th June 1978 the European Parliament 
adopted the resolution in the Klepsch report 
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calling on the European Commission "to submit 
to the Council in the near future a European 
action programme for the development and pro-
duction of conventional armaments within the 
framework of the common industrial policy". 
102. While Mr. Davignon, replying for the Com-
mission, considered that armaments production 
and trade could be the subject of a Community 
approach, either in the framework of commercial 
policy (customs) or of industrial policy, reactions 
of governments so far have been divided. Mr. de 
Guiringaud, the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, on 23rd June considered Mr. Davignon's 
interpretation of the Rome Treaties "open to 
criticism", while Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, said on 20th July that the 
Belgian Government considered it "desirable" 
that the institutions of the Community should 
pay attention to the armaments industry. The 
Klepsch report was discussed by the IEPG on 
3rd October 1978, which found it an "interest-
ing proposal'' according to press reports. 
103. What is surprising is that the pursuit of 
common industrial objectives in the context of 
a joint policy for the procurement and manu-
facture of arms should have been neglected so 
long. 
104. There is surely a strong case for the Euro-
pean Economic Community to be concerned in 
this important aspect of the economies of its 
member states. All the members of the Com-
munity, except the Irish Republic, are also mem-
bers of the North Atlantic Alliance. So are 
Greece, Turkey and Portugal whose admission 
to the Community is on the way. They are the 
same countries though associated for different 
purposes. The Treaty of Rome makes no refer-
ence to defence, nor have the organs of the 
Community - Council, Commission, Court and 
Assembly- any military function. This is well 
understood. It is the Treaty of Brussels and the 
North Atlantic Treaty which provided concur-
rently for the collective defence of the same 
group of European powers, though many of us 
believe that the failure of the attempt to create 
a European defence community in 1954 marked 
a tragic set-back for the idea of Europe. The 
designation of specific weapons, standardisation 
agreements, joint production and all the technical 
aspects of NATO's long-term defence programme 
must remain the responsibility of the Military 
Committee of the Alliance, assisted by the 
Military Agency for Standardisation, the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors and 
the international bodies mentioned above, notably 
the IEPG, which has the practical merit of 
including France, as well as the other NATO 
members. But, none of these bodies, whose aim 
is to achieve particular objectives of the defence 
programme, is competent to devise a common 
policy for the procurement and manufacture of 
arms as a necessary part of the economy and 
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industrial life of the nations concerned. The 
EEC is the only European institution in a posi-
tion to bring about the restructuring of the 
European arms industry, which is vital to the 
introduction of a common procuretnent policy 
as well as to systematic co-operation and inter-
change with the armaments industry of the 
United States, which could make the two-way 
street a permanent feature of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Hitherto, the Community has suffered 
from having no regard to the armaments industry 
in Europe. In 1976, 22 % of all the research 
and development funds of its governments were 
accounted for by that industry, so that, without 
it, a common industrial policy cannot be estab-
lished. Secondly, the co-ordination of procure-
ment and manufacture of weapons by the 
national defence establishments has, so far, 
resulted in a number of fragmented, individual 
projects because there was no coherent organisa-
tion on the production side. 
How the task might be discharged 
105. Were the EEC to set up, as is suggested, 
a body to co-ordinate the procurement and manu-
facture of the arms of its member states, which 
would be either a section of the Commission, 
or an agency responsible to it, what would be its 
modus operandi ? It would be through the Min-
isters of Defence sitting on the Council of the 
Community that it would receive definitions of 
the military material needed for a given period, 
the Ministers of states represented in NATO's 
Defence Planning Committee basing their 
requirement on their commitments to the 
medium- and long-term defence programmes of 
the organisation, the French and Irish Ministers 
indicating the common projects, if any, in which 
their governments wished to participate. It would 
then be a question of identifying and co-
ordinating the expertise available in each of the 
existing national arms industries and firms con-
tracting for governments. On the industrial side 
the problems would not be essentially different 
from those of industrial policy in general, in 
much of which the European Community is 
already involved - location of works, employ-
ment, worker participation, investment, social 
welfare and the environment. 
106. There would be a number of financial, 
technical and legal problems involved in a 
system of co-ordinated production of armaments. 
For example, guarantees would be needed to 
protect some · countries against losses in their 
balance of payments, incurred in the short term. 
For example, this would not necessarily apply to 
individual projects, but, on the basis of several 
projects over a number of years, an effort ought 
to be made to operate the principle of fair 
return. Procurement, that is the purchase of arms 
and technical know-how from countries outside 
the Community, should also come under the 
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responsibility of the Community's agency, in 
order to protect fair competition, and ensure, as 
far as possible, equality of advantages (with the 
exception of the particular United States legisla-
tive restrictions on the transfer of nuclear 
devices). 
107. This would be necessary, particularly in 
the longer term, so as to prevent a few Euro-
pean undertakings from acquiring a virtual 
monopoly through the restructuring of industry 
that must take place. Such companies should 
continue to live at risk. Co-operation on such 
procurement would also be necessary as part of 
any intercontinental collaboration between 
Europe and the United States. Through close col-
laboration on procurement, it would be possible 
to make purchases of American arms and equip-
ment conditional on equivalent purchases by the 
Americans from Europe, so establishing the 
desired two-way street. 
108. Another important area where the Com-
munity could make its influence felt is the 
financing of industrial research and develop-
ment, undertaken in co-operation between firms 
in several member states in areas of special 
interest to the armaments industry as well. Most 
research and development projects in the air-
craft, computer and electronic industries fall into 
this category. 
109. Furthermore, the creation of a common 
fund to facilitate structural change would be a 
natural task for the Commission. Consideration 
might also be given to whether or not the Com-
munity should play some part in building up 
common buffer stocks of strategic raw materials 
so that, in a crisis, production could be main-
tained in both defence and civilian industries. 
110. Having regard to the existing overlapping 
and wastage of money on research and develop-
ment in the production of armaments, the co-
ordination of research and development suggests 
itself as a subject particularly suitable for an 
arms-production agency of the Community. This 
is a prickly subject, involving not only the 
expertise, amour-propre and vested interests of 
many pundits in each country but also patents 
and national security legislation. 
111. Evidently, the research findings of a pa.rtic-
ular project sponsored by the Community 
ought to be fully accessible to all those under-
takings taking part in it. But there is also the 
question of whether research findings should be 
available to the participating countries for 
onward transmission to other enterprises, in cases 
where organisations from only some of the 
countries taking part are involved on the manu-
facturing side. If this cannot be implemented, 
steps should be taken to ensure that, over a 
period of time, projects are allocated in such a 
way that individual participating countries do 
not acquire a monopoly of advanced technology 
in one or more areas. 
112. Other problems which would arise from 
the intervention of the Community in the 
restructuring of the European arms industry 
would include : rules of comperumtion, partic-
ularly for 10111 of exports ; the legal framework 
for co-operation between undertakings, both in 
respect of company law and the law of contract, 
would need revision; and, in the same way, the 
legal basis for the allocation of research and 
development contracts and production contracts, 
including, in particular, common rules for 
adjudicating tenders, should, if not actually 
determined within an EEC framework, be worked 
out in collaboration with the Commission. 
113. The real difficulty of any such plan out-
lined above, is not detail but principle. We are 
dealing with sovereign, independent states, all 
of whom to a greater or lesser extent, regard a 
nationally-owned arms industry as going to the 
heart of their concept of sovereignty. It is clear 
that such co-operation as there is at present 
between the member states of the EEC on the 
procurement and manufacture of arms is not the 
result of any coherent, long-term policy, but 
relates solely to isolated projects, where the 
partners have usually had to choose between 
collaboration or abandonment of the project. 
114. Has Europe the political will to recom-
mence its journey towards unity Y There are 
three traditional routes : unity through conquest, 
which has been tried and failed ; unity through 
economic integration, which has run into the 
sands, and unity through the fear of a common 
enemy. Soviet rearmament has increased the 
perception of the threat in Europe. But are we 
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sufficiently afraid to begin the necessary process 
of dismantling the bastions of our national 
sovereignty ? The idea of a European defence 
community evaporated, as we know, in the 1950s, 
when Germany joined its former enemies in the 
American-European Alliance. Today, we should 
start to talk once again about the defence of 
Europe in the context of Europe. A Community-
wide arms procurement and manufacture agency, 
the purpose of which would be to restructure the 
European 8d"'DB industry, is, in the long term, the 
only way in which Europe can retain the ability 
to make arms, which it needs today, and by so 
doing, guarantee its own independence. 
VD. Opinion of the minority 
115. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by 7 votes to 6 with 3 abstentions. A 
minority of the Committee was opposed to involv-
ing the European Community in armaments 
industry policy, and some members would there-
fore have deleted paragraph 2 of the draft recom-
mendation. Some members believed such involve-
ment would be divisive of the Alliance, possibly 
isolating the United States or the allied EurO-
pean countries which are not members of the 
Community, or might impose too great a burden 
on the Community or undermine the IEPG ; 
others again doubted the legality of the proposal. 
Several were anxious to ensure greater parlia-
mentary control - at national and international 
level - of the armaments industry. The view 
was also expressed that some proposals of the 
report could lead, through standardisation, to a 
new integration which was held to be detri-
mental 
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.APPENDIX I 
The ten action areas under the NATO long-term defence 
programme on which task forces have been established 1 
APPENDIX I 
1. Readiness 6. Communications, command and control 
2. Reinforcement 
3. Reserve mobilisation 
4. Maritime posture 
5. .Air defence 
1. See paragraphs 25 et seq. of the explanatory memo· 
ran dum. 
7. Electronic warfare 
8. Rationalisation 
9. Logistics 
10. Theatre nuclear modernisation 
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Future equipment programmes 
(a) Belgium 
Equipment to be replaced in the future in 
the three armed forces subject to the approval of 
the various supervisory bodies : 
(a) improvement of six Hawk (Helip) 
batteries ; · 
(b) replacement of ± 1,200 infantry armou-
red vehicles (lA V) ; 
(c) modernisation of the equipment of a 
signals battalion ensuring communica-
tions for the staff headquarters ; 
(d) renewal of army transport vehicles in 
continuation of a programme already 
under way covering : 
- 1,800 quarter-ton 4 X 4 vehicles; 
- 900 8-10-ton lorries; 
- 160 tractors and semi-trailers; 
- 100 wheeled breakdown vehicles ; 
(e) procurement of 330 Milan systems for 
the ATK surface programme ; 
(f) RITA programme: extension to other 
transmission equipment ; 
(g) procurement of air-to-air and air-to-
surface munitions, mainly for F-16 air-
craft. 
(b) France 
Principal armaments programmes recently 
launched or likely to be launched by France 
in the coming years 
Naval armaments 
- Nuclear submarine (attack) 
- Minehunter (with Belgium and the 
Netherlands) 
- ASW and anti-aircraft corvettes 
- Carrier-borne Super Etendard fighter 
aircraft 
-New-generation Atlantic maritime patrol 
aircraft 
- Anti-submarine helicopters 
-Torpedoes 
- Second-generation anti-ship missile 
- Self-defence systems for ships 
Land armaments 
- Main combat vehicle 
- Anti-tank helicopter 
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- Tactical transport helicopter 
- Third-generation anti-tank missiles 
- Individual light weapon 
- Seli-propelled and towed 155 mm howit-
zers 
- Very short-range ground-air missile 
- Artillery rockets 
- Battlefield surveillance systems 
- Artillery assistance systems 
- RITA communications network 
Air armaments 
- Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft 
-Alpha-Jet trainer aircraft 
- Air-air missiles 
- Laser-guided air-surface missiles and 
rockets 
- Interception radar 
- Helicopter and aircraft engines 
- Tactical fighter aircraft 
(c) United Kingdom 
Production and development 1 
Royal Naoy 
311. Ships 
(a) Nuclear-powered fleet submarines. These 
vessels are designed for hunter/killer operations 
against surface ships and submarines. HMS 
Sceptre, the tenth nuclear-powered fleet sub-
marine and the fourth of the Swiftsure class, is 
planned to enter service shortly and two more 
of the class are under construction. The order 
for HMS Trafalgar, the first vessel of a new 
class of nuclear-powered fleet submarines, was 
placed last year and a second is planned for the 
coming year. These submarines will have improve-
ments in equipment, endurance and speed which 
will enable them to be more effective in their 
primary role of hunting and detecting enemy 
submarines and surface ships in support of 
NATO operations. 
(b) Anti-submarine cruisers. HMS l111Vine1"ble, 
the first of the anti-submarine cruisers, was 
1. Statement on defence estimates 1978, Cmnd 7099. 
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launched in May 1977 and construction work 
on the second, HMS Illustrious, continues. A 
third ship of this class is planned. 
(c) Destroyers. Two Type 42 guided-missile 
destroyers are now in service and a third, HMS 
Newcastle, will shortly be accepted into service. 
Three more are due to enter service in the com-
ing year. Four more ships were on order at the 
beginning of this year and further orders are 
planned. 
(d) Frigates. Seven Type 21 frigates are now 
in service and the last of the class is expected 
to enter service shortly. With the launching of 
HMS Battleaxe in 1977, two Type 22 frigates 
are now fitting out and two more are under 
construction. A fifth Type 22 is planned to be 
ordered this year. 
(e) Mine countermeasures vessels. HMS Led-
bury, the second vessel of the Hunt class of mine 
countermeasures vessels, is under construction 
and further orders are planned for this year. 
(f) Patrol vessels. Five ships of the Island class 
have now entered service as offshore patrol 
vessels. Two further ships of this class have 
been ordered for a variety of tasks including 
coastal fishery protection. 
(g) Fleet replenishment ships. RF A Fort Grange 
will enter service this year and a further vessel 
is under construction. 
(h) Refits. The modernisation of HMS Dido, 
the last of the first batch of eight ships in the 
Leander class frigate refit programme, is 
expected to be completed ,later this year. Modern-
isation of three ships in the second batch is com-
plete, with four more in progress. Work has also 
begun on the refit of HMS Andromeda, the first 
ship in the third batch, which will include the 
fitting of the Sea Wolf point-defence missile 
system, Exocet anti-ship missiles, enhanced sonar 
equipments and electronic warfare equipment. 
312. Naval aviation 
(a) Sea Harrier. The first front-line Sea Harrier 
squadron is planned to form in 1980 for embark-
ation initially in HMS H ermes. The second will 
embark in HMS Invinc~"ble, and ultimately all 
squadrons will be deployed in ships of her class. 
The aircraft will be armed with Sidewinder 
AIM9L air-to-air and P3T air-to-surface missiles 
to provide it with a quick-reaction capability 
against enemy aircraft and an attack capability 
against surface vessels. 
(b) Naval helicopters. Sea King Mark 1 heli-
copters are being modified to the standards of 
Mark 2 helicopters, currently in production. Sea 
Kings will also be fitted with an improved radar 
and communications system and an acoustic pro-
cessor and sonobuoys to supplement the existing 
dunking sonar. The other helicopter under pro-
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duction for the Royal Navy is the Lynx Mark 2, 
which will be operated from most destroyers and 
frigates. 
Naval weapons 
313. Air-defence weapons 
(a) Sea Dart. This medium-range surface-to-air 
guided weapon system is now fitted in three 
ships, and is expected to be accepted into opera-
tional service this year. A programme is under 
way for an improved Sea Dart system and 
supporting radars to increase its air-defence 
capabilities to meet the expected threat in the 
mid to late 1980s. 
(b)Sea Wolf. The intensive series of sea trials 
on board HMS Penelope proved highly successful 
and production of both missile and ship system 
has begun. The weapon system is in advance of 
all others of its type and will provide the Type 
22 frigate and other ships with a close-range self-
defence capability against missiles and aircraft. 
A programme of improvements is in hand to 
maintain the capability of Sea Wolf in the face 
of expected developments in the threat. 
314. Anti-surface ship weapons 
(a) Sub-Harpoon. Negotiations were completed 
with the United States Government last October 
for the full development of Sub-Harpoon, a sub-
marine-launched, air flight long-range anti-ship 
missile which will provide the main anti-surface 
ship armament of our submarine fleet from the 
early 1980s. 
(b) Sea Skua. This anti-ship missile is expected 
to enter service in the early 1980s. Carried by 
the Lynx helicopter, it is intended to provide 
destroyers and frigates with an attack capability 
stretching far beyond their horizon. 
(c) NATO anti-surface ship missile. Joint 
feasibility studies are now in hand with a number 
of NATO allies for the next generation of anti-
ship missiles for service in the late 1980s and 
1990s. 
315. Anti-submarine weapons 
(a) Heavyweight torpedoes. Feasibility studies 
for a successor to the submarine-launched Tiger-
fish torpedo have begun. 
(b) Lightwei(jM torpedoes. Development is con-
tinuing on Sting Ray, the advanced lightweight 
torpedo. It is designed to succeed the American 
Mk 46 torpedo and will be capable of being 
launched from surface ships, helicopters and RAF 
Nimrod aircraft. 
316. Other naval equipment 
(a) Propulsion units. A new marine propulsion 
unit based on the latest version of the Rolls-
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Royce Spey aero-engine has entered full develop-
ment. 
(b) Sonars. Several types of new sonar equip-
ment are being developed and fitted to provide 
surface ships, submarines and helicopters with 
improved anti-submarine detection and classifica-
tion capabilities. 
(c) Electronic warfare and communications 
equipment. Advanced new electronic warfare and 
communications equipment are included in natio-
nal and collaborative development and produc-
tion programmes. A NATO collaborative develop-
ment programme is in hand for a decoy system 
for use against anti-surface ship missiles. 
(d) Navigation equipment. Production orders 
have been placed for an improved inertial navi-
gational system which will be fitted in sub-
marines and the new anti-submarine cruiser. 
(e) Ship radars. An advanced air surveillance 
and target indication radar is being developed 
and will be in service with the surface fleet by 
the mid-1980s. 
(f) Airborne radars. The Seaspray airborne 
search radar is now in full production. This is 
being fitted in the Lynx helicopter and will pro-
vide target information for Sea Skua missiles. 
Blue Fox, a derivative of Seaspray, is under 
development and will be fitted in the Sea Harrier 
for air-to-air and air-to-surface roles. 
(g) Action information systems. The large 
majority of the surface fleet will be fitted with 
computer-based action information systems toge-
ther with digital data links by the mid-1980s. 
Army 
317. Armoured forces 
(a) Chieftain. Work on the planned improve-
ments to maintain and enhance the effectiveness 
of Chieftain into the 1980s is going ahead. In 
addition to latest marks of the tank laser sight, 
units will also this year begin to receive the 
muzzle reference system. A number of modifica-
tions to improve the reliability of the main 
engine are being incorporated into the fleet. 
(b) Chieftain replacement (MBT 80). The 
Anglo-German collaborative studies on a future 
main battle tank were terminated in March last 
year. Although there was a large measure of 
agreement on the details of the requirement, 
both countries felt tha:t collaborative develop-
ment and production would not be possible, 
mainly because the time-scales in which each 
country required the replacement tank became 
incompatible during the course of the joint 
work. National studies on the best way of meet-
ing our requirement for a tank to be in service 
by the late 1980s are now in progress, and these 
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will make use of the valuable work carried out 
during the joint concept studies. 
(c) Mechanised infantry combat vehicle. The 
second phase of project definition for a mechan-
ised infantry combat vehicle, to replace part 
of the present FV 430 series of armoured person-
nel carriers in the 1980s, began in August ~ast 
year. Project definition has also begun on a series 
of variants. 
(d) Tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles. 
Two more variants in the series are now entering 
service - Striker, which carries the Swingfire 
anti-tank guided weapon system, and the com-
mand vehicle, Sultan. The last variants in the 
series, Samaritan, an armoured ambulance, and 
Samson, a recovery vehicle, are planned to enter 
the production phase this year. 
(e) Combat engineer tractor. The hew combat 
engineer tractor will enter service this year. 
318. Artillery and associated equipment 
(a) FH 70 and SP 70. The towed 155 mm field 
howitzer, FH 70, will begin to enter service 
early next year. The three collaborating coun-
tries, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Italy, are also continuing 
development work on the self-propelled version, 
SP 70. Prototypes have been produced and are 
now undergoing technical evaluation trials. 
(b) Supervisor. Development of Supervisor, a 
battlefield surveillance and target acquisition 
system using real-time data transmission, is 
continuing. Supervisor is based on an unmanned 
miniature helicopter, the prototype of which will 
make its first flight in the spring of this year. 
(c) Cervantes. Development of a trailer-mounted 
radar, to locate rocket launchers and mortars, is 
continuing. 
319. Army guided weapons. 
(a) Rapier air-defence missile system. Deploy-
ment of the all-weather blindfire tracking radar, 
DN 181, will begin early this year. Studies are 
now being carried out on further improvements 
to Rapier and to evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of a tracked version. 
(b) Helicopter-borne anti-tank guided weapon. 
Following the evaluation of the Franco-German 
HOT and the Ameri<lan TOW systems, the 
Ministry of Defence announced in August last 
year that TOW is to be adopted and will enter 
service with the army Lynx helicopter in the 
early 1980s. A substantial part of the equipment 
will be manufactured under licence in the United 
Kingdom. 
(c) Swingfire long-range anti-tank guided 
weapon. Development is continuing of a thermal-
imaging night sight for Swingfire. Discussions 
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have also begun with France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the requirement for a 
third-generation long-range anti-tank guided 
weapon. 
(d) Milan medium-range anti-tank guided 
weapon. It has been possible to accelerate delivery 
of the initial batch of Milan equipments being 
bought from the Franco-German consortium, 
Euromissile. Deliveries of this batch began last 
year and will be spread over two years. Develop-
ment of a thermal-imaging night sight for Milan 
has begun on a collaborative tripartite basis be-
tween the United Kin·gdom, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and France. 
320. Other army equipment 
(a) Light anti-armour weapon. Project defini-
tion began last year on a man-portable anti-
armour weapon to replace the 84 mm Car! Gustav 
recoilless rifle and 66 mm M72 rocket. Discus-
sions are taking place within the EPG on the 
possibilities of collaboration. 
(b) Small arms. NATO technical trials to select 
a standard calibre for future small arms began 
last year, and military tests will begin later this 
year. The new British 4.85 mm weapon system, 
comprising an automatic rifle and light support 
weapon, has been entered in the trials and the 
results should be available by the end of next 
year. 
(c) Mines. The Barmine anti-tank mine is now 
in service and work began last year to develop 
additional fuses to extend its operational applica-
tion and improve its resistance to countermeas-
ures. The complementary off-route mine and the 
Ranger scatterable anti-personnel mine system 
will enter service later this year. 
(d) Electronic warfare. In July last year, an 
electronic-warfare regiment took its place in the 
order of battle of 1 (BR) Corps. Most of its 
equipment will be British, although some is being 
bought from France. Further improvements in 
our electronic-warfare capability are under con-
sideration. 
(e) Lynx helicopter. Intensive flying trials of 
the army version of Lynx have been completed, 
and the helicopter is expected to enter service 
in the middle of this year, ·replacing the Scout. 
(f) Vehicles. The intrOduction of a range of 
low-mobility vehicles - a basic cargo carrier, 
with tipper, fuel tanker and recovery variants-
is proceeding according to plan. A main con-
tractor has been chosen by competitive tender for 
the production of an 8-tonne medium-mobility 
lood carrier which, together with its variants, 
will form the backbone of the Army's future 
logistic fleet. 
(g) Communications. The Ptarmiga.n. tactical 
trunk communications system, which will replace 
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the present Bruin system, has now entered the 
final stages of development. Ptarmigan has been 
designed to conform with standards agreed in the 
communications sub-group of the Eurogroup, to 
enable future trunk systems to be fully inter-
operable. 
(h) Automatic data processing (ADP) system. 
Trials will be carried out in BAOR of a new 
command and control ADP system, Wavell. If 
these trials are successful it is planned eventually 
to equip all formation headquarters in 1 (BR) 
Corps with W avell to assist them in data-
handling. 
(i) Logistic landing craft. Two newly-built 
logistic landing craft have been launched. 
HMAV Ardennes was commissioned in December 
last year and HMA V Arakan will be commis-
sioned in August this year. These vessels will 
provide peacetime logistic support to the Hebri-
des and logistic support for the reinforcement of 
Europe in war. 
Royal Air Force 
321. New aircraft 
(a) Tornado GR1. First deliveries of production 
aircraft, of which 150 have so far been ordered, 
are expected next year. The variable geometry 
configuration will confer great operational flexi-
bility and permit a combination of high-speed 
low-level flight, good range and an excellent 
take-off and landing performance. The tri-natio-
. nal flight test programme had amassed some 
1,500 hours by the end of 1977, and test data 
indicate that service requirements will be met. 
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(b) Tornado F2. The Tornado F2 air-defence 
variant is now in full development with the first 
of three development aircraft under construction. 
It will have an excellent loiter capability and its 
armament will include Sky Flash medium-range 
and AIM9L short-range air-to-air missiles, and 
cannon. The first phase of the airborne trials of 
an important new air-intercept radar for the 
Tornado F2 has been completed and the second 
phase, to demonstrate full mission capability, 
will begin shortly. 
(c) Nimrod AEW. Full development is under 
way to convert eleven Nimrod aircraft to the 
AEW role. They will enter service progressively 
in the early 1980s, replacing the Shackleton. 
Mission system avionics will be developed and 
integrated into a modified Nimrod airframe. The 
main features of the system will be a new radar, 
electronic support measures, "identification 
friend or foe" interrogators, an integrated data-
handling system and associated communications 
equipment. The aircraft is planned to be inter-
operable to the maximum extent possible with 
other NATO airborne early warning systems. 
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(d) The Harrier/Jaguar successor. Studies of 
various designs for an aircraft to replace the 
Harrier and Jaguar are continuing with the 
aim of combining a capability for battlefield 
attack and for air combat in one airframe. The 
possibility of developing such an aircraft col-
laboratively is being explored with a number of 
potential partners in the EPG. 
(e) Support helicopters. It is intended to meet 
the army's requirement for medium.lift helicop-
ter support by the purchase of 30 Boeing-Vertol 
CH-147 Chinook helicopters from the United 
States. The helicopters would be equipped with 
British equipment, where appropriate, to ensure 
commonality with equipment already in service 
with the Royal Air Force. At the same time a 
number of Wessex helicopters would be with-
drawn from the front-line and transferred to 
other roles, or pLaced in reserve. 
(f) Sea King search and rescue helicopters. The 
first of the Sea King search and rescue helicop-
ters have been delivered to the Royal Air Force. 
They will enter service during the year and the 
Whirlwinds they replace will be withdrawn. 
322. Aircraft in service 
(a) Nimrod maritime reconnaissance (MR) air-
craft. The major refit of Nimrod long-range 
maritime patroL aircraft is now in hand and 
flight trials of the acoustic processor start this 
year. The first refitted Nimrod MR2s with the 
processor, the associated active attack and long-
range passive sonobuoys, and the Searchwater 
radar are due to enter service next year. The 
refit is to be completed by the mid-1980s. 
(b) Harrier. An order for a further 24 aircraft 
has been placed and deliveries should start next 
year. The feasibility of fitting a new improved 
wing to the aircraft is also under study. 
(c) Jaguar. Work is in hand to increase the 
take-off thrust and the time between overhauls 
of the Adour Mk 102 engine. Reconnaissance 
pods containing British infra-red linescan and 
camera equipment are now being fitted. 
(d) Puma. The fleet wiLl be progressively up-
dated by modifications to improve performance 
and extend component life, and by the intro-
duction of fibre-composite main rotor blades and 
an ice and snow protection system. Delivery of 
an advanced tactical navigation system is plan-
ned to take place this year. 
(e) Phantom. Work has begun on a programme 
to improve the combat capability of the Phantom 
to maintain a high level of operational effective-
ness until it is replaced by the Tornado F2 in 
the mid-1980s. 
323. Aircraft weapons 
(a) Air-to-air missiles. The Sky Flash medium-
range air-to-air missile, to be carried by the 
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Phantom and the Tornado F2, is now entering 
full production. Requirements for future short-
range air-to-air missiles for the Phantom and 
Tornado F2 will be met by the procurement of 
AIM9L missiles most of which, subject to satis-
factory negotiation, will be manufactured by a 
European consortium of which the United King-
dom will be a member. 
(b) Air-to-surface weapons. Project definition 
has begun of the British Aerospace P3T anti-
ship sea-skimming missile, which will be fitted 
to the Buccaneer in the early 1980s to replace 
TV Martel and will later be carried by those 
Tornado GR1s which operate in the maritime 
strike/attack role. P3T will have a considerably 
longer range than Martel, will be guided by 
active radar to provide an all-weather day and 
night capability and will be able to penetrate 
the enemy's electronic countermeasures (ECM) 
defences. During the year American laser-guid-
ance kits to improve the accuracy of RAF 
1,000 lb high-explosive bombs and laser-
designator pods for use on Buccaneers will be 
delivered. Agreement in principle has been 
reached with the United States for the co-ope-
rative development of an advanced airfield attack 
system. Other weapons projects include studies 
of anti-armour and defence-suppression weapons, 
planned to enter service in the 1980s. 
324. Ground-based air-defence equipment 
(a) Rapier. The Rapier systems now in service 
with the RAF Regiment are being fitted with 
the blindfire tracking radar, DN 181. A study 
of further improvements is under way (see para-
graph 319(a) ). 
(b) The United Kingdom air-defence ground 
, environment (UKADGE). The planned pro-
gramme of improvements to UKADGE, which is 
receiving NATO funding support, is now well 
advanced and development work will begin this 
year. Work is also in hand to re-equip a number 
of early warning stations. 
325. Other electronics 
(a) "Identification friend or foe" (IF'F'). Feasi-
bility studies are in progress in order ·to define a 
replacement IFF system with NATO-wide appli-
cation. 
(b) Communications. High-speed data commun-
ications are planned for the transfer of informa-
tion required by future command and control 
systems. Project definition has begun on the 
exchange of digital data between fighters, AEW 
aircraft, ships and UKADGE, and the feasibility 
of introducing a general purpose ground com-
munication system, using digital transmission 
and computer switching techniques, is being 
investigated. New very high frequency (VHF) 
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and ultra high frequency (UHF) airborne radio · 
systems are being installed in most RAF aircraft 
to replace obsolescent equipment and to satisfy 
revised international compatibility standards ; 
new VHF and UHF ground radios are also being 
introduced. Techniques to improve beyond-line-
of-sight radio systems are being studied and the 
installation of a new HF radio ground/air net-
work for Strike Command aircraft has begun. 
The United Kingdom is co-operating closely with 
its allies to ensure that, where necessary, future 
communications systems are interoperable. 
(c) Electronic warfare. Passive radar warning 
equipment is being fitted in a variety of combat 
aircraft and active ECM equipment is plooned 
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to be fitted in the Tornado GRl and the Jaguar 
GRl. ECM for the Harrier are also being studied. 
326. Other development programmes 
Work is continuing on improving engine 
safety, efficiency and reliability and on reducing 
oosts. In order to build up experience on 
advanced technologies relevant to new aircraft 
and weapons, demonstrator programmes are 
being carried out on the use of composite mate-
rials for helicopters ; on the application of 
active control technology to enable the pilot to 
get maximum capability f:r;om the aircraft and 
allow greater freedom to the designer ; and on 
advanced air-to-air missiles. 
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Joint production - Collaborative projects as a proportion of national defence 
equipment procurement for countries replying to enquiries by the Rapporteur 
(a) Percentage of "procurement" head of defence budget spent on collaborative projects 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Belgium 15.6 30.6 31.1 49.4 60.6 
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.1 17.6 
-
n.a.. = not a. va.ilable. 
(b) Collaborative projects to which foregoing percentages relate 
(i) Belgium 
CVRT 
Gepard (AA 35 mm) 
RITA (already approved) 
Alpha-Jet aircraft 
F-16 aircraft 
Minehunters 
(ii) United Kingdom 
Sea systems 
Tyne/Olympus logistic support 
Olympus gas turbine support 
Seagnat - anti-ship missile decoy system 
NATO anti-surface ship missile 
Land systems 
CVR(T) family- tracker armoured vehicles 
SP 70 -155 mm self-propelled gun 
FH 70- 155 mm towed gun 
Midge surveillance system 
Milan: night sight 
Air systems 
Tornado- multi-role combat aircraft 
Jaguar- strike/attack aircraft 
Puma- twin engine GP helicopter 
Gazelle- GP light helicopter 
Lynx - anti-submarine and utility helicopter 
Martel- stand-off air-to-surface guided weapon 
JP 233 - airfield attack weapon 
Long-range passive sonobuoy and sonic processor 
AUS- Australia 
BE- Belgium 
CAN- Canada 
DK- Denmark 
FR- France 
FRG - Federal Republic 
of Germany 
IT- Italy 
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NL-
NO-
UK-
US-
BE/UK 
BE/FRG 
BE/FR 
BE/FR/FRG 
BE/NL/NO/DK/US 
BE/NL/FR 
BE/NL/UK 
FR/UK 
DK/FRG/NO/UK/US 
FR/FRG/NL/NO/UK 
BE/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
CAN/FRG/UK 
FR/FRG/UK 
FRG/IT/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
FR/UK 
UK/US 
AUS/UK 
Netherlands 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
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APPENDIX V 
Procurement, research and development, and research 
as a percentage of defence budget for countries replying to enquiries by 
the Rapporteur 
Belgium 
France 
United Kingdom 1 
1. Range for years 1974-78. 
n.a. = not available. 
Procurement 
18% 
43% 
44.2-38.1% 
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Research and Research development 
n.a. 0.06% 
10.8% 2.1% 
13.1-12.2% 1.9-1.8 % 
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Amendment 1 
A European armaments policy 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Bermann Schmidt and others 
1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper. 
21st November 1978 
Signed: Hermann Sekmidt, Hardy, van den Bergh, Stoffelen 
1. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
A European armaments poUcy 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
22nd November 1978 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, before "the standardisation" insert ",when 
necessary for the security of Europe,". 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "be concentrated in" insert "the 
Standing Armaments Committee and". 
Signed : V alleix 
I. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment 2 agreed to; Amendment 3 negatived). 
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Amendment 4 
A European armaments policy 
AMENDMENT 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen 
22nd Nove~ 1978 
4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "with such assistance as 
the Standing Armaments Committee can provide". 
Signed : Sto Uelen 
1. See 12th Sitting, 22nd November 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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The limitation of strategic arms 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
31st October 1978 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the limitation of strategic arms 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The strategic nuclear forces 
(a) Definition of United States and Soviet strategic forces 
(b) Capabilities and strategy of the superpowers 
(c) Strategic forces of France and the United Kingdom 
(i) The strategic nuclear forces of France 
(ii) United Kingdom strategic forces 
(d) Chinese strategic forces 
Ill. The SALT I agreements 
IV. The approach to SALT 11 
V. SALT and Europe 
(a) SALT and the balance of strategic forces of the two great powers 
(i) SALT 11 is liable to sanction a certain shift in the strategic balance 
to the advantage of the Soviet Union 
(ii) SALT 11 does not guarantee the Atlantic Alliance against the 
possible vulnerability of the American Minuteman missiles 
(b) SALT and the nuclear defence of Europe 
(i) The technological transfer problem 
(ii) Limiting American capability in Western Europe 
(iii) The problem of the reciprocal sanctuarisation of the territory of 
the two great powers 
(c) The need to define a European approach to SALT 
(i) Improving the Atlantic dialogue 
(ii) Designing a European security policy 
VI. Conclusion 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; 
MM. Bonnel, Boberti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM . ..4hrens, 
BoomeZ, Bechter (Alternate: Bossi), van den Bergh, 
Boldrini, Boucheny, CritchZey, DejarifMr,, Fosson, Grant, 
Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, 
Menard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Buchner), Pecchioli, 
Peronnet, Hermann Sehmidt (Alternate: Vohrer), Sehol-
ten, Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate: Banks). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in itaZics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the limitation of strategic arms 
The Assembly, 
Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deter-
rent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater than the stake 
represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventional forces ; 
Considering that the United States strategic nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the 
allied deterrent but that the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which 
they face Soviet planners, make a. greater contribution than their size would suggest ; 
Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa. on 19th June 1974 assigns to the 
British and French strategic nuclear forces a deterrent r6le of their own ; 
Deploring the inadequacy of progress in detente and concerned by the deterioration of East-
West relations ; 
Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategic arms race; 
Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence 
matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking 
account of the results of the strategic arms limitation talks ; 
2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly parti-
cipating in the talks; 
3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in 
respect of nuclear weapons ; 
4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces 
between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact; 
5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of detente ; 
6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategic arms 
limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in 
this field. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur was asked to examine the 
on-going strategic arms limitation talkS (SALT) 
and their implications for European security. 
2. It might naturally be considered that these 
talks rel'ate solely to the interests and respon-
sibilities of the United States and the Soviet 
Union, but it must be noted that they are of 
primary concern to Europe in view of the 
owrwhelming part played by Soviet and Ameri-
can nuclear weapons in the two systems of 
alliance. Any change in the conditions of the 
bal'ance of forces between the two great powers 
in fact immediately leads to an alteration in the 
environment in which Europe has to ensure its 
security. It compels the Atlantic Alliance to 
make a critical' review of the strategic concepts 
on which its defence policy is based. 
3. The strategic arms limitation treaties 
already concluded or to be concluded do not of 
course in themselves modify the balance of forces 
between the two great powers, but they give 
official recognition to the divergent trends in 
their military capabilities and circumscribe their 
competition. 
4. Consideration must therefore be given to 
the present state of the strategic potential of 
each of the two great powers and in particular 
the question of the proportionally faster growth 
in Soviet strategic weapons: with the possibility 
of parts of the American strategic system 
becoming vulnerable in the near future, is this 
not a sign of the development of serious threats 
to the credibility of the strategy of graduated 
response on which is based the security of mem-
ber countries of the NATO integrated military 
structure? 
5. Moreover, can negotiations which seek to 
control armaments rather than bring about 
disarmament and which organise the armaments 
race rather than stop it fundamentally meet 
Europe's needs Y 
6. The strategic arms limitation talks must 
not be taken for true negotiations on full and 
controlled disarmament. They are merely an 
arrangement of competition between the two 
great powers, which is now largely a matter of 
qualitative improvement of strategic weapons. It 
is therefore possible to observe a direct agree-
ment between the United States and the Soviet 
Union which may have negative consequences 
of two kinds for Europe : on the one hand, the 
territories of the two great powers are mutually 
recognised as nuclear sanctuaries although the 
possibility of a confrontation in other theatres, 
particularly Europe, is not precluded. 
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7. On the other hand, the United States may 
be tempted to give its policy of co-operation with 
its allies second place to the search for a com-
promise with its Soviet partner. 
8. Finally, a disturbing trend in American 
policy since the Carter Administration took 
office must be recognised. Previously, under the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations, the strategic 
arms limitation talks were considered as part 
and parcel of the process of detente. Today, as 
Richard Burt wrote in the July 1978 issue of 
Foreign Affairs : 
"The new administration views SALT 
more as an arms control proooss and less as 
a political enterprise : the talks, it is said, 
can be separated somewhat from the wider 
Soviet-American political' relationship and 
arms control approached on its own tech-
nical merits." 
9. Agreed, the maintenance of deterrence at a 
quantitatively lower and economically more 
bearable level is a most positive goal, but there 
is no proof that the future SALT II agreements 
will bring the Alliance much closer to this goal. 
On the contrary, insofar as these agreements 
might be merely a technical instrument for the 
control of armaments and not a step towards 
detente, their effect in reducing tension might 
be qlllite limited. To speak of limiting or banning 
technical improvements, i.e. a de facto qualitative 
freeze, would be acceptable to France only if it 
were a freeze at the technological level reached 
by the two great powers, thus leaving France 
the possibility of continuing to improve its 
nuclear forces up to the desirable level. A freeze 
which kept French forces at their present level 
would be unacceptable. 
10. The report is drafted at a time when 
negotiations on a second SALT agreement 
- SALT II - are reported by United States 
spokesmen to be "perhaps 95 % complete", with 
a draft of sixty pages. The meetings in New 
York between the United States Secretary of 
State, Mr. Vance, and the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, Mr. Gromyko, on 27th and 28th September 
and in Washington with President Carter were 
followed by a further meeting in Moscow on 
22nd and 23rd October, and will be followed 
by others in November. It is anticipated 
however that outstanding points still to be settled 
will delay signature and publication of the agreed 
text unti1 after the Assembly has debated this 
report in the week beginning 20th November. 
The report cannot therefore attempt to pass 
judgment on a document which members of the 
Committee have not seen ; instead it will report 
and comment on the positions of the parties to 
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the extent that these are publicly known and, in 
conclusion, reiterate the desiderata for present 
and future agreements on the control of strategic 
weapons which the Assembly has adopted in the 
past on reports from the Committee. 
11. The Committee reported in November 
1972 1 on the first SALT agreements signed by 
Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev on 26th May of 
that year, and has reported most recently in 
1977 2 on subsequent negotiations. As a basis for 
its 'Conclusions the present report first describes 
the present status of the strategic nuclear forces 
of the nuclear weapon powers, then recalls the 
provisions of the first SALT agreements, before 
finally describing the status of the present 
negotiations. 
D. The strategic nuclear forces 
(a) Definition of United States and Soviet 
strateJric forces 
12. The SALT negotiations at present cover 
only the strategic nuclear forces of the two 
superpowers which are based on the territory of 
one (or on submarines) and are capable of 
reaching targets on the territory of the other 
superpower. These cover the three categories of 
ICBM, SLBM and the strategic bombers. 
13. Although it is believed that at one time 
the Soviet Union would have wished to include 
forward-based systems in the talks, and con-
ceivably the strategic forces of the allies of the 
United States, these have so far been excluded 
and SALT II is not expected to contain any 
reference to them. Forward-based systems com-
prise nuclear weapons systems located outside 
the territory of the two superpowers, but never-
theless capable of attaining targets on the ter-
ritory of the other power. Forward-based systems 
are not by definition outside the MBFR area. 
However, it is true that they are not deployed 
in the MBFR area in peacetime. These weapons 
include bombers such as the American F-111 
bombers based in the United Kingdom and 
American carrier-borne aircraf,t. Soviet IRBMs 
and MRBMs are not considered to be forward-
based systems because they are stationed on 
Soviet territory but targeted on Western Europe 
(i.e. the SS-20, with a range of 5,000 km. and a 
triple warhead, in service since 1977) but they 
are a growing threat. The definition of theatre 
weapons now in force in the Alliance is com-
pletely different and extends very largely 
beyond the MBFR reduction area (Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, Poland, Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and 
1. Document 587, East-West relations and defence, 
Rapporteur Mr. Destremeau. 
2. Documents 726 and 7 44, European security and 
East-West relations, Rapporteur Mr. de Koster. 
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the Netherlands). In principle, the MBFR talks 
were not to cover nuclear weapons. An allied 
proposal (option Ill) began to bring them into 
the discussion, but the principle of taking them 
into account has not yet been accepted by the 
West. Some of the NATO aircraft concerned are 
capable of reaching targets in the western area 
of the Soviet Union. 
(b) Capabilities and strategy of the superpowers 
14. Since the first SALT agreement neither 
of the superpowers has claimed to possess or to 
be seeking "superiority" in strategic nuclear 
weapons. "Essential equivalence", or "rough 
parity" is the current language in official United 
States documents. 
15. The objectives of United States strategic 
nuclear policy are described in the financial year 
1979 annual report of the Secretary of Defence, 
Mr. Harold Brown, as follows : 
"The possibility of a strategic nuclear 
attack on the United States itself is very 
low. But since the consequences of such 
an attack would be so catastrophic, we 
must maintain a powerful strategic force 
to deter it. Because of our unique role in 
the collective security system of the West, 
we have a special obligation to deter 
nuclear attacks on our allies... or on our 
forces overseas. In addition the United 
States and its allies must be free from any 
coercion and intimidation that could result 
from perceptions of an overall imbalance 
or particular asymmetry of nuclear forces. 
The strategic forces, in conjunction with 
the United States and allied theatre 
nuclear and conventional forces, also have 
a rOle to play in deterring non-nuclear 
attacks - particularly large-scale conven-
tional attacks on NATO and our Asian 
allies. 
We want mutual deterrence to be so stable 
that it cannot be upset in a crisis. We 
want it to be so well designed that neither 
side will be tempted to try to upset it over 
the longer term." 
16. The basis of the stable mutual deterrence 
is the capability of the remaining nuclear forces 
that would survive any nuclear attack by the 
adversary, still to be able to inflict unacceptable 
damage on the aggressor. A study released by 
the United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency on 29th August estimated that by 
the mid-1980s improvements in Soviet strategic 
forces would have made the two countries 
"essentially equal" in target destruction capa-
bility, although at the present time the United 
States had a lead. The study estimated that 
current Soviet capability in a surprise attack 
could destroy some 55 % of American hard 
TABLE I 
Strategic nuclear forces covered by SALT (as at mid-1918) 
United States Soviet Union 
Range 1 Number Number 
2 Total Range 1 Number Number• Total Category Type of missiles and yield number of Type of missiles and yield of number of km 
or aircraft of warheads warheads km or aircraft warheads warheads 
ICBMs Minuteman 11 11,000 450 1 X 2Mt 450 SS-9 12,000 190 1 X 15-25Mt 190 
Minuteman Ill 12,000 550 3x170kt 1,650 SS-11 10,500 780 1 X 1-2Mt 780 
Titan 11 11,000 54 1 x5-10Mt 54 SS-13 8,000 60 1 X 1Mt 60 
SS-17 10,500 60 1 or 4 X 900kt 150 
SS-18 12,000 110 1 x20 or 8x2Mt 200 
SS-19 10,500 200 1 or 6 X 1Mt 700 
ICBM sub-total 1,054 2,154 1,400 2,080 
SLBMs Polaris A-3 4,600 160 1 X 600kt 160 SS-N4 560 27 27 
SS-N5 1,200 54 54 
Poseidon 4,600 496 10 X 50kt 4,960 SS-N6 2,800 528 1 X 528 
SS-N8 7,600 370 1-2Mt 370 
SS-N X 17 4,800+ 16 1 X 1Mt 16 
SS-N X 18 8,000 + 1 3 X 1-2Mt 1 
SLBM sub-total 656 5,120 1,000 1,000 
Heavy bombers B-52 9,000 400 10 or 4,056 Tu-95 6,500 100 2 X Mt 200 
- more Bear 
10,000 Mja-4 4,800 35 2 X Mt 70 
Bison 
Total delivery 
vehicles and 
warheads 2,110 11,330 2,535 3,350 
I. Maximum combat radius for bcmbers. 
2. Number of independently-targeted warheads (MIRV). Other multiple warheads (MRV) counted as one. 
Sources: Adapted from IISS Military Balance 1978-79 and United States Department of Defence Annual Report, financial year 1979. 
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targets - i.e. the protected ICBMs and com-
mand and control facilities. United States 
nuclear forces that would survive such an attack 
would still be capable of destroying more than 
60% of Soviet hard targets. Mr. Brown in his 
annual report estimates that the United States 
retains in all circumstances, with forces that 
would survive an all-out Soviet surprise attack, 
the capability to destroy two hundred Soviet 
cities - which are estimated to contain 34% 
of the population and 62 % of the industrial 
capacity. This may be said to be the statistical 
basis of mutual assured deterrence. 
17. This situation is essential to the security 
of the Alliance. Deterrence is in fact the very 
basis of Europe's defenc-e. The Soviet Union 
must remain convinced that any operation 
seriously threatening the independence of Euro-
pean states would quickly expose it to the risk 
of strategic nuclear retaliation on its towns. 
18. However, United States and,-in particular, 
French concepts differ over the speed at which 
such a threat must be revealed. While the United 
States considers ,that a diversified escalation 
must precede the threat of strategic retaliation, 
France considers that the purpose of deterrence 
is to avoid any confrontation whatsoever, even 
limited, and thus after a number of warnings 
including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, 
the enemy must be placed before the risk of 
anti-city nuclear launches immediately after the 
first defeats threatening the security of national 
territory. The underlying concern here is to 
prevent Europe becoming a battlefield where 
the two great powers test their forces without 
exposing their own territory. 
19. Despite these differences, a point of agree-
ment remains: :iJn the last resort, the Alliance's 
security depends on the threat to Soviet ter-
ritory represented by the strategic capacity of 
the United States and, with specific means at a 
specific level, those of France and the United 
Kingdom. 
20. From this point of view, however, certain 
disturbing factors may, in the medium term, 
affect the American strategic protection which 
Europe enjoys. The recent improvement and 
increase in Soviet strategic weapons, the erosion 
of American superiority in many areas such as 
the accuracy of missiles or MIRV technology 
and the possible vulnerability of surface-to-
surface intercontinental missiles located in the 
United States make one wonder whether by the 
end of the eighties the United States will be 
able to maintain a nuclear deterrent which 
effectively covers Europe and not just United 
States territory. 
21. It is moreover this very concern to provide 
Europe with the greatest possible nuclear pro-
tection that has led France to reserve its position 
towards what are called the MBFR talks in 
Vienna. 
22. There are various ways of comparing the 
capability of nuclear forces which vary with 
warhead yield, more importantly with missile 
accuracy, and other less publicised factors such 
as missile reliability (not all missiles can be 
expected to function when required) and the 
geographical distribution of targets to be 
attacked. The following comparisons of United 
States 1¥1d Soviet forces, according to different 
criteria, have been published : 
TABLE II 
Comparison of strategic forces covered by SALT - mid-1971 
Category 
ICBM 
SLBM 
Bombers 
Totals 
1. Calculated destructive power. 
2 
Y - for yields up to 1 :MT. 
3 
1 
Number of warheads 
United Soviet 
States Union 
2,154 2,647 
5,120 909 
4,056 270 
11,330 3,826 
Equivalent Throw.weight 
megatonnage 1 or payload (tonnes) 
United Soviet United Soviet 
States Union States Union 
1,460 2,950 1,000 3,540 
830 860 500 590 
4,400 780 10,360 2,140 
6,690 4,590 11,860 6,270 
Y - for yields over 1 :MT (radius of destruction assumed to extend beyond target area). 
2 
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23. The United States has an active programme 
for improving and replacing its various strategic 
weapons systems. According to the 1979 fiscal 
year annual report of the Secretary of Defence, 
the "highest national priority" is being devoted 
to the development of air-launched cruise mis-
siles of which both an air force version AGM-86 B 
and a navy version Tomahawk are under 
development. There will be competitive flight 
tests in 1979 leading to the selection of one for 
production in November 1979 and entry into 
service from March 1980 onwards. A submarine-
launched version of Tomahawk is under full 
development and production of the ground-
launched version is scheduled to start in 1979. 
These capabilities are seen as better options than 
the new penetrating bomber B-1 which was can-
celled by President Carter. The strategic sub-
marine programme provides for the new sub-
marine Trident carrying twenty-four missiles to 
begin entry into service in 1981 and collBtruc-
tion to continue at the rate of three every two 
years. The new missile Trident I with a range 
of 7,400 km. is in production and will be back-
fitted to twelve Poseidon submarines from 
October 1979, as well as being fitted to the 
Trident su:bmarines. An improved missile Tri-
dent II is under "concept formulation" to retain 
an option to improve range, payload and 
accuracy. Development continues to "provide a 
technology base" for the new mobile missile MX 
designed to move either between a large number 
of silos, or along a trench some tens of kilo-
metres in length. In the field of re-entry vehicle 
design the technology is being developed for a 
manoeuvring evader re-entry vehicle (the so-
called MARV). 
(c) StrQtegic forces of France and 
the United Kingdom 
24. France and the United Kingdom are not 
parties to the SALT negotiations, and their 
strategic forces cannot of course be in any way 
circumscribed by SALT II. The existence of 
these forces was however alluded to in the 
course of the negotiations on SALT I in 1972 
when the Soviet Union in a unilateral statement 
concerning its strategic missile submarines stated 
that it would consider itself free to increase the 
number allowed the Soviet Union under SALT I 
if the number of strategic submarines of the 
allies of the United States were to be increased 
beyond the numbers then operational or under 
construction. Clearly too the relative importance 
of the strategic nuclear forces of these two allies 
would increase if the forces of the United States 
and the Soviet Union were in the course of 
future SALT negotiations to be reduced signi-
ficantly below their present levels. 
25. For all these reasons it is convenient to 
describe here the present status of the strategic 
forces of these two countries. 
135 
DOCUMENT 7S7 
26. While British, French and Italian scien-
tists had participated in various parts of the 
United States nuclear weapon programme during 
World War II, at the conclusion of hostilities 
the United States took a unilateral decision to 
terminate any further co-operation on nuclear 
energy with its allies or any other country. The 
decision was subsequently enshrined in the 
United States Atomic Energy Act of 2nd August 
1946 (McMahon Act) which prohibited the 
divulgation of nuclear information for any 
purposes to any country. The decision led the 
British and French Governments to initiate their 
own national nuclear energy programmes ; a 
certain amount of technical information was 
already available to them with the return of 
their scientists who had participated in various 
aspects of the United States programme. The 
British military nuclear programme started_ a 
few years before that of France, the first 
experimental explosions being conducted by 
Britain in 1952 and by France in 1960. 
(i) The strategw nuclear forces of France 
27. French policy has laid particular emphasis 
upon the independence under national control 
of its nuclear forces. The Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Yvon Bourges, addressing the National 
Assembly on 15th June 1978 made a typical 
statement: 
"National independence - it is first to 
the weapons of deterrence that we look to 
guarantee it. It is on the strategic nuclear 
force that it is based. Nationally conceived 
and nationally constructed, it is obviously 
national in its use. Linked to the appre-
ciation of the vital interests of France and 
of any threat to them, such use rests solely 
with the authority of the Head of State." 
28. The French doctrine of deterrence is not 
however stated in the statistically precise terms 
of assured destruction afforded by the larger 
force of the United States. In the same speech 
Mr. Bourges said merely: 
" ... the level of damage judged necessary 
for the credibility of our deterrent has 
now been reached, through a yield in 
megatons which has do~bled over the last 
four years and which will continue to 
increase, and because the numbers of 
targets within our range is also increasing." 
General Mery, the French Chief of Staff, 
speaking on 3rd April 1978, said : 
"It would be particularly deceptive at this 
time to try to ascertain the nuclear force 
level of the superpowers and calculate it 
precisely as a basis for limiting our own 
strategic forces, because our forces are not 
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determined in relation to the force level 
of potential adversaries. This is why we 
believe... that the first stage of nuclear 
disarmament must be achieved by the 
superpowers. We cannot take part until 
they have very substantially reduced the 
volume of their arsenals and ended the 
unrestrained qualitative competition in 
which they are engaged." 
France being a medium-sized power, the des-
tructive capability necessary for the effectiveness 
of its deterrent is well below the potential of 
the great powers. It is in fact enough for the 
French strategic nuclear force to be capable of 
causing material and human damage on enemy 
territory which is clearly greater than the stake 
represented: by the territory it is defending. This 
is what is often called the logic of the weak 
deterring the strong. The French strategic 
nuclear force seems particularly able to play 
this deterrent role since it has a considerable 
second-strike capability. While the Mirage IV 
bombers are the most vulnerable and the missiles 
on the Plateau d'Albion may in the medium 
term be exposed to a pre-emptive attack from 
an adversary, for the time being no existing 
technical means threaten the invulnerability of 
nuclear Illi93il~launching submarines. 
29. The French strategic nuclear forces at 
present comprise : 
TABLE ill 
French strategic forces - mid-1918 
Range 1 Number Yield of Category Type of missiles km 
or aircraft warhead 
ICBMs SSBS S-2 3,000 18 150kt 
SLBMs 1 submarine with 16 MSBS M-2 3,000 16 500kt 
3 submarines with MSBS M-20 4,800 48 1Mt 
Bombers Mirage IV 
Total warheads 
1. Maximum un-refuelled combat radius for bombers. 
30. There is an active programme for upgrading 
the French strategic forces. The Mirage IV 
strategic bombers are expected to remain in 
service until 1985 or beyond and studies are 
being undertaken for replacement systems which 
might involve either an air-launched cruise 
missile of simpler and cheaper design than that 
envisaged in the United States or a new light 
air-to-surface ballistic missile which could be 
launched from an aircraft. The S-3 strategic 
missiles of the Plateau d' Albion to be installed 
in 1980 will have the range and warhead of the 
M-20 ; it may be replaced in the 1990s either 
by a missile equivalent to the M-4 planned for 
the strategic submarines which would have 
multiple re-entry vehicles, but as the vul-
nerability of these static weapons is recognised 
they may alternatively be replaced by the lighter 
missile which might be developed for launching 
from the air or from mobile ground launchers. 
As far as the strategic submarines are concerned, 
the fifth will be operational in 1979, and all five 
will then carry the M-20 missile. The decision 
has just been announced to undertake construc-
tion of a sixth submarine to a totally new 
design which should be ready by 1985. This 
submarine will be d~ed for quieter operation, 
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with a quieter reactor, and be capable of 
operating at depths in excess of 600 m. The 
M-4 missile to enter into service at the same 
time will have seven re-entry vehicles and a 
range of 4,500 km., capable of being launched 
when the submarine is below 40 m. (present 
models are launched from depths of between 15 
and 20 m.) The M-4 will then be fitted to the 
first five submarines. 
31. The desirability of a quieter submarine was 
alluded to by General Mery in the speech quoted 
above when he discussed the present invul-
nerability of the strategic submarines : 
"But it is practically certain that advances 
will be made in the field of accoustics, 
especially the passive mode. The Americans 
are making a big effort in this direction 
helped by their geographical location and 
that of their allies which permit them to 
put vast barriers between islands or con-
tinents, a procedure that is however 
effective only against noisy submarines. 
But it does mean that we should give 
immediate attention to making our SNLEs 
quieter in order to retain complete free-
dom of action as much in regard to the 
United States as to the USSR which is also 
making strides in this area though it is 
less favoured from the standpoint of 
geographical location." 
32. France has succeeded in producing a 
virtually independent nuclear force which owes 
nothing to assistance from its allies except for 
the supply of uranium fuel for the original land 
prototype (PAT) of the submarine propulsion 
reactor, which permitted development to be com-
pleted a year or two earlier than would have 
been possible with fuel from France's own 
enrichment plant at Pierrelatte, and the supply 
of eleven KC 135-F tanker aircraft for refuelling 
of the Mirage IV force. The cost however has 
been some diversion of resources from other 
areas of the defence effort including the French 
navy. Mr. Bourges in his speech to the National 
Assembly recognised that : 
"On the other hand during the 1960s the 
need to devote the greater part of navy 
credits to the construction of the strategic 
ocean force obliged us to reduce the rate o.f 
construction of surface vessels ... " 
Thus the French programme for nuclear-
propelled attack submarines provides for the 
construction of five to be started between 1976 
and 1982. The United Kingdom in comparison 
already has nine such submarines operational, 
a tenth is about to enter service and two more 
are under construction. 
(ii) United Kingdom strategic forces 
33. The post-war British nuclear weapons 
programme remained a purely national one until 
shortly after the first experimental thermo-
nuclear explosion in 1957. United States atomic 
energy legislation was being modified, first in 
1954 with the replacement of the 1946 McMahon 
Act by the Atomic Energy Act (1954). which 
permitted the communication of information to 
allied countries for training in the use of nuclear 
weapons - bilateral agreements were sub-
sequently concluded with the NATO countries: 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. Then in 1958 the 1954 Act was 
substantially amended to permit the transfer 
of information and fissile material for the 
production of nuclear weapons to an allied 
country that "has made substantial progress 
in the development of atomic weapons", and to 
permit the transfer of information, plant and 
fissile material for military nuclear propulsion 
units ; all such exchanges were to be _,subject 
to the conclusion of specific biLateral agreements 
with recipient countries. 
34. On the day following the latter amend-
ment the United Kingdom concluded an agree-
5. 
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ment with the United States providing for the 
mutual exchange of information on various 
nuclear weapons matters including information 
on the construction of nuclear warheads and 
propulsion reactors, and providing for the 
transfer to the United Kingdom of one complete 
submarine nuclear propulsion plant, and the 
supply of replacement cores and nuclear fuel 
to operate it. This agreement was amended the 
following year (1959) to provide for the 
exchange of fissile and other nuclear material 
for the operation of propulsion reactors and for 
the construction of nuclear warheads. The agree-
ment precludes either ·party communicating to 
third parties information or material which it 
has received from the other. 
35. While the agreement as a whole is of 
indefinite duration, particular provisions have 
terminal dates which may be extended by sub-
sequent agreement. Thus the exchange of 
information on the construction of propulsion 
reactors and warheads could be terminated on 
one year's notice to take effect on 31st December 
1968 and every five years thereafter; it is cur-
rently in force therefore at least until 31st 
December 1983. The provision of nuclear fuel 
for propulsion plants originally agreed up to 
August 1968 has been extended until 31st Decem-
ber 1979, while the exchange of fissile and other 
nuclear material for construction of nuclear 
warheads originally in force until 31st December 
1969 has been successively extended by five-
year periods, the most recent of which will also 
expire on 31st December 1979. 
36. Since the 1958 agreement the United 
Kingdom has continued to design and construct 
its own nuclear warheads and propulsion 
reactors, but has done so on the basis of a 
mutual exchange of information and nuclear 
material with the United States. The United 
Kingdom retains a national capacity for pro-
ducing military grade fissile material, but has 
found it more economical to close down the 
uranium enrichment plant and to obtain uranium 
235 from the United States in return for British 
plutonium 239 which can be produced more 
cheaply. In 1976 the United Kingdom decided to 
construct a plant for the production of tritium, 
an ingredient of thermonuclear warheads, which 
had hitherto been imported from the United 
States. The Ministry of Defence claimed that 
domestic production was more convenient and 
would save dollars, but the decision clearly 
ensured the autonomy of British nuclear weapon 
manufacture. 
37. Britain however has not pursued a policy 
of self-sufficiency in the production of strategic 
missiles. Development of a liquid-fuelled missile 
Blue Streak was suspended in 1960 because 
liquid fuels had become ob~olete in military mis-
siles ; instead agreement was reached with the 
United States for the supply of an air-launched 
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ballistic missile Skybolt, development of which 
was however abandoned by the United States in 
December 1962. The United States then agreed, 
at the Nassau meeting between President Ken-
nedy and Mr. Macmillan, the British Prime 
Minister, to supply the Polaris submarine-
launched missile instead of Skybolt, on the 
understanding that the British Polaris force 
would be assigned to NATO "except where 
Her Majesty's Government may decide that 
supreme national interests are at stake ... " 
38. The present British strategic nuclear force 
comprises four Polaris nuclear-propelled sub-
marines each equipped with sixteen Polaris A-3 
missiles with a range of 2,500 nautical miles. 
The submaril\e hulls, the nuclear-propulsion 
reactors, and the thermonuclear warheads (three 
per missile, but not independently targetable) 
are of British construction, while the Polaris mis-
sile, less warhead, is imported from the United 
States. The force is operated by British crews 
under British command. As the force is assigned 
to NATO the selection of targets is undertaken 
by SACEUR's liaison team attached to the 
United States Joint Strategic Target Planning 
Staff in Omaha. It is obviously possible for the 
force to engage nationally selected targets 
without delay if ever the "supreme national 
interests" clause were to be invoked. The original 
strategic air force of Vulcan bombers, with a 
3,000-km. radius, was reassigned to theatre 
nuclear tasks in support of NATO some years 
ago, being judged obsolete as a strategic force. 
39. Official British statements lay little empha-
sis on the strategic nuclear forces, and do not 
expound an underlying doctrine. For some five 
years, under successive governments, the defence 
white paper has referred to them in terms very 
similar to the most recent : 
"The United Kingdom Polaris submarines ... 
between them maintain a continuous patrol 
and constitute an integral part of NATO's 
strategic nuclear force." 
40. Unlike the French strategic nuclear pro-
gramme there appears to be no clear programme 
for the replacement of the present British 
Polaris force, partly perhaps because this force, 
based on second-generation missiles, propulsion 
units and submarines, derived from earlier 
United States designs, is considered in Britain 
about one . generation ahead of currently-
operational French forces, although obviously it 
lags behind the United States Poseidon missiles 
and still further behind the Trident submarines 
and missiles which will shortly enter service. 
There has been a British warhead improvement 
programme for some years which will improve 
the penetration capability of the triple thermo-
nuclear warheads now fitted to the Polaris A-3 
missile. Answering parliamentary questions on 
21st March 1978 the Secretary of Defence, Mr. 
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Mulley, said that the limited studies into cruise 
missiles being undertaken were to enable the 
United Kingdom to participate in NATO discus-
sion on the defence potential and arms control 
implications of those systems ; the United King-
dom had no plans to develop a cruise missile or 
a successor to Polaris. British experts are 
believed to be dubious about the prospects of 
cruise missiles for replacing submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles. 
41. However both the hulls of the Polaris sub-
marines, and the solid-fuel motors of the Polaris 
missiles must be assumed to come to the end 
of their lives in the early 1990s. The submarine 
hulls were designed for a twenty-year life, and 
the first was launched in 1967. Even if some 
might last as long as thirty years, a single hull 
failure among the four submarines would end 
the national capability of the British deterrent 
because it would no longer be possible to ensure 
that one boat was always on patrol ; as a con-
tribution to the NATO deterrent however even 
two or three submarines could contilnue to serve 
because some United States Polaris submarines 
are also assigned to SACEUR on a similar basis, 
thus ensuring that SACEUR's targets would 
always be covered by more than one boat on 
patrol. If Britain decides to construct new sub-
marines to replace the present force it will have 
to plan for entry into service in the early 1990s, 
which will require a decision to undertake 
production by 1980. 
42. For missiles however, as pointed out above, 
Britain has no national production capability. 
The last United States Polaris missiles are to be 
phased out of service in the United States by 
1985 and despite the indefinite duration of the 
1963 United Kingdom-United States Polaris sales 
agreement, Britain must assume that replace-
ment missiles for its own force will cease to be 
available thereafter - and the life of solid-fuel 
motors, albeit of ma.ny years, is limited. Thus 
it must be assumed that the British Polaris mis-
siles will cease to be operational in the early 
1990s. One option for Britain could be to seek 
to secure the. United States Trident missile on 
similar terms to those on which Polaris missiles 
have been supplied - this prospect may seem 
attractive in Britain if agreement could be 
reached with the United States, as British 
estimates suggest that the present strategic force 
cost only one-third of the independently-produced 
French force. The alternative would be co-
operation with France to purchase the M-4 
generation of missiles, if the French Government 
was prepared to sell them. This supposes that 
different attitudes to assignment of nuclear 
forces to NATO did not create political dif-
ficulties, and that the British assessment of the 
M-4 missile found it to be a useful replacement 
for Polaris .A.-3. In either case a decision would 
again haye to be taken by about 1980 if the 
British force is to remain operational after the 
early 1990s. 
43. Lastly, if Britain is to maintain its present 
arrangements for exchanging information and 
fissile material for nuclear warheads with the 
United States, the corresponding clause of the 
1958 bilateral agreement will have to be renewed 
before its expiry on 31st December 1979. 
(d) Chinese strategic forces 
44. Chinese nuclear forces must loom large in 
the eyes of the Soviet Union, on whose territory 
they are targeted, and be a factor in the Soviet 
approach to SALT. 
45. According to the United States Department 
of Defence annual report and the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, China at present 
possesses some thirty to forty MRBMs with a 
range of some 1,000 to 1,200 km and a further 
thirty to forty IRBMs with a range of 2,400 km., 
both liquid fuelled. There are eighty TU-16 
bombers with a radius of action of 3,000 km. All 
these systems must be assumed to be fitted with 
thermonuclear warheads. 
m. The SALT I agreements 
46. Since 1959, the United States and the 
Soviet Union have managed to reach agreement 
on a number of measures, some bilateral, others 
multilateral, for limiting or more accurately 
bringing a degree of order to the armaments 
race. 
47. Among the multilateral agreements, men-
tion should be made of the 1959 treaty banning 
all military use of the Antarctic, the 1967 treaty 
banning nuclear weapons in outer space, the 1963 
treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, 
in space and under water, the 1968 non-prolifera-
tion treaty and the 1971 treaty banning the 
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed. 
All WEU countries are parties to the first of 
these treaties, all except France to the others ; 
the United Kingdom was a eo-negotiator and 
depository government for the last four. 
48. Taken as a whole, these agreements show 
a continuing concern and a determined policy 
pursued by the two great powers and accepted 
more or less willingly by a· large number of 
other countries for various reasons, the main one 
probably being that apart from the United 
Kingdom none of them has nuclear weapons or 
expects to have them in the future. 
49. A major preoccupation is taking shape on 
both the Soviet and American side : not to 
become involved in a nuclear war. The non-
proliferation treaty and the agreement banning 
nuclear tests are so far the centre of a legal 
arsenal whose main effect is to reserve for the 
two great powers a joint monopoly of major 
political and strategic decisions. A primary aim 
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of the SALT agreements is to organise this 
duopoly so as to make it permanent. 
50. The strategic arms limitation talks began 
in 1969, since when the process has been con-
tinuous, one stage of which is the 1972-73 group 
of agreements known as SALT I, signed by 
Mr. Brezhnev and President Nixon on 26th May 
1972. They comprise a treaty of indefinite dura-
tion on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles 
and a five-year agreement and protocol on the 
limitation of strategic offensive arms. None of 
these texts imposed a reduction in the levels of 
weapons then in service. However, the ABM 
treaty imposed major limits on future production 
since the two parties undertook to establish only 
two complexes with a radius of 150 km each 
deploying lOO ABM missiles and 100 ABM 
launchers ; the first complex was to protect the 
respective national capitals and the second 
ICBM launcher silos. Since then, the two coun-
tries have agreed to limit their ABM systems 
to a single complex; the Soviet Union deploys 
sixty-four launchers of this type round Moscow 
but the United States on the contrary has 
deactivated all its ABM launchers. 
51. An important element of the ABM treaty 
is its Article IX, according to which : 
" ... each party undertakes not to transfer 
to other states, and not to deploy outside 
its national territory, ABM systems or 
their components limited by this treaty." 
These provisions prohibited the transfer by the 
United States to an ally of ABM weapons 
(although not the communication of information 
about their manufacture). However, in a state-
ment on 18th April 1972, the United States 
indicated that the non-transfer incorporated in 
the ABM treaty in no way constituted a pre-
cedent for a treaty on the limitation of strategic 
offensive arms. 
52. The interim agreement on the limitation of 
offensive arms froze ICBMs and submarine-
launched bal1.istic missiles (SLBMs) at more or 
l-ess their then current or planned level. Strategic 
bombers were not Limited. A ceiling of 710 laun-
chers was imposed for the United States for its 
44 strategic submarines, compared wi.rth 950 
launchers for the Soviet Union's 62 submarines. 
The numerieal disparity was only apparent since 
.American launchers were starting to be armed 
with ten :independent multiple warheads per 
missiWe with the introduction of Poseidon. In a 
unilateral statement on 17th May 1972 the Soviet 
Union ass.erted that at the time of signature the 
United States and its allies were believed to have 
a total of fifty ballistic-missile submarines with 
800 launchers and that if, in the period during 
which the agreement remained in force, the 
United States' NATO allies increased the number 
of submarines in operation or under construction 
at the date of the signature of the agreement, 
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the Soviet Union would be entitled to merease 
the number of its submarines accordingly. 
53. For verification of the agreements, the two 
texts made provision for exclusively national 
means (i.e. mainly satellites) but added that the 
parties undertook not to intf'..r:fere with national 
technical means of verification of the other party 
nor use deliberate concealment measures which 
impeded verification by national technical means. 
54. To sum up, the first SALT agreements 
imposed severe limitations on anti-missile defence 
systems. Conversely, the number of offensive 
missiles was not limited and improvements in 
the armaments of both parties were not slowed 
down. In particular, the introduction of mul-
tiple independent re-entry vehicles continued_ in 
the forces of both superpowers (wi,th a five-year 
advance in the case of the United States), 
although such devices were not operational when 
the strategic arms limitation talks began. 
55. The positive aspects of the first SALT 
agreements must not be misjudged. The efforts 
thus made by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to translate detente into disarmament 
terms, and even mutual understanding, can only 
be welcomed. Indeed, detente not based on a 
degree of political understanding and disarm-
ament cauld be continually placed in jeopardy by 
the inevitable crises which the two great powers 
with world-wide interests have to face. Any event, 
even outside the areas covered by the two 
alliances, call.s in question certain aspects of the 
world balance, even mutual confidence, and may 
provoke dangerous confrontations. Understanding 
between the two great powers to preserve peace is 
thus essential. 
56. Second, the limitation of strategic arms was 
logical in any form of detente since the quanti-
tative accumuLation of weapons directed by each 
of the two parties almost exclusively against the 
other was a considerable financial waste and 
proof that neither side had confidence in the 
other's undertakings. 
57. Again, the two powers wished to avoid 
accumulating strategic weapons beyond the needs 
of effective deterrence. They intended to avoid 
a build-up of strategic capability whose destruc-
tive power would become meaningless iUS!Qfar as 
it went beyond the level required to raze not only 
the enemy's territory but the whole surface of the 
earth as well. 
58. Finally, the development of talks and pro-
cedure for the mutual and concerted exchange 
of information between the great powers could 
but be beneficial to peace insofar as the risk 
of war by accident or surprise could thus be 
eliminated. 
59. It must however be noted that the sacrifices 
made by the United States and the Soviet Union 
in SALT I were extremeLy limited. 
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60. ABM weapons did not guarantee totally-
effective protection of the territory of the two 
great powers but might give one of them the 
feeling that a technological breakthrough in this 
field would allow it to seize the opportunity of 
threatening to use its offensive weapons whilst 
it had a lead in the deployment of ABMs. Both 
countries made worth-while savings under this 
agreement. Deterrence by mutual assured destruc-
tion remained intact - a result which Europe 
can but welcome. 
61. The agreement freezing the number of 
ballistic missiles is more ambiguous. The freeze 
in no way put an end to the armaments race but 
guided it in a new direction. From quantitative 
it became qualitative. After SALT I, both sides 
scrapped obsolete weapons in order to attempt 
fm~her progress in the miniaturisation, payload 
capacity, power, accuracy and MIRVing of the 
weapons deployed. The destructive capability of 
the two great powers has not therefore been 
limited, on the contrary, it has increased consi-
derably since 1972. 
IV. The approach to SALT 11 
62. The negotiations leading up to SALT 11 
clearly lasted longer than either country expected 
when SALT I was signed in 1972. When the 
interim agreement came to an end in 1977, it had 
to be prolonged by a declaration, although it had 
initially been planned that a treaty on strategic 
offensive arms would be concluded before the 
agreement expired. The resignation of President 
Nixon and the subsequent replacement of the 
Democrat President by a Republican led to 
delays, partly because the Soviet leaders adapt 
rather slowly to new negotiators at the confer-
ence table. 
63. In Moscow in July 1974 President Nixon 
signed a protocol to the 1972 ABM treaty, redu-
cing from two to one the number of areas which 
each country might protect by such devices. Presi-
dent Ford subsequently reaehed agreement with 
Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok in November of 
the same year on guidelines for the future SALT 
11 agreement : based on the principle of equality 
and equal security, the new agreement was to 
allow each country an overall ceiling on numbers 
of delivery vehicles of all kinds, some of which 
might be equipped with multiple independent 
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It was to be valid 
from October 1977 until 31st December 1985. At 
a press conference, President Ford subsequently 
specified that the global ceiling for delivery 
vehicles (bombers, ICBMs and submarine-
launched missiles) would be 2,400, with a sub-
total of 1,320 vehicles which might be equipped 
with MIRVs. 
64. From a technological standpoint, three types 
of new development have hampered the pursuit 
of the negotiations : 
(i) The Americans have developed the crmse 
missile, a very accurate and not very vulnerable 
subsonic device. The Soviets collS'equently asked 
that it be included in the SALT ceilings. 
(ii) The Soviets for their part have deployed 
a new generation of surface-to-surface intercon-
tinental missiles: the more accurate SS-19, and 
the heavier SS-17 and SS-18. These missiles have 
moreover been equipped w1th MIRV s. 
65. Such progress is a threat to the credibility 
of the land element of the American triad because 
it may make Minuteman missiles in silos vulner-
able. In the negotiations, the United Stares has 
therefore sought to reduce as far as possible the 
ceiling on MIRVed missil.es and, more generally, 
to freeze sur~to-8urface intercontinental bal-
listic missille technology. 
(iii) Finally, the Soviet Union is deploying a 
new generation of supersonic bombers which 
NATO calls Backfire. These medium-range air-
craft could in certain c<mditions carry out a 
nuclear attack on American territory. The United 
States has therefore tried to have them included 
in SALT. 
66. When President Oarter took office, however, 
United States aims changed considerably ; a 
reduction was sought in the global ceiling from 
2,400 to 1,800 delivery vehicles of all sorts. This 
new trend seems to have held up the negotia-
tions but the United States now appears to have 
accepted a compromise figure. 
67. The strategic arms limitation talks have 
moreover been affected by the deterioration in 
American-Soviet relations following events in 
Angola and Ethiopia and the dispute over human 
rights. They have however been increasingly 
separated from the general context of pol.ri:tical 
clashes between the two great powers. 
68. According to the press, the SALT II agree-
ments being prepared consist of three documents : 
( i) an eight-year treaty remaining in force until 
1985 or 1986, incorporating essentially the Vl:a-
divostok agreement a.nd reductions below these 
ceilings ; (ii) a three-year protocol temporarily 
limiting certain aspects of cruise missiles, new 
types of ball.istic ~es and mobile ICBMs ; and 
(iii) a declaration of principles which will pro-
vide a framework for SALT III. 
69. The eight-year treaty will provide for: 
(a) an initial global ceiling of 2,250 stra-
tegic delivery vehicles, i.e. ICBMs, 
and bombers carrying nuclear bombs 
or nuelear cruise missiLes, which will 
be reduced to 2,250 during the period 
of the treaty ; 
(b) a sub-ceiling of 1,320 for MIRV ed 
ICBMs (with multiple independent 
warhea.ds), MIRV ed SLBMs and air-
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craft equipped with lang-rrunge cruise 
mis<rl1es ; 
(c) a sub-ceiling of 1,200 which concerns 
only MIRVed ballistic missiles (i.e. 
multiple-independent-warhead ICBMs 
and SLBMs); 
(d) a sub-ceiling of 820 which concerns 
only MIRVed ICBM launchers. 
70. The three-year protocol, the starting date 
of which is an important UllS'ettled issue in the 
negotiations, will provide for : 
(a) a ban on the deployment of mobile 
ICBM launchers and in-flight testing 
of ICBMs from such Launchers ; 
(b) a ban on in-flight testing and deploy-
ment of cruise missiles with a range 
of more than 2,500 km (aircraft-
launched) and the deployment of cruise 
missiles with a range of more than 
600 km for versions launched from sea 
and land platforms ; 
(c) limitations on in-flight testing and 
deployment of new types of ballistic 
missiles. 
71. The declaration of p:cinciples for the SALT 
III agreement will, the United States hopes, 
provide for : 
(a) a reduction in the total number of 
strategic vehicles to 2,000 or even 1,800 
systems; 
(b) a reduction of the sub-ceiling for 
MIRV ed missiles to 1,100 or even 
1,000: 
(c) a limitation of the number of Soviet 
"heavy~' missiLes, which would repre-
sent a redu~tion irn the number of 
Soviet heavy ICBMs currently 
deployed; 
(d) limitations 001 the development, testing 
and deployment of new ICBMs and 
SLBMs; 
(e) additional limitations on · strategic 
defence systems, including air and 
civil defence ; 
(f) additional measures to strengthen veri-
fication of the SALT agreements. 
72. It is noted that the number of Soviet vehi-
cles now commissioned exceeds certain numbers 
provided for in the draft treaty, which is not the 
ease for the United States. It would thus appear 
that one of the outstanding points to be settled 
between the two countries is the time-table for the 
dismantling of excess Soviet vehicles. Moreover, 
the United States wishes to have the Backfire 
bomber included in the vehicles covered by the 
ceiling. It still has to be determined what limita-
tions are to be imposed on in-flight tests and 
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deployment of new types of missiles, but it would 
seem that the American Trident I SLBM will 
be commissioned shortly, ·as will the Soviet SSN-
18 SLBM. It is reported that, subject to the limits 
described in paragmph 70 (b) above, the United 
States will retain full freedom to continue 
development of its cruise missiles described in 
paragraph 23 ; and each party will be free to 
deploy one new land-based am.d one new sea-based 
missile during the life of the treaty. 
V. SALT and Europe 
73. Since they seek to regulate the strategic 
rivalry between the two great powers, the stra-
tegic al'IllB limitation talks may have serious 
consequences for Europe. Our states, whose 
security is very largely ensured by the American 
deterrent, cannot fail to be affected by the out-
come of ·talks on the way in which this deterrence 
is exercised. The consequences of SALT may be 
twofold : first, the real and perceived balance of 
the strategic forces of the two great powers may 
take a mw shape and thus indirectly affect 
Europe's security ; second, and more directly, the 
problem of the strategic cover of our states is 
liable to be put in new terms. 
(a) SALT and the balance of strategic forces of the 
two great powers 
74. The strategic arms limitation talks them-
selves have no eoncrete effect on the balance of 
forces. The difference between · the respective 
structures of the forces on either side is a result 
of various decisions taken by military plam.ners in 
the United States and the Soviet Union. However, 
a possible SALT II agreement will condone a 
given state of the. ratio of forces and probably 
include commitments for the future (various bans 
on tests and deployment). It is therefore essential 
that Europe's future should not be mortgaged 
under this agreement. .As Paul Warnke, Direc-
tor of the. United States Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency has written 1 : 
"What a SALT agreement can do is to 
preserve a situation in which, although we 
may not be able to claim that will-o' -the-
wisp, strategic superiority, we can certainly 
know that we cannot be at a strategic 
disadvantage." 
75. The following remarks may be made on the 
maintenance of the balance, SALT and the 
surrounding military conteit : 
1. "Arms control: a global imperative", Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists, June 1978. 
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(i) SALT ll is liable to sanction a certain shift in 
the strategic balance to the advantage of the 
Soviet Union 
76. The SALT II treaties have not yet been 
concluded or ratified. Some uncertainty prevails 
in this respect and, a fortiori, about SALT III, 
which makes final judgment impOS8ible. Some 
assessment may be made however. First, it cam be 
noted that on present reports the SALT II 
agreemenJts appear definitely more satisfactory 
than SALT I. Primarily, the ceilings are quite 
clearly lower than those agreed at Vladivostok 
and they are being identified by types of arms ; 
the Soviet Union will have to make effective 
reductions, however small, in its existing arsenals. 
Second, for the first time a brake is being applied 
to technologieal competition, and in particular to 
the Soviet deployment of a new generation of 
intercontinental missiles. 
77. However, although SALT II is to establish 
overaLl eqru.ality in respect of strategic launchers, 
there is no hiding the fact that the recent build-
up of Soviet forces has been far faster than that 
of the United States. SALT II represents a stat!)-
ment of the ratio of forces but behind the situa-
tion re£1ected by these draft agreements is con-
cealed a disturbing trend : since summer 1973, 
the Soviet Union has been deploying new inter-
continent,al missiles whose accuracy, power and 
throw-weight have been considerably improved 
(SS-17, 18 and 19). These missiles are fitted with 
multiple warheads. The ceilings laid down in 
SALT II will in no way prevent the Soviet 
Union from increasing its lead in deliverable 
megatons and throw-weight. Some observers fear 
that by 1985 the Soviet Union may have acquired 
a lead of 7 to 1 in del:iwrable megatons and 5 
to 1 in throw-weight. In particular, it should 
be noted that the ceiling in SALT II for MIRV ed 
missiles (820) is far higher than the actual num-
ber of Soviet missiles so equipped. The Soviet 
Unilon can therefore continue to MIRV its :inter-
continerutal vehicles. The American lead in total 
number of nuclear warheads may diminish after 
1982. 
78. The United States will adm1ttedly retain a 
substantial lead in nuclear loads carried on bom-
bers and submarine missiles thanks to the deploy-
ment of cruise missiles and the introduction of 
the new Trident I MIRV ed missile. 
79. But generalfy speaking it is impossible to 
escape the conclusion that ·during the period 
covered by the draft SALT treaty there will 
effectively be a change in the strategic nuclear 
balance to the detriment of the West. Here it 
should be stressed that since the 1972 SALT 
agreements the Soviet Union has commissioned 
four new intercontinental missiles, two new sub-
marine missiles (two others are still at the 
development stage) and a new bomber. The 
United States for its part has tested and then 
abandoned one bomber, completed the deploy-
menit of one submarine missile and started tests 
on ooother. 
80. This difference of rhythm in the strategic 
competition between the two great powers, 
aathough not affecting their approximate parity, 
nevertheliess has serious consequences for Europe. 
81. A nrumber of experts in the United States 
and Western Europe think that SALT II and 
above all the pr<>gr€SS which this agreement will 
not prevent the Soviet Union from making are 
liable to weaken the credibility of American 
deterrence on behalf of Europe. The fact that the 
American potential is visibly doolining compared 
with the increasing strength of the Soviet Union 
does not in itself have serious consequences for 
the security of Amerioon territory proper, but 
it weighs heavizy on the situation of Europe : 
will the latter be able to continue to place as 
much rcliance as in the past on its American 
ally in a crisis seriously threatening its interests Y 
(ii) SALT Il does not guarantee the Atlantic 
AUiance against the possible vulnerab~'lity of the 
American Minuteman missiles 
82. The Soviet-A.merican balance of terror will 
obviously not be changed by the contents of the 
SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union and the 
United States will continue to have a more than 
adequate second or third strike capability of 
inflicting intolerable damage on each other. But 
although deterrence by murtual assured destruc-
tion woulJd remain the top level of escalation, 
the credibility of lower levels of retaliation might 
in rthe medium term be compromised if the land 
element of the American strategic triad (Minute-
man missiles in silos) were to become vulnerable. 
This is even more serious in that Europe's defence 
in the framework of the NATO integrated mili-
tary structure actually depends on these interme-
diary levels of graduated response. The vulner-
ability of the Mmuteman missiles would thus 
have very serious consequences for European 
security. The only explanation. for the fact that 
the Soviet Union has developed SS-17, 18 and 19 
missiles and replaced its obsolete ICBMs at a 
rate of 125 to 150 per year is that it wishes to 
have the ability to destroy a major part of Ame-
rican missiles in their silos in a first strike. If 
the Soviet Union fits its ICBMs with multiple 
warheads up to the maximum ceilings under 
SALT II and continues to improve the accuracy 
of its means of delivery as it has done in recent 
years, just before the mid-eighties it will have a 
reasonable capability for destroying the Minute-
man silos. · 
83. The MX missiLe which might avert this 
threat cannot be tested or deployed during the 
three-year period covered by the SALT II pro-
tocol. In ·addition, it will be politica1ly very diffi-
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cult to start developing them when the protocol 
expires since public opinion would consider this 
a step backwards in the control of armaments. 
84. Admittedly it is not certain that the Minute-
man will become vulnerable. The very possibility 
of a Soviet counterforce attack, "a cosmic roll of 
dice", according to Mr. Harold Brown, United 
States Secretary of Defence, may seem totally 
unrealistic. The fact remains that at the begin-
ning of the eighties the United States stl1ategic 
cover of Western. Europe is liable to be affected 
by an uncertainty factor. 
85. Here too the consequences of such a situa-
tion for European security are serious. 
(b) SALT and the nuclear defence of Europe 
86. The foregoing paragraphs attempt to show 
that a change in the strategic balance to the 
detriment of the United States and the possible 
vulnerability of Minuteman missiles may indi-
rectly weaken the nuclear protection of Europe. 
87. According to the strategy of graduated 
response adopted by the integrated military 
bodies of NATO the American response in the 
evenit of a conventional and rtactical nuclear defeat 
in the European theatre would not be massive. 
It would try to strike selectively a number of 
enemy military or industr:ial targets. It may be 
wondered whether the credibility of the United 
States selective strategic response will not 
diminish considerably the day it is clearly 
demonstrated that the land elements of its 
strategic forces are vulnerable. 
88. In addition, other factors may also affect 
the nuclear protection of Europe. 
(i) The technological transfer problem 
89. The SALT agreements will include a so-
called "non-circumvention" clause. It would 
appear that the two parties have agreed not to 
have recourse, through the intermediary of "other 
parties", to measures which might weaken the 
agreements. The United States Government haB 
always ·stressed that this clause does not speci-
fically exclude the trans:lier by the United States 
of arms, components or plans for arms to its 
aJlies. One point seems essential : insofar as the 
futlliJ:'e situation of Europe may be one of less 
nuclear cover, it is of major importance that the 
British and French strategic weapons under 
national command retain and increase their own 
potential. From this point of view, it is essential 
for the United States to provide uninterrupted 
supplies of Polaris missiles to the United King-
dom. Further, it is recalled that the provisions 
of the agreement between the United Kingdom 
and the United States on exchanges of fissile 
materit!l for nuclear weapons will have to be 
renewed in 1979. Finally, every possibility of 
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beneficial co-operation between Europe and the 
United States at strategic level must be preserved, 
inter alia, to quote only one example, for the 
development of a European arsenal of cruise 
missiles. 
(ii) Limiting American capab~"lity in Western 
Europe 
90. When SALT I was concluded, the American 
negotiators managed to resist Soviet pressure to 
include forward-ba8ed systems in Europe in the 
negotirutions. Europe can but welcome this fact. 
HoweVlel', as Richard Burt wrote in the July 1978 
issue of Foreign AffOJirs : 
"... the Carter Ad.ministration... has not 
succeeded in minimising the potential 
impact of the new aceord on future Ameri-
can contributions to NATO defence. This, 
of course, is because the Administration has 
accepted the concept of limiting long-range 
sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles. 
While the contribution these systems could 
make to NATO's theatre nuclear (and con-
ventional) capabilities is still under study, 
there are strong reasons to believe tha.t 
cruise missiles deployed in the European 
theatre would greatly enhance the survival 
and responsiveness of NATO's existing 
lll.uclear posture." 
91. It would therefore appe!U' that the United 
States has traded in a weapons system of direct 
interest to Europe (cruise missiles) in exchange 
for Soviet concessions in the field of inter-
continental IIllssiles which are a direct threat to 
American territory. 
92. A parallel to this decision is the delayed 
deployment by the United States of the enhanced 
radiation weapon (neutron bomb). In the event 
of a fairly concentrated tank attack, this weapon 
provides a moons of halting the offensive with 
minimum destruction in the surroundings. It is 
therefore particuLarly suitable for defending the 
European theatre. But in spring 1978 President 
Carter decided to interrupt their development 
withput the matter having been negotiated with 
the Soviet Union, probably to improve the overall 
atmosphere of the stmtegic arms limitation talks. 
93. Such attitudes can but weaken the nuclear 
protection of Europe. They should encourage 
Europeans to take their own defence more 
actively in hand, particularly where strategic 
weapons are concerned. 
( iii) The problem of the reciprocalsanctuarisation 
of the territory of the two great powers 
94. An analysis of the strategic arms limitation 
talks gives the impression that the essential aim 
of present or future agreements lies in the mutual 
guarantee exchanged by the two great powers 
144 
not to devastate each other's territory by nuclear 
attack. 
95. Here, it is significant that various agree-
ments on the prevention of nuclear war have been 
concluded m the framework of SALT. 
96. In spite of the positive aspects of such 
agreements, it may be wondered whether the 
stabilisation of strategic nuclear weapons alone, 
preserving the territory of the two great powers 
from attack to a greater or lesser extent, might 
not lead to less stability in local situations, parti-
cularly in Europe. · 
97. Europe's only possible answer to this 
question clearly seems to be the maintenance of 
its own strategic nuclear force at the level neces-
sary for its security. 
(c) The need to define a European approach to SALT 
98. The foregoing considerations must not be 
taken as a disavowal of SALT. On the one hand, 
it is for the United States Senate and it albne to 
decide on the future agreements. Moreover 
Europe c8ill but welcome a reduction in the level 
of strategic weapons, provided however this does 
not result in its own defences being wealrened. 
99. For the effects of SALT to be wholly 
positive, Europe itself must find an answer to 
the questions which will inevitably be raised by 
the mew agreements. 
100. An answer has to be found m two fields. 
First, in Atl~tic co-operrution Europe must make 
the United States pay greater heed to Europe's 
own interests and concerns than heretofore. 
Second, at European level Europe must draw all 
the conclrusions from the possession by two of its 
states of nuclear forces under national command. 
(i) Improving the Atlantic dialogue 
101. The essential question .facing Europe with 
regard to SALT is how far the Unilt.ed States 
is prepared to take account, in its direct negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union, of the requirements 
of a defence policy planned and adopted by all 
the allied countries, or whether it considers that 
strategy and, in the end, the defence policy of 
the Alliance, must come after its agreement with 
the Soviet Union. This problem is all the more 
acute in that sooner or later SALT, in a third 
or subsequent stage, will oome up against Euro-
pean nuclear weapons. There will then be very 
strong pressure for them to be integrated into 
the system of arms control, whereas they are an 
iTreplaceable element in the protection of 
Europe's territory and strengthen the overall 
deterrence of the Alliance, as was underlined in 
the Atlantic declaration in Ottawa on 19th June 
1974. 
102. Moreover, Soviet weapons such as the SS-20 
in the SALT grey area are a direct threat to 
Europe. The Atlantic Alliance must find an 
answer to this threat, without this involving 
agreement between the two great powers without 
European participati~, to transform Europe 
into an area with a special nuclear status. 
103. Here Europe must realise that any negotia-
tions implying a search for a nuclear balance 
specific to the European theatre can but be 
negative and contrary to its interests. 
104. Indeed, the concept of a European nucliear 
balance has no meaning : it depends on the 
assignment of targets, in particular for missile-
launching submarines. 
105. Moreover, such a ooncept would. weaken the 
NATO deterrent in that it would imply recogni-
tion of American disengagement : to confer a 
special nuclear Btatus on Europe would in effect 
mean making a radical distinction between Euro-
pean and American territory and depriving the 
American commitment to defend Europe with 
strategic weapons of much of its credibility. 
106. Europe must therefore make itself heard 
in the North Atlantic Council, particularly to 
obtain a better definition of the conditions of 
iJts security in the context of strategic arms limita-
tion. Moreover, a more active and moo-e united 
Europoon presence should also help to stress the 
true deterrent role of British and French nuclear 
weapons. 
(ii) Designing a European security policy 
107. SALT raises new problems for Europe 
which it must solve on its own. It has the where-
withal, i.e. the strategic nuclear forces of France 
and the United Kingdom. It is therefore possible 
and desirable, particularly in WEU, that agree-
ment be reached and conSultations held on the 
use of such weapons, and especially on the stra-
tegy of deterrence which they make possible. 
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108. Already these weapons not only cover the 
nationaL territory which they defend, they also 
contribute to the security of Europe as a whole, 
pamicularly by introducing an additional factor 
of uncertainty into the calculations of a would-be 
aggressor. The conclusions of this de facto situa-
tion must be drawn in terms of European 
political co-operation. 
109. From this standpoint Franco-British 
nuclear co-operation would seem most timely both 
for the development of new systems and for the 
use of existing ones : two submarine fleets used 
jointly are obViously more effective tham. when 
they patrol separately. 
110. But there are major obstacles to such co-
operation. They are juridical: insofa.r as the 
British are linked with the United States under 
the 1958 bilateral agreement 1 and the Nassau 
agreements. They are also political insofar as the 
British nuclear force is integrated in NATO's 
military structure and in particular in its 
targeting arrangements. 
111. However, there is a possibility. If it were 
to materialise - and your Rapporteur personally 
is in favour - it would have to be in the next 
few years before the renewal of the British 
submarines and Pol:aris missiles. 
VI. Conclusion 
112. The strategic arms limitation talks thus 
concern Europe toO. Your Rapporteur wishes our 
governments to realise this and not allow our 
states to find themselves, as the N eue Ziircher 
Zeitung said on 8th October, in the grey area of 
the talks where its interests would be misunder-
stood am.d jeopardised. F<>r the limitation of 
strategic arms to be truly beneficial and to foster 
peaoo and security, full account must be taken 
of the interesta of each of our respective nations. 
113. This is the aim WEU must pursue first and 
foremost. 
1. See paragraphs 34 et seq. 
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( i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and 
that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to 
defence; 
(ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement 
since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ; 
(iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures 
of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control ; 
(iv) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General 
Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of arms control 
measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating forum ; 
(v) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability; 
(vi) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ; 
(vii) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: "Armaments Year Book" and 
"Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms 11.nd Ammunition"; 
(viii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on 
inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts; 
(ix) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek 
agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENT!:! 
Take concerted action in aH appropriate bodies with the following objects in view: 
1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control 
measures to be concluded in the next five years, including : 
(a) a comprehensive test ban; 
(b) a chemical weapons treaty; 
(e) a. strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of 
civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear coun-
tries; 
(d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe; 
(e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international 
transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-
producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy·; 
(f) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the 
CSCE final act ; 
(g) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional 
weapons and incendiaries ; 
and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification : 
(h) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis 
equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and 
peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible inter alia for publishing, on the basis of its 
own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports 
on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ; 
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2. To secure the pa.rticipation of a.ll nuclear weapon powers a.nd previous members in the transformed 
Committee on Disa.rmament and the negotia.tion in tha.t body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (a), 
(b), (e), (/) and (g); 
3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by 
the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special 
disarmament session in 1981 to review progress. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
The Committee adopted the original version 
of this revised report on disarmament on 20th 
June, while the special session on disarmament 
of the United Nations General Assembly was 
in progress. The report was debated in the WEU 
Assembly on 22nd June, during the first part 
of the twenty-£ourth session, when a number of 
amendments to the draft recommendation were 
discussed, two of which, supported by the Rap-
porteur, were adopted. But in the absence of a 
quorum the Assembly was unable to vote on the 
draft recommendation as amended, the t~t of 
which is reproduced at appendix. 
The special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly ended on 1st July and adopted 
by consensus a final document which incLuded, 
most notably, an agreement for transforming ~he 
Committee on Disarmament into a more effective 
negotiating body. The original" report was there-
fore referred back to the Committee for revision 
to permit reference to be made to the conclusion 
of the special session. Paragraph (iv) has accord-
ingly been added to the preamble of the revised 
draft recommendation and paragraph 2 of the 
operative text reworded, but the text now sub-
mitted to the Assembly remains otherwise the 
text as amended by irt on 22nd June. 
* 
** 
1. World military expenditure in 1978 has been 
estimated at $400 billion, of which 70 % is 
accounted for by the NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries, and 18 % by the countries of the third 
world including China 1• The greatest increase 
in expenditure over the last decade has come 
from the third world countries - excluding 
China their share of total world expenditure rose 
from 6% to 14%, whereas the expenditure of 
the two military blocs is estimated to have been 
roughly constant in real terms but to have 
decreased from 80 % to 70 % as a proportion of 
world expenditure. In 1976 total world military 
expenditure was estimated at $325 billion - as 
much as the world spent on health. and more than 
was spent on education. In absolute terms at 
constant prices world military expenditure has 
increased by 13 % over the last ten years and 
by 77 % over the last twenty years. 
2. Thus the early hopes of the United Nations 
- Article XI of the Charter of which empowers 
the General Assembly to consider "the principles 
1. World armaments and disarmament yearbook 1978 
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
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governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments" and to make "recommendations with 
regard to such principles" have not been fulfilled. 
Since the first meeting of the General Assembly 
in 1945 the level of armaments throughout the 
world has steadily increased and there has been 
no agreement on disarmament in the sense that 
none of the agreements so far concluded since the 
second world war (with the exception of the 1972 
biological warfare convention) provides for 
existing levels of armaments to be reduced or 
for weapons to be destroyed. It is true however 
that in the last twenty years a number of arms 
control measures have been agreed which have 
had the effect of codifying an existing situation, 
and some of which may have imposed restraints 
on some of the signatories in the sense that they 
may have been inhibited from developing or 
deploying certain weapons systems that they 
might otherwise have done .- four agreements 
are probably significant in this respect: the 
antartic treaty ; the partial test ban treaty ; the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; and the seabed treaty. 
3. The history of disarmament and arms control 
negotiations since the second world :war can be 
considered in two phases - the first largely 
fruitless up to about 1958 when negotiations 
were conducted in subsidiary bodies of the United 
Nations Security Council- the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Commission on Conventional 
Armaments, later merged into the. Disarmament 
Commission which had a sub-committee composed 
of the pe~nent members of the Security Coun-
cil and Canada. By 1958 the membership of the 
United Nations had increased from the original 
fifty-one to over eighty, and the voting power of 
the non-aligned countries in the General Assembly 
was becoming predominant. 'l'he Disarmament 
Commission in that year was enlarged to include 
the whole membership of the United Nations and, 
true to Parkinson's law on committees, ceased to 
be an effective negotiating forum - since then 
it has met only twice in 1960 and in 1965. 
4. In the course of 1958 a number of exchanges 
of letters between President Eisenhower and 
Mr. Khrushchev led to a certain rapprochement 
between the views of the United States and the 
Soviet Union on approaches to disarmament which 
resulted in the setting up of the Ten-Nation 
Disarmament Committee (five NATO and five 
Warsaw Pact countries). This met for three 
months in 1960 and, with a year's interruption 
caused by the U-2 incident in 1960, led on 20th 
September 1961 to a joint statement by the 
Soviet Union and the United States on "agreed 
principles as a basis for multilateral negotiations 
on disarmament". While these stated that the 
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goal of negotiations was a programme to ensure 
general and complete disarmament accompanied 
by procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes they contained a reference to efforts 
to ensure early agreement on measures of dis-
armament- i.e. limited measures of disarmament 
or "collateral measures". In December that year 
the General .Assembly endorsed the agreement 
reached between the Soviet Union and the United 
States to establish new negotiating machinery 
known as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee (ENDC) which met for the first time in 
Geneva in 1962. 
5. As originally constituted, the ENDC com-
prised five NATO countries: Canada, France, 
Italy, United Kingdom, United States; five 
Warsaw Pact countries : Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union ; 
and eight non-aligned countries ; Brazil, Burma, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria and 
Sweden (France however did not take up its 
place in the conference). The membership has 
been progressively enlarged over the years, still 
maintaining roughly the same balance between 
aligned and non-aligned countries, and its title 
was changed in 1969 to the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Its present 
membership is as follows : western-aligned coun-
tries : Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
United States; Warsaw Pact and Soviet-aligned 
countries : Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German 
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, 
Poland, Romania, Soviet Union ; non-aligned 
countries : Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, India, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Zaire. 
6. The CCD which meets normally in two 
longish sessions each year in Geneva is not strictly 
speaking part of the United Nations machinery, 
but is in fact serviced by its secretariat, and a 
special representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General participates in its sessions. The 
conference operates under the eo-chairmanship of 
the United States and the Soviet Union who 
reserve the right to determine the agenda and 
dates of sessions of the conference although in 
practice these are invariably settled through 
private negotiations with the other participants. 
The daily chairmanship of working sittings 
rotates among the membership. The CCD, like 
its predecessor the ENDC, reports on progress 
made each year to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations; they have been the forum where 
initial multilateral agreement has been reached 
on the partial test ban treaty, the non-
proliferation treaty, the treaty banning weapons· 
of mass destruction on the seabed, the convention 
banning biological weapons, and the convention 
on the prohibition of environmental modification 
techniques for military purposes. 
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7. Over the last eight years there have of course 
been important developments in strictly bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on arms control issues, in particular 
in the SALT talks, but also five others : limita-
tion of armaments in the Indian Ocean (Berne, 
from March 1977, latest meeting 17th February 
1978) ; agreement on radiological weapons - i.e. 
employing radiation from radioactive material in 
the absence of a nuclear explosion- (last meeting 
4th May 1978) ; limiting international transfers 
of conventional armaments (Helsinki, from 
December 1977, latest meeting 4th-8th May 
1978) ; a ban on anti-satellite satellites (Helsinki, 
8th June 1978), and an agreement on chemical 
weapons. There are also the trilateral Soviet 
Union, United Kingdom, United States talks on 
a comprehensive test ban in Geneva, and the 
negotiations between members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in the MBFR talks in Vienna. 
Except as they affect the issues discussed at the 
United Nations special session, these "bloc to 
bloc" negotiations are not discussed in this report, 
nor are the broader confidence-building measures 
agreed in the CSCE framework which include 
also the European neutrals. 
8. There has always been a contradiction 
between the need for a restrk1ed number of 
countries to participate in any forum where 
actual negotiations on disarmament can be con-
ducted, and the desire of all members of the 
United Nations to discuss the subject - and the 
membership of the United Nations is now 149. 
There is also the often-expressed frustration of 
many non-aligned countries at the failure to reach 
any agreement at all on actual measures of 
disarmament as opposed to measures of arms 
control ; moreover, since the non-proliferation 
treaty was concluded in 1968, in their view the 
agreements reached in the CCD framework have 
had little more than cosmetic value, meaningful 
negotiations on arms control have shifted to the 
restricted frameworks listed in the previous 
paragraph. 
9. At the 1976 ministerial se&~ion of the non-
aligned countries' groupings, held in Colombo, 
proposals were made by Yugoslavia for a special 
session of the United Nations General Assembly 
to be devoted specially to disarmament and the 
proposal was agreed to unanimously at the thirty-
first session of the General Assembly in December 
1976. Drawing on the experience of the 1974 and 
1975 special sessions devoted to the "new inter-
national economic order" the special session is 
invited to agree on a declar8i'tion of principles and 
on a programme of action. A fifty-four-member 
preparatory committee has been discussing the 
agenda and other proposals for the special session 
since March 1977. While it is recognised that the 
special session will not be a negotiating forum for 
reaching an agreement on specific measures of 
disarmament, it is hoped by many of its principal 
sponsors that it will be able to re-orientate the 
general approach to disarmament as conducted 
in other fora. 
10. The special session opened in New York on 
23rd May and is to continue until 28th June. 
From 6th to 9th June your Rapporteur was able 
to discusg with the heads of various delegations 
in New York their initial impressions of the 
special session. The present report deals with the 
main proposals that have so far been presented 
to the special session or preparatory committee. 
United Nations General . Assembly special 
session on disarmament 
General arrangements 
11. It was agreed in the preparatory committee 
that after a general debate and a review of the 
present disarmament situation work will con-
centrate on three main areas - the adoption of 
a declaration on disarmament, the adoption of a 
programme of action on disarmament and a 
review of international disarmament negotiating 
machinery including the role of the United 
Nations itself. This report will summarise pro-
posals already tabled in the preparatory com-
mittee, or so far presented to the special session, 
first by various WEU countries, and then by 
certain other significant countries or groups. 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom 
12. These five WEU countries, together with six 
other aligned countries - Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Japan, Norway and Turkey- tabled 
a draft declaration on disarmament on 13th 
December 1977, and with the exception of Turkey, 
a draft programme of action on 1st February 
1978. 
13. The draft declaration stated in its general 
objectives that the ultimate goal of disarmament 
is to ensure the survival of mankind through 
strengthening peace, security and stability. An 
integrated disarmament programme should ensure 
that disarmament is general and complete under 
effective international control and accompanied 
by procedures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and arrangements for the maintenance 
of peace and security. Such disarmament would 
permit states to possess only those non-nuclear 
forces and armaments that are necessary to 
maintain internal order and provide agreed man-
power for a United Nations peace force. A further 
goal would be the release of resources a significant 
proportion of which should go to satisfying the 
economic and social needs of developing coun-
tries. 
14. Principles governing disarmament negotia-
tions should ensure the active participation and 
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support of all states, particularly nuclear weapon 
states and militarily significant states, and for 
agreements to be effective it must be apparent to 
states that they serve their best interests, and 
agreements should be reached wherever possible 
on a basis of consensus. Disarmament measures 
must be balanced to provide undiminished secu-
rity at lower levels of armaments and forces and 
progress will depend upon agreement on effective 
methods of verification. Negotiations on limited 
measures of disarmament should not preclude 
negotiations on a treaty of general and complete 
disarmament. 
15. The draft declaration proposes by way of 
priorities that specific multilateral disarmament 
measures should contribute to progress towards 
the ultimate objective of general and complete 
disarmament. While the eventual elimination of 
all nuclear weapons is the most important 
challenge, partial agreements, in particular uni-
versal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty, 
would be a vital contribution accompanied by 
measures to prevent both horizontal and vertical 
proliferation 1 and the establishment where 
appropriate of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While 
recognising the right of all states to nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes there must be inter-
national nuclear safeguards in particular those 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
which as a minimum must apply to international 
transfers of nuclear material, equipment and 
technology. The elimination of chemical weapons 
and any new weapons of mass destruction are 
of great importance. Lastly the declaration points 
out that most of the world's military expenditure 
is devoted to conventional military power. All 
states should make efforts in parallel to those in 
the field of nuclear disarmament to halt the 
diversion of resources to conventional weapons, 
the international transfer of conventional arms 
should be brought under control and the reduc-
tion of military budgets in all countries could 
provide undiminished security at a lower level 
of armaments. 
16. The draft programme of action tabled by the 
same ten countries first reaffirms that the 
ultimate goal is general and complete disarma-
ment and then sets out priorities in negotiations 
for the next few years with proposals for con-
current studies to prepare future negotiations 
towards general and complete disarmament. The 
immediate measures proposed are the halting 
and reversal of the nuclear arms race especially 
through a second SALT between the United 
States and the Soviet Union to be followed by 
further negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons ; 
1. By "horizontal proliferation" is meant, in the dis-
armament negotiations, the spread of weapons systems to 
more countries ; by "vertical proliferation" is meant the 
acquisition of more and improved weapons by a country 
already possessing a weapons system. 
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it calls for the earliest conclusion of the com-
prehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear 
explosions to be adhered to by all states ; it calls 
for further measures to strengthen the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime based essentially on the 
non-proliferation treaty and IAEA safeguards ; 
it calls for the establishment of additional 
nuclear-weapon-free zones in suitable regions 
through agreement between all states in the region 
and the effective co-operation from nuclear 
weapon states. 
17. Secondly the programme calls for appro-
priate assurances by nuclear weapon states to 
increase the confidence of non-nuclear weapon 
states in their own seeurity from nuclear attack. 
In this connection your Rapporteur notes that 
the so-called "negative security assurances", 
whereby non-nuclear weapon countries are to be 
assured that nuclear weapons will not be used 
against them will of course require special con-
ditions which exclude the present arrangements 
for ensuring the security of the allies and 
associates of nuclear weapon states. It is under-
stood that this particular proposal may secure 
support from both the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 
18. The third proposal dealing with other 
weapons of mass destruction calls for conventions 
to ban chemical weapons and radiological weapons 
and agreements to ban any new weapons of mass 
destruction that may be devised. 
19. Fourthly in the field of conventional 
weapons there are proposals for bilateral, regional 
and multilateral agreements to restrict the pro-
duction, transfer and acquisition of conventional 
weapons ; conventions to prohibit or limit the use 
of certain indiscriminate conventional weapons ; 
and lastly agreements on a regional basis to 
strengthen peace and security and urgent efforts 
to contribute to a more stable military relation-
ship in Europe. The concept of regional disarma-
ment is particularly favoured by Belgium. 
20. The programme next proposes various 
measures to strengthen international security and 
confidence to be undertaken in addition to the 
specific disarmament measures. These include 
proposals for all countries to publish detailed 
information about their armed forces, the total 
value of their arms production and of their 
transfers of arms to other countries ; to supply 
full information on military budgets in accord-
ance with the standardised scheme to be prepared 
by the Secretary-General on the basis of a present 
pilot study. This would be a step towards verified 
and balanced reductions in military expenditure. 
In this connection your RapporLeur understands 
that the United Kingdom has volunteered to 
participate. It is understood that in such a pilot 
study of national military budgets by the United 
Nations Secretary-General a representative 
sample of other countries would have to include 
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both underdeveloped countries and "planned 
economy" - i.e. communist - countries. Lastly 
the section proposes that confidence-building 
measures of the type included in the· Helsinki 
final act should be extended to other regions 
possibly with broader parameters - it proposes 
twenty-one days' advance notice of major military 
movements or manoeuvres ; invitations to 
observers from other countries to attend 
manoeuvres and improved communications 
between governments particularly in areas of 
tension by the establishment of "hot lines" and 
other methods to reduce the risk of conflict due 
to miscalculation. 
21. Among the studies proposed to facilitate 
future negotiations on further disarmament 
measures the proposals place emphasis on the 
need for the United Nations peace-keeping role 
and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes to be regarded as complementary to 
disarmament. There should be studies of ways to 
limit the build-up of conventional weapons 
regionally taking into account the international 
transfer of conventional weapons and the pos-
sibility of a reciprocal limitation of the levels 
and types of conventional weapons ; and the 
establishment of a United Nations register of 
weapons transfers 1 • Your Rapporteur points out 
that as a general rule recipient countries have 
been opposed to proposals for publicising or 
controlling in any way the international transfer 
of conventional weapons, but that India which 
has been among the opponents may now be taking 
a more favourable view of such proposals. Other 
studies would include the relationship between 
disarmament and development on the basis of 
the report of the present ad hoc group of 
governmental experts - a subject in which the 
Nordic countries are interested, to include the 
conversion of armaments industry to other pur-
poses - and studies of all regional aspects of 
disarmament designed to increase confidence and 
stability - an aspect in which Belgium is parti-
cularly interested. Lastly studies are proposed 
of various technical measures to contribute to 
confidence building such as demilitarised or 
limited force zones and early-warning systems. 
Such systems have been tried out effectively in 
the Sinai since the 1973 hostilities ; the United 
Kingdom proposes that the technical expertise 
should be acquired by a United Nations body 
and extended to other areas of the world. 
Belgium 
22. Speaking at the special session on 2nd June, 
Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, laid stress on regional aspects of 
disarmament. He said that parallel attention 
1. It is recalled that sueh a register of arms transfers 
was mantained by the League of Nations up to the out· 
break of the second world war. 
should be devoted to conventional weapons and 
to weapons of mass destruction. In the latter 
case, the non-proliferation regime should be 
strengthened by the accession to the non-
proliferation treaty of countries that were not 
yet parties and by strengthening the IAEA safe-
guards. But conventional weapons represented 
more than four-fifths of all world military 
expenditure and should be given equal attention ; 
here agreements between the countries of a parti-
cular region on desirable levels of armaments 
would have the effect of limiting transfers into 
the region, and Belgium would support consulta-
tions to control the transfer of weapons in the 
world. He also proposed a balanced and verifiable 
reduction in military budgets. 
Denmarl« - and the Nine 
23. Mrs. Ostergaard, Danish Minister without 
Portfolio, spoke in the special session on 25th 
May first on behalf of the nine European Com-
munity countries, by virtue of Denmark's chair-
manship. (The countries sponsoring the western 
proposals outlined in paragraph 12 et seq above 
include six of the Nine, but not France, Ireland 
or Luxembourg.) She pointed out that the Nine 
were particularly interested in the strengthening 
of security in Europe by establishing a more 
stable relationship at a lower level of military 
potential ; a principle which involved the inter-
relationship between disarmament and national 
security including the inherent and balanced 
right of states to individual and collective self 
defence which the Nine hoped to see included 
in the declaration to be agreed by the special 
session. For the programme of action the Nine 
stressed that measures to curb and reverse the 
nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons were of fundamental importance, 
while parallel action should be taken on a regional 
and multilateral basis to limit and reduce the 
world-wide build-up of conventional weapons and 
forces. The Nine supported an in-depth study of 
the relationship between disarmament and 
development and also suggested that confidence-
building measures of the type contained in the 
CSCE final act, including prior notification of 
military manoeuvres and invitations to observers 
to attend them, might be applied to other regions 
in the world. Finally, on behalf of the Nine, she 
mentioned further use of modern technology 
including observation satellites for the inter-
national verification of disarmament agreements, 
although she made no direct reference to the 
specific French proposal. 
24. Turning to machinery, she recognised the 
need for a negotiating body of limited size and 
a deliberative body open to the whole membership 
Qf the United Nations, but made no specific 
reference to French or other proposals in this 
connection. The Nine felt however that the role 
of the United Nations should be strengthened in 
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the disarmament field and effective follow-up 
to the special session might take the form of a 
second special session to generate continuing 
pressure for productive negotiations. 
25. Speaking on behalf of Denmark, Mrs. 
Ostergaard noted the connection between inter-
national efforts to reduce military expenditure 
and the commitment to a new international econo-
mic order, and endorsed the Nordic proposal for 
an in-depth study of the relationship between 
disarmam~t and ·development. She gave very 
high priority to a strategy of nuclear non-
proliferation, and referring to conventional 
disarmament, endorsed the objective of limiting 
production and procurement of conventional 
weapons and limiting international arms 
transfers. · 
United Kingdom 
26. Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, 
addressed the special session on 2nd June when 
he mentioned in particular prospects of agree-
ment on a comprehensive test ban treaty, saying 
that the United Kingdom was about to put 
forward (unspecified) new proposals in the tri-
partite United Kingdom-United States-Soviet 
Union negotiations in Geneva with the aim of 
achieving a ban on all nuclear explosions in all 
environments. Inspection under agreed rules 
would be necessary and an intt.rnational system 
of seismic stations was proposed which would 
enable some non-nuclear weapon countries to 
participate directly in the ban. Referring to 
strategic nuclear weapons, Mr. Callaghan 
welcomed clear references by the United States 
and the Soviet Union to their readiness to 
negotiate on the significant reduction of the 
numbers of strategic weapons systems and to 
constrain improvements in such systems which 
he saw as the objective for a third round of 
negotia;tions to follow the yet-to-be-.concluded 
SALT II. But nuclear armouries in Europe 
would also have to be further restrained. He 
reiterated the western group's proposals for 
security assurances for non-nuclear states which 
the United Kingdom would be prepared to enter 
into with other nuclear powers, and would 
support the establishment of further nuclear-
weapon-free zones such as that established in 
Latin America by the Tlatelolco 'treaty. On the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the United 
Kingdom hoped that more than the present one 
hundred states would adhere ito the non-
proliferation treaty, but recognised that coun-
tries could renounce nuclear weapons in other 
ways, in particular by accepting the full-scope 
safeguards of the !AEA. 
27. On MBFRs the western powers were awaiting 
Warsaw Pact replies to the proposals put forward 
by the West in April, and the NATO countries 
had agreed with the United Kingdom that more 
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impetus should be given to the negotiations by 
proposing a meeting at the level of foreign 
ministers. Recognising that MBFR covered a 
limited area in Europe, he welcomed and called 
for careful consideration of the French proposal 
for extending the geographical scope of negotia-
tions on military forces in Europe. 
28. The United Kingdom had taken the lead 
in proposing that confidence-building measures 
of the type agreed at Helsinki - such as advance 
notification of military movements and 
manoeuvres, exchanging observers at manoeuvres, 
and exchanging military visits - should be 
adopted in other regions, and modern technical 
means of surveillance such as those installed in 
the Sinai peninsula after the 1973 cease-fire could 
also be applied in other regions of the world. 
Verification of arms control agreements was seen 
as another confidence-building measure and the 
United Kingdom had accepted voluntarily inter-
national inspection of civil/nuclear facilities and 
would play a full part in verifying a compre-
hensive test ban and a chemical weapons conven-
tion in which case the United Kingdom would 
accept inspection of relevant chemical manufac-
turing plants in Britain. Mr. Callaghan pledged 
the United Kingdom to accept on its territory 
whatever further measures of verification, 
including international inspection, were needed. 
Turning to the conventional arms build-up, Mr. 
Callaghan recognised the special responsibility of 
countries which supplied arms and said that the 
United Nations should consider ways of restric-
ting the sale of conventional arms, possibly on 
a regional and multilateral basis, with the involve-
ment on an equal footing of both suppliers and 
recipients. On military budgets, he said that some 
states published defence budgets which were 
known to be very incomplete an<l urged that the 
system of measuring and reporting military 
budgets devised under the auspices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General should be tested by a 
representative sample of states. (In reply to a 
question by the Chairman, it was stated in the 
House of Commons on 26th May that eight 
states, including the United Kingdom, had so far 
indicated their willingness to participate in a 
private test of the United Nations reporting 
scheme. An agreed standardised United Nations 
system of reporting military budgets was seen as 
an essential prerequisite of international agree-
ment on the balanced and verified reduction of 
military budgets.) 
29. Mr. Callaghan commended the United States 
proposals for the establishment of a stand-by 
United Nations peace-keeping force which the 
United Kingdom was very ready to examine. He 
also mentioned negotiations to control chemical 
weapons and the relationship between disarma-
ment and development. 
30. Turning to disarmament macli.inery, Mr. 
Callaghan said that the negotiating role belonged 
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to the COD in Geneva but its eo-chairmanship 
system could be reformed and France and China, 
it was hoped, would participate. There might be 
a case for adding some more members to make 
the COD more representative and there should 
be a close relationship with the United Nations 
and fuller arrangements for non-members to 
participate in the work of the COD. He called 
for a more important role for the United Nations 
Secretariat, suggesting that the Disarmament 
Centre should be responsible for collecting data 
on disarmament. 
31. In conclusion, Mr. Callaghan reiterated his 
belief that agreement on disarmament had to be 
reached by consensus and proposed that there 
should be a further special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1981 to review 
action that had been taken meanwhile. 
Germany 
32. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut 
Schmidt, addressed the special session on 26th 
May. He identified four elements for a more 
stable peace : a policy of political, strategic and 
military balance ; a policy of detente, conflict 
containment and reconciliation of interests ; a 
capacity for effective crisis management ; and 
lastly predictability of political and military 
conduct. Military balance implied parity over all 
in terms of security policy rather than arith-
metical identity of all kinds of armed forces, but 
balance could not be confined to the military 
sphere, it must also be sought in foreign policy 
and in economic and social fields. Discussing arms 
control proper he said the non-proliferation treaty 
had been valuable in limiting nuclear armaments 
but it must not be an obstacle to the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, the growing use of which 
required strengthened international measures to 
prevent misuse, especially of plutonium. Broad 
international consensus was required to streng-
then the non-proliferation regime. As for arms 
limitation in Europe the aim of the MBFR 
negotiaJtions in Vienna was to establish parity by 
means of balanced rEductions to result in com-
mon collective ceilings on both sides. The joint 
communique signed after Mr. Brezhnev's visit to 
Bonn on 6th May 1 stated for the first time that 
approximate equality and parity were sufficient 
to ensure defence - a statement that was also 
welcomed by Mr. Callaghan in his speech. 
33. Chancellor Schmidt described specific 
German contributions to international security, 
recalling, although without specific reference to 
1. "The two sides consider it important that no one 
should seek military superiority. Thily proceed from the 
assumption that approximate equality and parity are 
sufficient to ensure defence. In their opinion, correspond-
ing disarmament and arms limitation measures in the 
nuclear and conventional fields meeting that principle 
would be of great importance.'' 
the Brussels Treaty or WEU, that from 1954 
Germany had renounced the production of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Ger-
many's experience of international control of the 
non-production of chemical weapons showed that 
it could be effective, without economic harm 
and at reasonable cost ; he invited interested 
states to visit the Federal Republic to see how it 
was possible to verify adequa;tely a ban on the 
production of chemical weapons, an agreement on 
which he considered particularly urgent. Ger-
many was also prepared to make its institutions 
available for seismological verification of a 
comprehensive test ban. He proposed further 
that the confidence-building measures agreed at 
Helsinki should be made binding upon all states 
in Europe and welcomed the proposals of the 
French President. Measures such as the notifi-
cation of military exercises, exchange visits of 
members of the armed forces, invitations to 
observers to attend military exercises could be 
extended to other regions of the world and 
regional agreements could form the basis of a 
future world-wide convention on confidence-
building measures. But beyond the sphere of 
military security, mistrust between peoples had 
to be eliminated and Germany would contribute 
to a United Nations programme to· foster under-
standing among the young generation of all 
nations, and would be presenting specific pro-
posals later. 
34. The Chancellor mentioned the relationship 
between the limitation of armaments and develop-
ment and agreed with Vice-President Mondale 
that efforts should be made to regulate the 
international transfer of armaments to achieve 
which both suppliers and recipients must agree 
to exercise restraint. He called for all exporting 
countries to undertake to disclose their arms 
deliveries. In this field Germany's policy was to 
refuse on principle to grant aid for the export 
of weapons and only very exceptionally to export 
weapons to countries outside its own alliance. 
None were exported to areas of international 
tensions. At the same time Germany had mass-
ively increased its development aid budget. 
Netherlands 
35. On 5th April 1978 the Netherlands sub-
mitted a paper to the preparatory committee 
proposing specifically that in the final document 
of the special session all countries should be 
invited to give their views on the establishment 
of an international disarmament organisation. 
The paper acknowledges earlier proposals 
advanced both by Sweden and the Nether lands 
in 1973. 
36. The international disarmament organisation 
is envisaged as the operational framework for 
the implementation of disarmament treaties, 
responsible mainly for verification but also 
acting as a clearing house for disarmament 
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information and for orgamsmg review confer-
ences provided for in disarmament treaties. The 
paper notes that the pending conventions -
to ban chemical weapons and to ban nuclear tests 
in all environments - will both require their 
own type of inspection and verification machin-
ery, including seismic arrays in the latter case, 
and that the French proposal for a United 
Nations observation satellite capability is also 
relevant to the functions that could be incorpor-
ated into an international disarmament organis-
ation. Among data such an organisation might 
handle could be information on stockpile destruc-
tion, seismic data and the results of inspections. 
Such an organisation might be set up in the first 
place for the implementation of a particular 
disarmament treaty, its member countries being 
parties to that treaty, and then given more func-
tions to assume responsibilities provided for in 
further disarmament treaties as they are con-
cluded. Its membership would therefore be open-
ended. 
Italy 
37. In a paper presented to the preparatory 
committee on 18th April 1978 Italy made pro-
posals concerning disarmament machinery. The 
General Assembly would remain the forum for 
universal consideration of disarmament matters 
with prior consideration in its First Committee 
but ad hoc committees could be set up for special 
issues. The rOle of the Security Council is recalled 
with the suggestion that it might establish a 
committee with regional sub-committees to con-
trol the international transfer of conventional 
weapons. The COD is seen as the best forum 
for substantive negotiations but its role would 
be enhanced if the two absent nuclear weapon 
states (France and China) joined it. The follow-
ing proposals for improvements are made : 
- limited increase in membership to provide 
better geographical and political balance ; 
- participation of any country interested 
as an observer empowered to submit 
written proposals and take part in their 
discussion; 
- plenary meetings might be open to the 
public. 
The paper makes no recommendation about the 
present system of eo-chairmanship by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Italian paper 
also proposes the establishment of a permanent 
international organ for verification employing 
technological verification methods such as sens-
ing, sampling, recording, communicating and 
interpreting devices. 
France 
38. On 23rd February 1978 France submitted in 
the preparatory committee a paper containing 
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outline proposals for the declaration, the pro-
gramme of action and the machinery for nego-
tiations. The proposals were elaborated in Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing's address to the General 
Assembly on 25th May and in four specific 
memoranda. The French Delegation to the special 
session included among its members Mr. Jules 
Moch who had been leader of French disarma-
ment delegations up to 1960 when France had 
participated fully in multilateral negotiations 
including the Ten-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee which met from 1959 to 1960. In 1961 
when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee was established, France decided not to 
take up its seat on that body, and has not since 
then participated in the multilateral disarma-
ment negotiations which led to the conclusion 
of the partial test ban and non-proliferation 
treaties among others. 
39. In his speech to the special session Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing described disarmament 
as having been a failure so far ; the world was 
over-armed - in reality at a level of wartime 
rather than peace. The ultimate objective of real 
disarmament, general and controlled, had to be 
based on reality and France approached it on 
the basis of three fundamental concepts : every 
state had the legitimate right' to security ; dis-
armament was the affair of all countries, not the 
monopoly of the few ; approaches to disarma-
ment must take account of special regional 
situations. Among concrete proposals for disarma-
ment France introduced detailed memoranda on 
a world institute of disarmament research and on 
a United Nations observation satellite agency, 
and is to circulate a third on a special disarma-
ment fund for development. 
40. President Giscard d'Estaing considered the 
world in two separate headings - the non-
nuclear regions where encouragement should be 
given to the conclusion of specific non-nuclear 
agreements such as that on the denuclearisation 
of Latin America (Tlatelolco treaty), and nuclear 
weapons powers should renounce the use or threat 
of the use of nuclear weapons against states 
party to nuclear-free-zone agreements. The con-
ventional arms race should then be controlled 
by agreements between the countries of the region 
fixing armaments ceilings or successive levels for 
reductions. France would be ready to facilitate 
such agreements by adapting its policy on the 
sale of armaments accordingly. The rest of the 
world, largely the northern hemisphere, was 
covered by the nuclear deterrent, and controlling 
the nuclear arms race depended in the first 
instance on the two superpowers because there 
was considerable disproportion between their 
nuclear forces and that of France. If after 
successive reductions the disproportion changed, 
France in its turn would consider drawing its 
conclusions therefrom. But in the area covered 
by the nuclear deterrent the visible disproportion 
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of conventional weapons was a hindrance to the 
reduction of nuclear weapons, and France was 
making specific proposals in a memorandum to 
the countries participating in the CSCE for a 
European disarmament conference covering the 
area from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
41. The French memorandum on an inter-
national observation satellite agency observes 
that at present only two countries have military 
observation satellites which they use to gather 
information from any poi!Ilt on the surface of the 
earth that they determine, and which play an 
important role in verification of their bilateral 
arms agreements. ],ranee proposes that this 
method of verification should be made available 
to the international community as a whole. The 
agency would be responsible for collecting, pro-
cessing and disseminating information from earth 
observation satellites and would participate in the 
verification of existing and future international 
disarmament and security agreements ; inter-
national security organisations could also apply 
to the agency for its services ; the agency could 
also act at the request of a state to investigate 
an alleged infringement of an international 
agreement by another state provided the consent 
of that other state was obtained. The Security 
Council, it is suggested, could also make use 
of the agency under the terms of .Article 34 of 
the United Nations Charter which empowers it 
to "investigate any disPute or any situation 
which might lead to international friction or give 
rise to a dispute ... ''. The agency would be a 
specialised agency of the United Nations open 
to all members and specialised institutions. 
42. The ag!'lncy's technical resources could be 
developed in three phases : in the first, be 
responsible for interpreting and disseminating 
data from existing nationally-owned satellites; 
in the second phase, the agency would have its 
own ground terminals for collecting data directly 
from nationally-owned satellites ; in the third 
phase, the agency would own its own observation 
satellites as well as the ground terminals and 
the necessary processing capability. Three sources 
of finance are suggested - compulsory contri-
butions of members ; voluntary contributions 
including contributions in kind by way of techni-
cal services provided by states possessing obser-
vation satellites ; and finally, contributions for 
services rendered where states apply to the 
agency for verification of disarmament or secur-
ity agreements concluded by them. France pro-
poses that a committee of experts be established 
to submit to the thirty-fourth session of the 
General .Assembly (i.e. opening in September 
1979) detailed proposals for the establishment of 
the agency. 
43. It should be noted that France has recently 
earmarked Frs. 700 million for a military obser-
vation satellite programme to be operational by 
the end of 1983 or early 1984. These "satellites 
probatoires d'observation terrestre" (SPOTs) 
would be powered by solar panels and launched 
by the European Ariane launchers. It is no doubt 
envisaged that the satellite observation agency 
could draw on resources of these satellites as 
well as those of the superpowers. 
44. The concept of a United Nations satellite 
observation capability in order to provide strictly 
independent data for the verification of inter-
national disarmament agreements was originally 
put forward by the WEU Assembly in Recom-
mendation 227 adopted on 8th December 1972 
on the report of the Committee 1 which proposed 
the establishment of an arms limitation verifi-
cation agency under United Nations aegis- the 
report envisaged that such an agency might be 
equipped with its own technical means of external 
verification such as observation satellites and 
seismic arrays. Subsequently in Recommendation 
254 adopted on 20th June 197 4 on a further 
report of the Committee 2 the Assembly proposed 
a United Nations satellite observation capability 
as an adjunct to United Nations peace-keeping 
capability - a proposal made with particular 
reference to the need to verify positions of troops 
on particular dates when establishing the cease-
fire line in the 1973 Middle East conflict. 
45. In its memorandum on an International 
Disarmament Research Institute, France pro-
posed the establishment of an autonomous insti-
tute similar to the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR). The imrtitute 
would be independent under an executive 
director appointed by the governing body which, 
in turn, would be composed of independent 
persons known for their contribution to peace and 
disarmament or their expertise in security mat-
ters. They would be appointed by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Presidents of the 
General Assembly and of the Disarmament Com-
mittee. Research conducted by the institute while 
being useful for current negotiations would not 
necessarily be directly linked to them, subjects 
suggested include : military technologies ; com-
parative analysis of different systems of verifi-
cation of disarmament agreements ; the concept 
of the right to security and its regional appli-
cation. Initially the institute might employ some 
ten experts and would be financed through a 
contribution from the United Nations budget and 
voluntary contributions from governments, inter-
governmental organisations, foundations and 
other private sources, provided the independence 
of the in8titute was conserved. 
1. Document 587, East-West 'relations and defence, 
Rapporteur Mr. Destremau. 
2. Document 637, Security and the Mediterranean, 
Rapporteur Mr. Jung. 
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46. The French proposals continue with the 
establishment of an international disarmament 
fund for development to be devoted in the first 
place to the economic and social development of 
the poorest countries. Initially a fund of 
$1 billion is proposed, through voluntary con-
tributions - 50 % from the nuclear weapon 
countries in proportion to the numbers of 
nuclear delivery systems they possess and 50 % 
from wealthy and heavily-armed countries in 
accordance with criteria to be agreed. Contri-
butions could be counted against the 0.7% of 
GNP which has been fixed internationally as a 
target for industrial countries to devote to the 
development of the poorer countries. 
47. In its memorandum to the twenty-three 
countries participating in the CSCE (the Euro-
pean countries plus the United States and 
Canada) proposing a conference on disarmament 
in Europe, it is understood that France proposed 
a conference of the CSCE countries giving 
priority to increasing security through con-
fidence-building measures and the limitation and 
reduction of conventional weapons. The nego-
tiations would apply to the European territories 
of all participating countries - thus extending 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. Negotiations 
would cover major conventional air and land 
weapons with a high offensive capability, the 
forces servicing these weapons, and their logistic 
support when within the zone covered by the 
negotiations. The definition excluded naval forces 
and nuclear weapons which could not be dealt 
with in a conference limited to European 
territory. 
48. The conference could proceed by stages, 
first drawing up anti-surprise and stabilisation 
measures based on mutual information corre-
sponding to the aims of the confidence-building 
measures agreed in the CSCE. In the second 
phase, when the first had made sufficient pro-
gress to increase confidence, the conference could 
turn to measures of limitation and actual reduc-
tion of conventional weapons and forces which 
would apply to all military powers attending 
the conference whether or not they were members 
of a collective defenetl organisation. Specifically 
the conference would not be an obstacle to more 
limited agreements with more far-reaching pro-
visions - presumably therefore it is intended to 
work in parallel with the MBFR. After an 
exchange of views with the countries to whom 
the memorandum is addressed, France envisages 
the convening of a preparatory committee for the 
conference on disarmament in Europe and is 
prepared to make concrete proposals for its 
organisation, but its procedure could be based 
on that of the CSCE. 
49. In annexes to the memorandum it is under-
stood that France proposed the following con-
fidence-building measures involving multilateral 
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mutual information measures : the exchange of 
data on command structure and the location of 
forces limited to major formations ; exchange of 
data on military budgets using a Swedish pro-
posal as a basis - this data could be collected 
and disseminated by the executive secretariat 
of the conference. Bilateral mutual information 
measures based on reciprocity could be the 
exchange of observers for manoeuvres in accord-
ance with the rules agreed by the CSCE ; visits 
and calls ; the exchange of military instructors 
and lecturers ; the development of facilities 
accorded to military attaches including freedom 
of movement. Secondly, anti-surprise measures 
would be based on one month's advance notifi-
cation of manoeuvres and movements including 
air and land manoeuvres involving joint oper-
ations by land, air and amphibious forces, at a 
level of one to two divisions, notice to cover 
not only the forces involved but also the major 
equipment as defined in the second annex. Thirty 
days' notification could also be given of mobilis-
ation exercises and movements of land and air 
forces covering movements of one to two divisions 
over distances greater than 200 kilometres. 
Notification could be accompanied by the desig-
nation of principal points of passage, especially 
for the crossing of frontiers. Thirdly, stabilis-
ation measures more constraining than the fore-
going might involve a ceiling on land-air 
manoeuvres of, for example, 60,000 men. within 
defined conditions of space and time ; and the 
establishment of air or satellite surveillance 
systems which could be covered by a European 
agreement. 
50. In the second annex on the limitation and 
reduction of forces, it is understood that France 
suggested that they should apply to conventional 
equipment combining mobility with great fire 
power including medium and heavy battle tanks ; 
infantry armoured vehicles ; field artillery and 
multiple rocket launchers ; combat aircraft 
(fighters, fighter bombers and reconnaissance 
aircraft) ; armed helicopters ; and the forces 
associated with the foregoing equipment and 
their logistic support. Agreements on reduction 
should lead to the demobilisation of the units 
concerned. The verification measures necessary 
for such agreements could be carried out by the 
satellites of the international agency proposed 
by France, and by the system of air surveillance 
as well as observers for on-si:te inspections. 
51. In its proposals for disarmament negotiating 
machinery the French paper submitted to the 
preparatory committee observes that the United 
Nations remains the natural framework for 
debates on disarmament, and that in the deliberat-
ing body all member states should be able to 
participate on a basis of equality. France pro-
poses that the First Co:mmittee of the General 
Assembly (a committee of all members) should 
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be enabled to sit as a disarmament commission 1 
and thus constitute the universal deliberating 
body. There should then be a new negotiating 
body replacing the present CCD, which would 
be responsible directly to the Disarmament Com-
mission. The new body entitled the "Disarmament 
Committee" would have from thirty to forty 
members including states with a particular 
interest in disarmament, the members of the 
Security Council and would be representative of 
all regions of the world. The chairman would be 
elected for two years from among any partici-
pating state other than the permanent members 
of the Security Council. Dec:lliions of the Dis-
armament Committee would be taken by con-
sensus and it would be the forum for disarma-
ment negotiations based on recommendations 
from the Disarmament Commission to which it 
would report. Countries not members of the 
Disarmament Committee would be free to attend 
its meetings as observers. 
United States 
52. Neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union has played a prominent role in the special 
session on disarmament. President Carter did 
not attend the special session in person, but 
Vice-President Mondale addressed it on 24th May 
when he stressed the unprecedented communist 
military build-up in Europe and the increased 
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union which 
required the western allies to make moderate 
increases in their defence budgets: On disarma-
ment, he forecast what he called two historic 
achievements : for the first time agreement could 
be reached between the United States and the 
Soviet Union to reduce the combined total of 
delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons ; 
secondly, a comprehensive test ban would be 
produced controlling nuclear explosions by the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union. He proposed nine points for 
inclusion in the action programme to be adopted 
by the special session: reduction in the number 
of strategic weapons and increasingly stricter 
qualitative restrictions on their later develop-
ment ; a ban on nuclear tests ; international 
co-operation to ensure that no further nuclear 
powers emerged ; a ban on weapons of mass 
destruction other than nuclear weapons; reduc-
tion in the constant rise in conventional weapons ; 
strengthening arms control agreements (and the 
United States offered to provide specialists for 
technological means of verification - what he 
called "the eyes and ears of peace" - understood 
to include aerial photography and early-warning 
devices) ; development of institutions and exper-
tise on arms control ; the creation of a United 
1. There is an existing United Nations body known as 
the Disarmament Commission which last met in 1965 
(see paragraph 3). 
Nations reserve force for the maintenance of 
peace ; the release of new resources from arma-
ments to economic and social development. He 
proposed a new extraordinary session of the 
General Assembly in 1981 to review progress. 
Soviet Union and its allies 
53. On 7th September 1977 the Soviet Union 
together with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia the Ger~ 
man Democratic ~epublic, Hungary, 'Mongolia 
and Poland subnutted a working paper to the 
preparatory committee outlining basic provisions 
for the programme of action. It appears to 
include no new ideas but lists eleven well-known 
disarmament topics on which, it is asserted 
agreement is essential: cessation of the nuclea~ 
arms race and nuclear disarmament; measures 
to avert the danger of nuclear war ; complete 
and general prohibition of nuclear weapon 
threats ; consolidation in every possible way of 
the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons ; prohibition and destruction of chemical 
weapons stockpiles ; prohibition of the develop-
ment of new types and systems of mass destruc-
tion ; establishment of nuclear-free zones and 
zones of peace ; limitation and reduction of 
armed forces and conventional weapons · reduc-
tion of military budgets ; complete de~ilitaris­
ation of the seabed and the ocean floor · and 
regional measures for military detente and dis-
armament. 
54. It is significant that in its comments on 
negotiating machinery the Soviet paper says that 
the existing multilateral, bilateral and regional 
systems are suitable but continues its support 
for a world disarmament conference. Some coun-
tries feel that now that China has joined the 
United Nations and •that indeed that organis-
ation's membership is virtually universal a world 
disarmament conference holds little advantage 
over the present special session of the General 
Assembly. 
Fifteen non-aligned members of the CCD 
55. On 4th April 1978 the fifteen non-aligned 
members of the COD submitted a working paper 
on organisation and procedures of the COD which 
made the following succinct proposals. To 
strengthen the existing link with the General 
Assembly, all member countries of the United 
NaJtions would be free to submit proposals on any 
subject being negotiated in the COD and to par-
ticipate in the proceedings when those proposals 
were discussed. The role of the United Nations 
Secretary-General's special representative and :the 
United Nations Centre for Disarmament should 
be enhanced ; the eo-chairmanship system should 
be replaced by a system "to be agreed upon"-
the following alternative proposals being listed 
- chairman by monthly rotation among all 
m~mbers of the COD ; monthly rotation among 
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all non-nuclear members of the COD ; a bureau 
o~ four members comprising a chairman rotating 
mther monthly or on a sessional basis and three 
vice-chairmen. Two members of the bureau would 
be selected from states belonging to the military 
blocs and two from non-aligned countries. 
China 
56. Mr. Huang Hua, Chinese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, addressed the special session 
on 29th May when he implied that China was 
prepared to take part in future disarmament 
negotiations. The speech was otherwise devoted 
to criticism of the two superpowers for their 
"colossal military potential", but more particu-
larly of the Soviet Union : "social imperialism a 
lately arrived superpower, is undertaking' a 
threatening offensive... the Soviet Union by the 
scale of its uncontrolled expansion of armaments, 
puts the other superpower in the shade". He 
said that disarmament had made no progress 
because the two superpowers were not sincere, 
and he cond~mned the partial test ban treaty and 
the non-proliferation treaty as having tied the 
hands and feet of many non-nuclear countries · 
the history of SAL'!' was one of a strategi~ 
arms race. He called first for the prohibition 
and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons 
and the convening of a world summit conference 
for that purpose. He called for the two super-
powers to take the following measures : under-
take not to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear countries or 
denuclearised zones ; repatriate all their armed 
forces and dismantle their foreign military 
bases ; stop the nuclear and conventional arms 
race and begin the progressive destruction of 
nuclear weapons and a massive reduction of con-
ventional weapons ; undertake not to station large 
forces or conduct military manoeuvres in areas 
close to the frontiers of other countries and 
undertake not to attack other countries ; under-
take not to export arms to any country for the 
purpose of exercising control, provoking war or 
threatening war. ' 
57. China subsequently confirmed its commit-
ment to participating in a disarmament negoti-
ating forum and circulated a working paper 
calling for the abolition of the COD in favour 
of a new negotiating body to be truly free from 
superpower control, composed on a fair and 
equitable basis. 
Conclusions 
58. The Committee concludes that there is a good 
case for trying to reach agreement in the special 
session on a medium-term programme of four 
to five years on practical proposals, designed 
to give impetus to realistic measures of disarma-
ment, and possibly to modify slightly the existing 
DOCUMENT 788 
neg()l;iating machinery which at present is the 
COD. 
59. Unfortunately all desirable features of a 
negotiating (as opposed to deliberating) forum 
cannot be reconciled - it is significant that the 
Soviet Union and the United States have so 
far been publicly silent on · or have opposed 
any modification to the COD. It is possible that 
these countries might now be prepared to give 
up the eo-chairmanship, and the susceptibilities 
of many countries, including France, would be 
soothed if the system were replaced, for example. 
by a chairmanship rotating among all members 
on a fairly short-term basis (one month) sup-
ported say by a four-nation balanced bureau as 
proposed in the non-aligned paper quoted above. 
Membership cannot however be much increased : 
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with thirty participating membf:rs it is already 
less effective than originally when it had only 
eighteen. It is however important that France 
should rtake up the vacant seat that has always 
been reserved for it, and that China, the only 
other absent nuclear power, should join. Con-
sideration might be given to permitting other 
countries to submit proposals to the COD, and 
possibly attend sessions as observers with the 
right of participation when their proposals are 
discussed. Such a body would be much the same 
as the "Disarmament Committee" proposed by 
France and a change of title and status would be 
a relatively small price to pay if the participation 
of France and China were thereby secured. It 
would however be important to maintain the 
consensus principle as far as decision-making is 
concerned. 
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The Assembly 
APPENDIX 
Draft recommendation on disarmament as amended 
by the Assembly at its sitting on 22nd June 1978 1 
(i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached $400 billion per annum and 
that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to 
defence; 
(ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement 
since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ; 
(iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures 
of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete 
disarmament under effective international control ; 
(iv) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability; 
· (v) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ; 
(vi) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations: "Armaments Year Book" and 
"Statistical Year Book of the Trade iri Arms and Ammunition"; 
(vii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on 
inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts ; 
(viii) Accepting the rMponsibility shared by WEU members with other major armB suppliers to seek 
agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view : 
1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control 
measures to be concluded in the next five years, including : 
(a) a comprehensive test ban; 
(b) a chemical weapons treaty; 
(c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of 
civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear coun-
tries; 
(d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ; 
(e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international 
transfer of conventional arms ; 
(/) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the 
CSCE final act ; 
(g) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional 
weapons and incendiaries ; 
and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification : 
8 
(h) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis 
equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and 
peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible inter alia for publishing, on the basis of its 
1. Amendments agreed in the Assembly are printed in italics. 
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own sources of information as well as ma.nda.tory reports by a.ll countries, annual reports 
on the forces a.nd armaments of all countries a.nd arms transfers between countries ; 
2. To make such changes to the present principal disarmament negotiating forum as will secure 
the participation of all nuclear weapon powers without reducing its effectiveness ; 
3. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by 
the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a. further 
special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress. 
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Amendments I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 1 
tabled by Mr. Boucheny 
I. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Considering that to the danger created by the increase in existing military capabilities is now 
added that of the proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons ; ". 
2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a. new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Stressing that the intensive arms trade now practised exerts its adverse effects on the 
economy, is immoral and increases the risk of armed conflicts breaking out ;". 
3. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Considering that any measure intended to slow or stop the quantitative and qualitative arms 
race must take account of the existing balances and the right of all states to security ;". 
4. Leave out paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"an effective balanced and controlled reduction, in conditions of equal security for all states 
concerned, of all forces and all arms, in particular, in a. first step, foreign forces and arms 
stationed in the zone covered by the Vienna. negotiations on the reduction of forces and arma-
ments;". 
5. After paragraph 1 (d) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as 
follows: 
"the balanced reduction of. forces, armaments and military budgets in Europe ;". 
6. Mter paragraph I (e) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as 
follows: 
"the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to 
strengthen mutual confidence in the military field;". 
7. In paragraph 1 {g) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "restrict the development 
of" and insert "prohibit research, development or production of" ; leave out "conventional". 
8. After paragraph 1 (g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"the reduction at a uniform rate of military budgets of permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, as well as those of other countries with large economic resources in 
the spirit of United Nations resolutions ;". 
9. Mter paragraph 1 (g) of the draft recommendation proper, add a. new paragraph as follows: 
"the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the 
world;". 
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10. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"2. To participate actively in the work of the transformed Committee on Disarmament in 
close liaison with the United Nations General Assembly and its Disarmament Commission in 
pursuit of the objectives listed in paragraph 1 ;". 
11. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"To associate all nuclear powers with the United States-Soviet agreement on the prevention of 
nuclear war;". 
12. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, a.dd a new paragraph as follows: 
"To associate all nuclear powers with the strategic arms limitation talks at the time appro-
priate to the state of the negotiations ;". 
13. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"To make the Mediterranean a denuclearised zone, free of foreign military bases, where the 
United States and Soviet fleets stationed in this zone would be limited, with the aim of their 
being withdrawn;". 
14. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"To prohibit the sale of any weapon or war material to colonialist, racist and fascist govern-
ments, and in particular to those of the Republic of South Africa., Southern Rhodesia., Chile 
and Iran.". 
Signed : Boucheny 
1. See lOth Sitting, 21st November 1978 (Amendments 1 and 2 negatived; Amendment 3 withdrawn; Amend· 
ments 4 and 5 negatived ; Amendment 6 agreed to ; Amendments 7 and 8 negatived ; Amendment 9 agreed to ; 
Amendments 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 negatived). 
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Amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18 
Disarmament 
AMENDMENTS 15, 16, 17 and 18 1 
tabled by Mr. Bo%%i 
21st Novemmber 1978 
15. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "other major arms sup-
pliers" insert "and the main recipient countries". 
In paragraph 1 (e) of the draft recommendation proper, after "major arms-producing coun-
tries" insert "and main recipient countries". 
16. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "a comprehensive test ban" 
and insert "a nuclear test ban if this does not jeopardise the security of the state concerned". 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, delete "(a)". 
17. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"To have an all-Europea.n conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all 
signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of 
a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces ;". 
18. Mter paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
"To introduce a development assistance fund in the framework of the United Nations formed 
by a tax on over-armament;". 
Signed : Bozzi 
1. See lOth Sitting, 21st November 1978 (Amendments 15 and 16 negatived; Amendment 17 amended and agreed 
to ; Amendment 18 withdrawn). 
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New weapons and defence strategy 
PREIJMINARY REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur 
Draft Order 
on new weapons and defence strategy 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the present introduction of new theatre weapons systems, in particular precision-guided 
munitions, and the proposed introduction of others such as cruise missiles and enhanced-radiation nuclear 
weapons, have many implications for defence policy, strategy and arms control, 
INSTRUCTS ITS CoMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND AB.M.AMENTS to continue its study of these 
questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly. 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur) 
1. This preliminary report is designed to intro-
duce a discussion of the implications for allied 
defence strategy of the modernisation of existing 
tacticaL nuclear weapons through the introduc-
tion of enhanced-radiation warheads, and the 
implications of other new weapons systems. 
2. Many recent events have drawn attention to 
the urgency of a comprehensive survey of all 
the issues involved before final decisions on 
certain options in the choice of new weapons 
are taken. 
3. Considerable modernisation of Warsaw Pact 
theatre nuclear weapons systems has been 
reported, with improvement of existing missiles 
and the possible introduction of the new SS-21 
and SS-22. President Carter having deferred 
production of an enhanced-radiation weapon in 
April has now approved preparatory production 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; 
MM. Bonnel, Bo'bertt (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. .tl.hr6'118, 
BtJ'Umel, Beehter (Alternate: Boszi), van den Bergh, 
Boldrini, BCYUOheny, Critohley, Dejaram, Fosson, Grant, 
Handlos, Hardy, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, Maggwn&, 
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of components which could provide such a capa-
bility for Lance missiles and 203 mm artillery. 
Certain European countries are actively con-
sidering the merits of cruise missiles as well as 
ERWs . .At the same time the greatly-increased 
accuracy of some modern conventional weapons 
permits them to perform military tasks pre-
viously beyond their reach. 
4. The Committee has already taken evidence 
from five distinguished experts in these fields, 
and is aware of the diverging opinions tha,t are 
held. It proposes that it should continue its 
studies in order to report fully to the next part-
se&'rlon of the Assembly on the following aspects : 
the conventional and nuclear balance ; the impli-
cations of new conventional and nuclear weapons 
technologies ; and the possible consequences for 
defence strategy. 
M~nard, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Biiohner), Pecchioli, 
P~ronnet, Hermann Schmidt (Alternate: Vohrer), Schol-
ten, Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate : Banks). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the rote are 
printed in itaZios. 
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Europe's external relations 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
2nd November 1978 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on Europe's external relations 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Internal preconditions of Europe's external relations 
Ill. Europe's position in the world 
IV. External policy interests and objectives 
(i) The preservation of European security 
(ii) The continuation and expansion of detente 
(iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the assurance of economic 
security 
(iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more 
equitable international economic order 
(v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe 
V. Summary 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Sir John Badgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chair· 
men) ; MM. Abens (Alternate : Spautz), Ariosto, Beith 
(Alternate : McNamara), Sir Frederic Bennett. (Alter· 
nate: Channon), MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamp'l, 
Druon, Faulds, Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den 
Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate: Voogd), Mangelschots 
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(Alternate: Van Waterschoot), Mende, Minnocci (Alter-
nate: Treu), Mo=er.steeg (Alternate: Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra), Muller, Peridier, Perin (Alternate : Van 
Aal), Portheine (Alternate : Schlingemann), Reddemann, 
Segre, Urwin. 
N.B. The names of those ta'kin,q part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Europe's external relations 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved ; 
Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy 
and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs 
of other states ; 
Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with 
all parts of the world in order to a~ure the security and well-being of their peoples; 
Considering that military security, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be 
maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts; 
Considering further that an uncontrolled arms race between East and West cannot increase our 
security, but only precipitate new dangers; 
Convinced that the continua~ion and extension of detente with the objective of arms control and 
balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security ; 
Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should 
be continued on a stable basis ; 
Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as 
possible the gap between North and South; 
Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the 
interest of industrial and developing nations alike ; 
Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability; 
Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement 
for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western 
Europe; 
Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western demo-
cracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields ; 
Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-
ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively 
exercised through other international organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, a·ll the problems raised by the application 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the 
opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited; 
2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain 
close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of detente and negotiations 
on the reduction and control of armaments ; 
3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue; 
4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a 
view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports; 
5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic 
nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the 
European Community and their share in the process of European integration. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. This report attempts to outline the external 
relations of EU!l'Ope. The RapporteUT is aware 
that such an endeavour is extremely difficult and 
would require, to be in a.ny sense complete, much 
greater length than is customary for repom of 
this Assembly. He must therefore limit his dis-
cussion to a few central aspects of European 
foreign relations and cannot treat even these in 
a systematic or comprehensive manner. 
2. Security policy, the central responsibility 
of WEU, will provide the emphasis of this report; 
in this connection, however, the conditioning 
factors, goals, and interests of Europe's external 
relations will also be examined. For this purpose 
it is first of all necessary to select the definition 
of Europe most appropriate in the present 
context. Further, the internal preconditions of 
Europe's foreign relations must be discussed with 
candour. Only on the basis of such an analysis 
can one grasp Europe's contemporary position 
in the world with some degree of realism and 
precision and examine Europe's most important 
foreign policy interests and objectives in order 
to clarify the foreign policy options available to 
it in its present state. 
3. In speaking of Europe one can refer to quite 
different geographical expanses, political entities, 
or international groupings. For the purpose of 
this report it would perhaps be most logical to 
select a definition of Europe which is as flexible 
as possible without, on the other hand, being so 
nebulous as to lose all practical meaning. An 
immediate limitation is given by the fact that 
Western Europe provides the starting point for 
our discussion. This concept of Europe embraces 
in the first instance the domain of the European 
Community and WEU, without, however, 
restricting itself to these two organisations. The 
European Community and WEU conceive of 
themselves as open communities, and the Euro-
pean Community is presently negotiating the 
enlargement to the south. This fact alone 
requires a definition of Europe more flexible 
than one limited to the existing institutional 
structures of the European Community and 
WEU. Moreover, on the level of security policy, 
an integral component of foreign policy, no less 
than thirteen European nations have bound 
themselves to an alliance with the United States 
and Canada. 
4. For these reasons the Rapporteur prefers to 
use a different criterion of selection and speak 
of the European, western-type democracies, i.e. 
of those European states which share the common 
foundation of pluralist democracy. Such a defini-
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tion would embrace the member states of the 
Council of Europe along with a number of 
smaller countries which have not, or not yet, 
acceded to that body. More important, however 
than determining the precise number of stat~ 
to be included in our examination of Europe's 
external relations is our definition of this com-
munity. of nations on the basis of certain shared 
values, namely a common dedication to western 
pluralist democracy and a common concern for 
human rights. In this sense, Europe would thus 
refer to democratic Europe. This concept would 
not embrace the continent of Europe in all polit-
ical and geographical respects, which would of 
course also include the Eastern European com-
munist countries. Even if one regards the con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe 
as a first manifestation of this "pan-Europe" ~llusion to common external relations is hardl; 
m place. But common foreign policy instruments 
are largely lacking as well for democratic Eu;rope, 
the concept chosen by the Rapporteur. Such 
instruments are no doubt most fully developed 
in the European Community. Therefore great 
weight must be placed upon the initiatives 
developed here. In addition, however, one must 
examine a wide range of interests and objectives 
which extend far beyond the domain of the 
Europe of the Nine and of WEU and which 
can be numbered among the foundations of 
Europe's common external relations. 
11. Internal preconditions of Europe's external 
relations 
5. The democratic European states discussed in 
this report belong to different alliances and 
groupings. They maintain both joint and separate 
relations with the rest of the world, as is evident 
in their membership of various regional group-
ings. Only two such organisations, however, are 
responsible for the defence and security concerns 
of their member states : NATO, which includes 
the United States and Canada ; and Western 
European Union, which joins seven European 
nations in a collective defence pact with a 
guarantee of long-term validity. WEU does not, 
however, dispose of its own military forces but 
relies on those of NATO : thus there exists no 
autonomous European defence community. 
Rather, the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal and Turkey) are convinced that the 
maintenance of European security requires close 
co-operation with Canada and the United States 
to counter successfully the threat which the 
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Soviet military potential poses to Western 
Europe. 
6. This European-American defence com-
munity must be regarded as a structural element 
of the European state system. In other words, 
the American presence in Europe must be regard-
ed as permanent. In its core this community has 
remained essentially the same as it has developed 
since 1949, even though not all European nations 
maintain the same type of ties with the Alliance. 
Its Scandinavian members, for example, are care-
ful to take the northern balance of forces into 
consideration in their relationship to the Atlantic 
Alliance. They allow neither foreign military 
bases nor the stationing of nuclear weapons on 
their territory. France withdrew from the NATO 
integrated command structure in 1966. The rela-
tionship of Greece and Turkey to NATO has 
been altered as a consequence of the Cyprus 
conflict of 1974, Greece having withdrawn to a 
considerable extent from the military integration. 
Turkey's relations with the United States were 
burdened for several years by the American arms 
embargo but have been normalised following the 
latter's recent repeal. NATO remains weakened, 
nevertheless, by the unsolved Cyprus question on 
its southern flank. 
7. A major gain for Europe and the entire 
Atlantic Alliance has been the elimination of 
dictatorial regimes in Portugal and Greece. With 
the domestic political transformations in Spain 
following the death of Franco, Western Europe 
can now be said to be composed entirely of 
democratic states. This important fact deserves 
to be emphasised, for it proves that democracy 
has not lost its attraction as a way of life. Spain 
has long been tied to the United States through 
a bilateral defence pact and is presently applying 
for membership of the European Community ; 
whether it will choose to join NATO as well 
remains an open question for the moment. The 
Rapporteur would emphasise that this decision 
lies entirely in the hands of the Spanish Govern-
ment and the Spanish people. 
8. Ten of the thirteen European members of 
NATO (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey) 
have informally joined together in the so-called 
Eurogroup within the Atlantic Alliance and have 
adopted common programmes, particularly in the 
years since 1970. France, Ireland and Portugal 
were also invited to join in this co-operative 
effort but chose not to participate. Portugal has 
since decided to join the group. The fact that 
the countries composing the Eurogroup have 
consciously avoided placing their co-operation on 
a formal basis proves that it is not an attempt 
to create an autonomous European defence com-
munity. The formation of a European programme 
group to harmonise defence and armaments pro-
posals demonstrates, on the other hand, the need 
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perceived in Europe for greater co-operation in 
matters of mutual defence. It should, however, 
not alter the existing foundations of the alliance. 
The precise forms in which defence co-operation 
could be organised presently constitute, in the 
view of the Rapporteur, an open question. 
9. A number of observers have perceived pos-
sibilities of co-operation in defence and security 
issues within the European Community. Such 
proposals discussed among experts envisage 
among other things the creation of an integrated 
defence sector in the European Community 
similar to the existing European political co-
operation. The Rapporteur regards such pro-
posals with scepticism. He is convinced that, 
while European political co-operation has devel-
oped into an extremely useful and effective 
instrument of the European Community and has 
led to a considerable capacity for action, the 
defence of Europe can be effectively organised 
only within the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for 
this are obvious. First of all, several member 
states of the European Community have openly 
declared their opposition to such military co-
operation ; the attempt to expand the European 
Community into a new defence community none-. 
theless could create considerable dangers for the 
level of European integration already achieved. 
The Rapporteur is also of the opinion that 
Europe's strategic position does not permit such 
a solution. He is convinced that Europe's military 
vulnerability cannot in this manner be reduced. 
One cannot recognise in the proposals any in-
crease in Europe's security as compared to the 
present alliance system. On the contrary, the 
United States could conclude that a common 
responsibility for Europe's military security no 
longer exists to the same degree as previously. 
Such a development would not promote the main-
tenance of a stable balance of power in Europe. 
The European Community has proved so success-
ful in foreign policy precisely because it has not 
appeared as a military power and has made no 
claims to domination, but is rather a factor of 
conciliation and peace. 
10. On the basis of European political co-opera-
tion, Europe has succeeded in making its voice 
heard and its weight felt in many cases : 
- at the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe, the European Com-
munity acted largely as a group, making 
its own contributions and proposals: The 
European Community member states 
presently share a common foundation for 
their positions on all essential questions 
of Ostpolitik and detente ; 
·- the European Community has similarly 
been represented as a community in inter-
national negotiations involving economic 
and energy issues, such as those spon-
sored by UNCTAD and the CIEC. The 
European Community also appears as a 
community in the United Nations, and 
the country providing the current Pre-
sident of the Council is authorised to 
speak for the Nine as a group ; 
- the European Community has conducted 
the dialogue with the United States 
begun in September 1973 on the basis• 
of mutually-agreed positions. A practice 
of close bilateral consultations between 
the Community and the United States 
has now developed from these consulta-
tions; 
- with its declaration on the Middle East 
of 6th November 1973 the Nine adopted 
a joint position regarding the Middle 
East conflict and intro.duced a balanced 
common Middle E·ast policy. They have 
subsequently repeatedly taken a position 
on this problem. 
11. All in all, the European Community is today 
in a position to adopt common policies towards 
almost all significant international issues, includ-
ing those relevant to international security. This 
contribution to Europe's foreign relations should 
not be underestimated, even if the voice of the 
Community cannot speak for the potentially 
much larger Europe beyond the borders of the 
Nine. 
12. This larger Europe has in the Council of 
Europe an institution which now unites practic-
ally all the democratic nations of the continent 
and which, given sufficient consensus, can express 
the position of its members on international 
affairs. The Council of Europe exercises an 
indispensable bridge-building function between 
the members and non-members of the European 
Community. It has promoted and developed joint 
solutions for many problems beyond the borders 
of the European Community which affect all the 
democratic nations of Europe. Its contributions 
to the implementation of . human rights are 
undeniable. It has proved useful •and deserves 
praise in the area of cultural exchange, in the 
promotion of social rights, and in the struggle 
against international terrorism. The fact that 
neutral and non-aligned nations as well as states 
with specific foreign and defence policy ties are 
represented. in the Council of Europe often pre-
vents the formation of a foreign policy consensus, 
even though the Council of Europe's joint 
action, for instance in the United Nations and 
other international bodies, would be highly desir-
able. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Committee of Ministers concern themselves none-
theless with a large number of international 
questions and have made valuable contributions 
inter alia to the CSCE, the East-West relation-
ship, questions of the third world, Africa and the 
Middle East. 
13. Naturally, with such a diversity of members, 
the Council of Europe cannot take major steps 
171 
DOCUMENT 790 
in foreign policy or, a fortiori, defence matters. 
However, due emphasis must be laid on its 
importance as a forum, both at Committee of 
Ministers and at Parliamentary Assembly level, 
for discussions between democratic European 
countries which have so often proved extremely 
fruitful on such matters as respect for human 
rights, East-West relations and the North-South 
dialogue. Your Rapporteur is happy to associate 
himself with the Committee members who asked 
for this remark to be included in the report. 
14. Even this brief examination of the internal 
preconditions of Europe's external relations 
demonstrates that almost all of the European 
international organisations combine a variety of 
partially overlapping ties and commitments 
which do not, however, evidence a homogenous 
structure. Even the most advanced European 
union, the European Community and its highly-
effective European political co-operation, is 
comprised of members united simultaneously in 
a plethora of other significant international 
European organisations. It suffices to point here 
to the simple fact that members of the European 
Community, WEU and NATO belong at the same 
time to the Council of Europe, the OECD, the 
Nordic Council and other similar groupings, thus 
bringing their specific interests to, but also 
accepting additional responsibilitieS from, each 
of these organisations. Finally, the reality of 
national interests distinct from all attempts at 
interna.tional co-operation must not be denied or 
minimised. On this basis, the process of common 
foreign policy formation thus represents a 
tremendously complex task, which becomes more 
difficult to fulfil according to the number of 
states involved. This task places great demands 
on the willingness to compromise of all European 
governments and therefore often places results 
in an uncertain light. 
Ill. Europe's position in the world 
15. Europe exercised a dominant influence in 
world politics for many years in the past. This 
is no longer the case, for two world wars have 
left major traces and destroyed the traditional 
European state system. This insight is clearly 
expressed in the document on Europe's political 
identity published by the nine foreign ministers 
on 14th December 1973. This text reads: 
"Although in the past the European 
countries were individually able to play a 
major role on the international scene, present 
international problems are difficult for any 
of the Nine to solve alone. International 
developments and the growing concentration 
of power and responsibility in the hands 
of a very small number of great powers 
mean that Europe must unite and speak 
increasingly with a single voice if it wants 
• 
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to make itself heard and play its proper 
role in the world., 
The combined potential of the European demo-
cracies is considerable. The potential of the 
countries of the European Community alone 
represents an order of magnitude comparable in 
respect to a series of factors of power to that 
of the two superpowers. Measured by its gross 
national product, its population, its monetary 
reserves and its share of world trade, the Euro-
pean Community is equal and in some respects 
superior to the superpowers. The European Com-
munity takes first place, for example, in world 
trade. Wide-ranging conclusions have been drawn 
from these facts, including the thesis that the 
European Community will "necessarily lead to a 
superstate and that this superstate will sooner 
or later ineluctably result in a superpower." 1 
16. The Rapporteur can hardly imagine, how-
ever, that the European Community will emerge 
as a superpower, at least in the sense in which 
this word is normally used. Decisive internal 
and external preconditions for such a develop-
ment are lacking, for it does not suffice to 
point to economic potential and the illusion of a 
defence union 'as proof of the superpower quality 
of the existing European Community. Equally, 
if not more important is, in the view of the 
Rapporteur, the consideration of Europe's eco-
nomic and military vulnerability, for this vul-
nerability determines how Europe defines its 
foreign policy and forms its relations with the 
rest of the world. Prime Minister Tindemans' 
report on European integration is based on the 
accurate assumption that Europe's strategic posi-
tion, dependence on exports and raw materials 
and lack of a homogenous internal structure 
force it to find its way to a common foreign 
policy: 
"That which struck me in all my conver-
sations was above all the widespread feeling 
of our impotence and vulnerability. This 
is a new experience for our peoples in recent 
history. The unequal distribution of material 
goods threatens the stability of the world 
economic system, the exhaustion of natural 
resources heavily burdens the future of 
industrial society and the internationalisa-
tion of economic activity increases the 
dependence of our productive apparatus. 
Our nations are too weak to accept this 
challenge by themselves. What importance 
do individual voices have today, aside from 
those of the superpowers ?... 
The reasons for ,a joint involvement of 
our nations in the world are, seen objectively, 
1. Johan Galtung, Kapitalistisohe fkossmaoht Europa 
oder Die Gemeinsohaft der Konzerne ? , Reinbeck bei 
Hamburg 1973, page 11. 
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obvious : they arise from the correlation of 
forces and from the dimensions of the prob-
lems we face. At the same time they are, 
viewed subjectively, deeply felt by our 
peoples : our vulnerability and relative 
impotence are all too readily apparent. The 
combination of these two factors renders our 
external relations one of the most important 
motives for European integration and there-
fore the European union has to conduct a 
foreign policy." 
17. The Rapporteur concurs with this view ex-
pressed in the Tindemans report. In his opinion 
the conclusion emerges that Europe's involvement 
in the world must be directed not at attaining the 
attributes of a superpower, but rather Europe 
should prove itself a factor of conciliation, co-
operation and peace. Since Europe's character 
makes it primarily a civil power 1 based essen-
tially on civil rather than military forms of 
power, its greatest foreign policy task is not 
to build a new centre of military might, but to 
contribute to political peace and to a civil world 
order through the example of its domestic order 
which aims at the implementation of social 
justice, democratic liberties and human rights. 
18. The two world wars have largely destroyed 
the basis of Europe's previous military and poli-
tical might ; the two superpowers today confront 
one another on its soil. In Eastern Europe this 
development at the end of the second world 
war led to a relationship of clear subordination 
according to the traditional logic of power pol-
itics. Western Europe, by contrast, has remained 
an important centre of world trade and, in polit-
ical terms, has emerged as more than a mere 
junior partner of the United States. An imperial 
relationship was avoided, in good part because 
of close European-American cultural ties, 
although Western Europe's military security rests 
upon the alliance with America and especially 
upon the latter's nuclear guarantee. Thus, while 
Europe's capacity for military action has been 
decreased, the political, economic, social and cul-
tural possibilities open to it remain considerable. 
This is due no doubt in part to the circumstance 
that in the atomic age the increasing destructive-
ness o-f nuclear weapons has if anything reduced 
the likelihood of their use. The former American 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed 
this paradox as early as 1965 : "Military might 
has never been so strong as today, but neither was 
it ever so useless as at present." 2 
19. Europe derives from this recognition con-
siderable room for manoeuvre in the non-military 
1. Fran<;ois DucMne, Die Roll~ Europas im Welt· 
system : Von der regionalen zur planetarisohen Interde· 
pendenz, in : Zivilmaoht Europa - Bupermaoht oder 
Partner?, Frankfurt 1973, page 33. 
2. Henry Kissinger, The troubled partnership, New 
York 1965, page 18. 
field, even though it does not strive to establish 
a third force between the two superpowers. In 
the view of the Rapporteur, a series of oppor-
tunities present themselves for Europe's role in 
world politics : 
20. (i) Regarding the relationship between the 
two major nuclear powers, Europe possesses suffi-
cient independent political and economic signifi-
cance to exercise a conciliating role. An essen-
tial objective of European foreign pdlicy should 
thus be today to prevent renewed EaBt-West con-
frontation and a possible return to the cold war. 
In the phase of Soviet-American bilateralism, as 
is developed in the early seventies with a series 
of comprehensive agreements between the two 
superpowers including the agreement on the pre-
vention of nuclear war of 22nd Jrme 1973, many 
Europeans feared that the Soviet Union and the 
United States would be in a position to decide 
the fate of Europe over the heads of the Euro-
peans. This impression is, in the Rapporteur's 
opinion, inaccurate, for Europe can have no 
interest in a relationship between the super-
powers marked by hostility and confrontation. 
Such confrontation would largely exclude any 
rapprochement between East and West and fur-
ther cement the division of our continent. 
Europe's policy should instead be to promote 
its interest in stable and continuing co-operation 
between E88t and West through close consulta-
tion with the United States ood corresponding 
contacts with the USSR. 
21. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe, in which the United States and 
Canada as well as the Soviet Union took part, 
provides a successful example of how construc-
tive co-operation between East and West can be 
arranged. This remains true even though undeni-
able difficu.Ities became apparent at the CSCE 
follow-up conference in Belgrade in the spring 
of this year. The Helsinki final act opens up 
opportunities for the European Community as 
well as for individual European states to broaden 
their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. 
The European Community is also presently' con-
ducting talks with COMECON in order to exa-
mine how far the two organisations can agree 
on mutual co-operation. 
22. Co-ordination of European and American 
foreign policy takes place primarily within the 
framework 'of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, 
a permanent dialogue between the European 
Community and the United States has developed 
since 1973 which concerns especially economic 
affairs. 
23. (ii) Japan offers another possibility of close 
co-operation with Europe. Europe shares with 
Japan a number of sim.iilarities with regard to 
its economic and strategic situation. Like Europe, 
Japan is extraordinarily dependent on foreign 
raw materials and export-oriented at the same 
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time. The alliance with the United States is, as 
far as security is concerned, decisive for both 
partners. Both Japan and Europe number among 
the most important industrial centres of the 
world yet do not play any significant military 
role. The renunciation of a role as a military 
power has been elevated to a guiding principle 
of Japanese foreign policy. Japan and Europe 
share an interest in participating in decisions 
affecting the world economy. In some respects, 
such as the maintenance of export opportunities, 
Japan and Europe appear 88 competitors, yet 
this does not diminish their broad convergence of 
interests in the problems of the world economy. 
24. Japan's export surplus with the European 
Community has risen dramatically in recent 
years, amounting to around five thousand million 
United States dollars in 1977. The European 
Community is therefore seeking, along with 
Japan and the United States, to limit the result-
ing dangers to the world economy. All three 
parties have committed themselves to fulfilling 
their common responsibilities in maintaining free 
international trade. Progress has already been 
achieved in economic discussions between the 
Community and Japan. · 
25. Japan is an important partner of Europe 
in all economic issues. The triangular relationship 
between Japan, Europe and the United States 
has been strongly emphasised in the latter coun-
try, particularly through the activities of the 
trilateral commission, one of whose founders is 
President Carter's current National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. This trilateral 
concept can prove quite useful in the opinion of 
the Rapporteur, as far as world economy is con-
cerned, although he would emphasise that it must 
not lead to the formation of a bloc of powerful 
industrialised nations, which could lead to a 
hardening towards the third world and a stale-
mate in the North-South dialogue. 
26. (iii) Europe's readiness to co-operate with 
all parts of the world should certainly not exclude 
China. Only recently, on 8th April of this year, 
the European Community concluded a commer-
. cial treaty with the People's Republic of China. 
It should really be self-evident that such a treaty 
is directed against no one, but serves the exclusive 
purpose of broadening international economic 
co-operation. The Rapporteur believes that secu-
rity considerations that have attached to the 
Chinese-European relationship cannot be a deci-
sive objective in the further development of 
Europe's ties to China. Co-operation between 
China and Europe could certainly take on a 
certain significance for Chinese domestic develop-
ment as far as economic and technological mat-
ters are concerned, and Europe, as an econo-
mically highly-developed region, could certainly 
make a contribution. Europe could also help 
constructively to bring China into discussions of 
major international issues. A security alliance 
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with the People's Republic of China, however, is 
not, in the view of the Rapporteur, an object of 
discussion. 
27. (iv) Europe can and must also play a con-
ciliating role in the North-South dialogue. The 
European Community is already connected with 
fifty-three developing countries of Africa, the 
Pacific and the Caribbean through the Lome 
Convention. Other European nations, such as 
Sweden, are making major contributions to 
development policy. Europe's geographical 
proximity and traditional ties that many Euro-
pean states haye with Africa should lead it 
really to declare its general solidarity with that 
continent's strivings for independence and so 
contribute to guaranteeing the peaceful economic 
and social development of the African continent. 
This does not exclude the careful examination 
and evaluation of the objectives and operating 
methods of the particular forces active in Africa. 
28. As pointed out in Professor Hofer's recent 
report on the African situation to the Council 
of Europe, co-operation between these two con-
tinents must be the co-operation of equal part-
ners. Democratic Europe, whose member states 
have granted independence to their former colo-
nial possessions, can play a major role in streng-. 
thening the independence of the young African 
nations, some of which again face the danger 
of losing their independence through external 
intervention and the presence of foreign troops. 
29. ( v) Similar considerations apply as well to 
the Middle East. That region's conflict potential 
and geographical proximity demand a specifi-
cally European contribution to peace in this 
region. This contribution could not, of course, 
be of a military nature, but could well assume 
economic dimensions. 
30. The European Community has worked, 
especially since 1973, for the restoration of peace 
in the Middle East and has repeatedly issued 
policy declarations concerning this area. Since 
1974 it has conducted the so-called Arab-Euro-
pean dialogue with the Arab states, which is con-
ceived as a long-range endeavour to intensify 
European-Arab co-operation. This dialogue 
should not, however, affect the continuing efforts 
to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. 
The prospects for such a peace have brightened 
considerably since the signing of an outline agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel on 17th Septem-
ber 1978. This agreement calls for the conclusion 
of a peace treaty between the two countries 
within three months. Europe could contribute 
to the achievement of the long-desired peace 
settlement by offering its comprehensive co-
operation with all the nations of the Middle 
East. The preamble of the Camp David agree-
ment states : 
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"Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of every state in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries free from threats or 
acts of force. Progress towards that goal 
can accelerate the movement towards a new 
era of reconciliation in the Middle East 
marked by co-operation in promoting econo-
mic development, in maintaining stability 
and in assuring security." 
IV. External policy interests and objectives 
31. The Rapporteur will attempt in this section 
of his presentation to outline the most significant 
interests and objectives of Europe's foreign 
relations. As previously mentioned, he cannot 
provide in this limited space a comprehensive 
and systematic treatment of this subject ; none-
theless he considers it important to discuss a 
few essential goals and interests underlying 
Europe's relations, even though no complete con-
sensus exists in all aspects of the opinions here 
expressed. 
32. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that 
Europe's most urgent and inspiring objective 
must be the preservation and guarantee of peace. 
Without the maintenance of peace in freedom, 
neither Europe as a whole nor the individual 
European states and societies can thrive. Under 
contemporary conditions, a war in Europe would 
cause unimaginable destruction of political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural values. 
33. From this fundamental consideration arise 
for the Rapporteur five foreign policy goals 
which, in his view, form the essence of Europe's 
external relations. These are : 
- the preservation of European security ; 
- the continuation and strengthening of 
detente; 
- the protection of raw material supplies 
and the achievement of economic secu-
rity; 
- the continuation of the North-South dia-
logue with the objective of a more equit-
able world economic order ; and 
- the preservation of stability in Southern 
Europe. 
These goals and interests of Europe cannot, of 
course, be so sharply distinguished from one 
another as might appear at first glance. The 
Rapporteur will attempt to clarify the various 
interconnections between these five major objec-
tives and interests insofar as this is feasible 
within the confines of this presentation. 
(i) The preservation of European security 
34. This objective presents, in the Rapporteur's 
analysis, four essential aspects : 
- military security ; 
- economic security ; 
- social security ; and 
- internal security. 
(a) Military security 
35. Most of the European nations considered 
in this report regard their security as best guaran-
teed through their membership of the Atlantic 
Alliance. These nations believe that in the age 
of nuclear weapons, national efforts alone cannot 
suffice to assure their security in the face of 
the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
As mentioned previously, there are various 
degrees of membership of the Alliance and a 
number of European states have chosen not to 
enter the Alliance at all. This is explained in 
some cases by a long tradition of neutrality 
(Sweden, Switzerland), in others by a freely-
chosen neutral status (Austria), and in still 
others by concerns for national independence and 
because some states perceive less strongly an 
immediate threat through the Soviet Union. For 
Europe as a whole, however, a neutral stance 
would not be tenable : even armed neutrality 
would pose excessive dangers for the security 
of the European states. 
36. In the judgment of the Rapporteur, the 
existence of a political and military balance 
between East and West in Europe forms the pre-
condition for the preservation of peace in this 
region ; such a balance is possible only on the 
basis of an American commitment to and presence 
in Europe. As Chancellor Schmidt pointed out 
in his speech before the United Nations in May 
of this year, the military balance : 
"must not necessarily be expressed in a 
total arithmetic identity in all types of 
weapons and forces. An overall strategic 
parity, however, must exist. It must also be 
psychoLogically understood and accepted as 
such by the European peoples." 
37. According to the most recent assessment of 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in London, we can proceed from the assumption 
of a military balance of power in Europe which 
largely excludes the possibility of a military 
1!-ttack 1• This balance of power arises from an 
assessment of the total military situation. The 
Warsaw Pact enjoys superiority or is catching 
up in certain fields, but the overall correlation 
of forces is at present so constituted as to render 
the possibility of an attack unattractive to it, 
according to The Military Balance 1978-79. The 
1. The Military Balance 1978-79, page 113. 
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concept of the balance of power must, however, 
be understood dynamically. This means among 
other things that the military balance can be 
altered by new armament efforts and develop-
ments in weapons technology. In the light of 
this dyn·amic nature of armament developments, 
the organs of WEU must continue to play their 
part in upholding a military balance of power 
in Europe. 
38. In the view of the Rapporteur, however, it 
is essential clearly to recognise that the military 
balance alone cannot suffice to preserve peace 
and security in Europe. Peace resting exclusively 
on a balance of forces and armaments would by 
its very nature remain precarious. The political 
willingness to negotiate and compromise is neces-
sary as well. To quote Chancellor Schmidt once 
again : "He who is unwilling to compromise 
can accomplish nothing for peace." For Europe, 
this means that military security cannot, in the 
final analysis, be achieved without a political 
readiness for negotiation and detente with the 
leading communist power, the USSR, as well 
as with the other Eastern European states. The 
Rappo:rteur will comment further on this sub-
ject later in this paper. 
(b) Economic security 
39. Since the oil crisis of 1973 we have all 
become increasingly aware that an assured supply 
of raw materialB and the ability to carry on 
uninterrupted economic activity are as essential 
to our security as military protection. The oil 
shock made clear that the withholding of vital 
supplies can strike at a society almost as hard 
as diroot military pressure. 
40. Many Europeans have perceived the oil 
crisis as a real threat, and some have introduced 
various proposals, including military scenarios, 
·to deal with such a situation. The Rapporteur 
would maintain that Europe's vulnerability in 
this respect cannot be overcome, i.e. that we 
Europeans cannot take refuge in a new faith 
in autarchy. Rather, we must learn to live with 
this vulnerability and demonstrate our willing-
ness to co-operate in an interdependent world 
economy. 
41. As a rule, dependence is seldom one-sided. 
If this were the case, only capitulation before 
the demands of the other side would be imagin-
able. In this connection it appears essential to 
the Rapporteur to emphasise the political wil-
lingness to compromise in all efforts to reduce 
Europe's vulnerability and its dependence, as 
is presently being attempted, in the field of 
energy. Without such a willingness, a dependent 
region such as Europe would reel from one crisis 
to another, seriously endangering our economic 
and military security in the process. The Rappor-
teur will return to this subject at another point 
in his presentation. 
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(c) Social security 
42. This aspect of security concerns first of 
all the preservation of social peace. Poverty and 
unemployment can threaten a society from 
within. Social objectives such as full employment, 
price stability and balance of external accounts 
should therefore not be underestimated in respect 
to external security as well. 
43. Europe has achieved a relatively high 
degree of social security and domestic peace in 
recent years. In comparison to most of the coun-
tries outside Europe, many of the European 
nations may be regarded as socially progressive 
and relatively stable economically. Significant 
disparities, however, still exist on our continent. 
A major long-range objective of European co-
operation must be to eliminate or at least to 
reduce these disparities. 
(d) Internal security 
44. In the recent past we have all become increas-
ingly aware that terrorism can threaten our 
societies from within. At the same time terrorism 
has proved to be an international phenomenon 
which must be fought at an international level. 
The Council of Europe has made a useful con-
tribution to this effort, and the seven leading 
industrial powers which gathered in an inter-
national economic summit conference last July 
in Bonn found it necessary to issue a joint state-
ment on the struggle against terrorism. 
45. The conflict with terrorism has shown that 
this phenomenon is quite capable of endangering 
the bases of western pluralist democracy. A 
common interest thus exists in acting jointly 
and decisively against terrorism. 
46. These new dimensions of security extend 
far beyond the competence of those European 
institutions concerned primarily with external 
security, namely NATO and WEU. They are 
of importance beyond the borders of the Euro-
pean Community as well, and can be properly 
understood and effectively guaranteed only in 
a wider context and in a new consciousness of 
global interdependence. The Rapporteur would 
maintain that the existing organisations and 
institutions in Europe and beyond are by all 
means adequate to address these new problems 
of European security. 
47. These different institutions and organisa-
tions must, however, carefully harmonise and 
co-ordinate their respective activities in order 
to guarantee maximum success. WEU must pro-
vide its contribution, but it must also recognise 
th111t in many cases, more comprehensive institu-
tions such as the European Community, NATO, 
the 0 ECD or the Council of Europe can act 
more effectively in regard to the appropriate 
measures. It would be advisable to adopt a 
flexible attitude in dealing with these tasks in 
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order to live up to the complexity of the security 
problems. As the Rapporteur hopes to have 
made clear, these problems involve not only 
external military security, but also numerous 
issues traditionally considered as domestic con-
cerns. 
(ii) The continuation and expansion of detente 
48. Detente, along with military defence, con-
stitutes the second pillar of European security 
policy, as the Harmel report has already recog-
nised in principle. Recognition of detente's 
importance to international security opened, in 
the late sixties and early seventies, a mther large 
area of East-West negotiation through a number 
of agreements between the Soviet Union and the 
United States on the one hand, and the USSR 
and the European nations, particularly the 
Federal Republic of Germany, on the other. The 
most important of these agreements include : 
- the quadripartite agreement on Berlin ; 
- the SALT agreements ; 
- the eastern treaties of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany ; 
- the final act of the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe ; as well as 
- a series of bil111teral agreements between 
E·astern and Western European states. 
49. These agreements have created a new frame-
work for decreasing the conflict potential of 
Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that certain 
aspects of detente are understood differently in 
East and West. Detente cannot eliminate the 
fundamental political and ideological contrasts 
between East and West: these continue to exist. 
Understood as the process of gradual de-escala-
tion of conflicts and agreement in areas where 
this is possible without abandoning vital inter-
ests, however, detente is a necessary element of 
western security policy to which there is no 
acceptable alternative. This concept of detente 
should really be undisputed, presuming as it does 
a balance of military power between East and 
West as its prerequisite. Its objective is the more 
effective assurance of peace through co-operation 
and the protection of security at a lower level 
of armaments. 
50. Above all, the Helsinki final act constitutes 
in the opinion of the Rapporteur an extraordin-
arily useful instrument of co-operation between 
East and West whose provisions open up a wide 
range of practical collaboration among the Euro-
pean states. The CSCE follow-up conference in 
Belgrlllde two years after the signing of the final 
act allowed an assessment of the implementation 
of that document's provisions and of further 
measures of detente in Europe. A second follow-
up conference is scheduled for 1980 in Madrid. 
51. The- Rapporteur is of thl:l opinion that the 
WEU .Assembly should contribute to the pre-
parations for this conference and co~cern itself 
with the pertinent topics by preparing a timely 
report. In his view, however, one should avoid 
overburdening the process of co-operation in the 
framework of the CSCE with new demands. The 
experience of Belgrade demonstrated that con-
tinuing differences in fundamental questions 
such as human rights do not have to preclude 
collaboration in vital areas such as the economic 
and humanitarian fields; these latter areas 
should receive closer attention in Madrid than 
was possible at Belgrade. 
52. The Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference 
took place in a period of uncertainty over the 
further progress of detente which arose as a 
result of uncertainties in the Soviet-American 
relationship. The complex reasons for this uncer-
tainty cannot be discussed here in detail. They 
are very complex, but may perhaps be indicated 
by the following factors : 
- intensification of the Soviet Union's 
military build-up combined with an in-
creasing interventionary pressure in 
Africa; 
- new complications in the continuing arms 
control negotiations created by develop-
ments in military technology on both 
sides; and 
- a hardening of Soviet domestic policy 
in response to the protests and demands 
of Soviet civil rights movements. 
53. The Rapporteur believes that this phase of 
uncertainty may now possibly have been sur-
passed and that more· promising prospects for 
the development of East-West co-operation have 
again arisen. He draws this conclusion from 
recent encouraging developments in the SALT 
talks and, despite continuing difficulties, in the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna. As is now 
reported, a personal meeting between President 
Carter and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev 
may well be in the offing. 
54. The SALT 11 negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union should be 
completed shortly. The success of these negotia-
tions lies in the interests of Europe as well. The 
progress achieved in the Vienna MBFR negotia-
tions has been above all the Warsaw Pact's accept-
ance in its reply of 8th June 1978 of the prin-
ciple of conventional parity for the reduction 
area. This principle was previously acknowledged 
in the common declaration signed by Federal 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and General Secre-
tary Leonid Brezhnev on 6th May 1978. This 
text states : 
"Both sides deem it important thart no one 
should seek military superiority. They pro-
ceed on the assumption that approximate 
equality and parity suffice to safeguard 
defence. They believe that adequate measures 
of disarmament and arms limitation in the 
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nuclear and the conventional fields, which 
meet that principle, would be of major 
significance." 
55. An important question, however, remains to 
be clarified, namely the discrepancy between 
NATO and Warsaw Pact figures concerning 
eastern military personnel in the reduction area. 
The Rapporteur is of the opinion that clarity in 
the question of data must be achieved to prevent 
the negotiations in Vienna from reaching an 
impasse. The Rapporteur would further con-
sider balanced arms control agreements an 
extremely important component of detente. 
56. The central objective of the MBFR nego-
tiations remains a balanced level of forces at 
lower levels attained through reductions by East 
and West. The SALT talks aim at fixing a 
balance in strategic nuclear weapons by a treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
This, however, could increase the significance of 
existing disparities between East and West in 
the conventional and tactical nuclear field. In 
addition, certain nuclear weapons which have 
been excluded from both SALT and the MBFR 
discussions cannot be excluded from considera-
tion in a system of military balance. These 
nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet SS-20 rockets 
targeted at Western Europe, must also be 
included in negotiations. 
57. Europe must also, in the judgment of the 
Rapporteur, accord decisive importance to econo-
mic co-operation between East and West. This 
co-operation is an element of detente which has 
been forced into the background somewhat 
because of the world economic recession. Europe 
must seek new initiatives in this area. 
(iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the 
assurance of economic security 
58. Experts do not presently reckon with a 
critical shortage of raw materials in the near 
future. The problems of inflation, recession, 
balance of payments imbalances and protectionist 
tendencies must apparently be taken much more. 
seriously. Europe faces a serious problem with 
respect to its raw material supplies, nonetheless 
- unlike the other industrialised countries with 
the exception of Japan, which finds itself in a 
similar position, it is between 70 and 100 % 
dependent on imports from third countries. The 
United States, by contrast, imports only about 
15 % of its raw material requirements. 
59. It is understandable that this heavy depend-
ence presents difficult problems for all of 
Europe's national economies. The foreign policy 
vulnerability resulting from this dependence 
would become immediately apparent in the event 
of another major crisis such as the 1973 oil 
embargo and subsequent quadrupling or quin-
tupling of oil prices, since raw materials are 
indispensable for industrial production. It is 
quite conceivable that the success of the oil 
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cartel could exercise a kind of domino effect for 
other raw materials. In certain cases this has 
already taken place. 
60. We must recognise, on the other hand, that 
the export of raw materials is a major source of 
monetary reserves for many third world coun-
tries and therefore assumes a key· function in 
their growth and employment policies. This fact 
alone points up the connection between raw 
material policy and development policy, the 
North-South dialogue and the effort to create a 
more equitable international economic order, 
which will be further discussed later in this 
report. 
61. The Rapporteur would especially emphasise 
here that Europe's dependence on foreign raw 
materials cannot, in principle, be eliminated. 
Partially, substitution possibilities may exist, 
perhaps combined with limits on consumption in 
the consuming countries, but one cannot com-
pletely put an end to the fundamental problem 
of raw material dependence. Europe has largely 
exhausted its own raw material reserves. 
62. In this situation, economic security can be 
secured only by political means and this means 
that a solution to Europe's problems can be 
found only in conjunction with the raw material 
producers. Thus co-operation rather than con-
frontation must be the guideline for Europe's 
foreign policy. This requires due consideration 
for the needs and opportunities of the developing 
countries in the context of a raw material policy 
for Europe. 
(iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue 
with the goal of a more equitable international 
economic order 
63. Closely connected with this last-mentioned 
objective is thus the continuation of the North-
South dialogue and the construction of a more 
equitable international economic order. The 
demands of the developing countries in this 
respect have been well-known since the United 
Nations declaration on the establishment of a 
new international economic order of 1st May 
1974. They include inter alia : 
- every nations's free choice of its economic 
and social system ; 
- complete and permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources and all economic activ-
ity; 
- adoption of an integrated programme to 
stabilise raw material prices through 
arrangements patterned after the Lome 
Convention and providing for buffer 
stocks under a common fund to stabilise 
the developing countries' income from 
raw material exports; 
- promotion of producers' cartels in 
developing countries; 
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- industrialisation of the developing coun-
tries with the objective of assuring them 
at least one-fifth of the world's industrial 
production by the year 2000 ; 
- instruments and mechanisms for the 
transfer of technology under equitable 
conditions ; 
- granting of preferences to developing 
countries and non-reciprocal treatment in 
all areas of international economic co-
operation; 
- development assistance without conditions 
amounting to at least 0. 7 % of the indus-
trialised nations' GNPs ; 
- a link between development assistance 
and the creation of new special drawing 
rights in the IMF ; 
- a solution to the third world countries' 
problem of indebtedness ; and 
- a greater voice for the developing coun-
tries in the IMF and other international 
organisations. 
64. The Rapporteur is of the opm10n that 
Europe must not close itself to the legitimate 
demands of the developing countries, even though 
protection of their own vital interests is of course 
a legitimate right of the European countries as 
well. Europe should not acquire the reputation 
of a club of rich societies unwilling to meet the 
third world countries half-way. Rather, it should 
seek to find suitable compromises in appropriate 
international conferences and in the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
65. The Rapporteur would point in this con-
nection to the work of the international North-
South commission under the chairmanship of 
Willy Brandt. He expects from this commission's 
report important initiatives for the policy of the 
European states. He believes further that the 
long-range interests of the industrial and the 
developing nations are not contradictory but 
complementary and reveal common perspectives 
as well. 
66. With a certain apprehension we must also 
observe that the international weapons trade, 
particularly the export of weapons to third world 
countries, is increasing considerably. A growing 
demand for armaments on the part of countries 
in the third world, along with growing export 
pressures within the industrialised naJtions, could 
create a dangerous momentum. Global expendi-
tures on armaments in 1977 are estimated at 
about $400 thousand million. The total value of 
weapon transfers to the third world has increased 
sharply. For so-called heavy weapons alone it 
amounted to around $7.3 thousand million in 
1976, as compared to $2 thousand million in 
1966 (expressed in constant prices). 
67. Regrettable in this connection is the Soviet 
Union's apparent propensity to limit its rela-
tionship to the third world largely to the delivery 
of weapons. In the view of the Rapporteur, 
serious steps should be taken better to control 
arms exports in the future. The export of 
weapons is not an appropriate form of foreign 
aid. The European nation,s should contribute to 
developing effective international instruments of 
control and assist in transforming military into 
peaceful technology. 
(v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe 
68. If Europe is to develop successful and 
stable foreign relations, it must also find convinc-
ing solutions for the problems which exist in its 
midst. The experience of the continuing crisis 
in Cyprus demonstrates that Europe can opti-
mally exercise its function of assuring peace 
abroad only when it is able to overcome its own 
internal conflicts. Whether Europe possesses 
this ability will be borne out in no small measure 
by whether it will prove capable of providing 
an effective contribution to the stabilisation of 
Southern Europe. This task is directly related 
to its commitment of solidarity with less-
developed Southern Europe. 
69. It is now certain that Greece, Spain and 
Portugal are firmly committed to applying for 
membership of the European Community. This is 
a welcome step in the interest of stabilising demo-
cracy in these countries. 
70. Moreover, the entrance of Spain and Por-
tugal into the European Community means at 
the same time that both nations can assume a 
bridge-building function with respect to Latin 
America. Both nations have historically main-
tained close ties to Latin America which rest 
upon a common cultural tradition. Further, fol-
lowing the end of its colonial domination in 
Africa, Portugal can now play a very useful 
role in European-African relations as well. 
71. The Rapporteur is particularly pleased that 
the governments of the Economic Community 
member states have agreed in princip,le to these 
countries' admission. He would, however, point 
out in this connection that the accession of these 
nations will not only make evident social and 
economic problems within the countries willing 
to accede which - for a solution - will require 
specific measures of assistance on the part of 
the European Community. Perhaps an even 
greater concern is the economic gap that could 
arise between the developed north of Europe and 
the entire southern region of the continent. The 
entry. of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the 
European Community will create economic diffi-
culties especially for Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and 
the other Mediterranean states which will like-
wise require Europe's attention. 
72. A further question arises with respect to 
Yugoslavia. The Rapporteur believes that the 
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problems of those countries in Southern. Europe 
which, at least for the foreseeable future, are not 
able to join the European Comm1mity also 
urgently require solutions .in order to prevent 
their estrangement from the rest of Europe, 
especially the European Community. He would 
therefore raise the question of whether Europe 
should commit itself to a special programme of 
economic solidarity for this region. The Rappor-
teur believes that such a solidarity programme 
would lie in the interest of the donor as well as 
of the recipient countries. Europe could thereby 
provide an important example of its capacity for 
effective foreign policy action and its determina-
tion to provide practical assistance. 
V. Summary 
73. It is certainly not yet possible at this point 
in time t~ speak of a unified, co-ordinated Euro-
pean foreign policy. Above all, a number of 
internal prerequisites for such a development are 
lacking. Nonetheless, in the Rapporteur's view a 
web of external relations has grown up among 
the democratic states of Europe which reveals 
a unified pattern and which, despite all varia-
tions in national interests, shows a series of com-
mon features. Outstanding among these is the 
high degree of Europe's dependence and vulner-
ability owing to its economic and military 
position. Europe can guarantee its security only 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Hence arises the common interest of preserving 
Europe as a force for peace, conciliation and 
detente and of developing a foreign policy charac-
terised by a willingness to co-operate with all 
parts of the world. Europe can best develop its 
influence in the world not as a military but as a 
civil power. 
7 4. Europe's most vital interests include : 
- the maintenance of its security ; 
- the continuation and expansion of 
detente; 
- the assurance of raw material supplies 
and the maintenance of economic secu-
rity; 
- the continuation of the North-South dia-
logue with the goal of a more equitable 
international economic order ; and 
- the assurance of stability in Southern 
Europe. 
75. Without desiring to overestimate Europe's 
position in. the world, one may observe that these 
objectives present a common challenge which 
demands of the democratic states of Europe con-
siderable energy in maintaining their common 
security. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Europe's external relations 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
20th Nove:oiber 1978 
I. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert: 
"Considering that military security in Europe is based on a stable balance of forces between 
the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact;". 
2. Leave out the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation and 
insert: 
"Concerned that the uninterrupted and uncontrolled arms race· between the West and the East 
may upset the balance of forces and give rise to new dangers;". 
Signed: Antoni, Bernini, Oalamandrei, OoraUo 
I. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendments negatived). 
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Amendment 3 
Europe's extemal relations 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, at end add: 
20th November 1978 
", recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation 
of both supplier and recipient countries ;". 
Signed : Roper 
1. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
Europe's external relations 
AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
20th November 1978 
4. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "and 
that this objective" to the end of the paragraph. 
5. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "military 
security" and insert "the security of Europe". 
6. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "uncontrolled". 
7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "reduction and control" and 
insert "universal and controlled reduction". 
8. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. 
9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "integration" and insert "uni-
fication". 
Signed : V alleix 
I. See 8th Sitting, 20th November 1978 (Amendment 4 withdrawn; Amendments 5 and 6 agreed to; Amend-
ment 7 amended and agreed to ; Amendments 8 and 9 negatived). 
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Relations between the WEU Assembly 
and the parliaments of member countries 
INFORMATION REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 2 
by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. SchUngemann, Rapporteur) 
I. Activities of the Committee 
1. The present report on the activities of the 
Committee covers the period May to October 
1978. In this brief space of time, the following 
publications were issued : 
2. ( i) Collected Texts 28 relating to action 
taken in national parliaments in implementation 
of recommendations adopted by the Assembly ; 
the next edition will be pub1dshed just before 
the November 1978 session. These editions have 
been published every six months since May 1963. 
Before then, the texts of interventions were 
included in the body of the Committee's report. 
3. (ii) The booklet "Texts adopted and brief 
account of the session" relating to the First Part 
of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session, pub-
lished in five languages. This booklet is sent to 
all members of parliament of member countries 
to keep some 3,000 persons informed of the work 
of the Assembly in their own languages and has 
been distributed after each part-session since 
June 1965. 
4. (iii) The monthly information bulletin on 
European parliamentary activity in the seven 
member states of WEU. By the next session, 
some 172 issues of this bulletin wil:l have been 
published since it star1led in July 1964. There 
is an index of the bulletin for the period 1964-70 
which has been up-dated six times to cover the 
first ten years. A second index for the period 
July 1974 to June 1979 willl>e issued during the 
second half of next year. 
5. At the close of the last session (19th-22nd 
June 1978), the Committee discussed the texts 
which had just been adopted, as it does every 
six months. In accordance with Rule 42bis of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, it 
selected the following recommendations which it 
felt should be discussed in the parliaments of 
member countries : 
- 313 on security in the Mediterranean ; 
- 314 on international terrorism; and 
- 318 on European security and African 
problems. 
6. These three recommendations were officially 
transmitted by Mr. K.-U. von Hassel, President 
of the Assembly, to the Presidents of the parlia-
ments of member countries who in turn refer 
them to the appropriate committees. In the 
Federa:l Republic of Germany, the three texts 
were reproduced in full in the German Delega-
tion's report to the Bundestag (Document 8/1991 
of 12th July 1978). 
184 
7. For several years, the German Delegation 
haB submitted a report twice a year after each 
part-session, including the full text of speeches 
by members of the delegation, and the Itali81D 
Delegation once a year appended to the report 
by the Committee for European Affairs. In 
France, the Senate and the National Assembly 
both include in their weekly information bul-
letins on work in their respective chambers a 
brief report on each part-session of the WEU 
Assembly. Since these bulletins are sent free of 
charge to anyone requesting them, this procedU're 
helps to make the WEU Assembly known to 
people in France who are interested in politics. 
Your Rapporteur suggests that the four other 
member countries do likewise : a report might 
be included in the Ohambre des Deputes, a 
Luxembourg review distributed free of charge 
throughout the Grand Duchy, and in the Weekly 
Information Bulletin of the House of Lords and 
its equivalent in the House of Commons which, 
since JuLy 1978, have been keeping the public 
informed of the work of the British parliament 
(for an annual subscription of £24). The Belgian 
and Netherlands Delegations could certainly 
find similar solutio~. 
8. Following the selection of texts for transmis-
sion to the parliaments of WEU member states, 
the Chairman of the Committee for Relations · 
with Parliaments, Mr. Jeambrun, wrote to all 
Committee members on 28th June 1978 sending 
model questions to be put on the three recom-
mendations and a fourth question asking whether, 
further to the statement by Mr. Davignon to 
the European Parliament on 13th June 1978, 
the European Community was empowered to 
consider armaments questions. By 1st November 
questions had been put and answers received in 
six countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, 
Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom). 
9. Apart from these questions and answers, the 
Committee secretariat has been informed of 
other interventions since Collected Texts 28 W88 
issued. They will all be included in Co1lected 
Texts 29 except the following : 
- account of the work of the First Part 
of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(19th-22nd June 1978), in the Senate 
brief information bulletin 159 of 5th 
July 1978, page 18 ; 
- international activities and parliamentary 
relations : WEU Assembly, in the Na-
tional Assembly bulletin 10 of 27th June 
1978, pages 73-75 ; 
- government report on the activities of 
WEU from 1st October 1977 to 31st 
March 1978, Bundestag document 
8/1688; 
- report by the German Delegation on the 
session of the WEU Assembly from 19th 
to 22nd June 1978, Bundestag document 
8/1991. 
10. A total of fifty-one interventions was 
recorded on 1st November compared with thirty-
eight for the first half of li78 and fifteen for 
the second half of 1977. Although the low level 
reached in the period 1972-74 seems past history, 
the total number of interventions is still below 
normal. Your Rapporteur urges members to use 
the work of the WEU ABsembly in their own 
parliaments and not forget to keep the Com-
mittee Secretariat informed since it cannot 
record what is not reported. 
D. Replies by governments to questions 
relating to Recommendation 314 and on the 
defence responsibilities of the European 
Community 
A. Fight against terrorism 
11. Questions relating to Recommendation 314 
were put as follows : 
"Is the government prepared, together with 
the Western European countries which are 
members of the same alliances, to endeavour 
to co-ordinate the use of their respective 
internal defence and police forces to meet 
the challenge to democracy stemming from 
terrorist operations in many countries and 
to take concerted action so that states are 
effectively deterred from granting any form 
of assistance to terrorist movements Y" 
12. Questions on the two issues of co-ordinating 
the use of internal defence and police forces 
and the fight against terrorist operations were 
put in: 
- Luxembourg (30th June 1978) ; 
- Belgiu.m (20th July 1978) ; 
- Italy (28th July 1978) ; 
- Netherlands (28th August 1978) ; 
- France (15th September 1978). 
13. The secretariat has recorded replies from 
the Belgian Government (8th August 1978), the 
Netherlands Government (28th August 1978), 
the Luxembourg Government (2nd October 1978) 
and the French Government (lOth October 
1978). 
14. These replies report that there is co-
operation (close, according to the Luxembourg 
Minister) in the exchange of information on 
terrorist acts, police action and the protection of 
185 
DOCUMENT 791 
civil aircraft and nuclear installations. However, 
the French Minister specified that co-operation 
must not be interpreted as meaning forces from 
various countries being placed on a war footing 
and under a single command. 
15. The meetings of Ministers of the Interior in 
June 1976, May 1977 and autumn 1978 and 
France's suggestions for the creation of a Euro-
pean juridical area, the European convention on 
the suppression of terrorism and, finally, a new 
convention governing relations between two 
member states, one of which has not acceded to 
the abovementioned convention, are all elements 
in the consolidation of this co-operation. 
16. On the second point, Mr. Thorn, Luxem-
bourg Minister, described the position of mem-
ber states: 
"With regard to concerted action to deter 
effectively any state from gra.nting any 
assistance whatsoever to terrorist operations, 
note should be taken of the declaration 
adopted at the summit meeting of the seven 
principal western powers held in Bonn last 
July. The states represented undertook to 
break off air links to and from any country 
refusing to extradite or put on trial those 
responsible for hijacking aircraft or refusing 
to return the aircraft in question." 
17. Mr. Bonnet, French Minister of the Interior, 
while thinking that the wording used by the 
WEU .Assembly, i.e. "to deter effectively any 
state from granting any assistance whatsoever", 
went too far, said that F:rance had never spared 
its efforts to reach agreements on this subject 
and wou'ld continue to do so. 
B. Statement in the European Parliament by 
Mr. Davignon, member of the Commission of the 
European Community 
18. Mr. Davignon spoke during the debate on 
a report submitted by Mr. Klepsch, a member 
of the European Parliament and also an alter-
nate member of the WEU Assembly since 1970 
and Rapporteur of the latter's Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments in May and 
November 1974. The report submitted in Stras-
bourg on 13th June 1978 is entitled "European 
armaments procurement co-operation". Accord-
ing to the Rapporteur, such co-operation is due, 
inter alia, to "the military requirements of inter-
operability and or standardisation ; the need to 
maintain a European armaments industry" 1 • 
Here the European Community "can play an 
important part and make a vital contribution of 
a kind which is not possible for other organisa-
tions like NATO or WEU" 1 • 
1. Report of Proceedings, page 43. 
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19. Mr. Davignon said : 
"I would therefore like there to be no 
misunderstanding. The Commission is in a 
position to formulate its views on the docu-
ment as it stands and is interested in 
making proposals on the industrial sector 
as related to the progi"amme of government 
purchases. It is perfectly clear that the 
Commission should retain, in this as in other 
matters, all its powers of judgement." 1 
20. Mr. Soury, a member of the European 
Parliament, said the aim of the debate was to 
"promote a European defence policy" 2 • 
21. Finally, Mr. Davignon said he "would like 
to preface [his] remarks by giving [his] view 
on the legality of the debate" : 
"The first thing to be said is that a number 
of peop:be consider that any question involv-
ing defence or security is outside the Com-
munity's competence. This is not our view, 
nor, moreover, was it that of the authors 
of the treaty, because it provides for certain 
customs duties on the importation of mili-
tary material into the Community. This is 
ample proof that the Community is not ipso 
facto excluded from dealing with military 
matters." 3 
22. The position thus adopted provoked a num-
ber of reactions, and questions were put in 
several par'liaments. For the time being, your 
Rapporteur can inform you of the opinions of 
only the Belgian and French Governments. 
23. On 8th August, Mr. Simonet, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in answer 
to a question put by Mr. Tanghe : 
" 
From these statements it can be seen that 
the Commisison has no intention of dealing 
with defence questions or matters relating 
to the choice of armaments but of concen-
trating on industrial data. 
The government considers that the reorgani-
sation of various industrial sectors in the 
Community, including those which occa-
sionally or regularly produce armaments, is 
an important task and that it is desirable 
for the various Community institutions to 
devote attention to it." 
24. Conversely, Mr. de Guiringaud, the French 
Minister, expressed a quite different opinion. 
Already, on 8th June 1978, during the foreign 
1. Report of Proceedings, page 46. 
2. Report of Proceedings, page 55. 
3. Report of Proceedings, page 71. 
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policy debate in the National Assembly and a 
few days before the debate in the European 
Parliament, he said: 
"The powers of the assembly are laid down 
by treaty. They may be neither modified 
nor extended without a revision of the 
treaties. This revision would first require 
the unanimity of the nine governments and 
in France the constitutionality of the text 
would have to be scrutinised and its adop-
tion, if necessary, made subject to a revision 
of the constitution. 
These are major juridical guarantees, 
clearly set out moreover in the decision of 
the Constitutional Council of 30th Decem-
ber 1977. 
Admittedly - as I said myself during the 
debate on ratification - no one can prevent 
members of the assembly discussing subjects 
not covered by the treaties and referring 
for instance to a specifie topical political 
matter. These exchanges of views between 
representatives of the nine countries on 
problems in the world and in particular in 
Europe can help to shape opinions. If this 
is so, France can but welcome the fact. 
It remains, and I again stress the fact, that 
when the assembly feels it should discuss 
questions which are outside its responsibility, 
such as the armaments problems mentioned 
by Mr. Valleix, it does so in conditions 
which could in no way commit governments 
for which any such positions are, as 
Mr. Couve de Murville recalled in quoting 
Article 2 of the law of approval, "null and 
void". 
Do I need to recall that the member states 
are sovereign states pursuing a fully-
independent external policy which respects 
national sovereignty ?" 
25. Subsequently, answering two questions put 
by Mr. Krieg (21st June) and Mr. Debre 
(23rd June), he said: 
"The resolution adopted by the European 
parliamentary assembly on the basis of a 
report tabled on behalf of the Political 
Committee on European armaments pro-
curement co-operation referred to by the 
honourable member is outside the terms of 
reference of the assembly of the European 
Community and outside the field of appli-
cation of the treaties. In this connection the 
government reserves the right to make the 
necessary remarks about the assembly's 
attitude at the appropriate time. Where the 
text of the resolution is concerned, the 
government specifies that it is of course null 
and void. 
As for the European parliamentary aasem.-
bly, the government has noted that the 
adoption of a motion on the armaments 
industry was outside the terms of reference 
oocorded to that institution by the treaties ; 
it reserves the right to malre the necessary 
remarks on this subject at the appropriate 
time ... " 
He further said that Mr. Davignon's interpreta-
tion of the Rome Treaty "might be criticised". 
26. However, the report adopted by the Euro-
pean Parliament was studied by the armaments 
directors of member countries of the indepen--
dent European programme group, which is 
believed to have described its contents as an 
"interesting proposal" 1• 
27. The British Government regards arma-
ments procurement as an essential part of 
1. See Atlantic News 1062, 11th October 1978, page 2. 
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defence policy and considers that the indepen-
dent European programme group is the main 
European forum for discussion of co-operation 
in defence equipment matters. 
28. The WEU Council for its part, expressing 
the views of the seven member governments, 
made the following reply on 14th August 1978 
to written question 184 put by Mr. Forni: 
"The Council consider the WEU Assembly 
to be the on]Jy assep1bly responsible for 
defence questions. The Council are however 
of the opinion that it is not within their 
province to make a statement on the com-
petence or non-competence of institutions or 
organs of institutions outside WEU itself, 
especially as their composition differs from 
that of WEU." 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each aeaion) 
Member countries 
C) 
:::1 
Recommendations '§I>. ~ .§ adopted in l Gl i! 0 ~ C) 3 ] ! e~ Gl "ii 1-j ~ r.Q i'S 
~ 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 19 3 11 
1976 16 40 13 14 2 3 
1977 4 18 4 13 1 1 
1978 12 18 2 6 2 6 
Total 93 227 195 270 21 94 
Annual average 9.83 8.48 3.96 11.74 0.91 4.09 
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t 
~ Total 
i p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 55 
8 54 
219 1,119 
9.52 6.91 
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APPENDIX 11 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, repUes, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1976 
~ s :8 a ~i ~ ]~ .g~» ~ 1 ~ ~ 1 G) ll 1:>0 I J ~ 0 ~ 'iO 'I ]I ~ ~ .s -et! ~ 0 G) ] ~ ~ E-t ~~ Ill lXI 0 G) .... il "00 
p:j ~ p 
Res. 59 2 4 2 8 
284 
-
285 X 2 5 2 2 11 
June 286 
-
1976 287 2 2 1 1 2 8 49 
288 X -
289 X 4 5 2 3 14 
290 X 4 2 2 8 
------
291 -
292 
-
Nov. 293 X 2 2 2 6 
1976 294 
-
295 X 2 1 2 5 47 
296 2 2 4 
Res. 60 
-
Other action 5 15 5 1 6 32 
--
297 
-
298 X 1 1 
299 X 2 2 4 
300 1 2 3 
June 301 1 2 3 
1977 302 2 1 2 5 22 
303 -
304 1 2 3 
305 1 2 3 
306 -
307 X 1 1 
308 X 1 1 2 
Nov. 309 X 1 1 2 
1977 310 X 1 1 33 
311 X 1 1 2 
Other action 4 15 4 2 25 
312 -
313 2 2 2 6 
314 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 
315 2 2 
June 316 -
1978 317 2 1 3 54 
318 2 1 1 2 6 
319 -
320 -
321 1 1 
Other action 4 13 2 3 2 24 
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APPENDIX m 
Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd Februa.ry 1963 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th N'ovember 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th Oot.ober 1975 
11th-12th May 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-10th May 1977 
3th-4th November 1977 
31st May-1st June 1978 
3rd November 1978 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
Bonn - Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of 
HeBBe) 
Paris - Cergy fPontoise 
Rome 
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The Assembly, 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 312 to 321 
RECOMMENDATION 312 1 
on strategic mobility 2 
16th November 1978 
Noting the great increase in the strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in 
the last decade ; 
Stressing the need for the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance on routine NATO .missions to 
be able to move freely throughout the area of the Alliance, but noting that a.s yet not all members 
offer sufficiently convenient arrangements ; 
Noting the significance for strategic mobility of decisions to be taken a.t the Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
1. Through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council to call on all countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance : 
(a) to offer mutual overflight and staging rights for military transport and combat aircraft on 
exclusively routine NATO missions or agreed exercises, subject only to normal notice 
through air traffic control or military channels ; 
(b) to permit routine port visits by warships of countries of the Alliance on normal NATO 
tasks a.t not more than two weeks' notice through military channels, and to waive charges 
on a.n agreed uniform basis, or consider multilateral funding; 
2. Through their representative> at the Conference on the La.w of the Sea to call for: 
(a) the high seas status, or a status no more restrictive for the operation of warships and 
military aircraft, of all waters beyond the territorial sea of a. maximum breadth of twelve 
miles to be maintained ; 
(b) the right of transit passage, as now defined in the informal composite negotiating text, 
through all straits linking two parts of the high seas as defined in paragraph 2 (a) above, 
to permit the overflight of aircraft and passage of warships, including the submerged pas-
sage of submarines, in normal operational mode. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(1st Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 758). 
191 
DOCUMENT 792 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
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I. The Council have considered the points raised in Recommendation 312 on strategic mobility which 
they have noted with interest. 
2. The procedures relating to overfiight and staging rights for aircraft and staging rights for ships 
are laid down in a series of agreements between allied countries. There would appear to be no need to 
change these arrangements which are in the main satisfactory. 
3. The Council welcome the call for the maintenance of the high seas status of all waters beyond a 
territorial sea limited to a maximum of twelve miles except insofar as they are affected by national 
jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf resources. This is an important 
issue alre!¥Iy widely appreciated and supported by the governments of the union. The Council believe 
that the present United Nations Law of the Sea Conference negotiating text protects this residual high 
seas status of waters beyond the territorial sea. 
4. The Council welcome the call to support at UNLOSC the concept of transit passage as now defined 
in the informal composite negotiating text, through straits which are used for international navigation 
which would permit the unannounced overfiight of aircraft, the passage of warships and the submerged 
passage of submarines. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 313 1 
on security in the Mediterranean 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling at the present time of economic difficulties that security will always be a condition of the 
political freedoms and economic well-being of the allied countries, and that accordingly an adequate defence 
effort must be maintained ; 
(ii) Believing that the Soviet Union through its continued quest for military bases in the Mediterranean, 
its interventionist policy in Africa and its reiteration of the dangerously ambiguous "Brezhnev doctrine" 
presents the greatest military threat in the region ; 
(iii) Aware that one of the greatest risks of major conflict through miscalculation arises in the Mediter-
ranean area. where the opposing interests of East and West merge with those of North and South; 
(iv) Believing therefore that every effort should be made through diplomatic channels to foster: a set-
tlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the differences between allied countries in the area ; the con-
tinued independence and integrity of Yugoslavia and the continued denial of military bases to forces of 
the Soviet Union ; 
(v) Believing that NATO provides for the foreseeable future the principal credible basis for the security 
of its members in the Mediterranean area and that its effectiveness depends on the full support and parti-
cipation of all member countries ; 
(vi) Believing in particular that the full and equal participation in NATO of both Greece and Turkey 
is vital to the security of each and to that of the Alliance as a whole ; 
(vii) Reiterating its view that security in the Mediterranean would be greatly enhanced by the accession 
of a democratic Spain to NATO, but stressing that such a decision is for a parliamentary majority in that 
country after the adoption of the new constitution ; 
(viii) Aware of the many conflicting considerations that must be reconciled in any policy on arms supply 
to non-NATO countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS 
Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view: 
I. To strengthen the collective position of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean: 
(a) by the more public identification of all member countries with NATO arrangements in the area.; 
(b) through the participation of forces of as many member countries as possible in exercices and 
contingency planning ; 
(c) by adjusting NATO command arrangements to reflect the reality of national contributions to 
NATO in the Mediterranean area; 
(d) by taking full account of the respective special requirements of Greece, Portugal and Turkey 
for the supply of necessary defence equipment and assistance, and by calling on the United States 
to eliminate its discrimination against Turkey ; 
(e) by considering what joint armaments production projects can usefully be established in Greece 
and Turkey in the NATO framework ; 
2. (a) To encourage Greece and Turkey to continue negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral 
differences ; 
(b) To urge the two ·Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations in the presence of the 
United Nations Secretary-General without further delay; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting). 
2. Expla.natory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Grant on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 776). 
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3. To arrange closer links between the integrated military structure of NATO and the Spanish armed 
forces, and their participation in NATO exercises, while leaving a. decision on the acceBBion of Spain to 
NATO to democratic discUBBion in the Spanish parliament; 
4. To ensure that non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean continue to see their interests best served 
by denying base rights or facilities to the Soviet armed forces ; 
5. To proclaim the unequivocal support of the West for the independence, territorial integrity and 
unity of Yugoslavia. and its continued non-aligned status; 
6. To ensure that all aspects of policy on arms exports by NATO countries to any non-NATO country 
are fully reviewed in the appropriate allied forum. 
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1. The Council welcome the call for more public support, by member countries participating in the 
integrated military structure, for the arrangements made in the Mediterranean, and to ensure their 
participation in exercises and contingency planning. Of the non-Mediterranean members of the union 
the United Kingdom contributes from time to time a ship to the naval on-call force in the Mediterranean, 
and all three United Kingdom services participate in exercises in the area. Furthermore the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands regularly participate in naval exercises in the Mediterranean. 
It should also be pointed out that ACE mobile force, which includes troops from several non-Mediterranean 
nations, regularly participates in exercises planned for the area.. NATO make a point of drawing public 
attention to these exercises through the media. It is also significant that France has in recent years 
strengthened her naval forces in the Mediterranean. 
2. It is the Council's view that command arrangements are primarily a matter for NATO. 
3. Member states participate in the efforts of the Alliance to help Greece, Portugal and Turkey and 
indeed all allies to meet their legitimate defence needs. 
4. The Council invite member nations to consider carefully what could usefully be done to develop 
co-operation with Greece and Turkey in specific areas of defence industry and individual projects. 
5. The member countries of the Alliance have consistently encouraged Greece and Turkey to continue 
negotiations to settle their remaining bilateral differences. 
They likewise urge the two Cypriot communities to resume their direct negotiations. 
6. The Council believe that expansion of Soviet forces in the Mediterranean or the establishment of 
new facilities for them in that area. would not be in the interests of peace generally. 
7. The Council support unequivocally the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugosla.via. 
and its continued non-aligned status. 
8. The Council attach importance to the use of the consultative Co-ordinating Committee for reviewing 
certain aspects of policy on arms exports to certain countries outside the Alliance. Full harmonisation 
of policy, however, is not always within reach given the national interests involved. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 314 1 
on international terrorism 8 
The Assembly, 
Considering the use of terrorist methods by organisations of any denomination to be a challenge 
to the practice of democracy by Western European countries and ~able to jeopardise their security; 
Considering that the growth of modern technology makes the more inClustrialised countries particularly 
vulnerable to terrorist organisations; 
Noting that the framework of terrorist action has widened beyond national frontiers; 
Considering therefore that terrorism constitutes a problem which can be tackled also in an inter-
national framework, as the Council of Europe did in preparing a European convention covering the matters 
within its competence ; 
Deploring the fact that certain sovereign states have on a number of occasions granted passive and 
even sometimes active assistance to terrorist operations ; 
Noting that these movements have become particularly active since 1970, compelling some govern-
ments of member countries to make large-scale increases in their internal defence and police forces ; 
Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council specific responsibility with regard to 
the fight against terrorism ; 
Welcoming the fact that the Council, in 1970 and subsequent years, took the initiative of exercising 
its responsibilities with regard to the fight against piracy in the air and the protection of diplomats, 
REOO:M:MENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
I. Promote the ratification by the member states of WEU of the convention on terrorism drawn up 
by the Council of Europe and already signed by the member governments ; 
2. Examine, when approving the tables submitted by member countries on their internal defence and 
police forces, the reasons justifying variations in these tables ; 
3. Seek thereby to co-ordinate the conditions in which such forces may be used to combat terrorism ; 
4. Encourage political consultations between its members towards finding international solutions to 
problems liable to provoke terrorist activities; 
5. Study the means by which Western Europe can effectively dissuade any state from granting assis-
tance to terrorists through asylum or otherwise ; 
6. Ask member governments to demonstrate their solidarity towards terrorist threats by applying 
strictly all agreed measures; 
7. Report to the Assembly by appropriate means on the measures it has taken to meet the challenge 
of international terrorism. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting). 
2. Expla.na.tary Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Milller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Docu-
ment 771). 
196 
DOCUMENT 792 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 314 
I. The Council have followed the drawing-up and noted the signing, on 27th January 1977, of the 
European Convention on the suppression of terrorism and stress the fact that the convention came into 
force on 4th August 1978. 
2. When the Council examine the reports received from member countries on the organisation of 
their internal defence and police forces, they will also take account of the reasons given in support of 
the modifications introduced. 
3. The Council believe it is proper to contribute to the co-ordination of police and security forces for 
the fight against international terrorism. 
4. The Council are not unaware that, within the framework of European political co-operation, the 
member states of the European Communities discuss in depth the problems raised by the suppression 
of terrorism. The Council do not feel that they should initiate any special. activity in WEU which might 
duplicate this work. 
5. Reference is also made to the declaration on the hijacking of aircraft adopted at the economic 
summit in Bonn on 16th and 17th July 1978. The Council will watch subsequent developments in this 
field. 
6-7. The Council feel that the governments of member states, in their fight against terrorism, have 
so far made all the joint efforts it was possible for them to make. These efforts will be continued in 
the light of future developments. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th November 1978. 
197 
7* 
DOCUMENT 792 
RECOMMENDATION 315 1 
on China and European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting China's continuing determ.ina.tion to safeguard its own security and ensure respect for its 
fully independent nationhood and its frontiers ; 
Considering that total resistance to external aggression from any source is a fundamental element 
in Chinese political thinking as it is in Western Europe ; 
Welcoming and reciprocating the Chinese Government's continuing efforts to develop good relations 
with Europe ; · 
Considering that China. is now a significant factor in the maintenance of global peace and security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
I. Examine attentively the r6le China. may play in regard to European and global security and study 
carefully the views expressed by the Chinese Government on matters relating to threats to international 
peace; 
2. Encourage member governments both to develop their bilateral trade relations with China and 
continue to concert their approach especially within the framework of the EEC with a view to increasing 
trade between Europe and China ; 
3. Favourably consider China's requests for increased industrial technology. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Sir Frederio Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee (Document 770). 
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The Council, having noted Assembly Recommendation 315, wish to make it c1ea.r tha.t the govern-
ments of the member states remain willing to develop and strengthen both their political and their 
economic relations with China.. They will continue their efforts to deepen their political dialogue with 
tha.t country since they consider that no-one can be unaware of the impact of measures taken by such 
an important country and since the solution of a. number of problems faced by the international com-
munity cannot be usefully sought and effectively ensured without China's being associated in it. Further-
more, these same governments will continue to give due attention to the strengthening of economic and 
technical relations, since the existence of a. stable and confident China. seems to them likely to be a. 
propitious factor for the maintenance of stability in the world. 
The Council are convinced tha.t the policy thus defined, which can and must be followed with a. 
view to improving the chances of world-wide detente, will be a. positive contribution to peace and will 
benefit the security of the whole international community. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 316 1 
on United States-Eu.ropean co-operation and competition in advanced technology 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that, notwithstanding the mutual European-United States interest in a common 
defence system, $10-15 billion is wasted each year on complicated military equipment either already 
produced or in service on this or the other side of the Atlantic ; 
Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology projects is a neces-
sity if the free world is to strengthen its posture vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc; 
Noting the need expressed in industrial circles for more transatlantic co-operation to strengthen 
the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Considering that existing organisations can adequately and actively promote the necessary co-
operation; 
Aware of the strong influence the adoption of an American national energy plan will have on 
Europe's possibilities as regards oil and gas supplies and the dangers which will arise if the oil-
producing nations are unable to meet world demand in 1985 by as much as 20%; 
Aware that several member countries and the United States are independently developing new 
methods for the gasification and liquefaction of coal and that large sums of money are needed to 
promote alternative technologies ; 
Convinced of the need to relay data from European satellites via the new tracking and data. 
relay satellite system TDRSS; 
Considering that member governments should pursue a policy whereby all Europe's space activi-
ties are integrated in ESA and that through ESA they should co-operate with the United States, 
and with NASA in particular, since there will shortly be new space developments in both communi-
cations and energy and both agencies have restricted budgets; 
Considering that the United States Government's new aviation policy and liberal pricing sys-
tem will have far-reaching repercussions for both the airlines and the aircraft industry ; 
Regretting the deplorably slow rate of progress in the Law of the Sea Conference now in its 
seventh session ; 
Noting that : 
(a} marine scientists in the United States and elsewhere are inhibited by the 200-mile limit of 
the economic zone following the Law of the Sea Conference in their fundamental and 
applied research on mineral and organic resources of the oceans, and on energy which might 
be derived from tapping the natural flows of tides, waves and currents; 
(b) fish supplies in the Mediterranean and oceans can be enhanced by the addition of organic 
wastes; 
(c) measures to conserve or destroy certain species of sea fauna can disturb the balance of 
nature and cause a. chain reaction of effects upon other species, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
A. To establish a high-level European-United States committee to promote European-United States 
co-operation in advanced technology projects in which the EEC would also participate on the Euro-
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: !100 the Report tabled by MM. Konings, Treu, Dr. Phipps and Mr. Jessel on 
behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 773). 
200 
DOCUMENT 792 
pean side, this high-level committee meeting at least onoo a year and submitting proposals to the 
governments concerned on : 
(a) how to implement the two-way street policy in respect of advanced military equipment in 
order to make more efficient use of Alliance resources ; 
(b) how to promote this policy at an early stage in research and development of new advanced 
weapon systems; 
(c) how to include military satellites and other military communications equipment in this co-
operation whenever possible ; 
(cl) how to work together in research and development of alternative technologies such as gasi-
fication and liquefaction of coal, solar energy and other new sources of energy and how 
to improve the productivity of certain nuclear reactors ; 
(e) how to co-operate in civil and military oceanographic activities, especially in seabed mining 
and the sharing of data on fish conservation, and promote the successful conclusion of the 
La.w of the Sea Conference ; 
B. I. To initiate urgent consideration by the United Nations as to means by which fundamental and 
applied ocean research can continue without restraint whilst providing for the mineral and other 
rights of each coastal state by sharing and publishing the results of research ; 
2. To adopt national fisheries and conservation policies which reflect scientific knowledge in res-
pect of: 
(i) the interrelationships between each species and its prey (e.g. porpoises and tuna); 
(ii) the effect upon fish stocks of organic wastes which when sufficiently diluted are generally 
beneficial and inorganic wastes which are generally detrimental ; 
C. To adopt a common policy in the EEC framework vis-a-vis the new United States aviation 
policy and not act in a dispersed manner with regard to the new aviation agreements now suggested 
by the United States ; 
D. I. To instruct ESA to study the possibilities either of participating m the United States tracking 
and data relay satellite system and building the required European ground station or of building its 
own TDRS system ; 
2. To draw up guidelines for working with the United States authorities on the development of 
the space shuttle transportation system, with special reference to communications and solar power 
satellites; 
3. To participate in more of NASA's scientific space projects through ESA. 
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I. The Council feel that they should draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that the Atlantic 
Alliance is concerned with United Sta.tes-European co-operation and co-ordination in advanced techno-
logy and that in particular the long-term defence programme drawn up by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation meets the points raised in Section A of Recommendation 316. 
A (a) Since work began on drawing up this programme, the United States has confirmed its acceptance 
of the principle of a. more equitable balance in trade in advanced military equipment. Moreover, the 
aim of this programme is to achieve rationalisation and increased military efficiency through greater 
standardisation and interoperability. 
A (b) The programme stresses the need to improve the NATO forces' means of defence in a. number of 
fields, more especially the following: anti-armour units, modern air-to-surface weapons and defence 
against chemical weapons. The next generation of anti-armour weapons might be developed through 
inter-allied co-operation or co-ordination. Moreover, the programme provides for the development of 
common families of air-to-surface weapons. 
The allies have also recognised the need for the mutual transfer of technology where this will 
help to increase the standardisation and interopera.bility of NATO defence equipment. 
A (c) In the field of telecommunications, command and control, the programme provides for certain 
measures designed to increase the overall facilities of the Alliance, which are essential to political consul-
tation in times of crisis, and make it possible to assume political authority over the forces through the 
high degree of interoperability in the field of tactical telecommunications which the programme will 
bring about. Co-operation and co-ordination will be directed to naval telecommunications, the interoper-
a.bility of tactical networks, single-channel radio access, inter-linking of NATO and national sectors, 
automatic strategic data-handling and improvements to war headquarters. 
In the light of all these facts, the establishment of a United States-Europe committee, as recom-
mended by the Assembly, does not seem necessary because it might duplicate the work of the existing 
Atlantic Alliance bodies. It should further be pointed out that the independent European programme 
group (IEPG) is studying the aspects of Atlantic relations mentioned by the Assembly. 
A (d) With regard to collaboration in research and development of alternative technologies, such as 
gasification and liquefaction of coal, a. high degree of German-Belgian co-operation already exists in this 
field and is developing very satisfactorily. A procedure for obtaining support from the European Com-
munity has been set in motion. France is considering the possibility of joining in this agreement. Co-oper-
ation with the United States in this field has come up against technical difficulties arising from the differ-
ence in the depth of the coal seams. 
The member countries which participate in the IEA attach great importance to the activities of 
that organisation with regard to research and development of other new sources of energy. The European 
Communities take part in this work. 
In the nuclear field, collaboration between Europe and the United States takes place essentially 
within the framework of Euratom [United States co-operation. 
A (e) The member states of WEU cannot but encourage collaboration in the field of oceanographic activ-
ities, especially in sea.bed mining and the sharing of data on fish conservation. To this end, they are doing 
their utmost to ensure that the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. shall come to a. 
successful conclusion. 
B. I. The current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference include discussion of a regime to govern 
scientific oceanographic research. Efforts have been made in the negotiations to achieve an acceptable 
balance between the wish of coastal states to regulate and conduct marine scientific research and the 
need for researching states to proceed as freely as possible with scientific research to increase scientific 
knowledge of the marine environment. Although the negotiations have not yet been completed, it is 
hoped that the eventual regime will protect the interests of both coastal and researching states. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th November 1978. 
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2. With regard to fishing zones and the protection of fish species, this is dealt with in the EEC, 
where full account is taken of the special scientific knowledge provided by each member state regarding 
its own areas and the corresponding marine flora. 
In addition, studies are at present being made at UNEP on the effects of organic and non-organic 
wastes on fish stocks. 
C. The European civil aviation authorities are endeavouring to co-ordinate their attitude towards 
questions of international civil aviation within the framework of the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) to which all EEC countries belong. These efforts to co-ordinate apply in particular to north 
Atlantic air traffic. 
D. 1. The European Space Agency has undertaken the Earthnet programme which is designed to set 
up a European network of receiving, processing and distributing stations for data and images trans-
mitted by all tracking satellites. The network has stations in France (Lannion), Italy (Fucino ), the United 
Kingdom (Oakhanger) and Sweden (Kiruna). In connection with the Earthnet programme, agreements 
have been concluded with NASA. The ESA is examining the need for European tracking satellites. 
2. The possibility that European countries might work with the United States in the field of space 
transport, telecommunications and solar power satellites is basically governed by the manner in which 
NASA's programmes are run. However, a. useful starting point exists in the current co-operation between 
the ESA and the United States Space Agency for the construction of Spacelab, which is to be put in 
orbit by the space shuttle. 
3. ESA also co-operates with NASA in implementing its scientific programme. In this context, it may 
be noted that ESA has outlined a. programme to use the space available in the Spa.celab laboratory for 
scientific experiments. 
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The .Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 317 1 
on application satellites 11 
Welcoming the Council's statement that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aeronau-
tical, space and energy policies and that European industry's capacity and technical level should be 
maintained ; 
Considering that the ESA convention was signed on 30th Ma.y 1975 but that of the original 
ten members of the former ESRO only the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Sweden 
and Switzerland have ratified it ; 
Regretting the unwillingness of several member countries' governments to adopt and finance an 
extended overall communications satellite programme as well as the Ariane launcher programme ; 
Aware of the need to enable the European aerospace industry to supply a satisfactory share 
of satellite systems intended for European countries, international organisations and domestic and 
regional systems in third world countries ; 
Noting the lack of a long-range European meteorological satellite programme and an earth 
resources programme apart from ESA's earthnet programme ; 
Considering that, although some member countries support their military forces, or realise the 
need to do so, through military application satellites, there are no plans for a proper European pro-
gramme to terminate Europe's total dependence on United States satellites in spite of the fact that 
many European satellites are, technically speaking, on a par with American satellites ; 
Considering further that the European aerospace industry should be given a fair share of 
orders for military application satellites from NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Urge the governments of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to acceler-
ate ratification of the ESA convention and address a similar request to the Spanish Government ; 
II. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appro-
priate steps to assure a substantive European presence in the exploitation of space and in particular : 
(a) to adopt a three-year ceiling for compulsory expenditure; 
(b) to adopt and finance an extended overall communications satellite programme; 
(c) to decide on the production of a. first series of five Aria.ne launchers; 
(d) to make sure that Europe will be aBBOciated with future development of the United States space 
transport system as it has been &BBOciated with its present development in financing the 
spacelab; 
(e) to ensure the pursuit and development of European activities in earth observation includ-
ing meteorology and remote sensing by satellites ; 
(/) to promote the Europeanisa.tion of the French project Spot (satellite probatoire d'observation 
de la terre) ; 
(g) to offer European industry a. fair share of NATO orders for military applica.tion satellites, 
with a view to further strengthening Europe's industrial potential in aerospace matters and, in the 
· light of the early prospect of world markets being opened, thus promoting Europe's position in appli-
cation satellites which is of major importance for employment in this industry. 
1. Adopted by the .Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordina.ry Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Soheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
. Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 766). 
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The United Kingdom ratified the convention in March 1978 and Belgium in October 1978. 
The ratification process is following its normal course in member countries where it has not yet been 
completed and there is reason to believe that these ratifica.tions will be forthcoming within a rea,. 
sonable time. 
The overall telecommunications satellite programme and the production of a promotional series 
of five Aria.ne launchers have already been agreed upon by the representatives of the countries repre-
sented in the European Space Agency. 
The French earth observation satellite project (SPOT) was submitted to each of the member 
states of the European Space Agency within the time limit and in accordance with the procedures 
laid down by the ESA Convention. Although member states had the opportunity to participate in 
this new project, it emerged, in the course of debates in the Council of the Agency, that only one 
of them wished to do so. The French Government therefore decided to carry out SPOT as a natio-
nal project, and France has stated that she would be prepared, if requested by the states concerned 
which are members of the European Space Agency, to permit, when the time comes, the use of the 
SPOT platform for future European missions. 
In this context it should be mentioned that ESA member states are considering a programme 
for an ESA earth observation satellite to be launched by 1985. 
During the 1977-81 period, two programmes (Aria.ne and Spacelab), of a size never before 
achieved in Europe, are due to be completed and a number of geostationary satellites (OTS, ECS, 
METEOSAT, MAROTS) have been or are to be launched. The success of these programmes will, 
from 1981 onwards, open for Europe the age of operational application satellites, especiaJly in the 
communications field. 
Member countries have noted the Assembly's interest in the pursuit of E~opean activities in 
earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites. 
Furthermore the Council recognise the need for European industry to receive a fair share of 
orders in connection with military application satellites. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th November 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 318 1 
on European security and African problems 1 
The .Assembly, 
Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the African countries is essential to 
the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of .Africa ; 
Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by African states to settle problems between 
themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Africa. ; 
Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or 
pretext for external intervention ; 
Considering that rtlspect for the sovereignty of African states remains & basic goal of any European 
policy; 
Regretting that the political framework inherited from the colonial period is ill-adapted to ethnic, 
linguistic and religious realities ; 
Considering that Europe should contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development 
of Africa; 
Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms by some African governments ; 
Condemning the policy of apartheid pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the 
principles of democracy and human rights on which western civilisation is based ; 
Welcoming the effort made by several African states to form a force with a view to maintaining 
peace on the African continent and defending it against any interference from outside ; 
Encouraging the member countries to pursue the efforts made in Paris on 5th June 1978 by five 
western powers and in Copenhagen on 12th June by the members of the European Community to concert 
their African policies, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with 
a view to co-ordinating their African policies ; 
2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members to aBBist in establishing peace and security in southern .Africa 
in order to establish a just and democratic transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, induce the South 
African Republic to terminate apartheid and promote the independence of Namibia; 
3. Initiate steps to reduce the present level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ; 
4. Study means of achieving a strict limitation of such sales, including enforcement of the embargo 
on arms supplies to the South African Republic ; 
5. Approach other arms suppliers with & view to their participating in this undertaking ; 
6. Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa. and Rhodesia which 
might render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment in that they strengthen the 
industrial potential of these countries ; 
7. Relate the economic aBSistance extended by European countries to the African states to the 
development of human rights in those countries ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: aee the Report tabled by Mr. Miiller on behalf of the General Aft'airs Committee 
(Document 772). 
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8. Promote through co-operation with African sta.tes their economic and social development, as well 
as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights ; 
9. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa. as defined in the Lome 
Convention ; 
10. Condemn the repeated military operations across the borders of Zaire, South Africa and Rhodesia; 
11. Condemn any aggressive military intervention in Africa., particularly the present Cuban operations 
encouraged by the support of the Soviet Union ; 
12. Promote the implementation by European firms operating in Africa of the code of conduct adopted 
by the EEC; 
13. Ensure that there are not created on the African continent, through the acts of the Soviet Union 
or its allies, in particular Cuba, military or strategic zones of influence because of the danger of encirclement 
that such situations would present for Europe and the Mediterranean ; 
14. Encourage and provide where requested effective support for the steps taken by several African 
states to combine their efforts with a view to maintaining peace in Africa. and defending the African 
continent against any interference from outside. 
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to Recommendation 318 
1. The member countries of the Council will continue to play a full part in the discussions of African 
topics which take place regularly in European political co-operation, with the aim of co-ordinating the 
African policies of the Nine. 
2. The Council fully support the efforts of the British Government, in co-operation with the United 
States Government, to achieve a genuine transfer of power in Rhodesia through a settlement involving 
all the parties and bringing about a cease-fire, and to call on all the parties to attend, and negotiate cons-
tructively at, an early round-table meeting in order to reach a settlement acceptable to the people of 
Rhodesia as a whole. They also endorse the view recorded by the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in 
Khartoum in July that the choice of leaders in Zimbabwe is up to the people of Zimbabwe. 
The Council share the Assembly's view that apartheid must be terminated in the Republic of 
South Africa. The institutionalised racism in that country is in total contravention of the western concept 
of human rights. 
The Council note the concern expressed by the Assembly to bring about independence for Namibia. 
The Council fully support the proposal drawn up by the five western members of the United Nations 
Security Council for a peaceful settlement in the territory leading to early independence through free 
and fair elections under United Nations supervision. In this connection, the Council welcome the adoption 
by the United Nations Security Council of Resolutions 431 and 435 on 27th July and on 29th September 
respectively. 
3. The Council agree with the Assembly that steps should be taken to halt the build-up of conven-
tional weapons throughout the world, which is creating a very worrying situation. The final document 
of the United Nations special session called for consultations between major arms suppliers and recipient 
nountries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons. It must be borne 
in mind that all states have an inalienable right to security and that there can be no question of imposing 
limitations on buyers in an authoritarian manner. The Council believe a poBBible solution might be to 
approach the problem on a regional basis as suggested by Belgium in the United Nations, through regional 
restraints in the form of agreements or understandings among recipients with which suppliers should be 
associated. In this respect, the arrangements now being considered by certain Latin American countries 
provide a good example which might be productive in Africa, perhaps in an OAU context. 
4. The Council emphasise the determination of the member countries of WEU to fulfil their obliga-
tions under Resolution 418 on South Africa and Resolution 253 on Rhodesia. 
5. As regards the economic aBSistance extended by member states to African states, the Assembly 
will have noted that the statement made by the EEC during the formal opening of renegotiation of the 
Lome Convention on 24th July made clear the very great importance attached by the Community to 
respect for human rights. 
6. The member states have very much in mind the need to maintain as one of the prime objectives 
of their co-operation with African states the promotion wherever pOBBible of the economic and social 
development of those states. 
7. The Community has made very clear in its statement during the formal opening of renegotiation 
on 24th July its intention to maintain its links with the ACP countries party to the Lome Convention, 
and to develop co-operation with those states to the maximum extent poBBible under the successor 
convention. 
8. The Council consider that the military operations referred to in paragraph 10 do not aid the cause 
of peace generally. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th November 1978. 
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9. All countries ha.ve the right to advance their interests by normal diplomatic, economic a.nd political 
means. However, the Council support the position of the OAU in believing tha.t African problems are 
best solved by African states themselves, without external intervention. They would therefore deplore 
the creation of military spheres of influence by foreign powers, which would jeopardise the prospects for 
peace, both in Africa. and in the surrounding areas. In this connection, the Council also welcome the 
improvement in relations between Zaire and Angola.. 
10. The Governments represented in the Council ha.ve undertaken to encourage companies of the Nine 
operating in the Republic of South Africa. to implement the code of conduct. 
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RECOMMENDATION 319 1 
on the poUtical activities of the Council -
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 1 
The Assembly, 
Gratified tha.t in the presentation of its annual report for 1977 the Council has in many res-
pects reverted to the practice it followed prior to 1976; 
Noting with satisfaction tha.t the Council has met most of the commitments made on its 
beha.lf for improving its relations with the Assembly ; 
Regretting tha.t there is still much ambiguity about the nature of the "informal meeting" 
with the General Affairs Committee in November 1977; 
Noting tha.t in several respects the Council falls far short of giving the Assembly sufficient 
information on the political aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty by member 
countries; 
Recalling tha.t the Council's responsibilities are defined in Article VIII of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine regularly, a.t wha.tever level it may be meeting, the questions connected with the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty by other organisations ; 
2. Provide more extensive information on consultations between member countries on matters 
relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
3. Organise a. joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee during the second ha.lf of 1978; 
4. Improve participation by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member countries in plenary 
sessions of the Assembly. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 768). 
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1. The Council will continue to ensure that the modified Brussels Treaty is applied and observed, 
both as part of their own political activities and in connection with consultations held in other frame-
works, particularly within the machinery of European political co-operation and in the North Atlantic 
Council. They fee] bound to observe that, by the frequency and pattern of its work, European political 
co-operation plays an important part in enabling the Nine to reach an agreed view on the most important 
foreign policy issues and to speak with one voice. In directing their own political activities, the Council 
must therefore take account of the results so achieved, believing, as they do, in the need to further 
European cohesion and to avoid aU unnecessary duplication of activity as well as the possible delaying 
effect of differences between a narrower or a. wider framework of European political consultation. 
However, the Council at permanent representative level are still checking regularly that the a.ppli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected. While this duty has not involved active or 
deta.iled considera.tion of issues forming the subject of consultations elsewhere, it nevertheless guarantees 
fulfilment of the responsibilities and undertakings set out in the modified Brussels Treaty. Moreover, the 
Council, meeting a.t ministeria.l level, consider a wide ra.nge of topical problems concerning European 
security and policy. 
2. In this context, the duty which belongs to the Council a.lone of informing the Assembly on all 
a.spects of the applica.tion of the modified Brussels Treaty forms a. major aspect of their political activities. 
The Council therefore intend to meet the Assembly's request for fuller information on consulta.tions 
between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. They 
aim to expand and develop the informa.tion supplied in their replies to recommendations and questions, 
which cover a wide ra.nge of matters rela.ting to European policy, in the a.nnual report, which, as the 
Assembly was able to note, is now becoming fuller and more complete, and in speeches made by the 
Cha.irman-in-Office and Ministers at plenary sessions of the Assembly and informal joint meetings. 
3. On this last point, it should be noted that a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee 
has already been arranged for 3rd November 1978. The Council consider that such political contacts with 
Assembly bodies should remain flexible and open in character, avoiding formal procedures which would 
involve lengthy previous consultations between members. Naturally, even within this informal frame-
work, the remarks of both the Chairman-in-Office and of all other members of the Council take due account, 
through an established practice, of agreed positions and, so far as possible, of the views of other members. 
4. In the same desire to keep the Assembly informed and to participate in its work, the Council will 
encourage as large a ministerial attendance as possible at Assembly sessions. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th October 1978. 
211 
DOCUMENT 792 
RECOMMENDATION 320 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 8 
The Assembly, 
Recalling the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies 
to recommendations ; 
Noting that the annual report of the Council still makes no mention of the level of British 
land forces on the mainland of Europe aBBigned to SACEUR although the basic figures are given in 
the British white paper on defence ; 
Noting that the armaments control provisions of the BruBSels Treaty are incompletely applied ; 
Anxious to maintain and make the best use of the expert knowledge of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and of the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Indicate in future annual reports the number of British land forces stationed on the mainland 
of Europe aBBigned to SACEUR in accordance with the commitment contained in Article VI of Pro-
tocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty; 
2. Set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of intergovernmental defence 
bodies and the ABBembly making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments and its Standing Armaments Committee ; 
3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which 
may not be produced on German territory. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 777). 
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to Recommendation 820 
I. As stated in reply to Recommendation 299, the Council will continue to indicate in future annual 
reports the total number of United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe. With regard to 
the provisions of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, comparison between the 
figures in the report and those in the British white paper on defence is misleading, as the figures are for 
various reasons not comparable. The Council will continue to receive from the British Government additional 
information from which they will satisfy themselves that the approved number of British forces assigned 
to SACEUR on the mainland of Europe is maintained. The Council must repeat that, in view of the 
security requirements of the governments concerned, additional information such as the Assembly has 
requested would not be suitable for inclusion in future annual reports to the Assembly. 
2. The Council cannot accept the suggestion made by the Assembly in point 2 of its recommendation. 
The duties of the ACA are defined explicitly in the limitative enumeration in Article VII of 
Protocol No. IV to the modified Brussels Treaty. This enumeration cannot be changed without amending 
the treaty itself. 
The fundamental character of the ACA, which has a precise mission to carry out in clearly-defined 
security conditions, would be completely changed by the new r6le suggested for it by the Assembly. 
Furthermore, the written material held by the ACA and the SAC relates exclusively to the highly 
technical matters within their particular competence, and the staffs of these two bodies are selected precisely 
for the specialised duties which they have to perform. 
3. Annex Ill to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty can be amended by the Council 
under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down in the treaty itself, in Article 11 of Protocol 
No. Ill. 
H the required conditions were fulfilled, the Council would have recourse to the procedure laid 
down in the treaty. 
4. With reference to the first clause of the preamble to the recommendation, the Council wish to state 
that they request the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information whenever they consider this to 
be necessary and, in particular, when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the 
integrated command structures of NATO. ' 
As regards the third clause of the preamble, which refers to the problem of the fields where the 
Agency is not authorised to exercise its mandate, the Council can do no more than confirm their earlier 
replies and, in particular, point 4 of their reply to Recommendation 284. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th September 1978. 
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RECOMMENDATION 321 1 
on scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
reply to the twenty-third annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Appreciating the continuing dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on Europe's energy 
supplies, European aviation and space questions ; 
Noting with anxiety however the increasing tendency in Europe to side-step the Community 
approach and make bilateral or trilateral arrangements; 
Considering the declaration of the heads of state or of government of the European Commu-
nity at their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978 underlining the urgent need to 
make Western Europe less dependent on imported energy sources and acknowledging that high prior-
ity must be given to large-scale investments in this sector ; 
Agreeing with the Council that there is an urgent need for a common energy policy for West-
ern Europe; 
Regretting that the state of European aviation has not improved since last year and that an 
overall civil and military aeronautical policy has not been formulated ; 
Gratified that member countries' approach to ESA's programmes has been more positive recently ; 
Gratified also at the Council's statement in its annual report that European nuclear fusion 
research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a. technological level compa.rable with tha.t of 
the United Sta.tes and the Soviet Union and that it wishes a European civil and military aeronaut-
ical industry to be developed capable of co-opera.ting, on an equal footing, with the United Sta.tes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Invite member countries : 
1. When defining their industrial policy, to take greater account of security requirements and in 
particular the need to : 
- ensure Europe's energy supplies even in time of crisis; 
- maintain the level of employment which is essential for social peace ; 
- guarantee the competitiveness of European advanced industries by a high level of research 
and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security ; 
2. (a) To continue to strive for a common European energy plan up to 1990; 
(b) To earmark a major part of their budgets for the development of conventional and new 
sources of energy and energy production as well as for energy conservation and environmental fac-
tors; 
II. Invite the Governments of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to seek 
the best means for the firms concerned in their countries to take part in the Airbus programme as 
full partners ; 
III. Invite the governments of the member countries to discuss the communication of 31st May 
last from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers of the EEC 
on concerted action on aircraft programmes so that they may take a decision on this matter at the 
next meeting of the European Council. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1978 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 774). 
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I. I. The member governments of WEU take great account of the need to ensure Europe's energy 
supplies even in times of crisis. Therefore several of them entered into the agreement on an international 
energy programme in 1975. This agreement includes detailed arrangements for sharing available crude 
oil and petroleum products in case of a supply shortfall. On the basis of this agreement, national admin-
istrations are each preparing a detailed programme of measures aimed at restraining demand and allocating 
petroleum products to the different sectors of national economy. This is an essential condition for the 
effective functioning of the lEA mechanism. In this programme special priority should be given to 
continuity in petroleum supplies to vital industries. On the other hand, regulations concerning strategic 
petroleum reserves, which are mainly based on international directives, enlarge the possibility to maintain 
industrial activities. The European Communities too have a. mechanism which aims at limiting energy 
consumption in times of crisis and which offers opportunities to restrain trade in petroleum products 
within the Community should the need arise. 
The policies defined and the considerable efforts made by all governments concerned clearly show 
that they consider maintaining the highest possible level of employment as their paramount task not only 
under conditions of co-operation and mutual understanding, but also in times of crisis. 
Governments do recognise the need to guarantee the competitiveness of advanced industries by 
a. high level of research and investment and thus strengthen the industrial basis of European security. 
By stimulating and supporting financially a number of research and development projects effectuated by 
advanced industries, governments endeavour to reach this aim. 
2. (a) All governments are prepared to work towards a European energy policy and are concerned 
with prospects for 1990 and beyond. This addition is necessary because investments in the energy sector 
have in most oases long leadtimes, which have to be taken into account. Discussions on energy matters 
and the decision-making in this area. are being held in several international fora, such as the International 
Energy Agency and the European Communities. 
(b) All governments concerned consider the development of conventional and new resources of 
energy and energy production and energy conservation of great importance. As the industrialised countries 
are to a large extent dependent on energy imports especially oil imports, it is necessary for them to 
diminish this dependence by developing their own resources, by conservation of energy and by stimulation 
of research, development and demonstration. Although the incentive for energy conservation exists mainly 
at national level, there is a great deal to be achieved through international co-operation and through 
exchange of information and experience. Governments therefore favour an international co-ordinated 
approach. Many governments have already implemented a number of measures to promote energy conser-
vation through good housekeeping and the improvement of efficiency in the use of energy in the industrial, 
transport, building, agriculture and domestic sectors. Several governments have decided to reinforce the 
efforts on research, development and demonstration of new techniques and new forms of energy. In the 
framework of general investment stimulation, special support will become available for industries which 
diminish their dependence on oil or on natural gas either by switching over in particular to coal or by 
achieving greater efficiency. 
II. The governments are prepared to seek and promote the best employment of their respective 
industrial skills and production capacities in order to achieve a. strong and competitive aircraft industry 
in Europe. 
Any high-level political discussion about common civil aviation building programmes based on the 
communication of 31st May last from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of 
Ministers of the European Communities has to await the outcome of discussions between industries and 
governments concerned on co-operation in civil aviation building programmes. Only after these delibera-
tions have produced a result can the Council of Ministers and eventually the European Council successfully 
be seized of the question. 
1. Comm1mica.ted to the Assembly on 16th November 1978. 
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Consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the 
European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU 
DRAFT ORDER 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
The Assembly, 
Considers that it is not expedient to examine a. report on the consequences of the forthcoming 
enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe a.nd for WEU a.t the Second 
Part of its Twenty-Fourth Session. 
1. Adopted in CoJDIDittee by 12 votes to 5 with 0 abstentions. 
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Methods of voting 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Mr. Boz:zi, Rapporteur 
TABIJE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT ORDER 
on methods of voting 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
22nd NovemlJer 1978 
I. The quorum problem from the point of view of the Rules of Procedure 
11. Practical means of ensuring a quorum 
Draft Order 
on methods of voting 
The Assembly, · 
Considering that its decisions caey greater weight if they reflect clearly-stated and widely-
supported political options ; 
Considering consequently that it is necessary to retain a. strict obligation for a. quorum for the 
adoption of the texts listed in Rule 34, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure; 
Considering however that practical steps must be taken to ensure the presence of the required 
number of representatives when votes are taken by roll-call and that the Presidential Committee 
should: 
(a) ask national delegations to ensure that a sufficient number of their members are to be 
present; 
(b) improve the organisation of roll-call votes, inter alia by audio, and if possible visual, 
announcement throughout the premises fifteen minutes beforehand ; 
(c) at the opening of each session, fix the dates and times of votes on texts on the agenda of 
the session ; 
Approving the conclusions of the present report, 
INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE AsSEMBLY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE 
To ensure that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure is applied in full. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman) ; 
MM. Bozzi, Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Borghi 
(Alternate : Treu), Brasseur, Craigen (Alternate : Lord 
Hughea), Mrs. Faccio, MM. Giuat, van Hulst, Jeaael, Konen, 
Lagourgue, Lemaire (Alternate : Peridier), Marqua.rdt, 
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Dr. Phipps (Alternate: McGuire), MM. Pignion, Sehauble, 
Schmidhuber (Alternate : Spies von Biilleaheilm ), Sgherri 
(Alternate: Antoni), Van Aal, Voogd (Alternate: Stoffelen), 
Zebisch (Alternate : SchejJler). 
N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are prin-
ted in italiea. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bo:zzi, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In 1975, the Presidential Committee instruc-
ted the Committee on Rules of Procedure and 
Privileges to study possible means of solving the 
problems arising from the difficulty of obtaining 
a quorum in plenary sitting. 
A report was prepared as a result of this 
study and the Presidential Committtee concluded 
after examining it that it was undesirable to 
modify the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
and that the practical measures suggested in the 
report submitted by Mr. Piket on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
should be adopted. 
For various reasons, .there was no follow-
up to this recommendation. 
There are therefore still ambiguities in the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Rules of 
Procedure relating to the method of voting which 
have sometimes l-ed to incidents when votes were 
taken. In order to endeavour to prevent a 
recurrence of such incidents, the Presidential 
Committee has asked the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges to prepare a further 
report. 
2. Since the remarks made in the previous 
report are still valid and misunderstandings can 
be avoided only by strict application of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly, as advocated by 
yop.r Rapporteur's predecessor, Mr. Piket, the 
report which your Rapporteur has the honour to 
submit for your opinion makes extensive use 
of the text of the report submitted by the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure .to the Presidential 
Committee and essentially approved by the 
latter. 
I. The quorum problem from the point of 
view of the Rules of Procedure 
3. The problem of the quorum varies according 
to the method of voting used : 
(a) In the case of anonymous votes - particul-
arly voting by sitting and standing, which is the 
usual method in the WEU Assembly - no 
reference is made to the quorum when the results 
are announced 1 • The vote is valid regardless of 
the number of voters, with the sole reservation 
1. The number of votes is not announced, the Presi-
dent merely announcing that a text is adopted or not 
adopted. 
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- introduced to avoid surprise votes - that a 
member of the Assembly may always ask the 
President to ascertain whether there is a quorum 
before taking the vote. 
(b) Conversely, the quorum is generally ascer-
tained in votes for which a rollrcall is held, i.e. : 
( i) the votes on the draft reply to the 
annual report and the vote on a draft 
recommendation or opinion as a whole 
(simple majority) ; 
(ii) adoption of an amendment to the Char-
ter or a motion to disagree with the 
annual report of the Council or part 
thereof (absolute majority). 
4. However, the quorum is not evident when 
there is apparent general consensus, i.e. in the 
absence of declared opposition or abstenition, 
because in practice the Assembly then dispenses 
with the roll-call vote in the interests of effi-
ciency, the result being assumed to be unanimous 
and announced as such. This practice has been 
progressively extended. 
5. Thus, in December 1975, the President of 
the Assembly declared a draft recommendation, 
on which a member of the Assembly had 
announced his intention to abstain, to have been 
"adopted unanimously with one abstention". Im-
mediately afterwards, the President considered 
another draft recommendation to have been 
adopted unanimously, the Assembly taking 
formal note of two abstentions, however. One 
representative then pointed out that the vote 
should have been by roll-call unless the Rules of 
Procedure were changed. However, this repre-
sentative did not proceed with his request and 
the President merely acknowledged that such 
procedure amounted to a change in procedure 
hiltherto followed. Folllowing these precedents, 
this method of voting has become current 
practice. 
6. A further step was taken the next year. It 
was in fact accepted that even opposition did 
not need to stand in the way of the application 
of the simplified procedure of "unanimous" 
adoption. However, such practice has sometimes 
led to complaints. 
7. The Assembly has had to recognise that 
this new precedent has led to some uncertainty 
about voting procedure. Some members of the 
Assembly therefore now feel the simplified pro-
cedure to be in order when a vote by rolil-call 
is not specifically requested. But others, refer-
ring to the provisions of the Rules of Proce-
dure, have rightly considered that by announc-
ing their opposition they made a vote by roll-call 
compulsory. This misundeTstanding and uncer-
tainty were at the origin of incidents during ifll.e 
last session: 
8. The Committee therefore considers that 
there should be a return to the originaJl practice, 
i.e. the simplified procedure which makes a roll-
call unnecessary can be followed only if it is 
noted that the Assembly is unanimous. If there 
is the slightest doubt on this subject, normal 
roLl-call procedure must be followed. 
9. Generally speaking, the Committee consi-
dered it politically undesirable to make the obli-
gation for a quorum less of a practical constraint. 
Unlike a national parliament, the WEU Assem-
bly is a purely CO'nsultative body. It has no 
legislative powers and cannot overthrow a 
government. The value of a recommendation 
adopted by the Assembly thus lies in the force 
of the political conviction it expresses and the 
degree and genuineness of the support it recei-
ves. A recommendation adopted by a narrow 
margin and not an effective majority of the 
members of the Assembly would carry little 
weight. Moreover, absenteeism would soon be-
come rife and there would be a risk of the 
Assembly's sessions appearing to be little more 
than social gatherings. 
To postpone a vote for lack of a quorum 
is admittedly tiresome, but by leaving the mat-
ter open it at least has the merit of ensuring 
that the Assembly's pdlitical will is not mis-
represented. If, on the other hand, all votes, even 
without a quorum, were declared vailid, a min-
ority might apparently obtain the rejection of a 
text by surprise when it might have been adopted 
by a large majority had its supporters been more 
watchful and present. 
10. The Committee therefore considered that 
the Assembly should not relax the present requi-
rements of the Rules of Procedure in respect of 
a quorum. All the same, if it is recalled that 
including fu!ll members and substitutes there 
are 178 members, it will be felt that it should 
be possible to achieve the required quorum of 45. 
So, rather than considering how to allow 
the Assembly to vote in spite of absenteeism, 
appropriate practical measures of combating 
absenteeism must be sought. 
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U. Practical means of ensuring a quorum 
11. Each member of the Assembly should be 
aware of his moral obiligation to carry out the 
task for which he was appointed. Chairmen of 
national delegaJtions might ensure that this moral 
obligation is borne in mind whenever necessary 
and moreover respected. Forms sent out by the 
Office of the Clerk asking members if they 
expect to attend a specific meeting should be 
channelled through the Chairmen of delegations, 
who should verify that sufficient members of 
their delegation are to take part. If not, they 
might ask members to make an effort to be 
present. If warned, some members might ende-
avour to free themselves from any other commit-
ments they may have had. 
12. A moraJl obligation may perhaps not be 
respected if there is no provision for appropriate 
sanctions. Suggestions have been made to impose 
financial sanctions and, even more important, to 
terminate the international mandate of parlia-
mentarians who fail to attend the meetings they 
have undertaken to attend. 
13. In point of fact, such specific and severe 
sanctions would be hard to apply because the 
delegations are not politically homogenous and 
the bureaux of the political parties to which 
members belong often have more authority than 
the Chairmen of delegations. However, the list 
of members absent without a valid excuse might 
be communicated to the Chairmen of national 
delegations and also to the Presidents of national 
parliaments, who would pass the list on to the 
Chairmen of the political groups. The authority 
of the Chairmen of delegations would thus be 
strengthened by pressure from the Chairmen 
of politicail: groups on members not carrying out 
~heir mandates. 
14. Since the presence o:f all members is particu-
larly essential when votes are taken, those which 
could not be held :for lack of a quorum might 
be grouped at an appropriate time, i.e. in prac-
tice on the last or penultimate day of the session. 
Discipline should be particularly :firm when 
grouped votes are taken so that sufficient mem-
bers are present. The day and time of grouped 
votes should naturally be announced to members 
before they leave their respective capitals. 
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submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2 
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Draft Resolution 
to amend ~ule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Aaembly 
The Assembly, 
DEOIDES to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly by the addition of a 
paragraph 5 drafted as follows : 
"5. A Substitute who is a Committeee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capa-
city, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he 
shall not be entitled to vote." 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
At the last session, Mr. Reid, responsible 
for presenting the report of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments, raised a point of 
order. He wondered to what extent he was 
entitled to speak considering the fact that he 
was a substitute and the difficulty of determin-
ing which representative's seat he could legiti-
mately occupy. 
Under Rule 7, any representative prevented 
from attending a sitting of the Assembly may 
arrange to be replaced by a substitute. Never-
theless, a substitute attending a sitting may not 
be certain which representative he is replacing, 
I. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman); 
MM. Bozzi, Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Borghi 
(Alternate: Treu}, Brasseur, Craigen (Alternate: Lord 
Hughu), Mrs. Faccio, MM. Giust, van Hulst, Jusel, KO'TUJn, 
Lagourgue, Lemaire (Alternate : Peridier), Marquardt, 
PRINTED IN FRANCE 
as shown by the question raised by Mr. Reid. 
.Again, it would be incorrect to oblige a repre-
sentative to be absent to allow his substitute to 
sit on the Committee bench as Chairman or 
Rapporteur. 
Consideration might therefore be given to 
adding a paragraph 5 to Rule 7 of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly in the same terms 
as Rule 39, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Parliamentary .Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. 
Hence the foregoing draft resolution. 
Dr. Phipps (Alternate: MeGuire), MM. Pignion, Sehiilubk, 
Schmidhuber (Alternate: Spies oon BUUesheim), Sgherri 
(Alternate: Antoni}, Van Aal, Voogd (Alternate: Stoffekn), 
Zebisch (Alternate : Sehef/ler). 
N. B. The namu of those taking part in the vote are prin-
ted in italics. 
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